IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-3) 


4, 


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I.I 


ii21    125 


US 

£    US.    12.0 


6" 


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L25  11114  11.6 


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Photographic 

Sciences 

Corporation 


23  WCST  MAIN  STRICT 

WUSTIR.N.Y.  145M 

(716)872-4503 


CIHM/ICMH 

Microfiche 

Series. 


CIHM/ICIVIH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


Canadian  Inctitute  for  Historical  IMicroraproductions  /  Institut  Canadian  de  microraproductions  historiquaa 


Tachnical  and  Bibliographic  Notaa/Nota*  tachniquaa  at  bibtiographiquas 


1 
t 


Tha  instituta  haa  attamptad  to  obtain  tha  baat 
original  copy  availabia  for  filming.  Faaturaa  of  thia 
copy  which  may  ba  bibliographicaily  uniqua, 
which  may  altar  any  of  tha  imagaa  in  tha 
raproduction.  or  which  may  aignificantly  changa 
tha  uaual  mathod  of  filming,  ara  chackad  balow. 


□   Colourad  covara/ 
Couvartura  da  couiaur 


I     I   Covara  damagad/ 


n 


Couvartura  andommagte 


Covara  raatorad  and/or  laminatad/ 
Couvartura  raataurte  at/ou  palliculte 


I      I   Covar  titia  miaaing/ 


La  titra  da  couvartura  manqua 


I     1   Colourad  mapa/ 


D 


Cartaa  g6ographlquas  bo  couiaur 


Colourad  ink  (i.a.  othar  than  blua  or  black)/ 
Encra  da  couiaur  (i.a.  autra  qua  blaua  ou  noira) 


I     I   Colourad  plataa  and/or  illuatrationa/ 


□ 
□ 


D 


D 


Planchaa  at/ou  illuatrationa  en  couiaur 

Bound  with  othar  matarial/ 
RaliA  avac  d'autraa  documanta 

Tight  binding  may  cauaa  ahadowa  or  diatortion 
along  intarior  margin/ 

Lareliura  aarrie  paut  cauaar  da  I'ombra  ou  da  la 
.  diatortion  la  long  dp  la  marga  IntAriaura 

Blank  laavaa  addad  during  raatoration  may 
appaar  within  tha  taxt.  Whanavar  poaaibla.  thaaa 
hava  baan  omittad  from  filming/ 
II  sa  paut  qua  cartainaa  pagaa  blanchaa  ajoutiaa 
lora  d'una  raatauration  apparaiaaant  dana  la  taxta, 
maia,  loraqua  cala  Atait  poaaibla.  caa  pagaa  n'ont 
paa  AtA  filmtea. 

Additional  commanta:/ 
Commantairaa  aupplimantairaa: 


L'Inatitut  a  microfilm*  la  maillaur  axamplaira 
qu'il  lui  a  it*  poaaibla  da  aa  procurar.  Laa  details 
da  cat  axamplaira  qui  aont  paut-Atra  uniquaa  du 
point  da  vua  bibliographiqua.  qui  pauvant  modif  iar 
una  imaga  raproduita.  ou  qui  pauvant  axigar  una 
modification  dana  la  m6thoda  normala  da  filmaga 
aont  indiqute  ci-daasoua. 


I     I   Colourad  pagaa/ 


s/ 


D 


Pagaa  da  couiaur 

Pagaa  damagad/ 
Pagaa  andommagAaa 

Pagaa  raatorad  and/oi 

Pagaa  raataurias  at/ou  palliculAaa 

Pagaa  discolourad.  atainad  or  foxei 
Pagaa  dicolor^aa,  tachetiaa  ou  piqudes 


I — I   Pagaa  damagad/ 

I      I   Pagaa  raatorad  and/or  laminatad/ 

r~7]    Pagaa  discolourad.  atainad  or  foxed/ 


t 

a 


a 

0 


□   Pagas  datachad/ 
Pagaa  ditachies 


Showthrough/ 
Tranaparanca 


I     I   Quality  of  print  variaa/ 


Quality  inigala  da  I'impraaaion 

Includes  supplamantary  material/ 
Comprand  du  material  supplAmantaira 

Only  edition  available/ 
Seule  Edition  disponible 


1 

V 

d 

b 
ri 
n 
n 


Pagea  wholly  or  partially  obscured  by  errata 
slips,  tissues,  etc..  hava  been  refilmed  to 
ensure  the  best  possible  image/ 
Lea  pagea  totalement  ou  partiallement 
obacurcias  par  un  feuillet  d'arrata,  una  pelure. 
etc.,  ont  M  filmies  i  nouveau  da  fapon  A 
obtenir  la  mailleure  image  possible. 


Thia  item  ia  filmed  at  tha  reduction  ratio  chackad  below/ 

Ca  document  eat  f  ilmi  au  taux  da  reduction  indiquA  ci-dassous. 

10X  14X  18X  22X 


26X 


30X 


y 


12X 


16X 


»X 


24X 


28X 


32X 


Th«  copy  filmad  h«r«  hat  been  raproduead  thank* 
to  tha  ganaroaity  of: 

Ubrary 

Trmt  Univeraity,  PMarborouflh 

Tha  imagaa  appaaring  hara  ara  tha  baat  quality 
posaibia  conaidaring  tha  condition  and  lagibiiity 
off  tha  originai  copy  and  in  Icaaping  with  tha 
ffilming  contract  apacifficationa. 


Original  coplaa  in  printad  papar  covara  ara  filmad 
baginning  with  tha  front  covar  and  anding  on 
tha  laat  paga  with  a  printad  or  illuatratad  Impraa- 
aion,  or  tha  baeic  covar  whan  appropriata.  All 
othar  originai  copiaa  ara  filmad  baginning  on  tha 
firat  paga  with  a  printad  or  illuatratad  impraa- 
aion.  and  anding  on  tha  laat  paga  with  a  printad 
or  illuatratad  impraaaion. 


Tha  laat  racordad  frama  on  aach  microfleha 
ahail  contain  tha  symbol  — ^>  (moaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  tha  symbol  ▼  (moaning  "END"), 
whichavar  appliaa. 


L'axamplaira  ffilmi  ffut  raproduit  grica  A  la 
gAnAroaiti  da: 

Library 

Trant  Univsnity,  PMsrborough 

Las  imagas  suivantas  ont  «t*  reproduitas  avac  la 
plus  grand  soin.  compta  tanu  da  la  condition  at 
da  la  nattat*  da  l'axamplaira  film*,  at  an 
conformit*  avac  laa  conditions  du  contrat  da 
filmaga. 

Laa  axamplairas  originaux  dont  la  couvartura  an 
papiar  ast  imprimis  sont  filmte  sn  commandant 
par  la  pramiar  plat  at  an  tarminant  soit  par  la 
darnlAra  paga  qui  comporta  una  amprainta 
d'imprassion  ou  d'illustration.  soit  par  la  sacond 
plat,  salon  la  cas.  Tous  las  autras  axamplairas 
originaux  sont  filmis  an  commandant  par  la 
pramlAra  paga  qui  comporta  una  amprainta 
d'imprassion  ou  d'illustration  at  an  tarminant  par 
la  darnidra  paga  qui  comporta  una  talia 
amprainta. 

Un  daa  symbolaa  suivants  apparattra  sur  la 
darnlAra  imaga  da  chaqua  microfiche,  salon  la 
cas:  la  symbola  — ^  signifia  "A  SUIVRE".  la 
symbcle  ▼  signifia  "FIN". 


Maps,  platas,  charts,  ate,  may  ba  filmad  at 
diffarant  reduction  ratios.  Thosa  too  larga  to  ba 
antiraly  included  in  ona  axpoaura  ara  ffllmad 
baginning  in  tha  uppar  lafft  hand  corner,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  fframas  aa 
required.  The  following  diagrams  illustrate  the 
method: 


Les  cartas,  planches,  tableaux,  etc..  peuvent  Atre 
filmAs  A  des  taux  da  reduction  diff6rents. 
Lorsque  le  document  est  trop  grand  pour  Atre 
reproduit  en  un  seul  ciich*,  il  est  film*  A  partir 
da  Tangle  supArieur  gauche,  de  gauche  *  droite. 
et  de  haut  en  bas,  en  prenant  le  nombre 
d'images  nAcessaira.  Las  diagrammes  suivants 
lllustrent  la  mithoda. 


1 

2 

3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

5 


t 


^' 


% 


>£ 


'-i.  7 


*1^ 


\i  'U. 

Ail  Ltl&.v 


KANT 


AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS. 


A] 


KAJSTT 


AND  HIS   ENGLISH    CRITICS. 


A  COaiPASISON  OF 

CRITICAL  AND  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


BT 


JOHN   WATSON,   M.A.,  LL.D., 

PR0?r,S80R  OP  HORAL  TOILOSOPIIT  W  qUIRN'S  CNIVIIBaiTT,  UNUTON,  OAWADA. 


"'•'  -hn.  int.: 

tS'tti--.-  -^  WALPOLE. 

MACMILLAN    AND    CO. 

1881. 


■a© 


J 


^  a.t9&.  V4- 


y 


PREFACE. 


In  this  work  an  attempt  is  made  to  point  out  the 
misconceptions  of  its  real  nature  that  still  prevent 
Kant's  theory  of  knowledge  from  being  estimated 
on  its  merits,  notwithstanding  the  large  amount  of 
light  recently  cast  upon  it,  and  to  show  in  detail 
that  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  raises,  and  partially 
solves,  a  problem  that  English  Empirical  Psychology 
can  hardly  be  said  to  touch.  The  general  point  of 
view  is  similar  to  that  of  Professor  Edward  Caird 
in  his  Critical  Account  of  the  Philosophy  of  Kant — a 
work  without  which  mine  could  not  have  been  written. 
But,  whereas  Mr.  Caird  confines  himself  almost  en- 
tirely to  a  statement  and  critici2i>^  of  Kant  himself, 
I  devote  most  attention  to  the  criticisms,  direct  and 
indirect,  with  which  Kant  has  recently  been  assailed. 
At  the  same  time,  I  have  thought  it  advisable  to 
prepare  the  way  for  a  defence  of  the  Critical  theory 
of  knowledge,  and  for  a  comparison  of  it  with  Em- 
pirical Psychology,  by  a  short  statement  of  its  main 
positions,  as  contained  m  the  Kritik  der  reinen 
Vemunft    and    the    corresponding    sections    of    the 


0 


GG5U, 


vi 


PREFACE. 


Prolegomena^  together  with  the  Metaphysiche  An- 
fangagriinde  der  Naturmssenaclicift.  Those  doctrines 
receive  the  fullest  treatment  which  have  been  the 
object  of  recent  attack,  or  which  have  a  close  bearing 
on  prevalent  modes  of  thought.  To  the  Refutation  of 
Idealism,  the  principles  of  Substance  and  Causality, 
and  the  Metaphysic  of  Nature,  in  its  relations  to 
Mr.  Spencer's  First  Principles,  a  good  deal  of  space 
is  therefore  allotted.  The  negative  side  of  the 
Critique,  setting  forth  the  limitations  of  knowledge, 
is  entered  into  only  so  far  as  seemed  necessary  to 
complete  the  consideration  of  the  positive  side,  and 
to  exhibit  the  divergence  of  the  Critical  distinction 
of  Phenomena  and  Noumena  from  the  Spencerian 
opposition  of  the  Knowable  and  the  Unknowable,  to 
which  it  bears  a  superficial  resemblance.  The  direct 
criticisms  which  I  examine  are  those  of  Mr.  Balfour, 
Mr.  Sidgwick,  and  Dr.  Hutchison  Stirling,  all  of 
which  rest,  as  I  believe,  upon  a  misapprehension 
of  Kant's  theory  of  knowledge,  and  lose  their 
apparent  force  when  that  theory  is  properly  under- 
stood. Minor  objections,  and  objections  such  as  those 
of  Mr.  Shadworth  Hodgson,  which  recognize  the 
essential  distinction  of  Metaphysic  and  Psychology, 
I  have  not  considered.  Nor,  in  examining  recent 
Empirical  Philosophy,  as  the  most  formidable  rival 
of  Critical  Idealism,  have  I  thought  it  necessary  to 
go  beyond  the  typical  systems  of  Mr.  Spencer  and 


PREFACE, 


tU 


the  late  Mr.  Lewes.  By  far  the  larger  part  of  the 
work  is  occupied  with  the  exposition  and  defence 
of  Kant's  system,  and  with  the  contrast  of  Criticism 
and  Empiricism  in  their  fundamental  doctrines.  In 
the  last  two  chapters,  however,  an  attempt  is  made 
to  show  that  while  right  in  principle,  the  theory  of 
knowledge  presented  in  the  Critique  is  not  altogether 
free  from  incoherent  elements  incompatible  with  its 
unity  and  completeness. 

Besides  Mr.  Caird's  Philosophy  of  Kant,  I  am  most 
largely  indebted  to  Professor  Green's  Introduction 
to  the  Works  of  Hume^  and  his  articles  on  Mr.  Spen- 
cer and  Mr.  Lewes  in  the  Contemporary  Review, 
and  to  the  Encyhlopiidie  and  Logih  of  Hegel. 

The  greater  part  of  the  criticism  of  Mr.  Spencer's 
Philosophy  in  the  ninth  and  tenth  chapters  has 
already  appeared  in  the  Journal  of  Speculative  Phil- 
osophy. 


Qdrbn's  Univeroitt, 

Kingston,  Canada. 


CONTENTS. 


OHAFTER  I. 

THE  PROBLEM  AND  METHOD  OF  THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE 
REASON— UK  BALFOUR'S  CRITICISM  OF  THE  TRANSCEN- 
DENTAL METHOD. 

Kant  and  hi*  reoent  oritioa — Ambiguity  in  Mr.  Balfour't  formnUtion  of  the 
Problem  of  Philoaophy— His  miMppreheniion  of  the  "premieee"  of  Kant 
—Object  and  Method  of  the  CWd^tie— Relation  of  Ktrnt  to  Hume—Con* 
trait  of  Criticiem  and  Dogmatiam— Examination  of  Mr.  Balfour'a  Objec- 
tions to  the  Tranacendental  Method,  .  .        Paget  1-33 

CHAPTER  II. 

THE  A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  PERCEPTION-MR.  SIDOWICK'S 
VIEW  OF  THE  REFUTATION  OF  IDEAUSM. 

Fint  question  of  Critical  Philosophy,  How  is  Mathematical  Knowledge  pos- 
sible ?— Mathematical  Judgments  synthetical  a  pHoH— Logical  result  of 
Hume's  mistake  in  supposiag  them  to  be  analytical  a  j>n*oW— DiflSculty  of 
showing  how  Mathematical  Judgments  are  a  priori— Th9  Problem  insol- 
uble by  Dogmatism— Critical  Solution,  forming  the  Transcendental 
Exposition  of  Space  and  Time — Provisional  character  of  the  jEtthetie — 
Metaphysical  Exposition  of  Space  and  Time— Result  of  the  JEUhetie  in 
abolidung  the  Dualism  of  Subject  and  Object— Mr.  Sidgwick's  charge  of 
inconsistency  in  Kant's  two  Refutations  of  Idealism — Examination  of  the 
charge — Harmony  of  the  Prolfgomenn  and  Cfritiqve  on  the  question  of 
Idealism,       ........      34-S9 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  A   PRIORI   CONDITIONS   OF   KNOWLEDGE   IN   OENERAL- 
THE  CATEGORIES  AND  SCHEMATA. 

Second  question  of  Critical  Philosophy,  How  is  a  Science  of  Nature  possible? 
— Failure  of  Dogmatism  to  answer  this  question — Universal  and  Necessary 
Principles  presupposed  in  pure  Physics — Distinction  of  Judgments  of 
Perception  and  Judgments  of  Experience — Illustrations  of  the  Distinction 
—How  are  Judgments  of  Experience  possible  T— Forms  of  Judgment  as 


CONTENTS. 

presapposing  the  Categories— Discovery  of  the  Categories— List  of  Cate- 
gories— Synthesis  as  the  condition  of  Knowledge  of  Objects — Understand* 
ing  as  a  Unity — Empirical  Consciousness  as  implying  Synthetical  Unity  of 
Self  •consciousness — Deduction  of  the  Categories — Limitation  of  Knowledge 
to  Objects  of  Experience — Imagination  as  mediating  between  Under- 
standing  and  Perception — Knowledge  of  Self  as  an  object— Summary  of 
results— Schematism  of  the  Understanding,  .  ,  Paqea  60-91 

CHAPTER  IV. 

RELATIONS  OF  METAPHYSIC  AND  PSYCHOLOGY— EXAMINATION 
OP  G.  H.  LEWES'S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

Relation  of  Recent  Psychology  to  the  Critical  Theory  of  Knowledge -Kant's 
view  of  Psychology — Lewes's  Psychology- His  Theory  not  a  Monism  but 
a  Dualism— Lewes's  view  of  the  relations  of  Psychology  and  Physiology — 
Examination  of  his  view — Lewes's  contrast  of  Observation  and  Introspec- 
tion— Untenableness  of  the  Contrast— Statement  and  Criticism  of  Lewes's 
Psychogenetio  Theory,        ......      92-137 

CHAPTER  V.  .       .  \ 

THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  JUDGMENT-DR.   STIRLING'S  INTER- 

PRETATION. 

Advance  from  Pure  Conceptions  to  Pure  Judgments — Distinction  of  Objects 
and  their  Relations — Contrast  of  Mathematical  and  Dynamical  Principles 
—These  Principles  also  distinguished  as  Constitutive  and  Regulative — 
Dr.  Stirling's  view  of  the  Principles  of  Judgment— Examination  of  his 
view — The  Critique  not  a  Phenomenology — The  Principles  of  Judgment  at 
once  Propositions  and  Law^s — Order  of  Kant's  Exposition,         .      138-168 

CHAPTER  VI. 

PROOF  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  JUDGMENT. 

1.  Axioms  of  Perception — Their  Application— Dr.  Stirling's  misconception  of 
Kant's  Proof — 2.  Anticipations  of  Observation — Their  Application — Rela- 
tions of  Extensive  and  Intensive  Quality — 3.  Analogies  of  Experience — 
(1)  First  Analogy :  Substance— This  Principle  universally  assumed — (2) 
Second  Analogy  :  Causality— (3)  Third  Analogy:  Reciprocity— 4.  Postul- 
ates of  Empirical  Thought,  .  .  .  .  .109-197 

CHAPTER  VII. 

OBJECTIONS  TO  KANT'S  PROOFS  OF  SUBSTANTIALITY  AND 
CAUSALITY  EXAMINED. 

Mr.  Balfour's  Criticism  of  the  First  Analogy  of  Experience — First  objection  : 
Kant  does  not  prove  absolute  Permanence — Mr.  Balfour's  failure  to  dis- 
tinguish Criticism  from  Dogmatism — Second  Objection:    Substance,  as 


—List  of  Cate- 
i— Understand- 
detical  Unity  of 
n  of  Knowledge 
etween  Under- 
st— Summary  of 
Pnf/c8  60-91 


KAMINATION 
>GE. 

jwledge- Kant's 
)t  a  Monism  but 
nd  Physiology— 
a  and  Introspec- 
iicism  of  Lewes's 
.      92-137 


CONTENTS. 


XI 


\ 


IG'S  INTER- 


action  of  Objects 
amical  Principles 
ind  Regulative— 
amination  of  his 
fl  of  Judgment  at 
.      138-168 


either  a  Substratum  or  a  Relation,  cannot  be  perceived — Misconception  of 
the  Critical  iJea  of  Substance — Mr.  Balfour's  Criticism  of  the  Second 
Analogy — First  Objection ;  Kant's  conclusion  that  all  sequences  are  causal 
inconsistent  with  his  assertion  that  the  sequence  of  feelings  is  arbitrary — 
Reply  :  only  real  sequences  or  external  changes  held  to  be  causal — Second 
objection :  Kant  assumes  objectivity  of  sequence — This  objection  confuses 
the  data  assumed  with  the  philosophical  hypothctis  explaining  them — 
Mr.  Caird's  statement  of  the  proof  of  Causality — Dr.  Stirling's  view  of 
that  proof — His  interpretation  wrongly  supposes  Perception  and  Concep- 
tion to  give  different  kinds  of  knowledge,  .        Pagea  198-235 

,^  CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  NATUKE. 

Relation  of  the  Categories  to  External  Nature — 1.  Phoronomy,  the  science  of 
Matter  as  the  Moveable  in  Space — Relative  and  Absolute  Space — Relativ- 
ity of  Motion — Composition  of  Motions,  as  determined  by  the  category  of 
Quantity — 2.  Dynamics,  the  science  of  Matter  as  occupying  space — 
Repulsive  Force  as  essential  to  Matter — Impenetrability — Infinite  Divis- 
ibility of  Matter — Mistake  of  the  Monadists — Matter  not  composed  of  an 
infinite  number  of  simple  parts — Attractive  Force  implied  in  Matter — 
Distinction  of  Repulsion  and  Attraction— Matter  as  subsumed  under  the 
category  of  Quality — 3.  Mechanics,  the  science  of  Matter  as  communicating 
Motion — Quantity  of  Matter  and  Quantity  of  Motion  correlative— Three 
Laws  of  Mechanics — (1)  Quantity  of  Matter  unchangeable— (2)  Changes 
of  Matter  due  to  an  External  Cause — (3)  Equality  of  Action  and  Reaction 
— These  Laws  subsumed  under  the  category  of  Relation — 4.  Phenomenology, 
the  science  of  Matter  as  an  Object — (1)  Relative  lioiion  possible.  Absolute 
Motion  impossible — (2)  Circular  Motion  of  a  Body  actual,  contrary  Motion 
of  space  not-actiial — (3)  Contrary  Motion  of  a  Body  acted  upon  necessary — 
Relation  of  these  Propositions  to  the  category  of  Modality,       .      236-259 


5NT. 

misconception  of 
pplication— Rela- 
s  of  Experience— 
dly  assumed— (2) 
•ocity— 4.  Postul- 
.      1G9-197 


[ALITY  AND 

-First  objection : 
Ir's  failure  to  dis- 
Substance,  as 


CHAPTER  IX. 

COMPARISON  OF  THE  CRITICAL  AND  EMPIRICAL  CONCEPTIONS 

OF  NATURE. 

1.  Kant's  Phoronomy  compared  with  the  third  chapter  of  Spencer's  First 
Principles — The  method  of  Spencer— His  unphilosophical  identification  of 
Seqtiences  and  Co-existences  with  Feelings — Time  and  Space  not  abstrac- 
tions or  derivable  from  Muscular  Feeling — Matter  not  resoluble  into 
Impressions  of  Resistance  and  Muscular  Adjustmrnts — Assumptions 
involved  in  the  derivation  of  Motion  from  Movements  of  the  Organism — 
Force,  the  most  concrete  of  the  Categories  of  Nature— 2.  Indestructibility 
of  Matter  and  Persistence  of  Force — Kant's  First  Law  of  Mechanics  pre- 
supposes Substance— Spencer's  Proofs  of  the  Indestructibility  of  Matter 
inconclusive — Kant's  Second  Law  of  Mechanics  presupposes  Causality — 
Examination  of  Spencer's  views,  that  Force  is  an  Ultimate  Truth,  and  the 
Persistence  of  Forceunprovable—Correlntivity  of  Matter  and  Force,  260-288 


wm 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  DISTINCTION  OF  NOUMENA  AND  PHENOMENA  IN  KANT 

AND  SPENCER. 

Diatinotion  of  Phenomena  and  Nonmena  in  the  uEathetic  and  ^na^^^ic— The 
Noumenon  of  Kant  as  the  Idea  of  a  Limit — Paralogisms  of  Rational 
Psychology— Antinomies  of  Rational  Cosmology— Contrast  of  Kant  and 
Spencer  as  to  the  Relativity  of  Knowledge — Spencer's  confusion  between 
Absolnte  Knowledge  and  Knowledge  of  the  Absolute — His  Absolute  an 
Abstraction — Indefinite  Consciousness  of  the  Absolute  impossible — Ex- 
amination of  Spencer's  opposition  of  Subject  and  Object— His  Proofs  of 
Realism  inconclusive— His  Universal  Postulate  no  Criterion  of  Truth- 
Transfigured  Realism  a  self-contradictory  Theory  —  Imperfection  of 
Spencer's  Conception  of  Mind  as  a  Substratum- Ultimate  Scientific  Ideas 
not  self-contradictory,         .....     Pages  2S9-32S 


CHAPTER  XL 

IMPERFECT  DEVELOPMENT  OP  KANT'S  THEORY  OF 
KNOWLEDGE. 

1.  Contrast  of  the  Manifold  as  given  and  the  Forms  as  originated  untenable — 
2.  Provisional  character  of  the  distinction  of  a  priori  and  a  posteriori 
Knowledge— 3.  Want  of  logical  development  in  Kant's  Theory  of  Know- 
ledge— 4.  Inter-connexion  of  the  Categories  of  Substance,  Cause  and 
Reciprocity — 5.  Imperfection  in  the  opposition  of  Pure  and  Mixed 
Categories,   ........    329-351 

CHAPTER  XII. 

EXAMINATION  OF  KANT'S  DISTINCTION  OP  SENSE, 
IMAGINATION  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 

1.  Examination  of  Kant's  view  of  the  Manifold  of  Sense — Various  meanings  of 
Sensation — Confusion  of  the  Manifold  with  immediate  Feeling— Confusion 
of  it  with  Perception  as  a  stage  of  knowledge — The  Manifold  properly  an 
element  in  Knowledge  and  Existence — 2.  Examination  of  Kant's  view  of 
Space  and  Time — Space  and  Time  not  mere  Forms  of  Perception— They 
are  the  simplest  determinations  of  Knowledge  and  Existence — Source  of 
Kant's  mistake — 3.  Examination  of  Kant's  view  of  Pure  Imagination — 
Confusion  between  Imagination  as  a  phase  of  Knowledge  and  as  an  element 
in  Knowledge — The  Transcendental  Schema  really  expresses  the  relation 
of  the  Elements  of  Knowledge — 4.  Examination  of  Kant's  view  of  Concep- 
tion— Various  meanings  of  Conception— Conception  as  a  phase  of  Knowledge 
— Scientific  Conception  a  unity  of  Analysis  and  Synthesis— False  Contrast 
of  Induction  and  D''duetion — Conceptions  as  the  Product  of  Abstraction — 
Contrastof  Abstract  Conceptions  and  Categories— 5.  Examination  of  Kant's 
view  of  Judgment— His  mistaken  assimilation  of  Analytical  and  Syntheti- 
cal Judgments- 6.  Examination  of  Kant's  view  of  the  Self— The  Noumenal 
Self  an  Abstraction,  ......    352-40? 


// 


KANT 


AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS. 


CHAPTER  I. 


THE  PROBLEM  AND  METHOD  OF  THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE 
REASON. — MR.  BALFOUR'S  CRITICISM  OF  THE  TRANSCEN- 
DENTAL METHOD, 

TT  is  no  longer  possible  for  any  one  but  a  superficial 
reader  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  to  regard 
Kant  as  a  benighted  "a  priori"  philosopher  of  the 
dogmatic  type,  afflicted  with  the  hallucination  that 
the  most  important  part  of  our  knowledge  consists  of 
innate  ideas,  lying  in  the  depths  of  consciousness  and 
capable  of  being  brought  to  the  light  by  pure  intro- 
spection. The  labours  of  recent  commentators  have 
compelled  us  to  see  that  this  short  and  easy  method 
of  disposing  of  the  Critical  Philosophy  is  altogether 
unsatisfactory.  At  the  same  time  I  cannot  help 
thinking  that  much  of  recent  criticism  rather  shows 
the  need  on  the  part  of  the  critics  of  a  closer  acquaint- 
ance with  Kant's  writings  and  mode  of  thought,  than 
calls  for  direct  refutation.  I  am  far  from  saying  that 
Kant  has  produced  a  final  system  of  philosophy, 
admitting  of  no  development,  and  demanding  only  a 
docile  acceptance.  All  that  I  mean  is,  that  along 
with  much  that  is  imperfectly  worked  out,  and 
even  with  some  self-contradiction,  he  has  given  us  a 


2  KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 

philosophy  which  must  be  regarded,  not  as  a  rival  of 
English  psychology,  but  rather  as  above  and  beyond  it. 
I  cannot,  therefore,  accept  so  sweeping  a  condemnation 
of  his  system  and  method  as  that  which  is  contained 
in  the  very  strong  language  of  Dr.  Hutchison  Stirling, 
who  regards  the  system  as  "a  vast  and  prodigious 
failure,"  and  the  method  as  only  "a  laborious,  base- 
less, inapplicable,  futile  superfetation."  So  very  harsh 
a  judgment,  modified  even  as  it  afterwards  is  by 
the  remark  that  ''Kant  nevertheless  abides  always, 
both  the  man  and  the  deed  belonging  to  what  is 
greatest  in  modern  philosophy,"^  seems  to  show  a 
plentiful  lack  of  intellectual  sympathy  on  the  part  of 
the  critic.  In  spite  of  the  minor  contradictions  and 
the  incomplete  development  of  his  theory,  Kant  has 
opened  up  a  "new  way  of  ideas,"  which  should  win 
a  general  assent  the  moment  it  is  seen  as  it  really  is. 
I  propose,  therefore,  to  state  in  my  own  way  the 
main  points  in  his  theory  of  knowledge;  and  as  the 
critical  philosophy  is  most  likely  to  commend  itself  to 
living  thinkers  when  brought  into  connection  with  the 
difficulties  they  feel  in  regard  to  it,  I  shall  interweave 
with  this  statement  a  review  of  recent  criticisms,  and 
an  examination  of  the  empirical  psychology  of  our 
own  day. 

Not  long  ago  Mr.  Balfour  gave  us  a  vigorous  criti- 
cism of  the  general  method  of  Kant,  which,  if  conclusive, 
would  virtually  foreclose  any  more  detailed  inquiry  into 
the  merits  of  the  philosophy  developed  by  its  aid. 
That  method  he  regards  as  radically  unsound,  and  the 
main  propositions  to  which  it  conducts  us  he  therefore 
holds  to  be  unproved  assumptions.  I  am  aware  that 
Mr.  Balfour  directs  his  artillery  rather  against  those 

»  Prinerton  Review,  Jan.  1879,  p.  210. 


(.1 


I.]     CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON—MR.  BALFOUR.     3 

whom  he  calls  Neokantians  or  Transcendentalists  than 
against  Kant  himself.  I  cannot,  of  course,  hold  myself 
responsible  for  the  opinions  of  all  who  may  be  called, 
or  who  may  call  themselves  Transcendentalists;  but  in 
so  far  as  such  writers  as  Mr.  Green  and  Mr.  Caird  are 
concerned,  I  think  I  may  venture  to  say  that,  as  they 
undoubtedly  conceive  of  the  problem  of  philosophy 
very  much  as  Kant  conceived  of  it,  and  seek  to  solve 
it  by  a  method  similar,  if  not  identical,  with  his, 
whatever  applies  to  Transcendentalism  applies  in  all 
essential  respects  to  Critical  Idealism  as  well. 

In  opening  his  battery  against  Transcendentalism, 
Mr.  Balfour  has  occasion  to  state  the  problem  of  phil- 
osophy as  he  understands  it.  But  unfortunately  he 
has  done  so  in  terms  that  are  fatally  ambiguous.  ''The 
usual  way,"  he  says,  "in  which  the  Transcendental 
problem  is  put  is.  How  is  knowledge  possible  ? "  .  .  . 
But  "the  question  should  rather  be  stated,  How  much 
of  what  pretends  to  be  knowledge  must  we  accept  as 
such,  and  why  ?"  .  .  .  Now,  "  if  we  were  simply  to 
glance  at  Transcendental  literature,  and  seize  on  the 
first  apparent  answers,  we  should  be  disposed  to  think 
that  the  philosophers  of  this  school  assume  to  start  with 
the  truth  of  a  large  part  of  what  is  commonly  called 
Science — the  very  thing  which,  according  to  my  view 
of  the  subject,  it  is  the  business  of  philosophy  to  prove." 
.  .  .  Nevertheless  "  Transcendentalism  is  philo- 
sophical, in  the  sense  in  which  I  have  ventured  to  use 
the  term :  it  does  attempt  to  establish  a  creed,  and, 
therefore,  of  necessity  it  indicates  the  nature  of  our 
premises,  and  the  manner  in  which  the  subordinate 
beliefs  may  be  legitimately  derived  from  them."  ^ 

•  Mind,  XII.,  p   481.     The  article  from  which  I  quote  is  reprinted  with 
little  change  in  Mr.  Balfour's  D^/ence  of  Philosoi<hic  Doubt, 


-V 


M 


4  KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 

Now  Kant  would  certainly  have  been  willing  to 
admit  that  the  problem  of  philosophy  might  be  thrown 
into  the  form,  "  How  much  of  what  pretends  to  be 
knowledge  must  we  accept  as  such?"  and  he  would 
also  have  admitted  that  it  is  the  business  of  philosophy 
to  prove  "  what  is  commonly  called  science ; "  but  as 
certainly  he  would  have  insisted  at  the  outset  upon 
defining  more  exactly  what  is  to  be  understood  by 
"knowledge"  and   "science."     For,   manifestly,   Mr. 
Balfour's  words  may  be  taken  in  two  very  difierent 
senses;  they  may  mean  either  (1)  that  philosophy  has 
to  prove  the  truth  of  the  special  facts  of  ordinary 
knowledge  and  the  laws  embodied  in   each  of  the 
special  sciences,  or  (2)  that  philosophy  must  show  from 
the  nature  of  our  knowledge  that  the  facts  of  ordinary 
knowledge  and  the  laws  of  the  special  sciences  rest 
upon  certain  principles  which  make  them  true  univer- 
sally, and  not  merely  for  the  individual.    I  cannot  help 
suspecting,  from  the  general  tenor  of  his  criticism,  that 
Mr.  Balfour  has  allowed  these  very  different  proposi- 
tions to  run  into  one  in  his  mind,  so  that,  having 
shown,  as  he  very  easily  may  do,  that  Kant  does  not 
prove  the  first,  he  rashly  concludes  him  to  have  failed 
in  proving  the  second.     Surely  Mr.  Balfour  does  not 
seek  to  lay  so  heavy  a  burden  on  philosophy  as  is  im- 
plied in  the  demand  that  it  should  prove  the  truth  of  the 
special  facts  of  observation  and  the  special  laws  of  the 
natural  sciences,  or  even  the  generalizations  of  empirical 
psychology.     No  one,  I  should  think,  would  seriously 
ask  a  philosopher  to  prove  it  to  be  a  fact  that  we  have 
experience,  say  of  a  ship  drifting  down  a  stream,  or 
that  the  three  interior  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to 
two  right  angles,  or  that  bodies  attract  each  other  in 
proportion  to  their  mass  and  inversely  as  the  square  of 


1       ni 


I.]     CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON— MR.  BALFOUR.     6 

the  distance.  Manifestly  if  philosophy  is  to  attempt 
a  task  of  this  kind  and  magnitude,  it  must  go  on  for 
ever  without  reaching  any  final  conclusion,  since  the 
special  facts  and  laws  of  nature  are  infinite  in  number. 
Philosophy  has  certainly  to  do  with  the  proof  of  know- 
ledge, but  he  would  be  a  very  foolish  philosopher  who 
should  attempt  to  unite  in  himself  the  functions  dis- 
charged by  all  the  special  sciences.  "The  sceptic," 
says  Mr.  Balfour,  "  need  not  put  forward  any  view  of 
the  origin  of  knowledge."  The  sceptic  is  a  privileged 
person,  and  of  course  need  not  put  forward  any  view 
of  anything ;  but  supposing  him  to  be  reasonable,  he 
will  not  dismiss  without  enquiry  the  view  of  those 
who  hold  that  the  question  as  to  "  the  origin  of  know- 
ledge "  is  the  question  of  philosophy.  The  follower  of 
Kant,  at  any  rate,  must  refuse  to  have  the  formula, 
which  best  expresses  the  problem  of  philosophy  as  he 
understands  it,  replaced  by  the  very  different  formula, 
How  much  of  what  pretends  to  be  knowledge  must  we 
accept  as  such  ?  if  by  this  is  meant.  How  are  we  to 
show  that  this  special  fact  or  law  is  true  \  The  special 
facts  of  ordinary  knowledge  and  the  special  laws  of  the 
natural  sciences,  are  not  propositions  which  the  philoso- 
pher seeks  to  prove,  but  data  which  he  assumes.  Of 
all  our  knowledge  the  conclusions  reached  by  mathe- 
matics and  physics  are  those  which  we  have  least  doubt 
about;  and  hence  I  do  not  understand  how  Mr.  Balfour 
can  object  to  the  philosopher  assuming  to  start  with 
"  the  truth  of  a  large  part  of  what  is  commonly  called 
science."  I  have  no  objection  to  find  with  Mr.  Bal- 
four's assertion,  that  a  philosophy  must  consist  partly 
of  premises  and  partly  of  inferences  from  premises.  I 
should  certainly  prefer  another  mode  of  expression, 
from  the  fact  that  the  process  of  inference,  according 


\  . 


8  KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 

to  the  account  given  of  it  by  formal  logic,  does  not 
allow  of  any  inferences  except  those  which  are  purely 
verbal ;  but  as  Mr.  Balfour  probably  only  means  to  say, 
that  there  are  certain  facts  which  do  not  stand  in  need 
of  proof  by  philosophy,  and  certain  conclusions  which 
it  is  the  business  of  philosophy  to  prove,  I  am  content 
to  accept  his  way  of  stating  the  case.  My  objection 
lies  against  what  he  very  strangely  supposes  to  be  the 
''premises  "  of  transcendental  philosophy.  The  actual 
premises  of  Kant  are  the  special  facts  of  ordinary  ex- 
perience in  the  widest  sense,  and  especially  the  facts  and 
laws  of  the  mathematical  and  physical  sciences.  No 
doubt  the  particular  philosophical  theory  we  adopt  will 
cast  upon  these  a  new  light,  but  it  will  in  no  way  alter 
their  nature  or  validity.  Should  the  Critical  explana- 
tion of  the  essential  nature  of  knowledge  be  accepted,  a 
new  view  of  the  process  by  which  knowledge  has  been 
obtained,  and  therefore  a  new  view  of  the  general 
character  of  the  objects  of  knowledge  will  grow  up, 
but  the  facts  themselves  will  remain  just  as  they  were 
before.  The  philosophical  theory,  that  the  existence 
of  concrete  objects,  apart  from  the  activity  of  intel- 
ligence by  which  they  are  constituted  for  us,  is  an 
absurdity,  does  not  throw  any  doubt  upon  the  scientific 
truth,  that  bodies  are  subject  to  the  law  of  gravitation. 
The  evidence  for  a  scientific  law  is  purely  scientific. 
The  philosopher  who  should  attempt,  from  the  general 
nature  of  knowledge,  to  establish  a  single  individual 
fact,  or  a  single  specific  law  of  nature,  would  justly 
draw  upon  himself  the  censure  of  taking  the  "high 
priori  road"  which  leads  only  to  the  kingdom  of  shadows. 
From  a  general  principle  only  a  general  principle  can  be 
inferred:  the  proof  of  a  special  law  demands  special 
evidence.    If  the  philosopher,  by  a  mere  examination  of 


i 


I.]     CRITIQUE  OF  FURE  REASON—MR.  BALFOUR.    7 


knowledge,  is  able  to  establish  a  single  qualitative  fact, 
why  should  he  not  evolve  a  whole  universe  out  of  his 
individual  consciousness  \  If,  however,  the  sceptic 
is  so  unreasonable  as  to  ask  him  to  prove  the  truth 
of  any  such  fact,  he  will  at  once  transfer  the  re- 
sponsibility to  the  physicist :  all  that  he  pretends  to 
do  is  to  show  that  the  law  is  not  a  mere  fiction  of  the 
individual  mind,  but  can  be  accounted  for  by  the  very 
nature  of  human  intelligence.  On  the  other  hand, 
should  the  philosophical  theory  advanced  be  such  as  to 
reduce  our  knowledge  to  a  mere  series  of  individual 
feelings,  we  shall  of  course  have  to  admit  that  the  facts 
of  individual  consciousness  have  no  universality  or 
necessity;  we  shall,  in  other  words,  be  compelled  to 
say,  that  there  are  no  facts,  in  the  ordinary  sense  of 
the  term,  but  only  supposed  facts,  or,  if  you  will, 
fictions.  It  will  no  longer  be  safe  to  say  that  there 
is  a  real  connection  between  objects,  but  we  may  at 
least  say  that  there  is  for  us  a  connection  betwc ..  what 
we  ordinarily  understand  by  objects.  The  empirical 
philosopher,  with  the  fear  of  Mr.  Mill  before  hiS  eyes, 
may  hesitate  to  say  that  two  and  two  are  four,  but  at 
least  he  will  feel  entitled  to  say  that  two  objects  added 
to  other  two  are  for  us  four. 

It  may  be,  however,  that  Mr.  Balfour  admits  all 
this.  In  that  case  the  problem  of  philosophy  will  be 
for  him,  as  for  Kant,  What  are  the  universal  principles 
which  are  presupposed  in  the  facts  of  our  ordinary  and. 
scientific  knowledge?  But  if  so,  I  must  take  the 
strongest  exception  to  Mr.  Balfour's  way  of  stating  the 
"premises"  of  Kant  and  his  followers.  The  problem 
being  to  show  how  we  may  justify  the  knowledge  we 
all  believe  we  possess,  by  an  exhibition  of  the  nature 
of  our  intelligence  as  manifested  in  actual  knowledge,  it 


^- 


8 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


1; 


is  manifestly  inadequate  and  misleading  to  say,  that 
the  Transcendentalist  begins  by  begging  the  sceptic  to 
admit  "  that  some  knowledge,  though  it  may  only  be  of 
the  facts   of  immediate  perception,   can  be  obtained 
by  experience ;    that  we  know  and  are  certain  of 
something — e.^.,  of  a  coloured  object  or  a  particular 
taste."    The  Transcendentalist,  unless  I  am  altogether 
mistaken,  would  not  state  the  matter  in  that  way  at  all. 
Kant  at  least  would  not  ask  anybody  to  admit  that  he 
has  jvsi  a  little  knowledge ;  much  less  would  he  ask 
him  to  grant  that  he  has  a  consciousness  of  a  coloured 
object  or  of  a  particular  taste.     The  difficulty  is  not  at 
all  a  quantitative  one.     Nothing  is  gained  by  reducing 
the  facts  "  postulated"  to  a  minimum,  so  long  as  the 
sceptic  is  asked  to  admit  a  fact  at  all ;  and  if  he  does 
admit  such  a  fact  as  the  immediate  perception  of  a 
colour  or  a  taste,  why  should  he  refuse  to  grant  the 
carefully  established  laws  of  the  special  sciences  ?     Is 
the  evidence  for  the  consciousness  of  the  laws  of  gravi- 
tation less  cogent  than  the  evidence  that  a  coloured 
object  is  perceived  ?    What  the  sceptic  should  object  to 
is  not  the  mere  number  of  facts  assumed  as  true,  but 
that  any  facts  are  assumed  as  true,  in  the  sense  of  being 
more  than  phenomena  of  the  individual  consciousness.  ; 
What  I  object  to,  the  sceptic  would  say,  is  the  assump- 
tion that  the  particular  facts  and  laws  which  no  doubt 
exist  in  our  consciousness,  are  universally  and  neces- 
sarily true  ;  I  ask  you,  therefore,  to  prove  the  supposed 
absoluteness,  objectivity  or  necessity— ^state  it  as  you 
please — of  these  facts  and  laws.     The  request  is  per- 
fectly reasonable,  and  the  father  of  Transcendentalism 
claims  that  he  has  in  all  essential  respects  resolved  the 
sceptic's  doubt.     It  is  in  the  process  by  which  he  en- 
deavours to  prove  that  there  are  universal  and  necessary 


1.]    CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON— MR.  BALFOUR.    9 

principles  underlying  knowledge  and  making  it  real  or 
objective,  that  Kant  is  led  to  refer  to  such  simple 
experiences  as  the  consciousness  of  a  coloured  object  or 
of  a  particular  taste ;  but  he  does  so,  not  because  he 
has  more  faith  in  such  immediate  feelings  than  in  the 
established  laws  of  science,  but,  on  the  contrary,  because 
he  has  no  faith  in  them  at  all.  The  argument  is  indi- 
rect, and  proceeds  somewhat  in  this  way  :  If  it 
is  to  be  maintained  that  all  external  concrete  objects 
are  without  or  outside  of  consciousness,  an  attempt 
must  be  made  to  account  for  knowledge  from  a  mere 
"  manifold"  or  detached  series  of  impressions — as,  for 
example,  the  impression  of  a  bright  colour  or  a  sweet 
taste  ;  but  from  such  an  attenuated  thread  of  sensation 
no  explanation  of  the  actual  facts  of  our  experience  can 
be  given.  Kant,  in  other  words,  argues  that  we  cannot 
suppose  an  unrelated  feeling  to  be  a  constituent  of 
real  knowledge.  Mr.  Balfour  completely  misses  the 
point  of  the  reasoning,  and  actually  supposes  Kant  to 
be  begging  the  sceptic  to  grant  him  the  fact  of  a  little 
knowledge,  in  order  that  he  may  go  on  to  extract  from 
it  a  great  deal  more. 

Philosophy  presents  itself  to  the  mind  of  Kant  with 
a  certain  antique  largeness  and  nobility  of  conception. 
Psychology,  which  with  us  is  usually  made  to  bear  the 
whole  burden  and  strain  of  philosophical  thought,  he  re- 
gards as  a  special  branch  of  knowledge,  ranking  in  scien- 
tific value  along  with  Chemistry  and  standing  below  those 
sciences  which,  as  admitting  of  mathematical  treatment, 
assume  the  most  precise  and  the  most  systematic  form.^ 
Kant's  impulse  to  philosophize  arises  in  the  first  place 
from  his  interest  in  such  purely  metaphysical  questions 
as  the  existence  and  nature  of  God,  the  freedom  of  the 

'  Metaphysiache  At^angagrUnde  der  Xaturwisienachc^fl,  ed.  Hartoiatein,  1867, 
p.  361. 


10 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS  [chap. 


I 


human  will,  and  the  immortality  of  the  soul.  His 
ultimate  aim  is,  in  the  language  of  Mr.  Lewes,  to  lay 
the  "  foundations  of  a  creed."  But  he  soon  discovers 
that  in  our  common  knowledge,  and  in  the  mathematical 
and  physical  sciences,  certain  principles  are  tacitly 
assumed,  which  are  not  less  metaphysical  than  those 
commonly  bearing  the  name.  We  are  perpetually 
making  use,  for  example,  of  the  law  of  causality,  and 
the  natural  philosopher  assumes  the  truth  of  such 
principles  as  the  indestructibility  of  matter.  Thus  an 
examination  into  the  nature  of  human  knowledge  is 
forced  upon  us,  both  as  a  means  of  determining  the 
limits  of  our  real  knowledge  and  of  justifying,  if  that 
be  possible,  the  universal  and  necessary  principles 
which  are  imbedded  in  ordinary  experience  and  the 
special  sciences.  Until  we  determine  the  essential 
conditions  of  human  knowledge,  it  seems  vain  to  attempt 
the  solution  of  the  more  ambitious  problem  as  to  the 
existence  of  supersensible  realities.  Hence  Kant  seeks, 
by  starting  from  what  every  one  admits,  to  discover 
whether  or  no  those  purely  metaphysical  questions  are 
capable  of  any  solution.  And  it  is  his  special  charge 
against  all  previous  philosophy  that,  from  neglect  of 
this  preliminary  criticism,  it  has  fallen  either  into  a 
dogmatism  that  can  give  no  reason  for  its  existence 
or  into  a  scepticism  that  can  only  be  a  temporary  phase 
of  thought.  His  aim  is  thus  in  one  way  dogmatic,  but 
his  is  a  dogmatism  which  comes  as  the  crowning  result 
of  a  critical  investigation  of  the  nature  of  knowledge, 
which  has  enabled  us  to  distinguish  demonstrable  from 
indemonstrable  or  problematic  assertions.  The  Critique 
of  Pure  Reason  undertakes  the  preliminary  task  of 
determining  what  are  the  ultimate  constituents  of 
knowledge,  and  this  cannot  be  done  without  drawing 


I.J    CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON— MR.  BALFOUR.  11 

in  outline  the  sketch  of  a  true  metaphysic,  the  details 
of  which,  OS  Kant  asserts,  can  easily  be  filled  in  by 
any  one  who  has  firmly  apprehended  its  main  features. 
Hence  wo  are  told  that  "  we  must  have  criticism  com- 
pleted as  a  science  before  we  can  think  of  letting 
metaphysic  appear  on  the  scene.  "^  Metaphysic  is  thus 
compelled  to  undertake  a  kind  of  investigation  which 
is  not  required  in  other  branches  of  our  knowledge. 
Other  sciences  may  properly  occupy  themselves  with 
the  agreeable  task  of  increasing  the  sum  of  knowledge ; 
metaphysic,  before  it  can  make  a  single  dogmatic 
assertion,  must  first  prove  its  right  to  exist.  Failure 
to  apprehend  this  fact  has  led  in  the  past  to  aimless 
wandering  in  the  region  of  mere  conjecture  and  to  the 
continual  alternation  of  over -confident  dogmatism  and 
shallow  scepticism.  The  first  and  most  important  task 
of  philosophy  is  therefore  to  prove  that  there  are 
metaphysical  propositions  implied  in  our  ordinary 
knowledge,  which  can  be  established  upon  a  secure 
foundation,  and,  as  it  turns  out,  that  the  propositions 
ordinarily  known  as  metaphysical  do  not,  at  least  by 
the  theoretical  reason,  admit  of  either  being  proved  or 
disproved.  Thus  the  enquiry  into  the  nature  of  know- 
ledge proves  to  be  at  the  same  time  a  discovery  of  the 
limits  of  knowledge. 

The  first  problem  of  critical  philosophy — one  that  is 
necessarily  bound  up  with  the  second — is,  How  can 
there  be  any  knowledge  of  real  or  objective  existence  ? 
The  question  is  not,  as  Mr.  Green  has  pointed  out,^ 
Is  there  real  knowledge  ?  but.  How  can  there  be  real 
knowledge  ?  It  is  true  that  we  may  accept  the  first 
mode  of  statement  if,  like  Mr.  Balfour,  we  interpret 

'  Pro/ej/omcna,  Mahafiy 'a  translation,  p.  II. 
'^  Contemporary  RevUw,  yixxi.,  \>.  26. 


12 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


it  to  mean,  How  am  I  to  distinguish  real  from  pre- 
tended knowledge  ?  but,  on  Kant's  view,  this  is  only 
another  and  less  definite  way  of  asking  how  knowledge 
is  possible.  For  wecan  separate  re>l  from  apparent 
knowledge  only  by  pointing  out  what  are  the  essential 
conditions  of  there  being  any  real  knowledge  for  us,  and 
this  is  just  another  way  of  asking,  How  is  knowledge 
at  all  possible  ?  By  determining  what  are  the  condi- 
tions of  real  knowledge,  we  at  the  same  time  deter- 
mine indirectly  what  is  not  real  knowledge.  Now,  an 
enquiry  into  the  nature  of  knowledge  must  in  some 
way  comprehend  all  the  facts  that  make  up  the  sum  of 
knowledge,  and  hence,  to  find  the  problem  workable  at 
all,  we  must  get  these  facts  into  a  convenient  and  port- 
able shape.  But  this  has  in  large  measure  been  already 
done  for  us.  Our  common-sense  knowledge  of  the 
world  of  nature  and  the  world  of  mind  has  been  carried 
up  into  a  higher  form  in  the  mathematical  and  physical 
sciences  on  the  one  hand,  and  in  psychology  on  the 
other,  and  from  these  we  may  therefore  start  as  from 
facts  that  every  one  admits.  Thus  the  general  and 
somewhat  indefinite  question.  How  is  knowledge  pos- 
sible ?  breaks  up  into  the  two  closely  connected  ques- 
tions. How  is  mathematical  knowledge  possible?  and 
How  is  scientific  knowledge  possible  ?  We  are  not 
here  concerned  with  the  special  truths  of  mathematics 
or  physics,  or  even  of  psychology,  but  only  with  the 
necessary  conditions  without  which  there  could  be  no 
mathematical  or  physical  or  psychological  knowledge. 
The  special  truths  of  those  sciences  we  assume  to  be 
true  :  they  are  the  facts  from  which  we  start,  not  the 
conclusions  we  desire  to  reach.  Our  object  is  to  dis- 
cover, by  a  consideration  of  the  nature  of  human 
intelligence,  what  are  the  essential  conditions  without 


x 


I.]     CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON— MR.  BALFOUR.    13 


)e  no 
3dge. 
|to  be 
the 
dis- 
iman 
Ihout 


which  there  could   be    no   sciences  of  mathematics, 
physics,  and  psychology. 

As  to   Kant's  method  of  solving  this  problem,  we 
may  say  that,  like  the  scientific  discoverer,  he  sought 
for  a  hypothesis  adequate  to   account  for  the  facts 
in  their  completeness.     The  only  exception  which  can 
properly  be  taken  to  this  way  of  putting  the  matter  is, 
that  it  is  not  so  much  a  statement  of  the  peculiar 
method  of  Kant,  as  of  the  method  by  which  all  know- 
ledge is  advanced.     It  is  rather  a  truism  than  a  truth 
that  the  discoverer  must  cast  about  for  some  hypothesis 
that  shall  harmonize  with  the  facts  he  is  seeking  to 
explain.     The  merit  and  characteristic  difference  of 
Kant's  method  lies,  not  simply  in  setting  up  tentatively 
a  hypothesis  and  testing  it  by  admitted  facts,  but  in 
the  comprehensiveness  with  which  he  has  stated  the 
problem  of  philosophy,  and  in  the  special  solution  he 
proposes      Like  all  discoverers,  he  began  with  certain 
facts  which  he  sought  adequately  to  explain,  and  like 
them  he  was  assisted   in  making  his  discovery  by 
observing  the  failures  of  his  predecessors.  This  accounts 
to  a  great  extent  for  the  peculiarities  of  his  mode  of 
statement.  All  through  the  Critique^  he  combines  with  a 
statement  of  his  own  theory  of  knowledge  a  polemic 
against  the  theories  of  others.    This  union  of  exposition 
and  criticism  makes  it  peculiarly  difficult  to  follow  the 
course  of  his  thought.      In  a  sense,  his  method  is 
dialectical ;  that  is  to  say,  he  brings  forward  certain 
propositions  as  if  they  were  precise  statements  of  his 
own  theory,  when  in  reality  they  are  merely  stages  in 
the  gradual  evolution  of  his  thought.     Thus  he  not 
infrequently  speaks  of  "  sensible  objects,"  or  **  objects 
perceived  by  the  senses,"   as  if  sense  of  itself  were 
an  independent  source  of  knowledge,  instead  of  being 


u 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


merely,  in  the  critical  meaning  of  the  term,  a  logical 
element  in  knowledge.  So  also  he  speaks  of  an  abstract 
conception  and  a  category,  of  an  analytical  judgment 
and  a  synthetical  judgment,  and  of  experience  in  its 
simple  and  its  philosophical  sense,  as  if  each  of  these 
terms  belonged  to  the  same  stage  of  thought.  In  truth 
it  must  be  admitted  that  Kant  was,  to  some  extent  at 
least,  the  victim  of  his  own  mode  of  statement ;  for 
while  he  always  keeps  the  ordinary  conceptions  in 
regard  to  knowledge  distinct  from  the  purely  critical 
formulation  of  it,  it  cannot  be  said  that  he  has  com- 
pletely harmonized  in  his  own  mind  the  two  very 
different  points  of  view. 

The  distinction,  then,  between  the  data  from  which 
he  starts  and  the  philosophical  theory  by  which  he 
endeavours  to  account  for  them,  is  never  absent  from 
Kant's  mind.  It  does  not  seem  to  have  occurred  to 
him  that  any  one  would  refuse  to  admit  that  mathema- 
tics, physics  and  psychology  do  as  a  matter  of  fact 
contain  propositions  that  are  true  within  their  own 
sphere.  Repeatedly  he  states  this  assumption  in  per- 
fectly definite  language.  Mr.  Balfour  himself  quotes 
from  the  Critique  Kant's  remark,  that,  "  as  pure  mathe- 
matics and  pure  natural  science  certainly  exist,  it  may 
with  propriety  be  asked  how  they  are  possible ;  for  that 
they  must  be  possible  is  shown  by  the  fact  of  their 
really  existing."  And  many  other  passages  might  be 
cited  to  the  same  effect.  Thus  he  remarks  in  the 
Prolegomena,  that  pure  mathematics  is  "a  great  and 
well  established  branch  of  knowledge," '  and  again  in 
speaking  of  the  mistake  of  supposing  mathematical 
judgments  to  be  analytical,  he  remarks  that  had  Hume 
but  seen  that  his  onslaught  on  metaphysics  was  virtually 

'Proleg.  tr.  §  G,  p.  41, 


\ 


1.]     CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON— MR.  BALFOUR.  15 


an  attack  on  mathematics  as  well,  "  the  good  company 
into  which  metaphysic  would  thus  have  been  brought 
would  have  saved  it  from  the  danger  of  a  contemptuous 
ill-treatment,  for  the  thrust  intended  for  it  must  have 
reached  mathematics,  and  this  was  not,  and  could  not 
be  H'lme's  intention."^  Kant  was  mistaken  about 
Hume's  intention,  as  Mr.  Mahaffy  and  others  have 
noted,  but  as  to  his  own  opinion  there  can  be  no  pos- 
sible mistake.  But  perhaps  the  clearest  passage  of  all 
is  that  in  which  he  says  that  "  pure  mathematics  and 
pure  science  of  nature  had  no  occasion  for  such  a 
deduction,  as  we  have  made  of  both,  for  their  own  safety 
and  certainty,  for  the  former  rests  upon  its  own  evidence 
and  the  latter  upon  experience  and  its  thorough  con- 
firmation. Both  sciences  therefore  stood  in  need  of 
this  enquiry,  not  for  themselves,  but  for  the  sake  of 
another  science,  metaphysic."^  Kant  therefore  invari- 
ably assumes  the  truth  of  the  mathematical  and  physical 
sciences,  and  only  asks  how  we  are  to  explain  the  factjl 
of  such  knowledge  from  the  nature  of  knowledge  itself." 
It  is  true  that  he  qualifies  this  unlimited  statement  so 
far  as  to  admit,  that  the  special  sciences  are  ultimately 
dependent  for  their  truth  upon  philosophical  criticism, 
but  the  qualification  applies,  not  to  the  special  truths 
which  form  the  body  of  those  sciences,  but  to  the  uni- 
versal principles  which  they  take  for  granted,  and  which, 
strictly  speaking,  belong  to  metaphysic.  "  The  possi- 
bility of  mathematics,"  he  says,  **  may  be  conceded,  but 
by  no  means  explained  without  [philosophical]  deduc- 
tion."' That  is  to  say,  while  no  one  can  doubt  that 
mathematical  judgments  are  universal  and  necessary, 
this  must  be  an  article  of  faith,  until  we  are  shown 
philosophically  the  ground  of  their  universality  and 


'  Proleg.  tr.  §  4,  p.  29.        ^Ibid.,  §  40,  j).  114. 


•Ibid.,  §12,  p.  48. 


16 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


-I 


necessity.  But  this  does  not  mean  that  proof  is  de- 
manded of  the  special  truths  of  mathematics,  but  only 
that,  in  accounting  for  knowledge,  we  must  find  out  the 
secret  of  their  universal  character.  The  problem  of  the 
Critique  is,  therefore,  the  purely  metaphysical  one  as  to 
the  objective  validity  of  the  knowledge  we  possess,  not 
the  scientific  problem  as  to  the  evidence  of  the  truth 
of  special  laws.  No  doubt  Kant  would  have  admitted 
that  a  failure  to  account  for  the  possibility  of  real 
knowledge  must  throw  doubt  on  the  absolute  truth  of 
the  conclusions  of  mathematics  and  physics,  since  these 
sciences  cannot  get  along  without  making  use  of  princi- 
ples which  they  do  not  seek  to  prove.  But  Kant's 
attitude  towards  the  scepticism  of  Hume,  and  his 
unwavering  faith  in  the  truth  of  the  sciences,  shows  us 
that  his  conclusion  in  that  case  would  be,  not  that 
science  has  no  truth,  but  that  the  metaphysical  theory 
propounded  is  marred  by  some  inherent  flaw.  The 
extreme  scepticism  which  Mr.  Balfour's  language  sug- 
gests, would  have  seemed  to  him  a  voluntary  creation 
of  self-tormenting  difl&culties.  The  truth  of  mathemati- 
cal propositions  as  such  was  in  his  view  necessarily 
mathematical,  and  of  physical  propositions  physical, 
and  it  would  have  appeared  to  him  mere  folly  to  ask 
philosophy  to  prove  what  no  one  denies.  It  is  surely 
enough,  he  would  have  said,  if  I  show  that  my  system 
is  consistent,  and  alone  consistent,  with  the  undoubted 
truths  of  mathematics  and  physics. 

In  developing  his  procf,  as  has  been  said,  Kant  was 
warned  by  the  utter  failure  of  previous  dogmatic 
systems — a  failure  which  he  regards  Hume  as  having 
proved  beyond  dispute,  so  far  at  least  as  the  principle 
of  causality  is  concerned — that  the  mode  of  explanation 
must  follow  a  completely  new  track.      The  inherent 


I.]   CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON— MR.  BALFOUR.    17 


'V 


vice  of  those  systems  betrays  itself  in  the  double  defect  ^ 
(1)  that  they  assume  knowable  objects  to  exist,  in  the  ^ 
fulness  of  their  attributes  and  in  their  relation  to  each 
other,  quite  independently  of  our  intelligence,  and  (2)'' 
that,  as  a  consequence,  they  suppose  that  we  can,  by 
mere  introspection  or  analysis,  obtain  judgments  which 
hold  good  of  things  in  themselves,  and  which  therefore 
are  true  not  merely  subjectively  or  for  us  as  individuals, 
but  objectively  or  universally  and  necessarily.  This 
twofold  assumption  is  a  characteristic  mark  of  dogma- 
tism. In  the  statement  of  his  own  theory  Kant  starts 
provisionally  from  the  dualism  of  knowledge  and  reality 
and  seeks  to  develop  a  true  theory  by  a  gradual  trans- 
formation of  the  false  theory.  Adopting  the  objection 
made  by  Hume  against  the  ordinary  proof  of  causality, 
and  expressing  it,  to  borrow  the  language  of  mathema- 
ticians, in  its  utmost  generality,  he  points  out  that  the 
principle  upon  which  it  goes  cannot  possibly  account 
for  the  fact  of  real  knowledge.  (1)  If  known  objects, 
as  the  dogmatist  assumes,  are  without  consciousness, 
and  yet  are  known  as  they  exist,  we  must,  to  account 
for  that  knowledge,  say  that  we  go  to  them  and  appre- 
hend them  one  by  one,  and  also  observe  that  they  are 
permanent,  that  they  undergo  changes,  and  that  they 
act  and  react  on  each  other.  Our  knowledge  of  concrete 
things  and  of  their  succession  and  co-existence  is  thus 
resolved  into  a  series  of  particular  perceptions.  Philo- 
sophically, therefore,  the  dogmatist  tries  to  account  for 
our  knowledge  of  real  objects  by  saying  that  objects 
are  revealed  •  to  us  in  the  individual  apprehensions  or 
perceptions  which  come  to  us  from  without.  Now, 
if  in  the  meantime  we  grant  that  things  exist  without 
consciousness  just  as  they  are  known,  it  is  plain,  that 
so  far  as  our  actual  knowledge  goes,  and  so  far,  there- 

B 


/ 


ait 


,'(..•/  ail 


•/ 


'•Vli 


18 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


' 


[ 


I 


fore,  as  the  dogmatist  is  entitled  to  affirm,  knowledge 
will  resolve  itself  into  a  succession  of  feelings  or  ideas  in 
consciousness.  But  the  most  that  we  can  philosophi- 
cally bas-e  upon  a  series  of  feelings  or  ideas  is  a 
knowledge  of  particular  objects,  particular  series  of 
events,  and  particular  co-existencies.  This  was  what 
Hume  pointed  out,  so  far  as  the  sequence  or  causal 
connection  of  events  is  concerned.  I  observe  flame  to 
be  attended  with  the  feeling  of  heat,  and  finding  this 
particular  sequence  repeated  frequently  in  my  con- 
sciousness, I  infer  that  flame  is  actually  connected  with 
heat,  and  that  the  one  cannot  exist  without  the  other. 
The  inference,  however,  is  unwarranted.  All  that  I 
can  legitimately  say  is,  that  in  my  past  experience  as 
remembered,  and  in  this  particular  experience  I  am 
now  having,  flame  and  heat  occur  successively.  Indi- 
vidual perceptions  of  such  sequences  I  have,  but  the 
inference  based  upon  them,  that  these  could  not  be 
otherwise,  arises  merely  from  the  nature  of  my 
imagination,  which  illegitimately  leaps  beyond  the 
immediate  perception  and  converts  it  into  a  universal 
rule.  On  perception,  as  we  may  say,  generalizing 
Hume,  no  judgment  in  regard  to  the  existence  of  real 
objects,  or  of  their  connection  or  co-existence,  can  pro- 
perly be  founded.  The  affirmation  of  the  reality  of  the 
objects,  or  of  the  relations  of  objects,  is  something  that 
we  add  to  perception,  not  something  actually  given  in 
perception.  (2)  This  leads  us  to  ask  whether  we  are 
more  successful  when  we  attempt  to  prove  the  per- 
manence, the  causal  connection,  or  the  interaction  of 
objects,  from  conceptions  instead  of  perceptions.  Now, 
conceptions  are  for  the  dogmatist  simply  I'.leas  in  the 
mind,  which  are  completely  separated  from  things 
without  the  mind.     The  conceptions  of  the  permanence. 


ar  .i''^r.h.::.fidil:;i<il.>J:^!i^'.ii-ie!X'i'i^*i,iili!^ 


1.]  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON— MR.  BALFOUR.    19 


the  changes  and  the  mutual  influence  of  substances,  are 
separated  by  an  impassable  gulf  from  the  substances 
themselves.  It  is  thus  perfectly  evident  that  we 
cannot  legitimately  pass  over  from  the  conception  of  a 
substance  to  the  substance  itself.  Completely  shut  up 
within  our  own  minds,  we  shall  vainly  endeavour  to 
break  through  the  walls  of  our  prison.  We  can 
certainly  frame  judgments  in  regard  to  the  ideas  which 
exist  in  our  minds,  but  we  cannot  show  them  to  have 
any  application  to  real  objects  or  events.  Thus,  having 
the  conception  of  substance,  we  may  throw  it  into  the 
form  of  the  judgment,  "Substance  is  th^t  which  is 
permanent."  Such  a  judgment  is  no  doubt  correct  so 
far  as  our  conception  is  concerned,  and  is  even  neces- 
sarily true  in  the  sense  that  it  is  free  from  self- 
contradiction  or  conforms  to  the  logical  principle  of 
identity,  but  it  has  no  demonstrable  relation  to  the  real 
substance  we  suppose  to  exist  without  consciousness. 
All  that  we  have  done  is  to  draw  out  or  state  explicitly 
what  was  contained  in  the  conception  with  which  we 
started,  and  however  necessary  and  valuable  this  pro- 
cess may  be  in  making  our  conception  clear,  it  is  value- 
less as  a  means  of  proving  the  reality  of  an  object 
supposed  to  correspond  to  it.  The  mere  analysis  of  the 
conception  of  substance  lo  more  shows  that  there  are 
real  substances  in  rerum  natura  than  the  analysis  of  the 
conception  of  a  hundred  dollars  entitles  me  to  say  that  I 
have  a  hundred  dollars  in  my  pocket.  Now,  dogmatism 
never  gets  beyond  purely  analytical  or  tautological  judg- 
ments of  this  kind ;  the  account  it  gives  of  the  nature 
of  knowledge  is  such  that  we  cannot  understand  from  it 
how  it  is  possible  to  have  the  experience  of  real  objects 
or  of  their  connection  at  all.  We  may,  therefore, 
summarise  Kant's  criticism  of  previous  philosophy  as 


so 


lu; 


,.</,■ 


,/:^  i/. 


^t 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


follows : — Knowledge  of  real  objects  existing  beyond 
the  mind,  and  of  their  connection  and  interaction,  must 
be  obtained  either  from  perception  or  from  conception  ; 
but  perception  cannot  take  us  beyond  the  consciousness 
of  a  particular  object  as  now  and  here,  and  conception 
tells  us  nothing  at  all  about  objects ;  hence  dogmatism 
caimot  explain  the  possibility  of  knowledge  at  all. 

So  far  Kant  has  closely  followed  in  the  wake  of 
Hume,  at  least  as  he  understood  him  ;  the  main  diifer- 
ence  being,  that  whereas  Hume  shows  the  imperfection 
of  dogmatism  only  in  regard  to  the  principle  of  caus- 
ality, Kant  universalizes  the  criticism  and  throws  it 
into  the  comprehensive  form :  real  knowledge  cannot 
be  accounted  for  from  mere  perceptions  or  from  mere 
conceptions.  It  is  in  fact  the  great  merit  of  Hume 
in  Kant's  eyes,  that  he  shows  with  such  clearness 
wherein  the  weakness  of  dogmatism  consists.  All 
a  priori  judgments,  i.  e.  judgments  derived  from  con- 
ceptions, seem  to  be  merely  analytical,  and  therefore, 
however  accurately  I  may  analyse  the  conception  of 
cause,  T  can  never  get  beyond  the  conception  itself. 
Hence,  as  Hume  argues,  the  supposition  that  the 
conception  of  causal  connection  proves  a  real  connection 
of  objects  is  a  pure  assumption.  The  moment  I  am 
asked  to  explain  how  I  get  the  knowledge  of  objects,  I 
must  refer  to  my  perceptions,  and  no  perception  can 
entitle  me  to  make  universal  and  necessary  affirmations. 
Expiessed  in  the  language  of  Kant,  Hume's  difficulty 
is  this :  How  can  the  conception  of  cause  be  thought 
by  the  reason  a  pnori,  and  therefore  possess  an  inner 
truth  independent  of  all  experience  ?  *    And  this  ques- 

*  This  mode  of  statement  is  provisional,  and  suggests  that  very  abstract  opposi- 
tion  of  thought  and  reality  which  it  is  the  main  aim  of  Kant  to  overthrow. 
The  required  correction  is  given  afterwards,  more  particularly  in  the  Analytic, 
See  below,  Chap.  ill. 


I.]   CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON— MR.  BALIOUR.    21 


tion,  when  put  universally,  assumes  the  form,  1  n  are 
synthetical  judgments  a  pnori  possible  ?  Hume  indeed 
does  not  content  himself  with  pointing  out  the  purely 
subjective  character  of  the  notion  of  causality,  but 
endeavours  to  explain  how  we  come  to  suppose  a 
necessity  where  none  exists ;  and  in  this  Kant  refuses 
to  follow  him.  A  series  of  perceptions  can  never  yield 
necessity,  for,  however  frequently  one  given  perception 
follows  another,  we  cannot  thence  conclude  that  the 
one  must  follow  the  other.  Our  belief  in  the  connec- 
tion of  perceptions  is  therefore  explained  by  the  psy- 
chological law  of  frequency  or  repetition  :  we  naturally 
suppose  that  what  is  often  associated  is  really  connected, 
and  thus  by  the  influence  of  custom  we  confuse  an 
arbitrary  association  of  our  ideas  with  a  real  connec- 
tion of  objects.  Accepting  Hume's  criticism  of  dog- 
matism, and  rejecting  his  psychological  account  of 
the  principle  of  causality,  Kant  endeavours  to  show 
that  we  can  have  a  synthetical  a  p^nori  judgment 
of  causality,  as  well  as  other  judgments  of  the  same 
kind  which  Hume  altogether  overlooked. 

We  can  now  see  why  Kant  states  the  problem  of 
philosophy  as  he  does,  and  what  is  the  general  method 
he  is  likely  to  follow  in  attempting  to  answer  the 
question.  How  are  synthetical  judgments  a  priori 
possible  1  As  the  failure  of  dogmatism  evidently  arises 
from  the  assumption,  which  no  one  prior  to  Kant  had 
questioned,  that  objects  and  events  exist  beyond  con- 
sciousness as  they  are  known,  it  was  only  natural  to 
ask  whether  this  assumption  may  not  be  a  mistake. 
The  general  answer  therefore  given  by  Kant  to  the 
problem  he  has  himself  propounded,  is  that  known 
objects  instead  of  being  passively  apprehended,  are 
actively  constructed  by  intelligence  as  operating  on  the 


/ttit/i  .'' 


..<ViiU 


22 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


\ 


material  supplied  by  the  special  senses.  The  existence 
of  things  in  themselves  is  not  indeed  positively  denied, 
but  such  things  are  shown  to  be  absolutely  distinct 
from  the  objects  we  actually  know.  The  theory  that 
intelligence  constitutes  known  objects  instead  of  pas- 
sively  apprehending  them,  is  held  to  be  the  only 
theory  that  explains  the  facts  as  a  whole.  In  the 
development  of  his  proof  of  this  theory  we  find  Kant 
continually  seeking  to  intensify  the  persuasiveness  of  his 
own  solution,  by  showing  the  inherent  imperfection  of 
the  dogmatic  conceptions  previously  accepted  as  conclu- 
sive. His  method  of  proof  thus  takes,  in  n?any  cases, 
an  indirect  form.  All  through  the  firat  part  of  the 
Critique,  we  find  him  asserting  that  unless  we  admit 
the  activity  of  intelligence  in  the  constitution  of  know- 
ledge, we  are  reduced  to  a  "  mere  play  of  representa- 
tions," or,  what  is  at  bottom  the  same  thing,  we  are 
compelled  to  attempt  the  impossible  feat  of  extracting 
reality  from  subjective  conception:.  These  two  things 
always  go  together  in  Kant's  mind  :  the  impossibility 
of  justifying  universal  and  necessary  judgments  from  a 
mere  manifold  of  sense,  i.  e,  from  an  arbitrary  succes- 
sion of  feelings,  and  the  impossibility  of  accounting  for 
\  knowledge  on  the  supposition  that  known  objects  are 
^  things  in  themselves  independent  of  our  intelligence. 
When  he  proposes  to  show  why  mathematical  judg- 
ments are  apodictic  and  yet  refer  to  individual  objects, 
Kant  points  out,  on  the  one  hand,  that  such  judgments 
cannot  be  obtained  by  an  analysis  of  conceptions,  and 
on  the  other  hand,  that  their  demonstrative  character 
is  unintelligible  if  we  suppose  the  objects  of  mathe- 
"^matics  to  be  known  by  particular  observations  of  sense 
or  by  empirical  measurements.  In  proving  the  prin- 
ciple that  the  knowledge  of  permanent  substances  is 


I.]    CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON— MR.  BALFOUR.    23 


one  of  the  conditions  of  a  real  knowledge  of  objects  in 
space,  he  shows,  that  apart  from  the  schema  of  the 
"  pernoanent,"  we  can  have  only  a  number  of  unrelated 
feelings,  which  by  no  possibility  can  be  identified  with 
real  substances ;  and  in  confirmation  of  this  criticism 
he  remarks,  that  the  ordinary  derivation  of  permanent 
things  from  the  conception  of  substance  assumes  that 
an  analytical  or  tautological  judgment  is  capable  of 
bridging  the  gulf  between  mere  conceptions  in  the 
mind  and  things  in  themselves.  So,  in  his  proof  of 
causality,  he  seeks  to  show  that  our  knowledge  of 
a  real  sequence  of  events  can  be  accounted  for,  neither 
from  an  arbitrary  train  of  feelings,  coming  one  after 
the  other  without  determinate  order  or  connection,  nor 
from  the  mere  conception  of  cause  as  we  find  it  lying 
ready-made  in  our  minds,  for  in  the  former  case  we  should 
not'Be'entitied  to  say  that  there  are  real  sequences,  but 
only  that  there  are  sequences  of  our  perceptions,  and 
in  the  latter  case  we  should  have  no  criterion  by  which  to 
distinguish  the  conception  of  cause  from  an  arbitrary 
creation  of  the  imagination.  Again,  the  existence  of 
a  primary  self-consciousness  he  establishes,  both  on  the 
ground  that  a  succession  of  states  of  consciousness,  not 
bound  together  by  a  single  identical  self,  will  not 
account  for  the  systematic  coherence  and  unity  of  our 
actual  experience,  and  on  the  ground  that  the  mere 
fact  that  we  always  think  of  the  self  as  one  does  not 
prove  the  self  to  be  one  in  its  own  nature.  Lastly, 
in  the  Refutation  of  Idealism  this  indirect  method  of 
proof  assumes  an  open  and  explicit  form;  the  argument 
being,  that  the  "  psychological  idealist "  can  never  show 
that  the  mere  sequence  of  ideas  in  the  individual  mind 
could  give  us  the  knowledge  of  real  substances  as  per- 
manent ;  but  that,  on  the  contrary,  we  could  never  have 


24 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


experience  of  the  self  as  in  time,  had  we  no  knowledge 
of  real  objects  in  space.  It  should  bo  observed,  however, 
that  this  polemic  against  dogmatism  might  be  elimin- 
ated from  Kant's  proof  without  really  destroying  its 
intrinsic  force.  The  transcendental  proof  has  assumed 
this  form  chiefly  from  historical  causes,  and  Kant,  in 
stating  it  as  he  does,  only  intends  to  commend  to  the 
lips  of  the  dogmatist  the  ingredients  of  his  own  poisoned 
chalice.  The  conclusiveness  of  the  theory  does  not  lie 
in  its  indirect  mode  of  proof,  but  in  the  completeness 
with  which  it  accounts  for  the  facts  of  experience 
as  a  whole.  Kant  might  have  stated  his  proof  alto- 
gether in  the  a^icmative  form  that  known  objects  must 
exist  in_relation  to  intelligence ;  and,  having  done  so, 
the  details  of  the  system  would  have  consisted  entirely 
of  a  presentation  of  the  essential  elements  of  knowledge 
in  their  relation  to  each  other.  The  "manifold  of 
sense  "  or  "  flux  of  sensations,"  is  not,  as  Mr.  Balfour 
seems  to  suppose,  a  ghost  of  Kant's  raising,  but  the 
unlaid  ghost  of  dogmatism  itself.  Transcendentalism 
"  convinces  by  threats,"  only  in  so  far  as,  like  every 
other  system  of  philosophy,  it  must  take  some  account 
of  accepted  systems  that  difier  from  it. 

If  the  above  is  at  all  a  correct  account  of  Kant's 
problem  and  method,  the  objections  of  Mr.  Balfour 
have  been  virtually  disposed  of  beforehand.  Those 
objections  seem  to  me  to  be  rather  the  difliculties  which 
naturally  occur  to  one  who  has  not  seen  into  the  heart 
of  a  system,  but  still  looks  at  it  from  the  outside,  than 
the  sympathetic  and  luminous  criticism  of  one  who,  by 
the  very  act  of  mastering  and  thoroughly  assimilating 
the  thought  of  another,  is  already,  as  Fichte  remarks, 
to  some  extent  beyond  it.  This  judgment  can  only  be 
completely  justified  by  an  examination  of  Mr.  Balfour's 


I.]   CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON— MR.  BALFOUR.     26 

objections  to  the  proofs  of  Substance  and  Causality,  and 
to  the  Refutation  of  Idealism ;  but  even  without  a 
special  consideration  of  these  we  may  see  that  his 
criticism  is  destitute  of  that  sureness  and  lightness 
of  touch  which  can  only  come  from  close  familiarity 
with  the  subject. 

What  the  Transcendental  philosophy  is  called  upon 
to  prove  is,  we  are  told,  that  the  principles  it  asserts  to 
be  true  are  "  involved  in  those  simple  experiences  which 
everybody  must  allow  to  be  valid."  ^  Now,  in  the  first 
place,  there  is  no  need,  as  has  already  been  indicated, 
to  lay  special  stress  on  simple  rather  than  on  complex 
experiences.  When  Kant  is  speaking  of  experiences  as 
data  he  has  to  explain,  he  places  scientific  truths  on  the 
same  level  as  common-sense  knowledge,  and  with  the 
whole  body  of  experience,  as  thus  understood,  he  con- 
trasts purely  philosophical  knowledge  as  a  higher  way 
of  dealing  with  the  very  same  facts.  In  speaking  of 
the  distinction  between  mathematical  and  philosophical 
knowledge,  he  remarks  that  )the  essential  difference 
between  them  lies  in  the  /fact  that  the  former 
sees  the  particular  in  the  universal,  and  the  latter 
the  universal  in  .the  particular;  and  that  those 
thinkers  who  proj^e  to  distinguish  philosophy  from 
mathematics  on  the  ground  that  the  former  deals  with 
quality,  and  the  latter  with  quantity,  have  confused 
a  difference  in  the  objects  of  those  sciences  with  the 
true  difference,  which  consists  entirely  in  the  point  of 
view  from  which  the  objects  are  regarded.''  In  the 
second  place,  Mr.  Balfour,  unless  I  misunderstand  him, 
entirely  misrepresents  the  Critical  method  when  ho 
speaks  of  certain  principles — by  which  he  means,  as  I 
suppose,  such  principles  as  the  permanence  of  sub- 

^Atind,  xii,  p.  483.  >  Kritik,  Methodenkhre,  p.  478. 


i 


26 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


stances,  the  causal  connection  of  events,  and  the  like — 
as  "  involved  in  "  our  simple  experiences.  We  may 
indeed  say  that  the  principle,  say  of  causality,  is 
"involved  in"  our  experience,  in  the  sense  that  an 
analysis  of  our  ordinary  beliefs  will  show  that  as  a 
matter  of  fact  we  do  suppose  events  to  be  really 
connected  together.  Every  one  is  "natural  philoso- 
pher "  enough  to  know  "  that  the  property  of  rain  is  to 
wet,  and  fire  to  burn ;  that  good  pasture  makes  fat 
sheep ;  and  that  a  great  cause  of  night  is  lack  of  the 
sun."  Mr.  Balfour's  words  may  therefore  mean,  that, 
while  every  one  has  the  belief  that  there  is  a  real  con- 
nection between  certain  known  objects,  it  is  only  by  a 
process  of  abstraction  that  we  learn  to  throw  this  belief 
into  the  general  form  of  a  principle,  and  to  affirm,  not 
that  fire  is  the  cause  of  heat,  and  rain  the  cause  of  wet- 
ness, but  that  every  event  has  a  cause.  I  am  loth  to 
suppose  that  Mr.  Balfour  is  under  the  impression,  that 
the  Transcendentalist  has  no  other  means  of  establish- 
ing his  principles  than  simply  taking  our  ordinary 
^^beliefs,  abstracting  from  the  concrete  or  individual 
element  in  them,  and  straightway  baptizing  the  residuum 
by  the  name  of  a  "  principle."  For  this  is  just  what 
Kant  means  by  dogmatism,  consisting  as  it  does  in  the 
mere  explicit  statement  of  what  is  wrapped  up  in  our 
ordinary  conceptions.  By  such  a  process,  as  lie  points 
out,  wcj  can  only  frame  analytical  judgments  that 
do  not  take  us  a  single  step  beyond  the  assumptions 
with  which  we  begin.  And  yet  it  is  difficult  to  resist 
the  conviction  that  Mr.  Balfour  has  fallen  into  this 
mistake,  when  we  find  him  saying  that  the  principles 
of  the  Critical  philosophy  are  the  "  casual  necessities 
of  our  reflective  moments,"  which  are  supposed  to  be 
established  by  showing  that  they  have  "always  been 


[chap. 


I.]   CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON— MR.  BALFOUR.    27 

thought  implicitly ; "  and  that  "  to  argue  from  these 
necessities  [the  principles]  to  the  truth  of  things  is  to 
repeat  the  old  fallacy  about  innate  ideas  in  another 
form."'  What  these  utterances  mean,  except  that 
Kant  and  his  followers  endeavour  to  prove  the  truth  of 
their  principles  by  an  analysis  of  our  ordinary  beliefs 
and  conceptions,  I  am  unable  to  understand.  Kant's 
doctrine  can  only  be  assimilated  to  "the  old  fallacy 
about  innate  ideas  "  on  the  supposition  that  it  assumes  \  \ 
certain  conceptions  as  true,  and  proceeds  to  "  deduce,"  / 
or  set  forth  in  abstract  language,  what  is  implied  in>^ 
them.  But  this  is  exactly  what  Kant  doea_,^o<  do.  If 
he  has  one  merit  more  than  anotHer,  it  is,  that  he  has 
disposed  for  ever  of  the  supposition  that  knowledge 
may  be  justifisd_by_jB_erelyLJJialy(dngJihaJbd  we 
happen  to  j^sess.  Instead  of  admitting  the  absolute 
separation  of  thought  and  reality,  an  assumption  under- 
lying and  vitiating  the  whole  procedure  of  dogmatism, 
he  maintains  that  reality  is  meaningless  apart  from 
its  relations  to  thought.  Mr.  Balfour's  mode  of  state- 
ment "cacTIBe  regarded  as  a  correct  formulation  of  the 
method  of  Transcendentalism,  only  if  we  suppose  him 
to  mean  that  the  facts  aud  laws  of  our  whole  experience 
imply  or  presuppose  certain  priijciples  belonging  to  the 
constitution  of  our  intelligence  ;  and  when  it  is  under- 
stood in  tJiis  way,  his  objection  loses  any  force  it  seemed 
at  first  to  possess.  But  let  us  consider  Mr.  Balfour's 
criticism  more  in  detail. 

Let  us  suppose  the  Transcendentalist  to  be  asked  by 
the  sceptic,  how  he  proves  the  absolute  truth  of  such  a 
principle  as  that  of  causality.  The  reply,  according  to 
Mr.  Balfour,  will  consist  in  begging  the  sceptic  to  admit 

^Atind,  xii.,  p.  489.  Cf.,  p.  484.  On  this  point,  see  Mr.  Caird's  remarks, 
Mind,  xui..  111-114. 


28 


KAJSIT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


that  we  "  get  some  knowledge  small  or  great  by  ex- 
perience ;"  and  having  obtained  this  very  moderate 
concession,  he  will  proceed  to  show,  that  his  transcen- 
dental necessities  or  principles  are  involved  in  it.  To 
take  a  concrete  instance,  the  sceptic  may  be  asked 
whether  he  admits  that  we  have  an  experience  of 
change,  and  if  he  assents,  the  Transcend  antalist  will 
attempt  to  show  that  experience  "  is  not  possible  unless 
we  assume  unchanging  substance."  Or  again,  the 
sceptic,  enticed  into  the  admission  that  we  have  an 
experience  of  real  events,  will  be  straightway  forced  to 
admit  that  such  an  experience  is  possible  only  if  we 
virtually  think  of  those  events  as  under  the  law  of 
causation.  The  essence,  then,  of  the  Transcendental 
method  consists  in  showing,  or  attempting  to  show,  that 
in  questioning  the  truth  of  such  principles  as  substanti- 
ality and  causality,  the  sceptic  contradicts  himself,  since 
he  grants  the  reality  of  certain  experiences  and  yet 
'<  makes  an  illegitimate  abstraction  from  the  relations 
which  constitute  an  object."  He  has,  therefore,  either 
to  rescind  his  admission  of  the  reality  of  the  object,  or 
to  admit  that  a  certain  principle  is  involved  in  his 
knowledge  of  it.  "  He  cannot,  in  all  cases  at  least, 
do  the  first ;  he  is  bound  therefore  to  do  the 
second."' 

I  acquit  Mr.  Balfour  entirely  of  any  intentional  mis- 
representation of  the  Critical  method  ;  but  the  fact  is 
not  the  less  certain,  that  he  has  given,  not  a  fair  state- 
ment, but  a  travesty  of  it.  I  see  nothing  in  his  way  of 
stating  the  case,  to  distinguish  criticism  from  dogmatism. 
Mr.  Balfour's  criticism  of  the  Refutation  of  Idealism 
seems  to  show  that  he  has  not  carried  his  scepticism  so 
far  as  to  doubt  the  correctness  of  the  ordinary  dualism 

•JIfiMrf,  xii.,  p.  -i82ff 


I.]   CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON—MR.  BALFOUR.     29 


of  intelligence  and  nature.  But  without  appreciating 
in  the  clearest  way  the  essential  absurdity  of  this  , 
dogmatic  assumption,  the  method  of  Kant  is  simply 
unintelligible.  The  only  way,  Mr.  Balfour  evidently 
thinks,  in  which  the  Transcendentalist  can  seek  to  make 
good  his  position,  is  by  analysing,  after  the  method  of 
formal  logic,  the  ordinary  or  uncritical  knowledge  which 
we  all  possess.  The  Transcendentalist  is  supposed  to 
reason,  that  cause,  substance,  &c.,  are  really  thought, 
although  only  in  an  obscare  way,  by  us  in  our  ordinary 
consciousness.  And  no  doubt  this  is  true  enough  ;  but 
it  dees  not  constitute  the  essential  nerve  of  proof.  If 
this  were  the  sole  force  of  the  argument,  Mr.  Balfour's 
objection,  that  the  principles  are  assumed,  not  proved, 
would  be  perfectly  sound.  The  explicit  statement  of 
the  implications  of  ordinary  experience  cannot  prove 
the  necessity  and  universality,  or,  what  is  the  same 
thing,  the  objectivity  of  the  principles  in  question. 
But  the  ready  answer  to  such  reasoning  is,  that  no  re- 
flection upon  our  ordinary  beliefs  which  does  not  in  some 
way  transform  the  current  view  of  them,  can  justify  us 
in  asserting  that  they  are  laws  of  nature.  What  Kant 
maintains  is,  that  reasoning  back  from  our  actual 
experience,  we  perceive  that  there  are  certain  forms 
of  intelligence  without  which  there  could  be  no  experi- 
ence at  all.  His  method  is,  starting  from  our  ordinary  /<?  6 
knowledge  of  concrete  facts,  and  from  our  'ordinary 
dogmatic  ju|^mente^  in  regard  to  them,  to  show  that 
we  can  never  prove  the  reality  of  the  facts,  or  the  ob- 
jectivity of  our  judgments  concerning  them,  so  long  as 
we  opposejhought  and  nature  as  abstract  opposites. 
This  Kant  endeavours  to  make  intelligible  to  the  dog- 
matist by  saying,  that  the  observation  of  independent 
objects  owing  nothing  to  intelligence,  can  never  yield 


i..u(-'..cd_ 


30 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


i 


real  knowledge,  because  it  cannot  take  us  beyond  an 
empirical "  is."    And  this  leads  him  to  say,  that,  while 
intelligence  may  be  dependent' on  separate  impressions 
for  its  apprehension  of  the  determinate  properties  of 
things,  it  is  yet  active'  in  combining  or  relating  those 
impressions,  and  so  constituting  them  as  real  individual 
objects,  real  events,  and  real  co-existencies,     It  is  only 
in  accordance  with  Kant's  method  of  thought  to  say, 
that  he  who  maintains  the  independent  reality  of  things 
as  knoivn,  and  denies  to  intelligence  any  share  in  the 
construction  of  that  reality,  must  attempt  to  account 
for  the  knowledge,  which  we  at  least  seem  to  possess, 
without  any  other  material  than  separate  impressions. 
What  else  indeed  can  there  be,  if  we  assume  that 
thought  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  constitution  of 
phenomenal  objects  ?    On  the  other  hand,  supposing 
known  objects  to  exist  only  in  relation  to  our  faculties 
of  knowledge,  intelligence  must  have  certain  functions 
of  svnthesis.  which  at  once  combine  into  unity  the 
detached  differences  supplied  by  the  special  senses,  and 
enable  us  to  explain  how  we  can  have  a  knowledge  of 
objects  other  than  our  own  subjective  conceptions.   For 
if  nature  exhibits  everywhere  a  system  and  unity  of 
objects,    which    have    been    actively  constructed  by 
thought  as  acting  upon  the  manifold  of  sense,  the 
puzzle  which  dogmatism  completely  fails  to  solve,  at 
once  disappears  :  we  are  no  longer  perplexed  by  the 
essentially  unmeaning  riddle,  How  can  we  pass  from 
conceptions  in  the  mind  to  objects  without  the  mind  ? 
for  objects  as  known  are  seen  to  have  no  existence 
except  in  relation  to  the  intelligence  by  which  they  are 
made  real.    The  functions  of  synthesis,  or  potentialities 
of  combination,  we  may,  if  we  please,  call  "relations;" 
but  it  must  be  observed,  that  they  are  able  to  operate 


I 


the 
and 
te  of 
For 
r  of 

by 

the 
e,  at 
the 


.» 


I.]   CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON— MR.  BALFOUR.    31 

whether  they  are  brought  into  explicit  consciousness  or 
no.  A  function  is  not  an  "innate  idea,"  but  the 
potentiality  of  an  indefinite  number  of  cognitions.  But 
how  do  we  know  that  thought  has  such  functions  1  "We 
know  it  because  the  workmanship  of  thought  is  mani- 
fested in  actual  knowledge  or  experience,  in  so  far  as 
we  combine  or  unite  impressions  and  thus  form  judg 
ments  about  real  things.  From  the  fact  that  we  have 
scientific  knowledge,  we  are  enabled  to  reason  back  to 
the  functions  of  thought  by  which  such  knowledge  is 
I  made  possible.  We  do  not  beg  the  sceptic  to  admit 
that,  in  our  immediate  perceptions,  there  are  involved  ^ 
principles  which  we  can  discover  by  mere  analysis,  and 
that,  unless  this  is  granted,  we  are  making  "an  illegiti- 
mate abstraction  from  the  relations  which  constitute  an 
object ;"  but  we  ask  him  to  explain  how  there  can  be  a 
knowledge  of  objects  apart  from  the  activity  by  which 
intelligence  constitutes  them.  Kant  has  no  thought  of 
cajoling  the  sceptic,  or  anybody  else,  into  the  admission, 
that  there  is  a  confused  metaphysic  even  in  such  simple 
experiences  as  a  perception  of  colour  or  a  feeling  of 
taste ;  all  that  he  asserts  is,  that  any  one  who  is 
earnest  in  his  endeavour  to  account  for  our  experience 
in  its  totality  must  come  to  the  conclusion  that  intelli- 
gence contributes  an  essential  element  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  known  universe.  And  those  who  refuse  to 
accept  his  theory  of  knowledge  he  asks  to  explain  how 
real  knowledge  can  be  derived  from  a  mere  analysis  of 
conceptions,  or  from  the  perpetual  rise  and  disappear- 
ance of  individual  feelings.  In  this  sense  alone,  and 
not  in  the  sense  that  each  of  us  has  a  confused  consci- 
ousness of  the  "  relations  which  constitute  an  object," 
do  Kant  and  his  followers  hold  that  there  can  be  no 
objects  apart  from  the  relations  of  thought.     Mr.  Bal- 


82 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


four  objects,  quite  in  the  vein  of  Locke's  criticism  of 
Descartes'  innate  ideas,  that  "  the  majority  of  mankind 
have  habitually  had  certain  experiences  without  ever 
consciously  thinking  them  under  the  relations  asserted 
to  be  implied  in  them ;"  and  from  his  point  of  view  he 
very  naturally  remarks,  that,  as  an  implicit  thought  is 
"  simply  a  thought  which  is  logically  bound  up  in  some 
other  thought,"  it  is  "  a  mere  possibility  which  can  be 
said  to  have  existence  only  as  a  figure  of  speech."  The 
simple  reply  to  this  is,  that  when  certain  relations  are 
said  by  the  Critical  philosopher  to  be  involved  or  im- 
plicit in  ordinary  experience,  all  that  is  meant  is  that 
they  are  manifestations  of  the  activity  of  intelligence  in 
relation  to  its  own  objects.  That  the  majority  of  man- 
kind do  not  consciously  bring  those  relations  before 
their  minds  only  shows  that  they  are  not  metaphysi- 
cians :  it  does  not  show  that  they  can  know  objects 
which  by  definition  are  beyond  consciousness  altogether, 
and  are  therefore  in  the  strictest  sense  unknowable. 
Intelligence,  as  Kant  maintains,  has  an  essential  nature, 
which  comes  into  operation  in  our  actual  experience ; 
but  the  recognition  of  this  fact  must  necessarily  be 
made  only  after  actual  experience  has  been  had.  Mr. 
Balfour  asks  how  it  comes  that,  "  if  relations  can  exist 
otherwise  than  as  they  are  thought,  sensations  cannot 
do  the  same."^  The  answer  of  course  is,  that  a  sensa- 
tion can  only  exist  as  it  is  felt,  whereas  a  function  of 
thought  must  operate  before  we  can  be  conscious  of  it 
as  having  operated.  A  function  of  thought,  in  other 
words,  is  in  itself  a  pure  capacity  or  potentiality,  the 
existence  of  which  can  only  be  revealed  to  us  when,  in 
relation  to  the  material  which  it  informs,  it  develops  i 
into  actuality.    The  fact  that  people  are  unaware  of  the 

•Mnrf,  xii.,  p.  488. 


[chap. 

sism  of 
lankind 
lit  ever 
,sserted 
dew  he 
ught  is 
n  some 
can  be 
»    The 
ons  are 
or  im- 
is  that 
jence  in 
of  man- 
before 
;aphysi- 
objects 
)gether, 
owable. 
nature, 
jrience ; 
irily  be 
i.     Mr. 
m  exist 
cannot 
Eb  sensa- 
Lction  of 
►us  of  it 
in  other 
lity,  the 
Nhen,  in 
leyelops  \ 
•e  of  the 


I.]    CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON— MR.  BALFOUR.    33 

part  played  by  intelligence  in  the  combination  and 
connection  of  impressions,  no  more  shows  that  in- 
telligence is  a  pure  blank,  than  the  ignorance  of  the 
calculus  on  the  part  of  the  "majority  of  mankind," 
is  a  proof  that  the  judgments  of  pure  mathematics 
are  untrue. 


U 


0 


81 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  A  PRIORI    CONDITIONS  OF   PERCEPTION. — MR.    SIDGWICK's 
VIEW  OF  THE  REFUTATION  OF  IDEALISM. 


1 


TU'E  have  seen  what  the  problem  of  philosophy  is, 
the  general  method  by  which  it  is  to  be  solved, 
and  the  direction  in  which  the  answer  must  lie.  Unless 
it  can  be  shown  that  there  are  synthetical  judgments 
a  priori,  no  consistent  and  adequate  theory  of  know- 
ledge is  possible.  Now,  of  all  the  knowledge  which  we 
possess  independently  of  philosophical  criticism,  none  is 
so  sure  and  free  from  doubt  as  that  which  is  embod- 
ied in  the  mathematical  sciences.  The  judgments  of 
mathematics  are  self-evident,  universal,  and  necessary, 
and  they  are  a  priori  or  independent  of  all  observation 
of  sensuous  things.  In  building  up  his  science  the 
mathematician  does  not  need  to  verify  his  conclusions 
by  the  perceptions  of  the  senses ;  in  fact,  such  percep- 
tions are  for  him  useless,  since  they  never  could  give 
rise  to  apodictic  certainty.  No  actual  measurement  of 
the  sides  of  a  triangular  object  could  entitle  us  to  affirm 
that  the  two  sides  of  all  possible  triangles  are  necessarily 
greater  than  the  third  side.  And  not  only  are  mathe- 
matical judgments  a  priori,  but  they  are  at  the  same 
time  synthetical.  The  ideal  objects  on  which  the 
mathematician  operates  are  always  individual,  and  are 


11.]       A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  PERCEPTION. 


35 


therefore  given  in  pure  pe»*ception.  Hence  mathematical 
judgments  are  unlike  uuose  of  any  other  science :  they 
rest  upon  perceptions,  and  yet  they  are  independent  of 
sensible  observation.  This  is  the  reason  why  mathe- 
matics deals  only  with  quantity  to  the  exclusion  of 
quality ;  for  only  quantity  can  be  constructed  or  pre- 
sented a  prion  in  immediate  perception.  Mathematics 
is  therefore  distinguished  from  other  sciences,  not  by 
the  objects  with  which  it  deals,  but  by  the  way  in 
which  it  looks  at  those  objects.  For  pure  perception 
is  at  once  individual  and  universal.  This  is  manifest 
when  we  consider  that  the  science  of  mathen?.atics  is 
built  up  by  means  of  definitions,  axioms,  and  demon- 
strations. A  definition,  in  the  strictest  sense,  must  be  a 
precise,  complete,  and  primary  representation  of  an  ob- 
ject, and  such  a  definition  mathematics  alone  can  give. 
The  object  to  be  defined  is  directly  originated  or  con- 
structed, and  hence  the  definition  is  immediately  verified 
in  a  pure  perception.  Axioms,  also,  are  based  upon 
the  immediate  perception  of  individual  objects,  which, 
as  constructed,  are  universally  and  necessarily  true. 
And,  lastly,  mathematical  demonstrations  are  alone 
self-evident,  because  they  alone  are  capable  of  direct 
verification.^  The  judgments  of  mathematics,  then, 
have  these  two  characteristic  marks:  (1)  They  rest  upon  -f- 
individual  perception,  and  (2)  they  are  a  priori  or  in- 
dependent of  sensible  perception.  Now  a  proper  appre- 
ciation of  the  nature  of  mathematics  gives  us  the  key  to 
the  solution  of  the  special  problem  of  metaphysics.  For 
that  problem  is,  as  we  have  seen,  to  explain  how  con- 
ceptions and  perceptions  can  be  brought  together  in  the 
unity  of  real  knowledge ;  in  other  words,  how  the  mind 
can  be  shown  to  be  in  actual  contact  with   known 

1  Kritik,  MethodenMre,  478-90. 


-L 


'•/ 


36 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


A-' 


objects.  Hume,  accepting  the  ordinary  dualism  of 
thought  and  things,  made  a  divorce  between  conception 
and  perception.  Hence  he  summarily  rejected  all 
universal  and  necessary  judgments,  and  admitted  only 
particular  judgments  resting  upon  an  immediate  per- 
ception of  concrete  objects  ;  at  least,  this  is  the  logical 
consequence  of  an  extension  of  Hume's  criticism  of 
causality  to  such  conceptions  as  substance  and  reci- 
procal action.  From  a  mere  conception,  as  he  main- 
tained, no  synthetical  judgment  applicable  to  real 
objects,  and  therefore  true  universally  and  necessarily, 
can  be  derived.  But  Hume,  while  he  reasoned  correctly 
on  the  basis  of  ordinary  dualism,  overlooked  a  conse- 
quence of  it  which  would  certainly  have  led  him  to  a  dif- 
ferent conclusion  had  he  only  taken  note  of  it.  If  there 
are  no  synthetical  a  priori  judgments,  what  becomes  of 
the  judgn  onts  of  mathematics,  which  every  one  admits 
to  be  universal  and  necessary?  Either  those  judgments 
must  rest  on  sensible  observation,  or  they  must  be 
derived  from  mere  conceptions ;  and  while,  in  the  one 
case,  they  can  have  no  universality,  in  the  other  case 
they  can  only  be  regarded  as  mere  analyses  of  the 
conceptions  we  find  in  our  minds.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
however,  mathematical  judgments  are  at  once  a  priori, 
and  yet  rest  upon  individual  perceptions.  Now,  this 
casts  doubt  upon  the  assumption,  of  Hume,  that  all 
a  priori  judgments  are  necessarily  analytical.  If 
mathematics  is  entitled  to  form  a  prion  synthetical 
judgments,  we  need  not  despair  of  showing  that  there 
are  a  prioin,  synthetical  judgments  of  a  metaphysical 
kind.  Hume  would  not  have  allowed  himself  to  con- 
demn all  metaphysical  judgments  as  subjective  had  he 
not  shared  in  the  common  fallacy,  that  mathematical 
judgments  are  analytical.      And  when  we  see  that 


II.]        A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  PERCEPTION.        37 

these  judgments  are  synthetical,  and  yet  a  priori,  the 
problem  of  metaphysic  no  longer  seems  to  bo  on  the 
very  face  of  it  insoluble. 

In  mathematics,  then,  we  have  instances  of  a  priori 
judgments  which  yet  are  synthetical;  but,  while  mathe- 
matical judgments  are  true  universally  and  necessarily, 
we  find,  upon  looking  more  closely  at  them,  that  they 
differ  from  such  metaphysical  principles  as  those  of 
substance  and  cause  in  one  very  important  point.  To 
entitle  us  to  affirm  that  "  every  event  must  have  a 
cause,"  we  must  be  able  to  show  that  this  judgment  is 
legitimately  derived,  not  from  a  perception  of  individual 
sequences,  but  from  the  conception  of  cause  in  gene- 
ral. No  mere  sequence  of  perceptions,  however  often 
repr'ated,  can  entitle  us  to  say  that  there  is  an  actual 
connection  between  real  objects.  The  causal  connection 
of  events  must  therefore  be  proved,  if  it  is  capable  of 
proof  at  all,  entirely  from  the  conception  of  cause.  A 
mathematical  judgment,  on  the  other  hand,  is  verifiable 
in  an  individual  perception  constructed  by  the  mind 
a  prion.  Thus  mathematics,  after  all,  does  not  seem 
to  help  us  so  much  as  it  at  first  promised  to  do, 
in  explaining  the  possibility  of  purely  metaphysical 
judgments.  There  is  no  great  difficulty  in  showing 
how  mathematical  judgments  can  be  synthetical.  We 
hi.  ve  simply  to  say,  that  we  go  directly  to  perception, 
although,  of  course,  not  to  empirical  perception  or  ob- 
servation, and  form  our  judgments  in  accordance  with 
the  object  perceived.  To  explain  philosophically  the  pos- 
sibility of  mathematical  knowledge,  it  is,  however,  neces- 
sary to  show,  from  the  nature  of  our  intelligence,  how 
we  can  have  the  synthetical  judgments  of  mathematics. 
And  this  we  seem  to  do  when  we  say  that  such  judg- 
ments  are   derived,   not   from   conceptions,  but   from 


M  KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 

perceptions.  But  thus  we  escape  one  diiSiculty  only  to 
fall  into  another  not  less  perplexing.  The  "synthetical" 
of  a  mathematical  judgment  we  explain  simply  and  satis- 
factorily by  saying  that  we  go  to  our  perceptions  and 
obtain  the  object  on  which  the  judgment  rests,  but 
how  shall  we  explain  the  "apnon  ? "  For  we  have 
always  been  accustomed  to  regard  perception  as  giving 
us  only  the  individual,  not  the  universal  and  necessary* 
A  perception  certainly  implies  the  immediate  presence 
of  the  rbject  perceived,  and  if  in  mathematics  we  are 
dependent  upon  the  actual  presence  of  the  object  in 
regard  to  which  we  form  a  judgment,  by  what  right 
shall  we  affirm  that  the  object  always  and  necessarily  is 
of  a  certain  nature  1  There  is  no  difficulty  in  under- 
standing how  we  can  say  that  this  individual  triangle 
now  before  us  has  its  interior  angles  equal  to  two  right 
angles,  but  what  entitles  us  to  say  universally  and 
necessarily  that  all  triangles  must  have  their  interior 
angles  equal  to  two  right  angles  ?  The  mathematician 
of  course  does  not  require  to  answer  this  question, 
because  he  is  not  dealing  with  the  ultimate  conditions 
of  knowledge ;  but  philosophy,  having  undertaken  to 
explain  the  possibility  of  all  kinds  of  knowledge,  cannot 
evade  the  responsibility  of  accounting  for  the  univer- 
sality and  necessity  of  mathematical  judgments,  as 
well  as  for  their  synthetical  character. 

Now,  it  is  perfectly  vain  to  suppose  that  this  question 
can  be  answered  on  the  lines  of  the  dogmatic  philosophy 
hitherto  in  vogue,  according  to  which  judgments  and 
perceptions,  thoughts  and  things,  are  separated  by  an 
impassable  gulf.  If  the  objects  of  mathematics  are,  as 
the  dogmatist  supposes,  real  existencies,  constituted 
independently  of  our  intelligence,  no  justification  of  the 
universality  and  necessity  of  mathematical  judgments 


M.]        A  I'RIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  PERCEPTION 


30 


E9       C«tl\A 

J,  but 

have 

riving                1 
ssary.                ; 

sence 

i^e  are 

ct  in 

right 
rily  is 

UUtJI" 

angle 

right 

and 

terior 

tician 
Btion, 
itions 

Bn  to 
annot 

liver- 

.s,  as 

jstion 

jophy 
3  and 

)y  an 

re,  as 

cuiea 
>f  the 
aents 

can  possibly  be  given.  For,  in  the  first  place,  if  mathe- 
niaticu  deals  with  real  objects  or  things  in  themselves 
existing  apart  from  our  consciousness  of  them,  it  is 
evident  that,  whether  such  objects  exist  or  no,  at  least 
they  cannot  be  known  by  us  as  they  are  in  themselves. 
It  is  self-evident  that  the  properties  of  real  things  can- 
not at  the  same  time  be  perceptions  in  us.  But,  in  the 
second  place,  even  if  we  waive  this  objection,  we  cannot 
explain  how  the  mere  succession  in  which  real  objects 
are  revealed  to  us  can  form  the  basis  of  universal  and 
necessary  judgments.  If  the  object  perceived  his  a 
nature  of  its  own,  quite  apart  from  any  relations  to  our 
faculty  of  perception,  we  are  necessarily  dependent  upon 
the  actual  perception  of  the  moment  for  any  knowledge 
of  it  we  may  possess.  What  the  object  may  be  when 
it  is  not  perceived  we  are  utterly  unable  to  say.  The 
only  judgments  we  can  form  must  therefore  be  par- 
ticular. We  may  say.  This  object  now  perceived  is  of 
a  certain  nature ;  but  we  cannot  say.  This  and  all 
objects  of  which  this  is  a  type  must  always  be  of  a  cer- 
tain nature.  The  universality  and  necessity  of  mathe- 
matical judgments  must  therefore  be  explained  in  a 
very  different  way  from  that  relied  upon  by  the  dog- 
matist. The  first  step  towards  a  true  theory  must 
consist  in  denying  that  the  objects  of  mathematics 
are  either,  as  Clarke  supposed,  things  in  them- 
selves, or  relations  of  things  in  themselves,  as  was 
held  by  Leibnitz.  The  justification  of  the  apodictic 
character  of  mathematics  we  must  seek,  not  in  the 
nature  of  things  lying  beyond  consciousness,  but 
in  the  constitution  of  our  intelligence  itself.  We 
have  to  explain  how  there  can  be  perceptions  which 
yet  are  a  pnori,  and  the  explanation,  it  is  manifest, 
must  be  of  such  i'  character  as  to  revolutionize  our 


40 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


ordinary  conception  of  the  relation  of  thought  to  its 
objects. 

Now  mathematics,  as  we  can  at  once  see,  deals  with 
perceptions  which  are  determinations  or  limitations  of 
space  and  time.  "  Geometry  is  based  upon  the  pure 
perception  of  space,  mathematics  obtains  its  conception 
of  number  by  the  successive  addition  of  units  in  time, 
and  pure  mechanics  at  least  cannot  reach  its  conception 
of  motion  without  making  use  of  the  idea  of  time."  ^ 
Philosophy,  however,  does  not  concern  itself  with  these 
specific  determinations  of  space  and  time,  but  only 
with  space  and  time  themselves.  Can  we  then,  from 
a  consideration  of  space  and  time  as  related  to  our 
faculty  of  perception,  account  for  the  universality  and 
necessity,  or  what  is  the  same  thing,  the  a  priori 
character  of  mathematical  judgments?  The  deter- 
minations of  space  and  time  which  are  the  objects  of 
mathematics,  cannot,  as  we  have  seen,  be  empirically 
observed  things  in  themselves,  or  definite  proper- 
ties of  such  things,  nor  can  they  be  mere  abstract 
conceptions,  obtained  by  the  grouping  of  the  observed 
properties  common  to  many  concrete  objects.  "  There 
is  therefore  only  one  way  in  which  my  perception  may 
anticipate  the  reality  of  the  object,  and  yet  be  a  pnon, 
viz.,  when  perception  contains  nothing  but  the  form 
of  sensibility,  which  precedes  all  the  real  impressions 
through  which  I  am  affected  by  objects."  ^  Space  and 
time,  therefore,  Kant  regards  as  pure  forms  of  percep- 
tion, by  which  he  means,  that  they  are  logically  prior 
to  the  impressions  of  the  special  senses,  and  that  as 
belonging  to  the  constitution  of  our  perceptive  faculty, 
they  are  in  themselves  mere  capacities  or  potentialities, 
which  come  into  operation  only  in  relation  to  those 


Prolegomena,  tr.,  §  10,  p.  45. 


Mbiil,  §9,  p.  44. 


»»1 


} 


II.]       A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  PERCEPTION.        41 

impressions.  We  can  now  see  generally  what  is  the 
critical  solution  of  the  problem,  How  are  mathematical 
^^  judgments  possible  %  They  are  possible,  Kant  answers, 
because  they  rest  upon  determinations  of  space  and 
time,  of  which,  as  belonging  to  the  very  nature  of  our 
intelligence  on  its  perceptive  side,  we  cannot  possibly 
divest  ourselves.  To  determine  space  and  time  as 
the  mathematician  does,  without  bringing  into  play 
these  forms  of  perception,  would  be  to  perceive  without 
employing  the  faculty  of  perception.  The  universality 
and  necessity  of  mathematical  judgments  is  therefore 
quite  compatible  with  the  fact  that  they  are  syn- 
thetical ;  as  specifications  of  the  forms  of  perception 
they  are  a  jpriori,  and  as  specijications  of  those  forms 
they  are  synthetical.^ 

This  general  statement  of  the  answer  to  the  question, 
How  is  pure  mathematics  possible  ?  will  enable  us  to 
understand  without  much  difficulty  the  various  points 
in  the  Msthetic.  In  this  division  of  the  Cntique,  Kant, 
as  he  tells  us,  "isolates  the  sensibility ; "  in  other  words, 
he  does  not  enquire  into  the  constitution  or  connection 
of  real  concrete  objects,  but  contents  himself  with 
pointing  out  the  relation  of  space  and  time  to  our 
intelligence.  The  discussion,  therefore,  is  so  far  of  a 
provisional  and  incomplete  character,  certain  assump- 
tions being  made,  which  are  afterwards  shown  to 
require  more  or  less  of  correction.  (I)  Kant  does 
not  in  the  first  instance  question  the  ordinary  view, 
that  individual  objects  as  existing  in  space  and  time  are 
known  as  individual  by  the  special  senses  :  he  merely 

>  Up  to  this  point  I  have,  in  this  chapter,  mainly  followed  the  discussion  in 
the  Prolegomena,  and  especially  §§  6-12.  I  may  here  make  the  general  remark, 
that  my  interpretation  is  based  throughout  on  a  comparison  of  the  Krilik  itself, 
with  the  other  writings  of  Kant,  and  particularly  the  Proleyomena,  the  J/e<a- 
I'liysische  An/angngriiinle  dtr  Natunvmenachdft  and  the  Lojilc, 


42 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


asks  how,  assuming  this  in  the  meantime  to  be  true,  we 
are  to  account  for  the  necessary  element  in  the  know- 
ledge of  individual  things,  L  e.  the  knowledge  of  their 
quantitative  relations.  (2)  As  he  does  not  enquire  into 
the  constitution  or  relation  of  concrete  objects,  Kant 
leaves  for  future  consideration  the  question  as  to  the  ap- 
plicability of  mathematics  to  those  objects.  His  reason 
for  doing  so  no  doubt  is,  that  the  answer  cannot  properly 
be  given  until  the  categories  have  been  discovered  and 
justified,  and  the  schemata  limiting  them  set  forth.  (3) 
In  treating  of  the  nature  of  space  and  time  in  their 
relation  to  our  faculty  of  knowledge,  Kant  assumes 
the  ordinary  explanation  of  conception,  as  the  product 
of  abstraction  from  the  individual  peculiarities  of  ob- 
jects, and  goes  on  to  show  that  space  and  time  are  not 
conceptions  in  this  sense  of  the  term.  This  provisional 
assumption  he  was  in  fact  compelled  to  make,  unless 
he  had  begun  the  Critique^  as  he  might  have  done,  with 
an  investigation  into  the  nature  of  the  categories  as 
standing  under  the  supreme  unity  of  self-consciousness. 
(4)  Lastly,  Kant  does  not,  in  the  ^Esthetic,  attempt  to 
explain  the  process  by  which  the  potential  forms  of 
space  and  time  are  determined  to  specific  spaces  and 
times,  but  with  a  glance  forward  to  the  completion  of 
this  process,  he  assumes  those  forms  to  be  already 
determined.  Hence  he  speaks  of  space  and  time  as 
perceptions,  although  strictly  speaking  they  are  not 
perceptions  but  merely  forms  of  perception.  Here 
again  the  order  in  which  he  has  seen  fit  to  develope 
his  theory  compels  him  to  anticipate  to  some  extent 
the  results  which  he  afterwards  proves;  for,  without 
entering  into  a  discussion  of  the  doctrine  of  the  cate- 
gories and  of  the  schematism,  the  process  by  which 
space  and  time  are  determined  could  not  be  explained. 


II.]       A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  PERCEPTION.        43 

The  j^sthetic  confines  itself,  therefore,  to  the  task  of 
showing  that  space  and  time  are  not  known  to  us 
through   the  special   senses,  but  are  universal   forms 
belonging  to  the  nature  of  our  perceptive  faculty ;  that 
they  are  not  abstract  conceptions  but  perceptions ;  and 
that  no  other  account  of  their  nature  is  consistent  with 
the  peculiar  character  of  mathematical  judgments.    The 
discussion  naturally  breaks  up  into  two  parts  :   the 
metaphysical  exposition  in  which  space  and  time  are 
shown  to  be  a  priori  perceptions,  and  the  transcen- 
dental exposition,  which  seeks  to  show  that  mathema- 
tical judgments  are  actually  based  on  determinations 
of  space  and  time,  and  cannot  be  accounted  for  on  any 
other  theory  of  their  nature  than  that  given  in  the 
metaphysical  exposition.     The  relative  incompleteness, 
of  the  Esthetic  as  compared  with  the  Analytic,  arises 
)^  '•'lAj  from  the  fact  that  Kant  does  not  yet  question' 
-b.  li,  jsumption  that  individual  objects,  as  distinguished < 
from  space  and  time,  are  known  by  the  special  sensesi 
without  assistance  from  thought,  and  that  he  so  far, 
accepts  the  account  of  the  nature  of  conception  which ' 
is  given  by  formal  logic.     This  incompleteness  is  how- 
ev^er  partially   modified  by  the  inferences  in   regard 
to  the  relation  of  individual  objects  to  consciousness, 
which  are  shown  to  follow  from  the  new  view  of  space 
and  time  which  Kant  adopts.     For,  as  space  and  time 
are  now  denied  to  be  realities  external  to  conscious- 
ness, the  concrete  objects  assumed  to  be  revealed  by 
the   special   senses  can  no  longer  be  identified   with 
things  in  themselves,  which  by  hypothesis  are  beyond 
consciousness. 

The  first  point,  therefore,  to  which  Kant  directs  his 
attention  in  the  Msthetic  is  to  show  that  space  and  time 
are  a  priori  forms  of  perception ;  in  proof  of  which  the 


44 


KAN2'  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS. 


[chap. 


following  reasons  are  adduced.  (1)  Space  and  time  are 
not,  as  is  usually  supposed,  derived  from  an  observation 
of  the  spatial  and  temporal  relations  of  individual 
objects.  The  external  objects  I  observe  are  without 
me,  and  without  or  side  by  side  with  each  other; 
while  all  objects,  whether  external  or  internal,  either 
co-exist  or  follow  each  other.  These  objects  therefore 
differ  not  only  in  having  distinct  properties,  but  in 
occupying  different  places,  and  presenting  thcLiselves 
in  different  moments  of  time.  Admitting,  then,  that 
individual  objects  are  apprehended  by  external  or  in- 
ternal sense,  I  must  still  presuppose  space  and  time 
in  order  to  explain  my  knowledge  of  the  relative  posi- 
tions of  external  objects,  as  without  me  and  without 
or  side  by  side  with  each  other,  and  to  explain  my 
knowledge  of  the  relative  position  in  time  of  both 
external  and  internal  objects.  Space  and  time  are 
therefore  independent  of,  and  presupposed  in,  the 
special  perceptions  of  the  senses.  (2)  The  concrete 
objects  which  we  observe  to  exist  in  space  and  time 
we  can  think  away,  but  it  is  impossible  to  think  away 
space  and  time  themselves.  We  must  therefore  regard 
space  and  time  as  a  priori. 

The  next  point  to  which  Kant  addresses  himself  is 
to  show,  that  space  and  time  belong,  not,  to  our  think- 
ing faculty,  but  to  our  perceptive  faculty.  In  proof 
of  this  he  brings  forward  two  considerations,  (l)  A 
general  or  abstract  conception  always  refers  to  a  num- 
ber of  individual  objects,  which  agree  in  certain  general 
relations,  while  they  differ  in  their  specific  properties. 
But  there  is  only  one  space  and  one  time,  not  a  number 
of  distinct  spaces  and  times.  We  do  indeed  commonly 
speak  of  various  spaces  and  various  times,  but  these 
are  not  separate  iudividuals,  but  parts  in  the  one  single 


II.]        A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  PERCEPTION.        45 


h 


I 


space  and  the  one  single  time.  Again,  in  a  general 
conception  the  individual  objects  standing  under  it  are 
first  known  as  complete,  and  the  conception  is  derived 
from  them  by  abstraction,  whereas  the  parts  or  con- 
stituents of  space  and  time  are  simply  limitations,  exist- 
ing not  prior  to  space  and  time  but  in  them/  From 
these  considerations  it  is  evident  that  space  and  time 
cannot  be  regarded  as  conceptions.  (2)  If  we  take  any 
abstract  conception,  we  must  of  course  say,  that  the 
marks  or  attributes  which  distinguish  it  from  other 
conceptions  will  be  found  in  all  the  individual  objects 
we  can  ever  observe  to  which  it  is  applicable.  But  the 
conception  itself  has  a  definite  number  of  marks  which 
constitute  its  individuality  as  a  conception :  the  indi- 
vidual objects  to  which  it  refers  are  not  contained  in  it, 
but  externally  brought  under  it.  Space  and  time, 
however,  actually  have  individual  parts  within  them- 
selves, and  these  parts  are  not  extfrnally  brought 
under  space  and  time  as  conceptions,  but  are  infinite 
in  number. 2  Space  and  time,  therefore,  are  evidently 
not  conceptions  but  perceptions.  And  as  they  have 
already  been  shown  to  be  a  priori  we  may  formulate 
their  character  in  the  proposition :  Space  and  time  are 
a  priori  perceptions.  They  are  a  priori,  to  summarise 
Kant's  reasoning,  because  every  special  perception  pre- 

'  It  is  possible,  as  Dr.  Stirling  points  out  (Jour.  Sptc.  Phil.,  xiv.  90),  that 
"  Bestandtheile "  may  mean  p?iysical  or  dtemical  constituents,  in  which  case 
we  must  substitute  for  "Again,  in  a  general  conception  ...  in  them" 
the  following : — "Nor  are  these  parts  constituents  that  pre-exist,  and  have  to 
be  put  together  (as  bricks  to  make  a  house,  or  oxygen  and  hydrogen  to  form 
water),  but  they  are  limitations  of  space  and  time  as  forms."  The  objection 
to  this  is,  that  physical  parts  or  chemical  elements,  when  combined,  produce 
an  integral  whole,  whereas  Kant  is  seeking  to  show  that  space  and  time  are 
not  uriversal  wholes.  He  may,  however,  merely  mean  here  to  emphasize  the 
a  priori  character  of  the  "parts." 

'  Space  and  time,  as  Kant  points  out  in  his  Metaphysic  of  Nature,  are  addible 
and  divisible  to  infinity. 


46 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


t 


supposes  them,  and  because  they  are  not  variable  but 
constant ;  and  they  are  perceptions,  inasmuch  as  they 
neither  denote  separate  individuals,  nor  connote  a  defi- 
nite number  of  attributes  belonging  to  separate  indi- 
viduals, but  are  themselves  determinate  individuals.^ 

By  the  application  of  his  peculiar  method  of  seeking 
to  account  for  the  actual  knowledge  we  admittedly 
possess,  Kant  has  begun  that  transformation  of  ordi- 
nary conceptions  as  to  the  nature  of  known  existence 
which  is  the  result  of  every  earnest  efibrt  to  apprehend 
the  relations  of  thought  and  reality.  His  way  of 
presenting  his  thought,  as  was  natural,  consists  in 
exposing  on  the  one  hand  the  vice  of  ordinary  Dualism, 
and  on  the  other  hand  in  substituting  for  it  his  own 
view,  that  our  intelligence  has  as  perceptive  an  essential 
part  to  play  in  the  formation  of  the  objects  in  regard 
to  which  mathematical  judgments  are  formed.  So  far 
he  has  dealt  only  with  the  pure  perceptions  of  mathe- 
matics, leaving  the  question  as  to  the  nature  of  concrete 
objects,  external  and  internal,  for  subsequent  considera- 
tion. Without  at  present  going  into  the  solution  of 
the  question.  How  is  the  science  of  nature  in  the  widest 
sense  of  that  term  possible  ?  we  can  see  that  the  ordi- 
nary dualism  of  thought  and  things  is  no  longer  tenable. 
If  space  and  time  are  forms  of  our  perception,  it  is 
absurd  any  longer  to  speak  of  known  external  objects 
as  existing  without  consciousness.  Such  a  supposition 
compels  us  to  adopt  the  self-contradictory  view  that  we 
have  a  series  of  feelings  representative  of  the  properties 
of  real  things,  which  are  yet  not  merely  successive  but 

•  For  the  reasons  given  above  (pp.  40-42)  the  metaphysical  exposition  re- 
quires some  correction  even  to  express  Kant's  own  final  view.  Cf.  Caird'a 
Philosophy  of  Kant,  pp.  264  ff.  The  transcendental  exposition  need  not  be 
given,  as  it  simply  repeats  what  has  already  been  explained.  See  especially 
pp.  39,  40. 


A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  PERCEPTION.        47 


it  is 


also  co-existent  or  permanent  in  time,  and  that  we 
have  a  knowledge  of  objects  which  by  definition  are 
beyond  consciousness  altogether  and  yet  are  identical 
with  the  objects  which  we  perceive.    Such  a  superfluous 
doubling  of  external  realities  must  be  the  result  of  a 
false  theory  of  knowledge.     Kant's  own  theory  seems 
to  himself  to  have  all  the  simplicity  of  a  true  hypo- 
thesis, and  to  have  the  merit  of  explaining  adequately 
the  necessity     nu      iversality  of  ma  Ltiatical  judg- 
ments.    Instead  of  a  double  series  of  objects,  an  object 
in  space  and  an  object  in  consciousness,  and  a  double 
faculty  of  perception,  having  before  it  at  once  states  of 
consciousness  and  properties  of  things,  we  have  merely 
objects  in  space  in  essential  relation  to  our  perception 
of  them.     Kant's  charge  against  dogmatism,  or  as  he 
calls  it  in  the  present  reference,  psychological  Idealism, 
is  that  it  confuses  externality  in  space  with  externality 
to  thought.     Real  things  are  certainly  external  in  the 
sense  of  being  arranged  in  relation  to  each  other  in 
space,  and  our  perceptions  are  internal  in  so  far  as  they 
are  arranged  as  successive  events  in  time ;  but  objects 
are  not  external  because  they  are  without  intelligence, 
nor  are  perceptions  internal  because  they  alone  are 
within  intelligence.    External  and  internal  have  mean- 
ing only  for  a  being  who  is  conscious  of  both  alike.     I 
call  a  thing  external  either  because  I  perceive  it  to  stand 
apart  in  space  from  another  thing,  or  to  be  distinct 
from   my   perceptions   as   they  occur   successively   in 
time ;  and  in  both  cases  I  am  speaking  of  externality 
in  the  sense  of  position  in  space,  not  in  the  sense  of 
independence  on  consciousness.     I  say  my  perceptions 
are  internal,  on  the  other  hand,  because  they  are  not 
made  up  of  parts  that  stand  out  of  each  other,  and 
because  two  perceptions  do  not  stand  apart  from  each 


48 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


I 

I 

i 
i 


other  like  two  objects  in  space;  in  other  words,  my  per- 
ceptions are  internal  because  they  are  not  in  space  but 
only  in  time.  But  although  I  distinguish  in  conscious- 
ness objects  as  external  from  perceptions  as  internal, 
the  objects  and  the  perceptions  alike  exist  only  for  me 
as  a  conscious  being.  What  Kant  proves,  then,  is 
that  space  and  time  exist  only  in  relation  to  intel- 
ligence, or  in  other  words,  that  the  opposition  of 
external  objects  to  internal  perceptions  is  a  logical 
distinction  within  consciousness,  not  a  real  separation 
of  consciousness  from  something  without  it.  And  this 
involves  the  transformation  of  the  ordinary  concep- 
tion of  the  self  as  known.  According  to  the  psycho- 
logical idealist,  we  are  immediately  conscious  by  internal 
observation  or  introspection  of  self  as  a  real  subject  of 
knowledge.  Hence  the  self  is  supposed  to  be  real 
apart  from  our  knowledge  of  it.  But  if  the  self  as  it 
exists  is  independent  of  our  knowledge  of  it,  what 
relation  does  it  bear  to  the  self  as  known?  It  can 
only  be  revealed  to  us  in  the  series  of  our  own  mental 
states,  and  such  states  as  in  time  imply  the  determina- 
tion of  the  form  of  time  by  the  faculty  of  perception. 
Thus  we  have,  according  to  the  dogmatist,  a  self  that 
is  given  as  successive  in  time  and  is  yet  independent 
of  time.  Here  therefore  we  get  into  a  difficulty  similar 
to  that  w^hich  we  have  found  to  beset  the  dogmatic 
theory  of  our  knowledge  of  external  objects.  The  real 
self  and  the  self  as  known  fall  apart  and  can  by  no 
legitimate  process  be  brought  into  connection  with 
each  other.  On  Kant's  theoiy,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
self  is  known  in  the  series  of  its  determinations  in  time, 
and  hence  the  real  and  the  known  self  come  together 
in  the  unity  of  knowledge.  Kant  does  not  indeed  deny 
that  there  is  a  noumenal  self  distinct  from  the  self  as 


n.]       A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  PERCEPTION.       49 

known ;  but  he  maintains  that  of  such  a  self  nothing 
whatever  can  be  said,  whereas  the  phenomenal  self  as 
within  consciousness  admits  of  the  fullest  knowledge. 

In  illustration  of  what  has  just  been  said,  it  may  be 
well  to  refer  here  to  Kant's  refutation  of  the  charge  of 
Idealism.  Mr.  Balfour  ^  maintains  that  in  the  Critique 
Kant  confuses  the  existence  of  external  objects  in  space 
with  the  existence  of  objects  external  to  the  mind,  and 
instead  of  proving  the  latter,  as  he  supposes  he  is  doing, 
only  proves  the  former.  This  criticism  is  endorsed  by 
Mr.  Sidgwick,  who  adds  in  support  of  it,  that  a  com- 
parison of  the  pertinent  passages  in  the  Critique  and 
Prolegomena  respectively,  shows  that  Kant  must  have 
allowed  the  two  meanings  of  externality  to  run  into 
one  in  his  mind,  since  the  same  or  similar  words  are 
used  in  totally  different  senses.  In  the  Prolegomena 
he  rejects  Idealism  on  the  ground  that  we  are  conscious 
of  ourselves  in  relation  to  noumenal  things  :  in  the 
Refutation  of  Idealiani  on  the  ground  that  we  are 
conscious  of  ourselves  only  in  relation  to  phenomenal 
things.  Now  "  it  is  more  than  strange,  it  is  simply 
incredible,  that  Kant  should  in  the  two  replies  have 
used  the  same  cardinal  terms  in  different  senses,  with 
a  perfect  consciousness  of  their  equivocality,  and  yet 
without  jjivinof  a  hint  of  it  to  the  reader."  ^ 

I  do  not  think  that  the  charge  of  confusion  as  pre- 
ferred against  Kant  by  Mr.  Balfour  and  Mr.  Sidgwick 
can  be  substantiated.  Kant,  as  I  understand  him,  had 
only  one  argument  against  Idealism.  The  relative 
passages  in  the  Prolegomena  and  Ciitique  respectively 
only  differ  in  so  far  as  the  former  explicitly  refers  to 


» Mind,  xii.  498. 

^  Mind,  xvii.  11.3.     Compare  with  what  is  said  below  Mr.  Caird'a  remarks. 
Mind,  xvi.  557  if,  xvii.  115. 

D 


«0 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


things  in  themselves,  while  the  latter  alloAvs  the  reader 
mentally  to  supply  the  reference.  Nor  do  I  think  that 
there  is  such  an  extraordinary  similarity  of  language, 
combined  with  an  absolute  difference  of  meaning,  as 
Mr.  Sidgwick  seems  to  suppose.  Let  us  first  look  at 
the  passage  in  the  Prolegomena}  Kant's  object  here 
is  to  repel  the  charge  of  Idealism,  which  had  been 
brought  against  him  by  certain  critics  who  had  mis- 
understood the  proper  bearing  of  his  theory  of  space 
and  time  on  our  conception  of  the  external  world.  He 
begins  by  saying  that  "  whatever  is  given  us  as  object 
must  be  given  in  perception."  Tlie  first  meaning  we 
naturally  attach  to  this  saying  is,  that  objects  in  their 
determinate  properties  exist  independently  of  conscious- 
ness, and  that  the  individual  coming  to  those  objects 
apprehends  them  through  his  senses  and  receives  them 
into  consciousness.  Kant,  however,  whose  aim  here  is 
to  convince  those  who  accept  this  dualistic  view  of  their 
mistake,  and  at  the  same  time  to  show  that  his  own 
theory  preserves,  and  alone  preserves,  the  reality  of  ex- 
ternal objects,  insinuates  into  the  popular  language  em- 
ployed a  new  meaning.  Fully  expressed,  the  remark 
quoted  amounts  to  this,  that  whatever  we  may  say  of 
the  relation  of  the  external  world  to  consciousness  this 
at  least  must  be  admitted,  that  external  or  sensible 
objects  are  external  not  to  thought  but  to  perception. 
That  Kant  here  makes  use  of  dualistic  language  only 
provisionally  is  plain  from  the  fact  that  he  imme- 
diately adds,  that  "  the  senses  never  and  in  no  manner 
enable  us  to  know  things  in  themselves,  but  only  their 
phenomena,  which  are  mere  representations  of  the 
sensibility."  The  dualist,  in  other  words,  admits 
that  external  objects  are  revealed  to  us  by  sense,  and 

■S13.    Remark  ii. 


i 


M-l     A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  PERCEPTION, 


61 


' 


therefore  he  must  further  admit  that  those  objects 
as  known  are  not  things  in  themselves,  but  only  things 
as  relative  to  our  consciousness.  The  properties  of 
things,  as  Kant  has  said  before,  "  cannot  migrate  into 
our  faculty  of  representation," »  and  hence,  unless  per- 
ceived objects  were  formed  by  the  application  of  space 
and  time  to  impressions  of  sense,  external  things  could 
not  be  shown  to  be  more  than  projections  of  our  imag- 
ination. "  Hence  we  conclude,"  says  Kant,  "  that  all 
bodies,  together  with  the  space  in  which  they  are,  must 
be  considered  as  being  merely  representations  in  us, 
which  exist  nowhere  but  in  our  thoughts."  That  is  to 
say,  the  ordinary  view  that  determinate  things  are 
independent  of  our  consciousness,  turns  out  to  be  a 
mistake,  when  we  refuse  to  accept  uny  theory  of  per- 
ception but  that  which  is  consistent  with  the  real 
knowledge  of  determinate  'things.  Perceived  objects 
are  therefore  not  things  in  themselves,  independent  of 
our  perceptive  consciousness  of  them,  but  objects  con- 
structed out  of  impressions  of  sense  as  brought  under 
the  forms  of  our  perception.  They  are  therefore 
"  representations,"  not  in  the  sense  that  they  are  mere 
ideas  of  objects  existing  beyond  consciousness,  but  in 
the  sense  that  they  are  objects  within  consciousness, 
and  yet  real  because  formed  by  the  necessary  constitu- 
tion of  our  perceptive  faculty.  Those  who  are  still 
unable  to  rid  themselves  of  the  preconception  that 
determinate  things  exist  beyond  consciousness  or  inde- 
pendently of  our  faculty  of  perception  will  of  course 
say  that  this  is  manifest  Idealism.  Kant's  reply  is, 
that  whether  we  call  his  view  Idealism  or  no,  at  least 
it  must  be  carefully  distinguished  from  what  he  else- 
where 2  calls  "  psychological  Idealism." 

*  Prolegomena,  tr.,  §  9,  p.  43.  ^Kritik,  p.  29,  note. 


52 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


"Idealism,"  says  Kant,  "consists  in  the  assertion 
that  there  are  none  but  thinking  beings,  all  other  things 
which  we  suppose  to  be  observed  by  perception  being 
nothing  but  representations  in  the  thinking  beings,  to 
which  no  object  external  to  them  really  corresponds." 
The  psychological  Idealist,  in  other  words,  reduces 
external  objects  to  a  mere  series  of  feelings  in  con- 
sciousness. "  I  say  on  the  contrary,"  continues  Kant, 
"  that  things  as  objects  of  our  senses  existing  outside 
us  are  given,  but  we  know  nothing  of  what  they  are  in 
themselves,  knowing  only  their  phenomena,  that  is,  the 
representations  which  they  cause  in  us  by  affecting  our 
senses."  That  is  to  say,  Kant  differs  from  the  ordinary 
Idealist  in  holding  that  what  we  call  sensible  or  external 
objects,  I.e.,  determinate  objects,  are  not  merely  transient 
feelings  or  subjective  states,  but  perceptible  objects 
which,  as  existing  in  space,  are  distinct  from  any  mere 
series  of  feelings  in  time.  To  this  Kant  adds,  to 
prevent  misunderstanding,  that  he  is  not  denying 
the  existence  of  things  in  themselves,  but  only  the 
existence  of  such  things  as  known.  The  objects  we 
know  are  things  in  space,  or  phenomena,  not  thinj^s 
without  consciousness.  The  force  of  Kant's  reply 
does  not  lie,  as  Mr.  Sidgvvick  seems  to  suppose,  in  the 
assertion  of  the  existence  of  noumenal  objects,  but  in 
the  affirmation  that  the  objects  we  know  are  real, 
because  they  exist  for  us  in  consciousness  and  are  yet 
distinguished  from  the  mere  sequence  of  our  repre- 
sentations.* I  am  not  an  Idealist,  Kant  argues,  because 
while  I  do  not  deny  the  existence  of  things  in  them- 
selves without  consciousness,  I  do  not,  on  the  other 
hand,  reduce  known  objects  as  existing  in  space  to  a 

'  The  admission  that  there  are,  in  any  ordinary  sense,  things  in  themselves 
is  provisionaL     See  below.  Chap.  x. 


It]       A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  PERCEPTION.       63 

mere  succession  of  transient  impressions  as  the  Idealist 
does.  If  to  this  interpretation  it  be  objected  that  Kant 
speaks  of  "  the  representations  which  objects  cause  in 
us  by  affecting  our  senses/'  and  therefore  must  be  here 
contrasting  states  of  consciousness  with  unknown  things 
in  themselves,  the  answer  is,  that  in  reasoning  with 
the  Idealist,  Kant  naturally  adapts  himself  so  far  to  the 
Idealist's  point  of  view,  and  that,  as  the  whole  course 
of  his  reasoning  shows,  he  mentally  interprets  '*  repr  j- 
sentations"  to  mean  phenomenal  obje  ts,  i.e.,  objecU 
formed  by  the  action  of  space  and  time  on  detached 
impressions  of  sense.  Accordingly  he  goes  on  iolsay 
that  he  "grants  by  all  means  that  there  arc  bodies 
without  us,  i.e.,  things  which,  though  quite  unknown  tn 
us  as  what  they  are  in  themselves,  we  yet  know  by  tiie 
representations  which  their  influence  on  our  &;n!iibility 
procures  us,  and  which  we  call  bodies,  a  term  signiiying 
merely  the  appearance  of  the  thing  which  is  unknown 
to  us  but  not  therefore  less  real."  Here,  again,  Kant 
aflirms  that  he  is  not  an  Idealist,  because,  while  grant- 
ing, or  rather  affirming,  that  things  in  themselves 
cannot  be  known  as  they  are,  he  yet  holds  that  there 
are  bodies  in  space  which  are  known  as  distinct  from 
the  mere  series  of  representations  belonging  to  the 
phenomenal  self.  No  doubt  the  ph*:«'^e  about  "things 
in  themselves  which  we  yet  know  bv  the  representa- 
tions which  their  influence  on  our  sensibility  procures 
us,"  might  be  used  by  one  wh..  accepts  the  ordinary 
view  that  objects  as  detern  iiiate  exist  beyond  con- 
sciousness and  are  only  known  through  the  perceptions 
which  they  excite  in  an  individual  mind  separate  and 
distinct  from  them;  but  this  only  shows  that,  while 
using  common  language,  Kant  infused  into  it  the  new 
meaning  which  it  acquires  when  viewed  in  the  light  of 


54 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


his  own  theory,  "Representations"  does  not  here 
mean,  as  it  would  in  the  mouth  of  the  psychological 
Idealist,  ideas  in  an  individual  mind  which  is  cut  off 
from  all  direct  contact  with  determinate  things,  but 
objects  determined  by  the  forms  of  space  and  time  in 
relation  to  individual  sensations.  The  contrast  of 
"representations,"  as  informed  sensations  or  pheno- 
mena to  "things  quite  unknown  to  us,"  is  perfectly 
clear  and  unmistakable  to  one  who  reads  Kant's  words 
in  connection  with  his  general  theory  and  with  the 
immediate  context.  The  refutation  of  the  charge  of 
Idealism  is  therefore  made  in  the  Prolegomena  to  turn 
upon  the  distinction  between  a  mere  succession  of  ideas, 
which  constitutes  the  whole  material  from  which  the 
psychological  Idealist  has  to  explain  the  knowledge  of 
real  existences,  and  known  objects  existing  in  space  and 
contrasted  with  the  series  of  our  perceptions  as  only  in 
time.  The  reference  to  things  in  themselves  is  not  es- 
sential to  the  proof,  and  is  merely  introduced  to  explain 
the  difference  between  Kant's  view  of  known  or  pheno- 
menal objects  and  the  ordinary  conception  of  objects  as 
constituted  apart  from  any  influence  of  our  perceptive 
faculty.  The  Idealism  which  is  sought  to  be  refuted  is 
that  which  maintains  that  we  are  immediately  conscious 
only  of  the  self  as  having  a  series  of  mental  states;  and 
Kant  distinguishes  his  own  theory  from  such  Idealism 
by  showing  that  for  the  absolute  distinction  of  deter- 
minate ideas  in  consciousness,  and  determinate  things 
as  existing  beyond  consciousness,  we  must  substitute 
the  relative  or  logical  distinction  of  determinate  ideas 
in  time  and  determinate  things  in  space  and  time. 
Let  us  now  look  at  the  argument  as  stated  in  the 
Critique} 

» KrUik,  p.  198. 


II.]       A  FHIOHI  CONDITIONS  OF  PERCEPTION.        65 

The  proof  is  of  the  nature  of  an  argumentum  ad 
hominem.  Kant  seeks  to  convict  the  Idealist  out  of  his 
own  mouth  by  showing  that  the  consciousness  of  self, 
as  having  a  series  of  states,  is  bound  up  with  the 
correlative  consciousness  of  the  not-self  as  a  congeries 
of  objects  in  space ;  and  this  he  does  by  endeavouring 
to  show  that  the  consciousness  of  our  feelings  as  before, 
now,  and  after  is  possible  only  on  the  presupposition  of 
the  consciousness  of  external  things  as  permanent.  The 
thesis  to  be  established  is  that  the  "  mere  consciousness 
in  experience  of  my  own  determinate  existence  proves 
the  existence  of  determinate  objects  in  space  outside  of 
me."  The  proof  begins  with  a  statement  of  what  is 
granted  by  the  Idealist  and  everybody  else,  viz.,  that  I 
am  conscious  of  my  own  determinate  existence  as  in 
time ;  in  other  words,  that  I  am  conscious  of  having  a 
series  of  mental  states.  Then  follows  the  proof  itself, 
which  contains  the  following  steps  : — (1)  The  conscious- 
ness of  time  as  determinate  can  only  be  accounted  for 
on  the  supposition  that  something  is  known  as  per- 
manent; (2)  This  permanent  cannot  be  found  in  my 
mental  states  per  se,  i.e.,  the  perm.anent  is  not  the  mere 
idea  of  the  permanent,  and  hence  it  must  bej  bound  up 
with  the  consciousness  of  external  things ;  (3)  Conse- 
quently the  consciousness  of  my  mental  states  as 
internal  necessarily  implies  the  consciousness  of  things 
in  space  as  external.  Let  us  take  these  steps  in  order. 
(1)  "  All  determination  of  time  presupposes  something 
permanent  in  perception."  Kant  gives  no  proof  of  this 
assertion,  mainly,  no  doubt,  because  he  had  proved  it 
at  length  in  the  first  analogy  of  experience.^  It  is 
enough  to  say  here  that  if  we  eliminate  the  permanent 
altogether,  we  cannot  conceive  how  there  should  be  a 

*  For  a  statement  of  this  proof,  see  Chap.  vi. 


66 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


consciousness  of  time  as  before,  now  and  after,  since 
time  is  the  mere  form  of  perception  of  which  we  cannot 
become  conscious  except  in  relation  to  the  particulars  of 
sense.  Now  (2)  "  this  permanent  cannot  be  anything 
in  me,  because  the  only  way  in  which  my  existence  in 
time  can  be  determined  is  through  this  permanent. 
Hence  the  perception  of  this  permanent  is  possible 
only  through  a  thing  outside  me  (Ding  ausser  mir)  and 
not  through  a  mere  idea  ( Vorstellu7ig)  of  a  thing  outside 
me."  These  two  sentences  really  contain  the  whole  of 
Kant's  argument  against  Idealism,  and  to  fail  in  under- 
standing them  is  to  miss  the  point  of  the  whole  refuta- 
tion. It  must  be  observed  that  a  strong  contrast  is 
drawn  between  (a)  a  "permanent  in  me,"  which  is 
equivalent  to  the  "  idea  of  a  thing  outside  me,"  and  (h) 
the  permanent  as  a  "  thing  outside  me."  The  gist  of 
the  argument  is,  that  a  "  permanent  in  me  "  is  a  "  mere 
idea  "  or  subjective  state,  and  that  this  is  the  only  per- 
manent which  the  psychological  Idealist  is  entitled  to 
speak  of.  Now,  argues  Kant,  the  mere  idea  of  the 
permanent  will  not  account  even  for  the  consciousness 
of  time  as  determinate.  This  is  further  explained  in 
the  remarks  appended  to  the  Refutation,  where  it  is 
pointed  out  that  the  mere  "  I "  of  conscioumess  must  not 
be  identified  with  the  "  I  "  as  determinate,  because  the 
self  as  determinate  is  in  time,  and  therefore  the  object 
of  inner  perception ;  and  again  that  the  "  I  "  is  destitute 
of  even  the  least  determinateness,  and  hence  cannot 
supply  the  permanent  required  as  "  correlate  of  the 
determination  of  time."  In  other  words,  the  pure  "  I  " 
is  not  a  permanent  in  time,  and  therefore  not  a  per- 
manent in  contrast  to  which  we  can  become  conscious 
of  the  self  as  in  time,  or  of  time  as  determinate.  The 
permanent,  therefore,  which  we  require  is  a  permanent 


i(> 


y    ': 


[chap. 


II.]       A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  PERCEPTION.       67 

in  time.  But  there  is  no  permanent  in  time  except  the 
permanent  in  space,  since  mere  ideas  have  no  perma- 
nence in  themselves,  and  the  pure  "  I,"  as  the  mere 
abstraction  of  relation  to  consciousness,  is  not  in  time 
at  all.  If  there  were  no  permanent  in  space,  but  only 
the  id^a  of  the  permanent  in  space,  there  could  be  no 
consciousness  of  time  as  determinate,  since  an  idea  is 
in  itself  a  mere  transient  state.  The  permanent  there- 
fore is  not  in  me,  or  is  not  a  mere  idea  of  a  thing  out- 
side of  me :  it  ii  a  thing  outside  of  me,  i.  e.  in  space. 
The  Idealist  is  therefore  compelled  to  admit  that  the 
permanent  is  not  outside  of  consciousness,  but  only 
outside  of  a  mere  series  of  mental  states;  in  other 
words,  external  phenomena  are  known  as  directly  as 
internal  phenomena.  Thus  the  opposition  of  mere 
ideas  to  things  without  consciousness,  is  transformed 
by  Kant  into  the  relative  distinction  of  real  internal 
events  and  real  external  things,  both  alike  being,  in 
Kantian  language,  phenomena,  and  not  the  one  a 
phenomenon  and  the  other  a  thing  in  itself,  as  tlie 
Cartesian  idealist  might  say;  or  the  internal  events 
real  and  external  things  nonentities,  as  the  Berkeleyan 
idealist  might  say.  Mr.  Sidgwick  is  therefore  in  error 
when  he  supposes*  that  the  "thing  outside  of  me  {Ding 
ausser  mir)"  of  the  Critique  is  identical  with  "the  un- 
known but  not  the  less  real  object  (mibekatinter  aher 
nichts  desto  weniger  ivirklicher  Gegenstand)  "  of  the 
Prolegomena,  and  is  contrasted  with  the  "mere  idea  of 
a  thing  outside  of  me  {blouse  Vorstellung  eines  Dinges 
ausser  mir) "  as  a  thing  external  to  consciousness  with 
a  state  of  consciousness.  The  "  unknown  but  not  the 
less  real  object "  of  the  Prolegomena  is  distinguished 
from  the  "thing  outside  of  me"  of  the  Refutation  as 

^Mind,  XV.  410. 


"•■-•    '"    -  ■" 


58 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


thing  in  itself  from  phenomenon,  and,  as  has  been  shown 
above,  the  "  thing  outside  of  me  "  is  contrasted,  not  as 
a  thing  external  to  consciousness  with  an  idea  in  con- 
sciousness, but  as  a  thing  in  space  with  that  mere  idea 
of  a  thing  in  space,  which  the  Idealist  according  to  Kant 
is  alone  entitled  to  speak  of.  Mr.  Sidgwick  has  mis- 
understood Kant's  argument,  from  not  bearing  in  mind 
that  it  is  not  direct  but  indirect.  The  interpretation  I 
have  given  is  borne  out  by  the  conclusion  of  the  proof, 
which  runs  thus  :  **  Consequently  the  determination  of 
my  existence  in  time  is  possible  only  through  the  exis- 
tence of  real  things  which  I  perceive  as  outside  of  me. 
Now  consciousness  in  time  is  necessarily  bound  up  with 
the  consciousness  of  the  possibility  of  the  determination 
of  consciousness  in  time,  and  therefore  with  the  exis- 
tence of  things  outside  of  me,  which  are  the  condition 
of  the  determination  of  time ;  i  e.  the  consciousness  of 
my  c  wn  existence  is  at  the  same  time  an  immediate 
consciousness  of  the  existence  of  other  things  outside 
of  me."  In  other  words,  my  own  existence  in  time 
(my  phenomenal  existence)  is  possible  only  through 
the  existence  of  things  in  space  (their  phenomenal 
existence) ;  for  the  consciousness  of  myself  as  in  time 
can  only  be  explained,  as  has  been  shown,  on  a  theory 
which  accounts  for  the  consciousness  of  determinate 
time,  and  this  again  presupposes  the  consciousness  of 
things  as  in  space.  The  Refutation  of  Idealism  there- 
fore diifers  from  the  passage  in  the  Prolegomena  simply 
in  omitting  any  reference  to  things  in  themselves, 
and  in  containing  a  complete  proof  of  the  correlation 
of  external  and  internal  phenomena  instead  of  a  mere 
assertion  of  their  correlativity.  That  in  the  Critique 
Kant  does  not  explicitly  refer  to  things  in  themselves, 
is  easily  accounted  for  when  we  consider,  that  in  the 


[chap. 


n.]       A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  PERCEPTION.       59 

remarks  added  to  the  Esthetic,  as  well  as  in  several 
passages  both  before  and  after  the  Refutation,  the 
distinction  between  thing  in  itself  and  phenomenon  is 
clearly  drawn,  and  hence  might  be  assumed  to  be 
familiar  to  the  reader. 


^\ 


% 


m 


^{ 


CHAPTER  III. 


THE  A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  KNOWLEDGE  IN   QENERAL.- 
CATEQORIES  AND  SCHEMATA. 


-THE 


rPHE  first  question  of  critical  philosophy,  ''iz.,  How 
is  mathematical  knowledge  possible  1  has  been 
answered  by  showing  that  space  and  time,  on  which 
mathematics  rests,  are  pure  forms  of  perception.  One 
inference  from  this  is  that  external  objects  are  not  out- 
side of  consciousness,  but  are  products  of  the  perceptive 
forms  as  applied  to  our  impressions  of  sense.  As  the 
external  objects  we  know  are  thus,  contrary  to  our  com- 
mon-sense view  of  the  World,  not  things  in  themselves 
but  phenomena,  we  may  expect  that  the  second  ques- 
tion of  critical  philosophy,  viz..  How  is  a  science  of 
nature  possible?  will  be  answered  in  a  similar  way. 
And  indeed  it  is  easy  to  show  that  if  by  nature  we 
understand  things  in  themselves,  there  can  be  no  science 
of  nature.  A  scientific  knowledge  of  things  that  exist 
in  complete  independence  of  our  intelligence  can  neither 
be  accounted  for  on  the  supposition  that  things  are 
known  a  priori,  nor  on  the  supposition  that  they  are 
known  a  posterion.  (1)  If  things  exist  independently 
of  thought,  they  must  have  an  unchangeable  nature  of 
their  own,  irrespective  altogether  of  their  relation  to 
our  faculties  of  knowledge.     It  is  therefore  impossible 


III.]      A  VRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


61 


•9 


to  pass  from  thought  to  things.  By  hypothesis  our 
conceptions  are  completely  separated  from  real  things, 
and  however  perfectly  we  may  analyse  them,  and  ex- 
press what  is  implicit  in  them  in  the  form  of  judgments, 
we  are  at  the  end  of  our  labour  no  nearer  to  real  things 
than  at  the  start.  Analytical  judgments,  valuable 
as  they  are  in  giving  clearness  to  our  conceptions,  do 
not,  and  cannot,  carry  us  over  to  things  assumed  to  be 
independent  of  all  relation  to  thought ;  only  synthetical 
judgments,  taking  us  beyond  conceptions  to  realities, 
are  of  any  avail,  and  such  judgments  cannot  be  shown 
to  be  a  pnon,  so  long  as  we  assume  the  independent 
existence  of  real  things.  The  difficulty  here  is,  there- 
fore, to  explain  how  there  can  be  a  priori  judgments 
that  are  not  merely  analytical.  (2)  Equally  impossible 
is  it  to  account  for  a  science  of  things  in  themselves  by 
observation.  Real  things  must  evidently  have  a  ne- 
cessary nature  of  their  own,  or  they  would  not  be  real. 
But  if  we  begin  by  saying  that  they  are  complete  in 
themselves  apart  from  any  relation  to  our  intelligence, 
we  can  only  obtain  knowledge  of  them  by  coming 
directly  into  their  presence.  We  are  thus  dependent 
for  our  knowledge  of  things  upon  the  extent  to  which 
our  observation  has  gone,  so  that  we  can  say  nothing 
about  objects  except  what  our  special  observations 
enable  us  to  say.  But  a  science  of  nature  must  con- 
tain laws  that  are  necessary  and  universal,  and  hence 
it  cannot  rest  on  mere  observation.  In  other  words, 
by  observation  we  cannot  know  things  as  they  really 
are.  As  before  we  saw  that  assuming  things  to  be 
completely  independent  of  thought,  our  judgments 
might  possibly  be  a  priori  but  could  not  be  syntheti- 
cal, so  now  we  find  that  admitting  them  to  be  synthetical 
they  cannot  possibly  be  a  pnon. 


62 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


And  yet  there  must  be  some  way  of  showing  that  we 
are  capable  of  making  judgments  that  are  not  merely 
analyses  of  assumed  conceptions,  but  hold  of  Nature 
herself.  For  that  there  is  a  science  of  Physics  resting 
upon  certain  universal  and  necessary  principles  is  uni- 
versally admitted.  Physics  is  no  doubt  based  upon 
observation,  in  so  far  as  its  concrete  content  is  con- 
cerned, but  it  also  presupposes  certain  elements  that  no 
mere  observation  can  supply.  Not  only  does  the 
physical  investigator  make  use  of  the  necessary  truths 
of  mathematics,  but  he  also  assumes  the  truth  of  certain 
discursive  principles,  resting  on  pure  conceptions.  Of 
course  Physics  is  not  based  entirely  upon  pure  percep- 
tions and  pure  conceptions ;  for  such  conceptions  as 
motion,  inertia,  and  impenetrability  have  an  element 
due  to  sensible  perception  and  therefore  cannot  be  called 
pure.  Besides,  Physics  is  not  the  science  of  Nature 
in  the  widest  sense,  for  it  deals  only  with  facts  of  the 
external  world,  to  the  exclusion  of  internal  or  psycho- 
logical facts,  while  by  Nature  we  properly  mean  to 
embrace  both  classes  of  facts.  Notwithstanding  these 
limitations,  however.  Physics  does  contain,  or  rather 
rest  upon,  certain  necessary  and  viiiiversal  principles, 
such  as  these  :  that  Substance  is  permanent,  and  that 
Every  event  depends  on  a  cause.  Confining  our  atten- 
tion, then,  to  these  a  priori  principles,  the  truth  of 
which  alone  makes  a  science  of  Physics  possible,  we 
get  the  conception  of  a  pure  science  of  Nature,  and  the 
problem  we  have  to  solve  is  to  explain  how  such  a 
science,  containing  a  body  of  necessary  and  universal 
principles,  can  be  accounted  for.  Nature  therefore 
must  mean  the  sum  of  knowable  objects,  and  the 
Science  of  Nature  the  necessary  principles  making 
them  knowable.    We  may,  in  fact,  say  that  our  pro- 


III.]     A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


63 


blem  is  to  justify,  if  that  be  possible,  those  necessary 
and  universal  propositions  which  the  scientific  man 
assumes  to  be  true,  and  which,  without  such  justifica- 
tion, can  only  be  a  matter  of  faith.  Now  the  objects 
to  which  a  science  of  Nature  applies  cannot  be  things 
the  nature  of  which  is  in  no  way  dependent  on  our 
thought,  for  this  assumption,  as  we  saw  above,  either 
prevents  us  from  accounting  for  our  knowledge  of 
reality  or  from  accounting  for  the  reality  of  our  know- 
ledge. But  while  of  things  in  themselves  we  can  have 
experience,  it    does    not  follow    that  everything 


no 


which  comes  within  our  experience  is  real.  Because 
only  phenomena  are  capable  of  being  known,  it  does 
not  follow  that  all  that  appears  to  be  true  really  is 
true.  There  are  real  phenomena,  and  phenomena  that 
are  mere  illusions,  and  again  phenomena  that  are  true 
only  for  the  sensitive  individual.  These  distinctions, 
however,  do  not  in  any  way  affect  the  question  as  to 
the  conditions  of  real  knowledge.  Whether  a  judg- 
ment is  true  only  when  limited  to  the  individual  as 
sensitive,  or  applies  to  objects  as  external ;  or  whether 
again  a  judgment  about  a  matter  of  fact  is  only  pro- 
bable or  certain ;  these  are  questions  for  the  sciep.tific 
specialist  to  determine  :  our  concern  is  solely  to  show 
the  possibility  of  apodictic  judgments  in  regard  to 
nature  from  an  examination  of  the  conditions  of  there 
being  any  real  knowledge.  It  will,  however,  aid  us  in 
solving  our  special  problem,  if  we  first  consider  the 
difference  between  those  judgments  which  the  scientific 
man  reg£|,rds  as  existing  laws  of  nature,  and  those 
which  have  not  reached  this  degree  of  scientific  cer- 
tainty. The  former  we  may  call  Judgments  of  Ex- 
perience, the  latter  Judgments  of  Perception.  Real 
experience  always  consists  in  judgments  as  to  objects 


64 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS 


[chap. 


that  are  true  not  merely  in  reference  to  the  sensitive 
nature  of  a  particular  individual,  but  in  relation  to  real 
things.  We  never  in  any  of  our  judgments  which  deal 
with  observed  objects,  come  into  contact  with  things  in 
themselves.  This  is  an  utter  impossibility,  because,  as 
we  have  seen,  things  in  themselves  cannot  possibly 
come  within  the  range  of  our  observation.  Were  there 
nothing  rise,  the  fact  that  Space  and  Time  are  simply 
forms  of  our  perception,  not  real  things  or  real  qualities 
of  things,  must  prevent  us  from  ever  observing  any- 
thing but  phenomena.  Even  the  simplest  perception  is 
therefore  not  the  perception  of  a  thing  in  itself,  but  only 
of  a  phenomenon.  But  this  is  in  no  way  inconsistent 
with  the  fact  that  our  first  judgments  as  to  phenomena 
are  only  provisional.  Now  these  judgments  we  may 
call  Judgments  of  Perception,  not  because  they  deal 
with  phenomena,  while  judgments  of  experience  deal 
with  things  in  themselves — for  both  alike  are  limited  to 
phenomena — but  because  the  former  class  of  judgments 
do  not  go  beyond  the  observation  of  phenomena  as  they 
ifirst  present  themselves  to  us  in  apparent  independence 
of  each  other,  while  the  second  and  higher  class  of 
judgments  imply  a  more  thorough  comparison  and  con- 
nexion of  phenomena,  and  therefore  the  arrangement  of 
them  under  the  categories  of  relation.  In  the  one  case 
we  take  things  as  they  first  present  themselves  to  us  in 
their  apparent  disconnexion  ;  in  the  other  we  go  be- 
yond this  first  view  of  things,  and  find  out  how  they 
are  related  to  each  other.  All  our  common-sense 
observations  of  things  are,  in  the  first  instance,  judg- 
ments of  perception,  which  can  attain  to  the  rank  of 
judgments  of  experience  only  by  scientific  investigation. 
Every  instance  of  a  judgment  about  a  mere  matter  of 
fact  is  a  judgment  of  perception  ;  every  discovery  of  a 


I 


CHAP. 


III.]     A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


66 


sitive 
3  real 
L  deal 
igs  in 
se,  as 
ssibly 
there 
imply 
alities 
:  any- 
tion  is 
it  only 
aistent 
omena 
e  may 
y  deal 
36  deal 
ited  to 
ments 
-s  they 
idencti 
ass  of 
A  con- 
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\\Q  case 
io  us  in 
go  be- 
they 
i-sense 

|ank  of 
^ration. 
Itter  of 
ry  of  a 


law  regulating  matters  of  fact  is  a  judgment  of  experi- 
ence. "  All  our  judgments,"  as  Kant  says,  "  are  at 
first  mere  perceptive  judgments."  In  other  words, 
when  we  look  at  the  gradual  way  in  which  our  know- 
ledge of  phenomena  of  nature  grows  up,  we  see  that, 
in  the  order  of  time,  judgments  of  perception  go  before 
judgments  of  experience.  Now  ^  judgment  of  experi- 
ence is  a  judgment  which  we  regard  as  true,  not  merely 
of  this  or  that  individual,  but  of  all  individuals ;  we 
regard  it  as  universally  and  necessarily  valid.  Thus 
judgments  of  experience,  ^W  because  they'are  regarded 
as  universally  and  necessarily  true,  we  conceive  to  be 
objective.  Judgments  of  perception,  of  course,  refer  to 
objects,  but  they  are  not  objective,  because  they  are  not 
proved  to  be  necessarily  and  universally  true  for  all 
human  intelligences  under  all  circumstances. 

Let  us  take  one  or  two  illustrations.  When  I  say 
This  room  is  warm,  I  do  not  make  a  judgment  that  is 
true  for  every  one,  but  only  one  that  is  true  for  myself 
as  a  particular  sensitive  individual,  and  only  for  me  so 
long  as  my  sensitive  organism  is  in  a  particular  state. 
Here,  then,  we  have  a  mere  judgment  of  perception. 
This,  indeed,  is  not  the  best  instance  that  could  be  given, 
for  it  is  evident  that  such  a  judgment  could  never 
become  a  judgment  of  experience,  because  heat  does 
not  exist  in  external  objects  apart  from  their  relation  to 
our  sensitive  organization.  It  may,  however,  serve  to 
illustrate  what  a  judgment  of  experience  is  not.  Here 
is  a  much  better  instance.  When  I  sav  "  The  air  is 
elastic,"  I  do  not,  in  the  first  instance,  mean  more  than 
that  a  certain  phenomenon  recognized  by  relation  to 
my  senses  is  associated  in  my  observation  with  a  certain 
property  ^Iso  relative  to  my  senses.  But  when  by 
scientific  observation  I  find  that  "  elasticity  "  is  bound 


E 


66 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


up  with  the  very  nature  of  air,  my  judgment  of  percep- 
tion passes  into  a  judgment  of  experience.  Or  again,  I 
observe  a  stone  to  grow  warm,  and  I  observe  that  this 
takes  place  when  the  sun  shines  upon  it.  But  it  may 
be  that  these  two  phenomena  are  not  really  connected 
with  each  other  but  only  happen  to  follow  each  other 
in  my  observation.  Until,  therefore,  I  have  proved  by 
scientific  observation  that  the  heat  in  the  stone  is  com- 
municated by  the  sun,  I  am  only  entitled  to  say  :  So 
far  as  I  can  see,  the  sun  is  the  cause  of  the  stone  grow- 
ing warm ;  I  cannot  say,  The  sun  is  the  cause  of  the 
stone  growing  warm.  In  the  one  case,  I  make  a  judg- 
ment of  perception  ;  in  the  other,  a  judgment  of  experi- 
ence. Now  it  will  be  seen  that  in  passing  from  a 
judgment  of  perception  to  a  judgment  of  experience, 
I  bring  into  play  a  connecting  conception — in  the 
cases  mentioned,  the  conception  of  cause.  The  ques- 
tion, therefore,  for  transcendental  philosophy  is  to  show 
of  what  nature  such  conceptions  must  be,  if  we  are  to 
account  for  necessary  and  universal  judgments.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  science  does  suppose  itself  to  be 
entitled  to  make  such  judgments,  and  that  in  doing  so, 
it  brings  into  operation  certain  conceptions.  The  ques- 
tion, therefore,  for  us  is  to  show,  if  we  can,  how  there 
can  be  conceptions  entitling  us  to  make  judgments 
about  real  objects,  i.e.,  to  form  a  priori  synthetical 
judgments  of  experience.^ 

We  have  seen,  then,  that  by  Nature  is  to  be  under- 
stood the  sum  of  knowable  objects  as  determined  by 
certain  universal  and  necessary  judgments.  Nature,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  external  nature,  means  not  determinate 


I 


'  So  far  the  Prolegomena,  §§  14-20,  is  in  this  chapter  followed.  With  the  above 
account  of  the  distinction  between  judgments  of  perception  and  judgments  of 
experience  compare  Caird's  Philosophy  of  Kant,  pp.  354  S,  .     ' 


III.]     A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  KNOWLEDGE.       07 

things  existing  apart  from  our  intolligenco,  but  those 
real  objects  connected  by  apodiciic  judgments  with 
which  physical  science  has  to  do.  Kant,  in  other 
words,  accepts  the  judgments  of  science  as  distinguished 
from  the  non-scientific  judgments  of  ordinary  conscious- 
ness, and,  pointing  out,  in  accordance  with  the  conclu- 
sions established  in  the  Esthetic ^  that  all  known 
objects,  and  therefore  the  objects  of  science,  are  pheno- 
mena, he  translates  the  question,  "  How  is  a  pure 
science  of  Nature  possible  ? "  into  the  form,  "  How  are 
judgments  of  experience  possible  1 "  His  problem, 
therefore,  is  not  to  establish  the  fact  that  there  are 
u/  j/dgments  of  experience — judgments  which,  as  neces- 
'  sarily  and  universally  true,  are  "  objective,"  in  his 
sense  of  the  term — but  to  explain,  if  possible,  hoio  we 
can  have  such  judgments.  This  is  the  same  question  in 
a  more  specific  form  than  that  with  which  he  started, 
viz..  How  are  synthetical  judgments  a  prion  possible  ? 
All  these  ways  of  putting  his  problem  he  has  :  How  is 
real  knowledge  possible  ?  How  are  synthetic  judg- 
ments a  pnon  possible  ?  How  is  a  science  of  Nature 
possible  ?  How  are  judgments  of  experience  possible  ? 
and  even,  How  are  objects  possible  ?  Put  the  problem 
as  we  please,  it  always  comes  back  to  this,  How  can  we 
justify  the  conviction  held  by  every  one,  and  empha- 
sized by  science,  that  our  knowledge  is  not  a  mere 
combination  of  coherent  fictions,  but  a  knowledge  of 
actual  existences  ? 

Now  the  especial  difficulty  in  answering  this  ques- 
tion arises  from  the  apparent  impossibility  of  showing 
that  judgments  which  rest  upon  conceptions  can  yet 
pply  to  real  things.  But,  taking  the  hint  from  what 
we  have  already  discovered  as  to  the  basis  of  mathe- 
matics, we  may  expect  to  find  the  solution  in  explaining 


^l 


68 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


things  from  the  nature  of  thought,  not  thought  from 
the  nature  of  things.  In  any  case,  our  problem  is  to 
account  for  real  or  objective  judgments,  and  hence  an 
analysis  of  our  faculty  of  judgment  ought  to  give  us  the 
clue  to  the  a  pnori  conceptions  of  thought,  if  there  are 
such,  as  we  cannot  doubt  there  are.  I  need  hardly 
say  that  Kant,  accepting  so  far  the  analysis  of  ordinary 
logic,  endeavours  to  reason  back  from  the  distinctions 
he  thus  obtains  to  the  pure  conceptions  or  categories 
which  are  to  serve  as  the  basis  of  objective  judgments. 
This  way  of  discovering  the  categories  is  evidently  in 
harmony  with  Kant's  general  method  of  seeking  for  a 
hypothesis  which  shall  adequately  explain  the  facts  of 
experience.  Just  as  the  judgments  of  mathematics  and 
physics  are  made  the  starting  point  from  which  phil- 
osophy has  to  work  back  to  the  ultimate  conditions  of 
knowledge,  so  the  common  analysis  of  judgments,  which 
is  assumed  to  be  correct  within  its  own  sphere,  is  used 
as  the  stepping-stone  to  the  pure  conceptions  which 
express  the  ultimate  nature  of  thought.  That  we  do 
make  real  judgments  no  one  doubts  ;  and  that  there  are 
certain  formal  rules  or  laws  to  which  thought  must 
conform,  formal  logic  has  shown ;  and  hence  we  may 
state  the  special  problem  now  to  be  solved  in  .this  way, 
What  are  the  ultimate  forms  of  unity  belonging  to  the 
constitution  of  our  intelligence,  in  so  far  as  it  is  not 
perceptive  but  thinking  ?  In  the  Esthetic,  the  neces- 
sary element  implied  in  our  knowledge  of  individual 
things  considered  as  simply  existing  in  space  and  time 
was  determined  ;  now  we  wish  to  know  what  is  the 
necessary  element  which  introduces  unity  into  all  our 
knowledge.  And  this  element  must  of  course  be  sup- 
plied by  thought,  not  by  sense.  Now  as  all  acts  of 
thought  may  be  reduced  to  judgment,  an  analysis  of 


#. 


III.]      A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


69 


the  various  forms  of  judgment  must  enable  us  to  find 
out  the  pure  conceptions  which  bring  unity  into  real 
knowledge.  This  analysis  we  find  ready  to  our  hands 
in  formal  logic.  Concentrating  itself  upon  the  faculty 
of  thought,  and  leaving'to  metaphysic  the  determination 
of  the  supreme  conditions  of  knowledge,  formal  logic 
asks  what  are  the  laws  by  which  the  understanding  is 
guided,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  in  the  actual  pro- 
cess of  knowing.  Nowjudgmentjs  the  act  of  thought 
by_which  various  representations  are  reduced  Jbo  unity 
by  being  brought  under  a  common  representation.  And 
unity  of  representation  may  be  brought  about  either  in 
the  way  of  (1)  quantity,  (2)  quality,  (3)  relation,  or 
(4)  modality.  (1)  Every  conception  is  capable  of  being 
made  the  predicate  in  a  judgment,  and  as  a  universal, 
it  is  a  possible  predicate  of  various  judgments.  And  as 
in  judging  we  may  either  bring  the  whole  of  the  indi- 
viduals denoted  by  the  subject,  or  only  some  of  them, 
or  again  a  single  concrete  individual,  under  the  concep- 
tion taken  as  predicate,  judgments  in  respect  of  quantity 
are  either  universal,  or  particular,  or  individual.  It  is 
true  that  formal  logic  practically  treats  the  individual 
judgment  as  universal,  and  therefore  divides  judg- 
ments into  those  whose  quantity  is  universal  and  those 
whose  quantity  is  particular ;  but  this  elimination  of 
the  individual  judgment,  which  is  perfectly  justifiable 
when  we  abstract  from  all  the  content  of  knowledge 
and  deal  only  with  the  relation  of  whole  and  part,  is 
not  admissible  when  we  use  the  functions  of  judgment 
as  a  clue  to  all  the  modes  of  unity  belonging  to  the 
constitution  of  thought.  In  real  knowledge  the  indi- 
vidual cannot  be  identified  with  the  universal,  and 
hence  there  must  belong  to  thought  a  form  correspond- 
ing to  the  individual.     In  the  universal  judgment,  then. 


70 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


I 


i> 


the  sphere  of  one  conception  is  completely  enclosed  by 
the  sphere  of  another  conception  ;  in  the  particular,  a 
part  of  the  one  is  within  the  sphere  of  the  other ;  and 
in  the  individual,  a  conception  which,  as  indivisible,  has 
no  sphere  of  its  own,  is  enclosed  within  the  sphere  of 
another  conception,  (2)  As  to  quality,  judgments  are 
affirmative,  negative,  or  infinite.  Here  again  formal 
logic  rejects,  and  rightly  rejects,  the  infinite  judgment, 
because  there  is  nothing  gained  by  distinguishing  the 
infinite  from  the  affirmative  judgment  when  we  are  not 
determining  the  conditions  of  real  knowledge.  In  the 
affirmative  judgment,  the  subject  is  thought  of  as  within 
the  sphere  of  the  predicate  ;  in  the  negative  as  without 
the  sphere  of  the  predicate  ;  while  in  the  infinite  judg- 
ment, the  subject  is  placed  within  the  sphere  of  one  con- 
ception and  at  the  same  time  is  excluded' from  the  sphere 
of  another  conception.  T'  .e  distinction  of  affirmative 
and  negative  judgments  is  familiar  to  every  one  ;  but  a 
ini't7Li(  c  word  may  be  said  about  the  negative  judgment.  In 
the  proposition,  "  The  soul  is  not  mortal,"  the  subject 
"  soul"  is  placed  within  the  class  "  not  mortal,"  and  is 
therefore  so  far  affirmative ;  but  on  the  other  hand,  it 
is  excluded  from  the  class  '*  mortal,"  and  is  therefore  in 
a  sense  negative.  The  infinite  judgment  thus  depends 
upon  a  function  of  thought  distinct  from  those  functions 
manifested  in  the  affirmative  and  negative  judgments ; 
and  hence  it  must  be  taken  note  of  in  our  attempt  to 
discover  all  the  pure  conceptions  which  the  functions  of 
thought  in  judgment  presuppose.  (3)  Besides  quantity 
and  quality,  judgments  r.re  distinguished  as  to  relation, 
i.e.,  as  categorical,  hypotlietical  and  disjunctive.  In 
the  first,  we  have  the  relation  of  two  conceptions ;  in 
the  second,  of  two  judgments,  and  in  the  third  of  several 
judgments,  separate  from  each  other  and  yet  combined 


III.]      A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  KNOWLEDGE.       71 


lotions 

lents ; 
ipt  to 
>ns  of 
mtity 

[ation, 
In 
;  in 
jveral 

Ibined 


into  a  whole.  (4)  Modality  is  a  distinction  of  judg- 
ments that  has  reference  merely  to  the  relation  be- 
tween our  knowledge  and  reality.  Here  judgments 
are  classified  as  problematic,  asserti^tive  and  apodictic, 
according  as  they  affirm  possibility,  actuality,  or  neces- 
sity of  the  objects  of  thought.^ 

Starting,  then,  from  the  forms  of  judgment  as  syste- 
matized by  formal  logic,  we  are  enabled  to  discover  the 
pure  conceptions  which  they  presuppose.  Whatever 
differences  there  may  be  in  the  objects  judged  of, 
thought  must  conform  to  certain  general  rules,  on  pain 
of  falling  into  contradiction  with  itself,  and  destroying 
even  the  possibility  of  true  judgments.  We  cannot, 
indeed,  from  a  consideration  of  the  forms  of  judgment, 
tell  whether  a  given  conception  represents  a  real  or  a 
fictitious  object,  but  we  can  tell  what  relations  vt  bears 
to  another  conception  also  given  to  us.  The  conception 
of  "  body,"  e.g.y  as  the  product  of  comparison,  reflection 
and  abstraction,  we  may  bring  into  relation  with  the 
conception  "  metal,"  and  so  determine  the  judgment 
thus  formed  in  respect  of  quantity  and  quality.  Now 
the  fact  that  in  such  analytical  judgments  we  determine 
abstract  conceptions  to  certain  relations,  shows  us  t/iat 
our  understanding  has  these  functic\:)s  as  belonging  to 
its  constitution  or  inner  nature.  Tiie  "niatter"  of  con- 
ceptions and  judgments  must  no  doubt  be  given  to 
thought,  but  the  rules  observed  by  thought  in  combin- 
ing conceptions  into  judgmeiify  n\ust  belong  to  thought 
itself.  It  is  therefore  plain  that  in  these  functions  of 
judgment  we  have  the  key  to  the  explanation  of  the 
conditions  of  knowledge,  so  far  as  knowledge  is  related 
to  thought  as  distinguished  from  sense.  All  real  know- 
ledge  must   at   the   very   least  conform  to  the  laws 

•  Prolegomena,  §  21 .    KrUik,  §  9.     Logik,  §§  20-25, 


l! 


1 


ft  KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLIS.  ^''  CRITICS.        [chap. 

binding  upon  thought  as  displayed  in  judgments. 
Hence,  just  as  formal  logic,  by  an  analysis  of  the  judg- 
ments we  make  in  our  ordinary  and  scientific  knowledge, 
is  able  to  discover  the  functions  by  which  unity  is  pro- 
duced in  our  conceptions  ;  so,  by  reasoning  back  from 
these  functions  of  judgment,  we  may  discover  all  the 
ultimate  conceptions  which  are  essential  to  the  consti- 
tution of  real  knowledge ,  we  may,  in  other  words, 
reach  to  the  pure  conceptions  which  such  knowledge 
presupposes.  While  the  combination  of  conceptions  in 
the  analytical  judgment  is  quite  a  different  thing  from 
the  combination  of  the  manifold  of  sense  by  which  real 
objects  are  at  first  made  knowable,  it  is  not  less  true 
that  the  functions  of  judgment  manifested  in  each  of 
these  modes  of  combination,  do  not  vary,  but  are  neces- 
sarily the  same  in  both.  "The  same  function,"  says 
Kant,  "  which  gives  unity  to  the  various  representations 
in  a  judgment,  also  gives  unity  to  the  mere  synthcais 
of  various  representations  in  a  perception ;  and  this 
unity,  expressed  generally,  is  a  pure  conception  of 
thought.  Thought  at  once  gives  analytical  unity  to 
conceptions,  and  synthetical  unity  to  the  manifold  of 
perception  in  general ;  and  indeed  the  logical  form  of 
judgment  presupposes  and  rests  upon  the  very  same 
acts  of  thought  as  those  by  which  a  transcendental 
content  is  given  to  our  various  representations.  Hence 
it  is  tha  the  pure  conceptions  of  thought,  as  they  are 
appropriately  called,  apply  a  pnon  to  objects."  *  That 
is  to  say,  the  act  by  which,  in  an  analytical  judgment, 
we  subsume  one  conception  under  another  of  higher 
generality,  implies  the  exercise  of  a  function  of  unity 
belonging  to  the  nature  of  thought  itself ;  and  having, 
by  analysis  of  our  actual  judgments,  discovered  this 

•  Kritih,  §  10,  p.  99. 


t  „ 


[chap. 


III.]      A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  KNOWLEDGE.       73 


function  to  belong  to  our  understanding,  we  may  be 
sure  that  in  the  actual  process  of  knowing  real  objects 
the  same  function  has  been  exercised.  Now,  as  the 
content  of  our  judgments  must  have  been  obtained  by 
synthesis,  and  not  by  analysis — since  analysis  does  not 
supply  or  add  to  our  knowledge,  but  merely  brings 
into  clearness  what  we  already  know — we  at  once  see 
that  there  are  certain  pure  conceptions  belonging  to  the 
form  of  thought,  which  are  the  necessary  conditions  of 
unity  in  our  knowledge  of  real  objects  and  of  their  con- 
nexions. The  functions  of  unity  in  judgments,  as 
systematized  in  formal  logic,  therefore  point  unerringly 
to  the  pure  conceptions  or  categories  by  which  the  unity 
of  the  known  world  is  produced.  The  table  of  categor- 
ies, as  we  may  be  sure,  is  complete,  because  it  is  ob- 
tained from  an  analysis  of  all  the  functions  of  thought 
as  exhibited  in  judgments.  It  was  because  Aristotle 
did  not  deduce  his  categories  from  the  nature  of  thought 
itself,  but  simply  gathered  together  those  conceptions 
which  struck  him,  and  which  seemed  to  him  to  be  prim- 
ary, that  his  list  is  at  once  redundant  and  defective.  Con- 
tenting himself  with  simply  gathering  together  those 
conceptions  which  he  happened  to  hit  upon,  and  which 
seemed  to  be  primary,  it  is  not  surprising  that  he  should 
omit  some  categories  altogether,  and  include  others 
that  are  not  primary  but  derivative  (action,  passion), 
as  well  as  an  empirical  conception  (motion),  and  mere 
modes  of  time  (when,  where,  position).  Let  us  see, 
then,  what  are  the  pure  conceptions  or  categories.vas 
implied  in  the  various  functions  of  judgment  These 
will,  of  course,  like  judgments  theriselves,  come  imider 
the  heads  of  quantity,  quality,  relation,  and  modality. 

(1)  Judgments,  as  we  said,  are  in  quantity  universal, 
particular,  or  individual.     Now  the  corresponding  cate- 


74 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


gories  are  pure  forms  of  thought,  by  the  application  of 
which  to  the  mere  multiplicity  of  sense,  concrete  indi- 
viduals and  specific  connections  of  individuals,  are  con- 
stituted. By  reducing  to  the  unity  of  quantity  the 
manifold  of  sense,  objects  are  constituted  as  unities, 
pluralities,  or  totalities.  The  categories  of  quantity 
therefore  are  unity,  plurality,  totality.  (2)  The  quality 
of  judgments  is  affirmative,  negative,  or  :'nfinite.  The 
categories  presupposed,  as  conditions  of  unity  in  real 
existence  in  so  far  as  it  is  knowable,  must  account  for 
the  afiirmation,  the  denial  or  the  partial  aflfirmatiou  ,nd 
partial  denial  of  objects ;  and  hence  we  have  as  categi  - 
ies,  reality  (existence  to  be  affirmed),  negation  (existence 
to  be  denied),  and  limitation  (existence  partly  to  be 
affirmed,  partly  denied).  (3)  Ay  ()  rcZa^/o/i,  judgments 
are  categorical,  hypothetical,  and  disjunctive.  Now  a 
categorical  proposition  affirms  the  relation  of  a  given 
predicate  to  a  given  subject ;  and  if  we  regard  this 
relation  as  real,  and  not  simply  logical,  we  have  the 
relation  of  a  real  subject  to  a  real  predicate,  i.e.,  we 
have  the  categority  of  substance  and  accident.  In  the 
hypothetical  judgment,  we  have  the  logical  relation  of 
antecedent  and  consequent ;  and  this,  when  viewed  as 
a  relation  between  real  objects  or  events,  is  the  category 
of  cause  and  effect.  Again,  in  a  disjunctive  judgment, 
we  have  the  logical  distinction  of  the  diffei  ent  parts  of 
a  conception  and  at  the  same  time  their  combination  ; 
and  this  relation  of  parts  and  whole,  when  taken  as 
applying  to  real  existence,  yields  the  category  of  recip- 
rocity. (4)  .'*:>,>  to  /.dOc/aZi^y,  judgments  are  problematic, 
assertative,  or  ppodictic.  A  .J  a  problematic  judgment 
as  to  real  objects  presupposes  the  category,  possibility 
— impossibility ;  an  assertion  as  to  reality  may  be  either 
affirmative  or  negative,  and  hence  the  category,  actu- 


III.]      A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  KNOWLEDGE.       76 


recip- 
[latic, 

lent 
)ility 
lither 

ictu- 


ality — non-actuality ;  and,  lastly,  an  apodictic  judg- 
ment, applicable  to  the  real  world,  either  asserts  that 
something  must  be,  or  denies  that  it  is  necessary,  and 
accordingly,  the  category  is  necessity — contingency.* 

Assuming,  then,  that  these  are  the  categories,  and 
all  the  categories,  the  next  point  is  to  justify  them,  i.e. 
to  show  how  they  serve  to  unify  knowledge.  This 
justification  or  "deduction"  of  the  categories  constitutes 
the  very  hoart  of  Kant's  theory  of  knowledge. 

The  misconception  that  determinate  objects  exist  as 
they  are  known  independently  of  any  relation  to  our 
faculty  of  knowing,  and  are  simply  taken  up  into  our 
minds  from  without,  has  been  partly  dissipated  in  the 
^Esthetic.  It  was  there  shown  that  known  objects  are 
not  independent  of  our  perceptive  faculty,  but  are  the 
product  of  the  pure  forms  of  space  and  time  as  applied 
to  impressions  of  sense.  Now  this  transfonns  our  ordi- 
nary view  of  things.  When  it  is  seen  that  known 
objects  are  not  independent  of  our  perceptive  faculty, 
the  dualism  of  consciousness  and  nature  is  replaced  by 
the  logical  distinction  of  internal  and  external  percep- 
tions. For  individual  objects  we  substitute  individual 
or  separate  impressions  of  sense,  only  existing  for  us 
as  perceptive  beings.  Similarly,  for  space  and  time 
as  realities  beyond  consciousness  we  substitute  space 
and  time  as  mere  potential  forms  belonging  to  the  con- 
stitution of  our  perceptive  faculty.  Thus  perception 
has  two  elements :  impressions  of  sense  as  the  "  matter  " 
of  perception,  and  space  and  time  as  the  "forms"  of 
perception.  Determinate  things  independent  of  con- 
sciousness, and  apprehended  as  they  are  in  their  own 
nai're,  transform  themselves  under  criticism  into  a 
"  matter  "  and  a  "  form  "  that  have  a  meaning  only  for 

'A'mJi,  §  10. 


76 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


I 


US  as  conscious  and  perceptive.  For  this  reason  Kant 
says  that  perceived  objects  become  for  the  critical 
philosopher  "simply  the  way  in  which  the  subject  is 
affected."  A  still  further  transformation  takes  place, 
when  we  examine  critically  into  the  relation  of  our 
thinking  faculty  to  objects.  For  all  thinking  or  judging 
is  a  purely  spontaneous  act  of  combination  (conjtmctio), 
as  distinguished  from  perception,  which  is  universally 
held  to  be  receptive.  On  the  ordinary  view,  thought 
or  understanding  combines  the  real  things  which  the 
senses  reveal  to  us,  or  the  real  lines,  figures,  &c.,  dealt 
with  by  mathematics,  and  this  act  of  combination  is 
judgment.  Even  from  the  ordinary  point  of  view, 
therefore,  thinking  is  a  process  of  combining  multi- 
plicity so  as  to  produce  unity.  The  critical  philosophy 
likewise  holds  that  thinking  or  judging  consists  in 
combining  multiplicity,  but  of  course  the  multiplicity 
combined  assumes  a  different  aspect.  We  cannot  say 
that  thought  combines  individual  objects  having  a  natulhe 
independent  of  our  knowledge,  for  the  main  result  or\ 
our  critical  investigation  in  the  Esthetic  is  to  show  that 
the  objects  which  we  know  are  not  independent  of  per- 
ception, but  are  resolvable  into  a  "matter"  of  sense  and 
two  potential  "forms  "  of  sense,  and  that  the  whole  per- 
'^  J.  ceived  object  exists  only  in  relation  to  consciousness.    It 

=  may  perhaps  be  thought  that  the  forms  of  sense  contain 
'^J^'f^luX*''^'^Ji^^  ^^^^^^^^^^  ^  faculty  of  combination,  and  that  in  co4 
•   *     i-f-^^-f'  /alescing  with  the  impressions  of  sense  they  yield  objectsj> 
known  as  arranged  in  space  and  time.     But  this  is  toi 

'^.v^attribute  to  a  mere  receptive  faculty  a  power  of  com-," 


::ri/r:; . -v^ 


„,,/,.^„^^,  r"'-^'.'bination  it  cannot  possibly  possess.  Moreover,  the: 
a, «/.;,  ^.t  'J  (■  s-^  forms  of  perception  are  in  themselves  mere  potentiali^t' 
o  t^C,i-^^  ^^'^  jti^j  they  must  not  be  confounded  even  with  mathen 
%':^Z''^'y^/ma.iica.\  figures — which  are  not  forms  of  perception  but 


fi,t  iU 


/,-» 


A,//- 


,(  *w 


.Utiitl. 


tk,. 


^'<TX, 


itr^  '^•f  '"^^ 


J^c,  ./^,J    fn^ 


'^  i.-,  .     ^..-  '^l'  ^■ 


I 


zi 


[chap. 

Kant 
ritical 
ect  is 
place, 
)f  our 
idging 
iictio), 
srsally 
lought 
ch  the 
,  dealt 
tion  is 
view, 
multi- 
osophy 
ists  in 
iplicity 
lot  say 
natu^ 
suit  oi\ 
»w  that 
of  per- 
ise  and 
e  per- 
ss.    It 
ontaiE 
in  coA 
jbjects^ 
is  to^ 
f  com-^ 
ir,   fch4 
jntiali-i 
nathe-^ 
n  but 


//' 


z/ 


f 


"  * . 


././ 


.L 


y^. 


.      ^^  ^r»--r     15-/ 


<  <'^  /'-.    / 


III.]      ^  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  KNOWLEDGE.       77 

determinations  of  those  forms — and  hence  they  are  not 
of  themselves  capable  of  arranging  sensations  in  space 
and  time.  The  only  combining  faculty  is  the  under- 
standing, and  the  "manifold"  which  is  to  be  combined 
is  either  impressions  of  sense  or  determinations  of  space 
and  time.  Into  this  manifold  or  multiplicity — this 
mere  difterence — the  understanding  by  its  combining 
activity  introduces  unity.  Now  this  leads  to  a  still 
further  transformation  of  the  common-sense  view  of 
things  than  that  effected  in  the  Esthetic.  If  known 
objects,  in  so  far  as  their  perceptive  element  is  con- 
cerned, are  resolvable  into  an  uncombined  manifold, 
thought  must  have  been  at  work  combining  that  mani- 
fold before  objects  can  be  known  as  objects  at  all. 
Thus,  whether  we  take  an  individual  object  as  a  sum  of 
properties,  or  two  or  more  individual  objects  as  con- 
nected in  experience,  we  must,  to  account  for  our 
knowledge,  suppose  thought  to  have  combined  the 
mere  manifold  of  perception  into  unity.  "Nothing,"  as 
Kant  says,  "is  thought  as  combined  in  any  object  which 
the  understanding  has  not  itself  previously  combined." 
Thus  the  ordinary  theory  of  perception  which  supposes 
individual  things  to  be  given  independently  of  thought, 
is  an  inversion  of  the  truth,  and  equally  the  ordinary 
view  of  judgment  as  a  mere  analysis  of  perceptions  or 
conceptions.  Analysis  presupposes  synthesis,  and  hence 
the  combining  activity  of  thought  is  exercised  even  in 
the  unconscious  combinations  which  take  place  in  the 
growth  of  our  knowledge,  and  not  merely,  as  common 
logic  supposes,  in  the  conscious  or  reflective  combina- 
tion of  perceptions  under  abstract  conceptions.  Now 
this  combining  of  multiplicity  by  thought  must  imply 
that  thought  is  in  its  own  nature  essentially  a  unity. 
From  the  uncritical  point  of  view,  the  combinations  of 


■\ 


_.^ 


n 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


It 


1;:- 


7'" 


.1.' : 


"l    ^ 
<«.i    ».i> 


thought  are  simply  the  external  comparinnr  of  two  or 
more  individual  things  supposed  to  be  know  n  in  percep- 
tion as  individuals  prior  to  the  comparison,  or  the 
arbitrary  arranging  of  one  conception  uncii'  r  another  of 
,  greater  extension.     The  product  of  such  external  cora- 
!  b'.aation  can  only  be  contingent.     I  combine  objects  in 
/  a  certain  way,  but  T  might  combine  them  in  any  other *:.-^.. 
way  I  pleased.     The  only  unity  therefuio  is  one  whIch.^L.„/!-/ 


'•''•  y  1^. r(!i(~  our  individual  reflection  must  be  supposed  arbitrarily 'f; ^,2* 
,J-  ^  i-'i~  "'  to  impose.  We  never  can  show  that  the  unity  which'^-'';'^^^ 
cii^.X'—'         we  suppose  to  exist  is  a  real  or  necessary  unity.     Our  /  ,,-~:t 


\u  Ati^^ 


suppose  to  exist  is  a  real  or  necessary  unity,     uur^ 

judgments  cannot  be  proved  to  be  objective.     The  only  -^^ 

L  '- ,  ,  t  '^z^  u-  way  therefore  in  which  the  unity  of  known  objects,    "~^ 

J.  A"  •^r,^ either  tiiken  separately  or  in  their  connection,  can  be 

•"'^^^j'^^^!^'^;*  established,  is  by  regaiding  thought  as  in  its  very 

hj' ''/ J  ^/^r  nature  a  unity,  and  as  therefore  capable  of  producing 

iu.f.'''^'*y    unity  in  known  existence.      That  this  must  be  so  is 


^"^I-Z^lI^"'  ■'J^^Q\''^^(iniirom.vfh.'a.i  has  already  been  said.     For  when 

^./lU-    ■>      known  objects,  in  so  far  as  they  are  relative  to  percep- 

,  tion,  aic  reduced  to  a  mere  multiplicity,  the  only  other 


Sill 


ihr        III  -  -  -  X  ./  '  u 

»/  uj:-^  :•  '  source  from  which  unity  can  come  is  thought  or  under- 
>''^; '/^'  'c^^,^^  standing.  The  unity,  then,  must  belong  to  the  very 
'i  t  *'<  J  nature  of  thought ;  and,  as  all  knowledge,  even  the 
simplest  and  least  reflective,  has  been  shown  to  imply 
the  combining  activity  of  thought,  it  follows  that 
thought  possesses  the  faculty  of  producing  unity,  be- 
cause it  is  itself  essentially  a  unity.  It  should  be 
observed  that  we  are  not  here  speaking  of  the  category 
of  unity.  That  category  is  a  special  application  of  the 
unity  of  thought  in  relation  to  objects,  not  the  unity  of 
thought  itself.  Can  we  then  show  how  thought  is  a  unity  ? 
The  answer  to  this  question  will  give  us  the  principle 
on  which  the  deduction  of  the  categories  must  proceed.* 


TICS.        [chap. 

n^  of  two  or 

)w  n  in  pcrcep- 

,rison,  or  the 

(!!'  r  another  of 

external  cora- 

DUie  objects  in 

1  in  any  other *-.<((.    ''-- 

-  IS  one  \i\Mfm,f  „.„(-> 

sed  arbitrarily 'i  ^.^ , 

e  unity  which^-jjj'^^;^ 

-y  unity.     Our^^nrr 

Lve.     The  only  -JJ--^** 

:nown  objects,   ~^ 

aection,  can  be 

IS  in  its  very 

3  of  producing 

must  be  so  is 

d.     For  when 

ive  to  percep- 

the  only  other 

lught  or  under- 
to  the  very 

Idge,  even  the 

Lown  to  imply 
follows  that 

\ing  unity,  be- 
lt should  be 
f  the  category 
iication  of  the 
»t  the  unity  of 
ightisaunity? 
the  principle 
lUst  proceed.* 


» 


III.]      A  PRIOR/  CONDITIONS  OF  KNOWLEDGE.        79 

In  our  ordinary  or  uncritical  consciousness,  we  do 
not  reflect  that  the  unity  of  thought  must  be  the  neces- 
sary condition  of  our  knowledge  of  real  things.  We 
suppose  on  the  contrary  that  things  as  they  are  in 
themselves  are  immediately  rtvealed  to  our  senses. 
We  have  an  igimediate  consciousness,  as  we  suppose, 
of  individual  things,  irrespective  altogether  of  any  unity 
introduced  by  our  consciou  ness  into  things.  "  The 
empirical  consciousness,  Vhich  accompanies  different 
ideas,  is  in  itself  scattere<  ^1  \  ithout  relation  to  the 
identity  of  the  subject."     1  t  words,  we  do  not  in 

our  ordinary  knowledge  know  what  is  the  principle 
which  makes  a  connected  knowledge  of  things  possible, 
but  simply  have  a  consciousness  of  now  one  thing  and 
then  another.  We  suppose  ourselves  to  be  immediately 
apprehending  things  as  independent  of  consciousness, 
and  hence  it  never  occurs  to  us  that  there  must  be  a 
unity  of  thought  in  our  knowledge  of  things.  We  have 
seen  however  that  we  must  seek  for  the  unity  of  know- 
ledge in  the  nature  of  thought  as  combining  the 
detached  multiplicity  of  perception.  Now  it  may  easily 
be  shown  that  such  a  unity  is  presupposed  in  ordinary 
consciousness.  My  knowledge  must  be  so  connected 
in  all  its  parts  as  to  form  a  rounded  whole  or  it  would 
not  be  knowledge  at  all.  If  it  were  not  connected  by 
a  central  unity,  I  should  have  no  connected  knowledge  : 
an  idea  that  I  cannot  bring  into  unity  with  other  ideas 
is  an  absurdity ;  or  at  leust,  granting  its  possibility,  it 
is  nothing  at  all  for  knowledge.  I  must  therefore, 
consciously  or  unconsciously,  connect  all  my  ideas  in  a^,  >^ 
unity.  On  any  other  supposition,  I  should  have  "  Si^^^l'^/^^-^ i^-^ 
self  as  many-coloured  and  varivVus  as  the  ideas  I  have." "  *'^V  ^ftS.^^ 
Each  of  my  ideas  must  therefore  be  connected  with^-^'-A^/*^^ 
every  other.     Hence  there  must  be  a  single  self  as  theJ^^L -/il'^t^ 


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23  WIST  MAIN  STSIET 

WEBSTH.N.Y.  14S80 

(716)  •72-4503 


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80 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


condition  of  there  being  for  me  a  faculty  of  thinking,  a 
faculty  of  reducing  multiplicity  to  unity.  We  can  see 
this  by  taking  any  idea  we  please.  Suppose,  e.g.,  I 
have  the  idea  "red."  Now  I  can  be  conscious  of 
"  red"  only  in  contrast  to  some  other  idea,  and  hence  I 
must  in  being  conscious  of  "red,"  relate  it  to  other 
ideas  previously  experienced.  Thus  the  fact  that  I 
have  a  connected  consciousness  of  things  necessarily 
presupposes  that  there  is  a  supreme  unity  connecting 
them.  This  unity  is  manifebtly  the  unity  of  the  self 
as  the  principle  of  connection.  The  conception  of  the 
self  as  the  condition  of  all  synthesis  is  the  supreme 
principle  of  all  thinking ;  it  is  in  fact,  as  we  may  say, 
thought  itself.  It  must  be  observed,  however,  that  it  is 
only  as  the  condition  of  the  connection  of  the  manifold 
of  perception  that  the  "J"  is  synthetical:  I  =  I  is  a  merely 
analytical  or  identical  proposition;  "  I "  as  the  supreme 
unity  making  the  unity  of  conscious  experience  possible 
is  alone  sjmthetical.  THTs  shows  that  our  thought  can- 
not operate  of  itself,  but  only  in  relation  to  the  manifold 
of  sense  :  in  other  words,  as  supplying  only  an  element 
of  knowledge  it  of  itself  gives  no  knowledge.  Thought 
cannot  perceive  any  more  than  sense  can  think,  and 
hence  known  objects  would  be  nothing  were  the  ele- 
ment contributed  by  either  faculty  absent.^ 

We  have  seen  above  that  thinking  is  judging,  and 
that,  reasoning  back  from  the  various  forms  of  judg- 
ment as  classified  by  formal  logic,  we  get  the  funda- 
mental forms  or  functions  />f  unity,  which  we  call  the 
categories.  And  as  the  /manifold  of  perception  can 
only  be  reduced  to  unitv^'by  reference  to  the  synthetical 
unity  of  self-consciousr^ss  as  the  supreme  condition  of 
thought,  it  of  course  follows  that  the  manifold  of  pilr- 

^  KrUih,  §  16. 


III.]     A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  KNOWLEDGE.       81 


ception  which  is  to  be  reduced  to  unity  or  objectivity 
must  stand  under  the  categories.  It  must  be  observed, 
however,  that  the  categories  are  in  themselves  only  the 
formal  conditions  of  the  combination  of  the  manifold 
of  perception,  and  do  not  originate  the  manifold  which 
they  are  capable  of  combining.  A  perceptive  under- 
standing may  not  be  impossible,  but  such  is  not 
the  nature  of  human  intelligence.  A  manifold  must 
therefore  be  supplied  to  the  categories  before  they  can 
possibly  operate,  and  this  manifold,  as  we  have  seen, 
belongs  to  us  as  receptive  or  sensuous  beings.  Now 
a  manifold  of  perception  may  be  either  pure  or  mate- 
rial :  i.  c,  it  may  be  either  a  determination  of  space 
and  time  as  in  mathematics,  or  it  may  imply  ijn 
addition  those  sensuous  impressions  which  give  to  us 
the  concrete  element  of  real  objects.  The  categories 
can  certainly  operate  on  pure  perceptions,  but  in 
doing  so  they  do  not  give  us  any  knowledge  of  Nature 
as  the  sum  of  real  objects.  Mathematics  deals  only 
with  the  determinations  of  the  forms  of  perception 
and  therefore  of  perceivable  objects,  not  with  real 
objects  themselves  :  its  judgments  are  universally  and 
necessarily  true,  supposing  real  objects  to  exist,  but  not 
otherwise.  Besides  the  categories  and  the  forms  of 
perception,  the  possibility  of  objective  judgments  or 
judgments  of  experience  therefore  implies  that  a  mani- 
fold of  sensuous  impressions  is  given  to  the  categories 
to  operate  upon.  And  this  shows  not  only  how  a 
science  of  nature  is  possible,  but  what  are  the  limits  to 
our  possible  knowledge.  No  doubt  thought  could 
combine  any  manifold  supplied  to  it;  but  this  mere 
possibility  is  useless  for  us,  since  the  only  manifold  we 
can  have  is  a  manifold  of  sense.  The  limit  of  our 
knowledge  is  therefore  fixed  by  the  compulsion  we  are 


83 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


under  of  obtaining  a  manifold  of  sense  before  we  can 
give  determination  to  our  conceptions.  A  non-sensuous 
object  is  thinkable  only  as  that  which  is  not  a  real 
object  of  knowledge :  it  can  be  defined  only  by  negative 
predicates,  and  therefore  cannot  be  known  to  be  real.^ 

We  have  now  so  far  determined  the  elements  which 
real  knowledge  implies,  and  marked  out  its  boundaries. 
There  must  be  a  manifold  of  sense,  referred  to  the  "  I " 
as  the  supreme  principle,  and  standing  under  the  forms 
of  space  and  time,  which  again  stand  under  the  cate- 
gories as  functions  of  unity.  But  while  all  these 
elements  are  necessarily  implied  in  our  knowledge 
of  real  objects,  there  is  still  a  difficulty  in  seeing  what 
hinds  the  difierent  elements  together.  For  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  manifold  of  sense  when  taken  in 
its  abstraction  is  merely  a  number  of  blind  or  isolated 
points,  having  no  principle  of  unity  in  them.  It  must 
further  be  remembered  that  the  forms  of  space  and  time 
are  in  themselves  mere  potentialities  having  neither 
unity  nor  determinateness.  In  like  manner  the  cate- 
goiies  are  forms  of  unity,  but  they  also  are  in  themselves 
mere  potentialities,  which  can  be  called  unities  only  on 
supposition  that  they  can  be  called  into  exercise.  And 
lastly,  the  "  I  "  is  in  itself  a  pure,  dead  identity  ;  it  is 
the  condition  which  must  be  presupposed  before  we 
can  possibly  explain  how  unity  comes  into  knowledge, 
but  it  is  powerless  to  account  of  itself  for  actual  know- 
ledge. The  manifold  of  sense,  the  forms  of  space  and 
time,  and  the  categories,  are  in  short  abstract  elements 
of  knowledge ;  but  in  no  one  of  them,  nor  in  the  whole 
of  them  taken  together,  do  we  find  that  wh  accounts 
for  the  actual  movement  of  thought  in  the  snowing  of 

'  Kritik,  §§  18-23.     A  fuller  disci^ion  of  the  limitations  of  our  knowledge 
will  be  found  in  Chapter  x. 


[chap. 

we  can 
snsuous 
a  real 
legative 
3  real.* 
s  which 
ndaries. 
the  "I" 
le  forms 
the  cate- 
lU  these 
lowledge 
ing  what 
must  be 
taken  in 
isolated 
It  must 
and  time 
neither 
he  cate- 
emselves 
I  only  on 
je.    And 
)y  ;  it  is 
ifore  we 
jowledge, 
A  know- 
ace  and 
ilements 
e  whole 
accounts 
wing  of 

knowledge 


III.]      A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  KNOWLEDGE.       83 

real  objects.  Wherein  then  shall  we  find  this  principle 
of  movement  ?  Kant  finds  it  in  the  pure  Imagination, 
which  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  Imagination  in  the 
psychological  sense,  since  it  does  not  reproduce  its 
objects,  but  produces  or  constructs  them.  Its  function 
is  to  determine  the  forms  of  space  and  time  in  certain 
universal  ways,  under  guidance  of  the  categories  and 
in  relation  to  a  given  manifold  of  sense.  It  is  thus 
the  necessary  medium  between  the  purely  intellectual 
forms  of  thought  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  purely 
perceptive  forms  of  space  and  time,  together  with  the 
differences  of  sense,  on  the  other  hand.* 

So  far  we  have  been  directing  our  attention  mainly 
to  nature  in  its  external  aspect ;  and  we  must  now 
show  how  the  deduction  of  the  categories  affects  the 
knowledge  of  self  as  an  object.  It  was  mentioned 
before  that  self  as  known  is  not  self  as  it  exists  apart 
from  our  human  faculties  of  knowing,  if  for  no  other 
reason  than  that  all  determinate  objects,  and  therefore 
the  self  as  the  subject  of  determinate  states,  are  only 
knowable  under  the  form  of  tim^.  This  is  quite  a 
different  view  from  that  held  by  the  dogmatic  philoso- 
phers, according  to  whom  the  self  is  an  immediate 
object  of  consciousness,  or,  in  other  words,  a  thing  in 
itself.  Kant,  on  the  other  hand,  holds  that  the  self 
as  the  supreme  condition  of  the  unity  of  knowledge  is 
not  identical  with  the  self  given  as  an  object  of  know- 
ledge. This  follows  from  the  account  of  the  conditions 
of  the  knowledge  of  real  objects.  Thought  is  purely  a 
faculty  of  combination,  and  requires  to  have  the  mani- 
fold of  perception  supplied  to  it  before  it  can  operate. 
Perception  has  two  elements,  the  pure  forms  and  the 
sensuous  material,  which  are  brought  into  relation  with 

>  Krltih,  1 24.    See  below,  p.  86  ff. 


84 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


each  other  and  with  the  categories  through  the  figur- 
ative synthesis  of  pure  imagination.  Now  imagina- 
tion as  determining  the  manifold  in  relation  to  time, 
the  pure  form  of  inner  sense,  makes  possible  the  con- 
sciousness of  self  as  existing  in  determinate  states. 
But  imagination  cannot  operate  except  in  accordance 
with  the  categories  :  the  "  figurative "  implies  the 
"intellectual"  synthesis.  Hence  the  self  is  only 
knowable  as  co-relative  to  the  object :  i.e.,  the  same 
synthetical  process  which  determines  external  (pheno- 
menal) objects  also  determines  the  self  as  an  in- 
ternal (phenomenal)  object.  The  "I"  as  a  concrete 
object  of  knowledge  must  therefore  be  carefully  dis- 
tinguished from  the  synthetical  "  I,"  which  as  the 
source  of  the  ct^egories  is  the  supreme  condition  of  the 
unity  of  knowledge,  and  therefore  of  the  known  world, 
in  both  its  external  and  its  internal  phases.^ 

The  above  is  substantially  the  deduction  of  the 
categories ;  but  it  may  not  be  without  advantage  to 
run  over,  in  a  less  methodical  way,  the  path  by  which 
Kant  has  come,  and  to  point  out  the  transformation  in 
the  ordinary  explanation  of  knowledge  which  is  the 
result  of  his  enquiry.  The  great  difficulty  which  seems 
to  bar  the  way  to  a  solution  of  the  problem  of  philoso- 
phy, as  it  first  presents  itself  to  Kant's  mind,  may  be 
expressed  in  the  alternative :  either  there  is  no  abso- 
luteness in  our  knowledge,  or  we  must  be  able  to  pass 
over  from  our  conceptions  to  realities.  The  dogmatist 
while  assuming  that  our  knowledge  is  absolute  or  real, 
yet  imagines  that  it  can  be  obtained  by  means  of  mere 
conceptions ;   the  sceptic  piaintains  that  conceptions 

*  Kritik,  p.  127  ff.  It  will  be  observed  that  I  only  pledge  myself  to  the 
substantial  validity  of  the  Deduction  of  the  Categories.  What  modifications 
Kant's  theory  of  knowledge  requires  I  try  to  show  in  Chap.  xii. 


III.;     A  PRIORI  CONDITIOJNS  OF  KNOWLEDGE.       85 

cannot  possibly  yield  reality,  and  hence  he  denies  that 
there  is  any  absoluteness  in  knowledge.  Kant  agrees 
with  the  former  in  holding  that  we  have  a  knowledge 
of  actual  existence,  and  with  the  latter  that  from  con- 
ceptions as  ordinarily  understood  no  explanation  of  the 
possibility  of  such  knowledge  can  be  given.  Evidently 
therefore  the  reality  or  absoluteness  of  knowledge  must 
be  preserved  by  showing  somehow  that  there  are  con- 
ceptions which  do  not  lie  apart  from  real  objects,  but 
are  essential  constituents  in  them.  But  to  do  this  we 
must  change  our  view  at  once  of  the  nature  of  real 
things,  and  of  the  nature  of  conception.  The  trans- 
formation is  partly  effected  in  the  ^Esthetic,  where  it  is 
shown  that  known  objects  are  not  things  in  themselves, 
but  are  relative  to  our  consciousness.  Existence  and 
knowledge  thus  begin  to  come  nearer  to  each  other.  If 
the  existence  that  is  real  is  existence  in  and  for  consci- 
ousness, things  may  be  real  and  may  yet  be  relative  to 
our  knowledge.  To  complete  the  transformation,  how- 
ever, we  must  show  how  there  can  be  conceptions  which 
are  constituents  in  real  objects.  Abstract  conceptions 
can  of  course  never  be  such  constituents;  for,  as 
defined,  they  are  merely  ideas  in  our  minds,  separated 
absolutely  from  realities  without  our  minds.  But  a 
conception  which  is  a  form  of  our  intelligence  intro- 
ducing unity  into  known  objects  and  connecting  them 
together,  so  far  from  being  separated  from  reality,  must 
evidently  be  essential  to  such  reality  as  known  by  us. 
Kant  therefore  solves  the  difficulty  raised  by  the  scep- 
tic by  denying  that  all  conceptions  are  separated  from 
realities.  His  first  way  of  conceiving  the  problem  of 
knowledge,  viz.,  How  do  we  go  beyond  conceptions  to 
realities  ?  is  shown  to  admit  of  no  solution  because  it 
is  essentially  absurd ;  for  conceptions  separated  from 


ae 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


realities,  can  of  course  never  tell  us  anything  about 
realities.  It  is  shown  however  that  there  are  pure 
conceptions  which,  so  far  from  being  apart  from  reali- 
ties; are  actual  constituents  in  them.  For  external 
objects,  not  less  than  internal,  are  relative  to  know- 
ledge :  and  if  so,  conceptions  or  forms  of  thought  may 
very  well  apply  to  objects.  The  only  question  now  is 
as  to  the  different  elements  within  knowledge.  And 
conception  is  evidently  the  element  which  gives  unity 
to  known  objects,  as  sense  is  the  element  which  gives 
diversity.  Thus  reality  and  knowledge,  which  were  by 
the  Esthetic  brought  into  proximity  to  each  other,  are 
shown  by  the  Analytic  to  come  close  together  and 
coalesce  in  the  unity  of  sense  and  thought,  resulting 
in  the  formation  of  a  concrete  knowledge  which  is  at  the 
same  time  concrete  objects  as  known.  And  in  this 
fusion  of  sense  and  thought,  reality  and  knowledge,  we 
have  a  systematic  unity  of  knowl'^'^g^'  which  is  at  the 
same  time  a  system  of  nature.  The  unity  of  nature 
therefore  is  a  unity  due  to  intelligence.  And  as  of  in- 
telligence and  therefore  of  nature  the  supreme  condition 
is  the  unity  of  self-consciousness,  in  the  reference  of 
every  known  object  to  the  single  self  we  have  the 
supreme  condition  at  once  of  the  unity  of  knowledge  as 
a  whole  and  of  the  unity  of  nature  as  a  system  of  real 
objects.  Kant's  "  secret "  then,  as  Dr.  Stirling  might 
say,  is  the  conversion  of  abstract  conceptions  into  ulti- 
mate forms  of  thought,  supreme  conditions  of  know- 
ledge, or  elementary  constituents  of  objects.  But 
besides  the  synthetical  unity  of  self-consciousness,  the 
categories,  the  forms  of  perception  and  the  manifold  of 
sense,  another  element  is  introduced  to  complete  the 
transformation  of  known  reality.  This  element  is  the 
schema,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  Kant  finds  it  neces- 


III.]     A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  KNOWLEDGE.       87 

sary  to  refer  to  in  the  deduction  of  the  categories,  but 
which  he  also  treats  of  separately.*  A  few  words  will 
be  enough  to  complete  the  explanation  of  this  part  of 
hisBystem. 

As  the  schema  is  the  product  of  the  pure  imagina- 
tion, Kant  begins  with  the  ordinary  view  of  the  nature 
of  Imagination,  and  proceeds  to  work  back  to  the 
critical  conception  of  it.  An  empirical  conception  is 
capable  of  being  verified  in  a  perception  because  there 
is  something  common  to  both.  Having  in  our  minds, 
e.  g.y  the  conception  of  a  plate  we  may  form  the  analy- 
tical judgment  that  a  plat^  is  round,  but  in  order  to 
determine  whether  the  predicate  is  real  or  imaginary, 
we  must  go  to  perception^  and  ask  whether  we  can 
find  in  it  a  determinate  ojbject  corresponding  to  that 
predicate.  We  of  course  fiind  that  we  can,  for  round- 
ness is  realised  in  the  pure  perception  of  a  circle.  Our 
analytical  judgment  thus  |}ecomes  synthetical,  and  we 
are  justified  in  regarding  ihe  conception  as  having  a 
reference  to  something  red.1.  But  when  we  pass  from 
those  conceptions  which  ^  simply  abstractions  from 
ordina^perceptions,  and  are  therefore  easily  verifiable 
in  perception,  and  ask  how  'pure  conceptions  are  to  be 
realised,  the  afiswer  is  by  no  means  so  simple.  The 
difficulty  ailses  from  the  fact  that  a  comparison  of  pure 
conceptions  and  pure  perceptions  shows  not  likeness 
but  absolute  unlikeness.  The  attribute  implied  in  an 
abstract  conception  and  expressible  in  a  judgment  is 
found  in  concreto  in  the  perception  from  which  it  was 
originally  abstracted;  but  a  pure  conception  or  category 
is  not  obtained  by  abstraction,  and  hence  it  is  difficult 
to  understand  how  it  can  be  realised  in  perception. 
And  yet  the  categories  must  apply  to  perceptions  if 

>  Kritik,  pp.  140-6. 


88 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


real  knowledge  is  possible  at  all.     The  difHculiy  here 
is  of  the  same  nature  as  that  which  we  have  all  along 
had  to  contend  with  :  it  is  in  fact  simply  another  form 
of  the  question,  How  are  synthetical  judgments  a  priori 
possible  ?  how  from  mere  conceptions  can  we  obtain 
judgments  which  are  binding  on  nature  ?    We  cannot 
get  rid  of  the  difficulty  by  assuming  the  pure  concep- 
tions to  be  applicable  to  things  in  themselves,  as  the 
Deduction  of  the  Categories  has  sufficiently  shown ;  nor 
^can  we  say  that  pure  conceptions  are  abstracted  from 
real  perceptions,  and  hence  the  categories  cannot  be  de- 
rived from  a  mere  analysis  of  objects  supposed  to  be 
passively  apprehended.      The  true  answer  lies  in  a 
hitherto   unsuspected    characteristic   of   Imagination. 
This  we  may  explain  by  a  reference  to  what  takes  place 
in  the  e very-day  processes  by  which  we  assure  ourselves 
that  we  are  not  dealing  with  mere  abstractions  but 
with  concrete  realities.    There  is  an  essential  distinc- 
tion between  an  image  and  a  schema.     I  have  in  my 
mind  a  conception  of  some  object — say,  that  of  a  dog 
— which  can  be  verified  in  perception  since  it  has  been 
obtained  by  abstracting  from  the  difierences  of  a  number 
of  individual  objects.     To  assure  myself  that  I  am  not 
dealing  with  a  mere  fiction,  I  bring  before  my  mind 
the  image  of  some  particular  dog  which  I  have  seen ; 
but  this  mere  image  will  not  enable  me  to  make  a 
judgment  about  dogs  in  general,  and  hence  I  have  to 
draw  in  imagination  a  sort  of  monogram  or  schema  of 
a  four-footed  animal.     The  schema  is  therefore  neither 
a  conception  nor  an  image,  but  partakes  of  the  char- 
acter of  both.     It  at  once  conforms  to  the  generality 
of  the  conception,  and  is  kept  within  limits  by  the  con- 
crete image.     We  can  see  that  the  same  process  comes 
into  play  in  our  mathematical  judgments.     When  e.  g. 


III.]      A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  KNOWLEDGE.       89 

the  geometer  forms  judgments  in  regard  to  the  triangle 
he  has  more  before  him  than  the  individual  perception 
or  image  of  a  special  triangle.  The  image  of  a  triangle 
is  an  isosceles,  a  right-angled,  an  equilateral,  or  a  scalene 
triangle ;  but  the  schema  of  a  triangle  is  a  sort  of  mono- 
gram or  outline  of  a  triangle  in  general.  The  image 
of  a  triangle  can  never  be  adequate  to  the  concep- 
tion of  a  triangle,  for  it  cannot  enable  us  to  make 
universal  affirmations :  to  say  e.  g.  that  every  triangle 
has  its  interior  angles  equal  to  two  right  angles.  In 
fact  it  is  not  images  but  schemata  that  lie  at  the  foun- 
dation of  our  mathematical  judgments. 

Now  these  examples  of  the  peculiar  faculty  possessed 
by  the  productive  imagination  of  drawing  monograms 
of  objects  of  perception  gives  us  the  clue  to  the  solution 
of  the  difficulty  with  which  we  are  here  concerned.  If 
we  can  show  that  there  is  a  transcendental  product  of 
the  imagination  enabling  us  to  realize  the  categories, 
our  difficulty  will  be  resolved.  Now  it  has  to  be  borne 
in  mind  that  transcendental  philosophy  does  not  treat 
of  the  special  facts  or  laws  of  nature,  but  only  of  the 
a  priori  conditions  which  make  known  objects  in  gene- 
ral possible.  To  account  for  knowledge  there  must  be, 
as  has  been  shown,  impressions  of  sense,  that  come  into 
our  consciousness  because  we  can  refer  them  to  the 
"I"  through  the  categories  and  the  forms  of  perception. 
But  these  impressions,  taken  in  abstraction  from  the 
a  pnori  elements  of  knowledge,  are  mere  detached 
differences  or  points  of  impression.  So  also  the  deter- 
minations of  time  and  space  as  perceptions — which 
must  be  carefully  distinguished  from  time  and  space  as 
mere  forms  of  perception — may  be  described  as  mere 
points  or  disunited  parts  of  space  and  of  time.  Our 
special  question  at  present  is,  how  these  points  of  im- 


00 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS, 


[chap. 


presBion,  and  points  of  space  and  time,  enter  into  or 
constitute  our  knowledge  of  objects,  whether  these 
objects  are  the  pure  perceptions  of  mathematics  or  the 
mixed  perceptions  of  ordinary  consciousness  and  science. 
Now  it  is  evident  that  there  is  a  difference  between 
imagination  as  it  is  exercised  in  our  ordinary  knowledge 
and  imagination  as  transcendental,  t.e.,  as  a  necessary 
and  universal  condition  of  knowledge  in  general.     In 
the  latter  case  there  can  be  no  image  ;  for  we  are  deal- 
ing with  the  universal  and  necessary  elements  of  know- 
ledge, which  enter  into  and  constitute  real  objects.    The 
imagination  must  therefore  act  on   the  <pure  forms 
of  perception,  and  be  guided  by  the  'pure  conceptions  of 
the  understanding.     But  there  can  be  no  transcenden- 
tal image  giving  concreteness  to  our  pure  conceptions. 
We  can  indeed  have  an  image  of  a  mathematical  figure, 
but  this  image  comes  into  play  only  in  the  special  per- 
cepts of  mathematics,  with  which  we  are  not  in  tran- 
scendental philosophy  concerned.    While  however  there 
can  be  no  pure  image,  enabling  us  to  visualize,  so  to 
speak,  our  pure  conceptions,  there  may  be  a  pure  schema. 
And  as  this  schema  is  to  be  the  condition  in  imagina- 
tion of  all  possible  phenomena,  in  so  far  as  these  are 
regarded  from  the  universal  point  of  view,  it  must  be 
related  to  that  form  of  perception  which  is  common  to 
all  phenomena,  whether  internal  or  external :  it  must 
i.e.  be  related  to  the  form  of  time.    This  schema  is  not 
to  be  confounded  with  the  pure  form  of  time  any  more 
than  with  the  pure  form  of  thought :  it  is,  in  fact,  not 
a  determination  of  time  itself,  but  a  universal  deter- 
mination of  the ^maijifold^  in  relationJoLtime.     Now, 
there  are  various  universal  ways  in  which  the  manifold 
is  determined  in  time ;  there  is  the  synthesis  of  homo- 
geneous units  in  time,  or  number;  the  synthesis  of 


III.]     A  PRIORI  CONDITIONS  OF  KNOWLEDGE.       91 

intensive  units  in  time,  or  degree  ;  the  representing  of 
the  permanent  in  time ;  the  representing  of  orderly 
sequence  in  time ;  and  lastly,  the  representing  of  real 
co-existence  in  time.  These  various  universal  modes 
of  determining  the  manifold  in  time  constitute  the 
schemata  of  Imagination,  and  the  process  by  which  the 
categories  are  applied  to  the  manifold  of  sense  through 
time  is  the  schematism  of  the  Understanding.  Thus 
the  categories  are  actualized  and  the  knowledge  of  objects 
is  made  possible.  And  as  the  manifold  of  sense  is  that 
element  of  knowledge  without  which  the  Understanding 
would  have  nothing  to  operate  upon,  the  necessity  we  are 
under  of  schematizing  the  categories  makes  it  impossi- 
ble that  the  categories  should  apply  beyond  the  limits 
of  the  phenomenal  world.  The  manifold  of  sense  is 
knowable  only  as  in  time,  and  hence  things  in  them- 
selves as  falling  outside  of  time  cannot  possibly  be 
known.  The  schemata  therefore  at  once  give  individu- 
ality to  the  category  and  universality  to  the  manifold 
of  sense.  In  determining  a  house,  e.g.y  as  an  extensive 
quantity,  I  must  combine  its  special  parts  in  succession, 
and  this  successive  addition  of  homogeneous  units  is 
guided  by  the  category  or  intellectual  form  of  quantity. 
Thus  the  units  are  put  together  by  a  process  of 
numbering  (the  schema)  in  which  I  at  once  individual- 
ize the  pure  conception  (the  category)  and  at  the  same 
time  bring  those  units  (the  manifold  of  sense)  under  it.^ 

>Dr.  Stirling  now  thinks  {Joum.  Spec.  Phil,  xiv.  pp.  267-286)  that  Kant, 
intending  to  make  the  schema  a  determination  of  time,  changed  his  mind  and 
made  it  a  determination  of  the  manifold  in  time  ;  and  that,  in  so  doing,  he  fell 
back  on  "  empirical  instruction  " — in  other  words,  on  sensible  perception.  To 
this  I  should  reply,  that  to  say  the  schema  is  not  derivable  from  pure  time,  is 
not  the  same  as  saying  that  it  i»  given  in  mere  sense.  The  schema  is  virtually 
the  relation  of  sense  and  thought.  See  below,  Chapters  v.  and  vii.  Cf .  Chap.  xii. 


92 


CHAPTER  IV. 


I 


RELATIONS  OF  METAPHYSIC  AND  PSYCHOLOGY. — EXAMINATION 
OP   G.    H.    LEWES'S   THEORY   OP   KNOWLEDGE. 

n^HE  most  important  result  of  the  critical  account  of 
knowledge,  as  wo  have  seen,  is  to  establish  the 
correlativity  of  the  inner  world  and  the  outer  world,  as 
both  alike  only  existing  in  relation  to  our  intelligence. 
Enough  has  probably  been  said  to  make  clear  the 
radical  distinction  between  the  critical  and  the  dog- 
matic account  of  that  relation.  But  as  it  has  been 
confidently  asserted  by  the  late  Mr.  Lewes  and  others 
that  recent  advances  in  biology  and  psychology  have 
superseded  Kant's  account  of  the  relation  of  subject 
and  object,  it  may  be  profitable  to  consider  shortly  the 
main  positions  of  the  new  psychology,  and  to  contrast 
it  with  Kant's  conception  of  psychology,  as  subordinate 
to  metaphysic.  I  think  it  will  be  found  that  recent 
empirical  psychology,  not  less  than  that  prior  to  Kant, 
must  be  regarded  as  coming  under  the  ban  of  "  dogma- 
tism." To  attempt  anything  like  a  discussion  of  the 
various  forms  assumed  by  that  psychology  would  lead 
us  too  far,  and  I  shall  therefore  confine  myself  to  the 
general  theory  of  Mn  Lewes. 

In  common  with  all  empirical  psychologists   Mr. 
Lewes  speaks  of  the  external  world  as  existing  inde- 


IV.] 


LE  WES'S  THEOR  Y  OF  KNO  WLEDGE. 


93 


rtlNATION 


pendently  of  our  consciousness,  and  as  endowed  with 
forces,  by  the  action  of  which  upon  the  organism,  a 
certain  molecular  motion  in  the  nervous  system  and  a 
corresponding  feeling  in  consciousness  are  set  up  in  the 
living  being.  The  external  world  he  conceives  of  as 
"  not  the  other  side  of  the  subject,  but  the  larger  circle 
which  includes  it ;  "^  and  feeling  he  calls  "  the  reaction 
of  the  sentient  organism  under  stimulus."^  So  far 
there  is  nothing  to  distinguish  recent  psychology  from 
the  psychology  of  Locke.  But  Mr.  Lewes,  following 
Fechner,  claims  that  the  nervous  excitation  and  the 
feeling  are  not  two  independent  phenomena,  due  to 
two  distinct  agents,  the  organism  and  the  mind,  but 
that  they  are  different  aspects  under  which  the  one 
agent,  the  organism,  manifests  itself.  Sentience  as 
well  as  the  molecular  movement  of  the  nervous  system 
is  a  reaction  of  the  organism.  Thus  we  have,  on  the 
one  side,  the  Organism  with  its  twofold  aspect,  and  on 
the  other  side,  the  Cosmos,  at  once  including  the 
organism,  and  calling  forth  its  reactions. 

The  first  remark  to  be  made  on  this  view  iS;  that,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  an  account  of  the  relation  of  the  external 
world  to  the  individual  man,  Kant  would  not  have 
made  any  radical  objection  to  it.  It  is,  on  the  face  of 
it,  an  explanation  of  the  connection  between  man  as  a 
living  being  and  the  other  objects  which  make  up  the 
world  of  nature.  And  we  have  Kant's  own  authority 
for  saying  that  men  considered  as  individuals  are  simply 
parts  of  nature.  Looking  at  existence  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  different  species  of  objects  composing 
it,  we  may  broadly  divide  objects  into  corporeal  and 
incorporeal,  or  living  and  non-living  things.  And  it  is 
the  object  of  the  physical  sciences  to  investigate  nature 

I  Problems  0/  Life  and  Mind,  vol.  i.,  p.  195.  *  Ibid.,  p.  210. 


/ 


94 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


in  the  first  aspect,  and  of  psychology  to  investigate 
nature  in  the  second  aspect.  Just  as  physics  deals 
with  the  laws  of  matter  and  motion,  so  psychology 
attempts  to  classify  the  various  phases  of  mental  life, 
and  the  successive  stages  through  which  the  individual 
and  the  race  pass.'  The  world  as  a  whole  therefore 
may  be  said,  from  this  point  of  view,  to  comprehend 
both  men  and  things,  or,  in  Mr.  Lewes'  language,  the 
Object  is  "  not  the  other  side  of  the  Subject  but  the 
larger  circle  which  includes  it."  There  is  nothing, 
again,  in  Kant  inconsistent  with  the  contention  of  Mr. 
Lewes,  that  to  every  mental  state  there  is  a  correspon- 
dent nervous  excitation.  It  is  true  that  Kant  speaks 
rather  slightingly  of  the  value  of  the  physiology  of  the 
brain  in  the  culture  of  the  individual,  on  the  ground 
that  in  it  we  are  dealing  with  "what  nature  brings  out 
of  man,  and  not  with  what  man,  as  a  freely  acting 
being,  makes  out  of  himself,"  and  hence  that,  so  far  as 
physiological  processes  are  concerned,  man  is  "  a  mere 
spectator,"  since  he  "  cannot  be  directly  aware  of  what 
is  going  on  in  the  nerves  and  fibres  of  his  brain."  ^  But 
the  very  form  of  his  remark  implies  that  there  is  an 
aspect  in  which  man  must  be  regarded  as  passive,  and 
there  is  no  denial  but  rather  a  recognition  of  the  asso- 
ciation of  nervous  and  mental  phenomena.  How  does 
it  come  then,  that,  agreeing  so  far  with  empirical  psy- 
chology, and  therefore  in  some  sense  admitting  the 
independence  of  nature  on  man,  Kant  yet  regards  the 
separation  of  thought  and  things  as  the  evidence  and 
consequence  of  a  false  philosophy?  The  answer  is 
perfectly  simple.  Psychology,  as  Kant  conceives  of  it, 
is  simply  a  discipline,  helping  us  to  widen  and  syste- 

>  ifetaphytUche  Artfangitgriinde  d.  Naturuniitetuehaft,  Vorrede,  pp.  357-362. 
3  Anthropologie,  p.  431. 


/ 


f 


IV.J 


LEWES S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


95 


matize  our  knowledge  of  the  world  of  men,  as  physics 
enables  us  to  learn  the  special  laws  regulating  the 
world  of  matter.  Psychology,  in  other  words,  deals  /«<- cy7 
not  with  the  relation  of  intelligence  to  nature,  but  only  ^*f ' '  ^r 
with  one  aspect  of  nature  itself.  The  classification  of  the 
various  faculties  of  knowledge,  the  systematic  statement 
of  the  gradual  way  in  which  our  knpwledge  grows  up,  and 
the  consideration  of  individual  and,  national  character- 
istics, tell  us  nothing  about  the  essential  conditions  of  . 
there  being  for  us  any  knowledge  whatever.  For  here 
we  are  dealing  not  with  the  knowing  subject  in  relation 
to  the  object  of  thought,  but  simply  with  one^spectjof 
the  known  object..  That  we  have  certain  mental  states, 
which  we  may  analytically  distinguish  as  sensation, 
imagination,  thought,  &c.,  does  not  entitle  us  to  say 
anything  about  the  primary  conditions  of  our  know- 
ledge of  nature.  When  we  have  completed  our  account 
of  mental  states  as  objects  which  we  know,  we  have 
left  untouched  the  question  as  to  the  relation  of  those 
mental  states,  together  with  things  in  space,  to  our 
intelligence  as  capable  of  comprehending  both  in  the 
unity  of  a  single  known  world.  In  other  words, 
psychology  is  an  empirical  science,  treating  of  the 
nature  of  the  individual  man  as  a  known  object.  It 
has  no  occasion  to  ask  how  knowledge  is  possible,  i.e., 
what  are  the  conditions  without  which  we  could  have 
no  knowledge  either  of  ourselves  or  of  external  things, 
but  leaves  this  problem  to  be  dealt  with  by  metaphysic. 
To  suppose,  as  Mr.  Lewes  does,  that  Kant  would  have 
been  con  pelled  completely  to  alter  his  metaphysic,  had 
he  only  seen  that  the  "  a  'priori  elements "  might  be 
explained  as  "  originally  formed  out  of  ancestral  sensi- 
ble experiences"  is  a  delusion  arising  from  an  incom- 
plete apprehension  of  what  Kant's  problem  was.    "  Even 


96 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


granting,"  Kant  would  have  said,  "  that  we  as  indivi- 
duals inherit  certain  tendencies,  this  in  no  way  affects  the 
question  as  to  the  essential  conditions  of  knowledge. 
No  matter  how  we  as  individuals  have  come  to  obtain 
our  knowledge,  at  least  it  is  not  denied  that  we  do 
have  knowledge ;  I  ask  you,  therefore,  what  theory  you 
propose  in  explanation  of  this  fact.  That  we  have 
a  knowledge  of  external  objects  and  also  of  our  own 
mental  states  is  a  fact ;  but  it  is  not  an  explanation  of 
the  fact.  It  is  this  explanation  which  I  have  tried  to 
give.  And  I  maintain  that,  on  the  supposition  of  the 
independence  of  nature,  whether  as  external  or  internal, 
on  our  intelligence,  no  consistent  explanation  of  the 
fact  of  knowledge  is  possible." 

And  this  leads  me,  in  the  second  place,  to  say  that 
Mr.  Lewes's  psychological  theory  is  simply  a  new  form 
of  that  dogmatism  to  which  Kant  so  strongly  objects. 
It  assumes  the  essential  independence  of  nature  on 
intelligence,  and  in  so  doing  confounds  the  logical 
distinction  of  external  and  internal  phenomena,  as 
existing  only  for  intelligence,  with  the  real  separation 
of  subject  and  object. 

No  point  is  more  emphatically  dwelt  upon  by  Mr. 
Lewes  than  the  identity  and  yet  distinction  of  neural 
changes  and  changes  of  feeling.  The  ordinary  concep- 
tion of  the  relation  of  body  and  mind  is  that  of  two 
independent  things,  substances,  or  agents,  externally 
acting  and  rieacting  upon  each  other.  This  conception 
must,  he  asserts,  be  rejected.  We  cannot  accept  the 
view  of  the  Rational  Psychologists,  who  "  treat  mental 
facts  simply  as  the  manifestation  of  a  Physical  Prin- 
ciple, at  once  unknowable  and  intimately  known,  a 
mysterious  agent  revealed  to  consciousness;'"  we  must, 

'  Lewes's  Study  of  Psychology,  §  1. 


IV.] 


LEWES'S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


97 


on  the  contrary,  "  frankly  accept  the  biological  poin'  of 
view,  which  sets  aside  the  traditional  conception  of  the 
mind  as  an  agent  apart  from  the  organism."^  Having 
got  rid  of  this  fiction  of  abstraction,  what  shall  we  have 
to  substitute  ?  Mr.  Lewes  is  equally  clear  on  this  head. 
The  only  agent  is  the  organism.  "  To  many  thinkers, 
the  contrast "  of  objective  and  subjective  "  seems  far 
more  than  that  of  aspects,  it  is  that  of  agents."  But 
"what  we  know  is  that  the  living  organism  has  among 
its  manifestations  the  class  called  sentient  .  .  .  and 
states  of  consciousness.  ...  It  is  not  known,  nor  is 
there  any  evidence  to  suggest  that  one  of  these  classes 
is  due  to  the  activity  of  the  organism,  the  other  to  the 
activity  of  another  agent.  The  only  agent  is  the 
organism." 2  When  we  "seek  the  agent  of  which  all 
the  phenomena  are  the  actions,  we  get  the  organism."* 
In  place  of  the  conception  of  two  agents,  the  organism 
and  the  mind,  we  have  to  put  the  conception  of  a  single 
agent,  the  organism.  All  the  actions  performed  by  a 
living  being,  including  those  that  have  usually  been  set 
apart  as  mental,  and  ascribed  to  an  independent  source, 
must  now  be  ascribed  to  the  organism  alone.  Evi- 
dently, then,  the  organism  will  have  a  double  duty  to 
perform  :  to  it  the  operations  formerly  ascribed  to  the 
body,  as  well  as  those  ascribed  to  the  mind,  must 
both  alike  be  ascribed.  We  have  thus  a  single  agent, 
performing  diverse  operations.  But  these  operations 
have  at  least  this  in  common  that  they  are  alike  pre- 
dicable  of  a  single  agent.  The  organism,  e.g.,  is  not 
only  the  bearer  of  neural  tremors,  but  it  feels,  thinks, 
and  wills.  And  it  must  be  observed  that,  while  all 
vital  actions  are  now  perceived  to  belong  to  the  organ- 
ism, we  are  still  compelled  to  draw  a  broad  distinction 


>  Lewes'a  Study  of  Payehology,  g  4. 


«  Mil,,  §  0.  »  Jbid.,  §  7. 


a 


98 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


between  subjective  phenomena — those  formerly  ascribed 
to  mind — and  objective  phenomena — those  formerly  at- 
tributed to  body.  Thus  the  organism  has  two  sets  of 
functions,  broadly  contrasted  as  subjective  and  objective. 
Now  it  has  always  been  held,  even  by  those  who  main- 
tained the  existence  of  a  mind  distinct  from  the  body, 
that  there  is  the  closest  correspondence  between  the 
two.  This  conception  must  be  retained,  but  it  must 
be  transformed  in  such  a  way,  that  the  correspond- 
ence shall  be  regarded  as  not  exceptional,  but 
perpetual. 

Every  event,  then,  has  at  once  an  objective  and  a 
subjective  aspect.  What  exactly  does  this  mean  ?  It 
means  that  "  states  of  consciousness  are  separable  from 
states  of  the  organism  only  in  our  mode  of  apprehending 
them."*  Now  there  is  a  certain  imperfection  of  expres- 
sion in  this  way  of  stating  the  matter;  for,  if  the 
organism  is  the  sole  agent,  "states  of  consciousness" 
are  "  states  of  the  organism/'  and  therefore  should  not 
be  contrasted  with  them.  What  Mr.  Lewes  means, 
however,  is  evident  enough  so  far :  he  means,  that  the 
"sentient  changes"  of  the  organism  are  inseparable 
from  its  "  neural  changes."  But  even  after  this  expla- 
nation there  is  an  ambiguity  in  Mr.  Lewes's  words  to 
which  it  is  important  to  refer.  States  of  consciousness, 
we  are  told,  are  separable  from  neural  changes,  "  only 
in  our  mode  of  apprehending  them."  Now  our  "  mode 
of  apprehending"  both  kinds  of  change  must  be  by 
"  states  of  consciousness,"  and  hence  it  would  seem  that 
states  of  consciousness  are  separable  from  neural  changes 
only  in  states  of  consciousness.  How  then  can  the 
broad  contrast  of  subjective  and  objective  be  still  pre- 
served 1     Instead  of  a  broad  contrast,   the  relation 

» iStudif  of  Psychology,  §  4. 


\ 


IV.] 


LEWES' S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


99 


would  seem  to  be  one  of  subordination,  the  subordina- 
tion of  the  neural  affections  to  the  states  of  conscious- 
ness. There  can  be  no  doubt,  however,  that  Mr.  Lewes 
means  to  affirm,  not  a  relation  of  subordination,  but  a 
relation  oi' coordination :  both  sets  of  changes  he  regards 
as  on  the  same  level.  By  "  states  of  consciousness " 
we  must  accordingly  understand  a  series  of  feelings, 
taken  in  abstraction  from  a  series  of  movements  in  the 
organism.  Mr.  Lewes  may  therefore  mean,  either  (1) 
that,  while  in  our  mode  of  apprehending  them,  the  two 
kinds  of  changes  are  "  separable,"  in  reality  they  are 
identical,  or  (2)  that  they  are  identical  in  being  parallel 
phenomena  of  the  same  organism.  Mr.  Lewes,  as  it 
seems  to  me,  does  not  distinguish  between  these  two 
very  different  points  of  view :  he  virtually  assumes  the 
former^  while  ostensibly  he  is  only  asserting  the  latter, 
and  it  is  by  this  confusion  of  thought  that  he  is  enabled 
seemingly  to  preserve  at  once  the  separation  and  the 
identity  of  the  sentient  and  the  neural  changes.  "  The 
living  organism,"  he  says,  "  has  among  its  manifesta- 
tions the  class  called  sentient ;  and  these  are  known  as 
sensible  affections,  i.e.,  the  changes  excited  by  the  con- 
tact of  external  causes,  and  assignable  to  visible  organs 
of  sense ;  and  states  of  conscmisness,  i.e.,  the  changes  of 
feeling,  excited  by  internal  causes,  and  not  assignable 
to  visible  organs."*  "What  on  the  objective  side  is 
material  combination  is  on  the  subjective  side  spiritual 
combination ;  mechanical  and  logical  are  only  two 
contrasted  aspects  of  one  and  the  same  fact."^  '*  All 
psychological  processes  are  objectively  organic  pro- 
cesses," and  "  the  mechanism  of  these  processes  may  be 
expressed  in  objective  or  subjective  terms  at  will,  sen- 
sorial changes  being  equivalent  to  sentient  changes."' 

study  qfPtyehohgy,%^.  ^  Ibid.,  %  17.  » /6«.,  §  19. 


100 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS. 


[chap. 


"A  sensation  or  a  thought  is  alternately  viewed  as  a 
physical  change  or  as  a  mental  change."^ 

It  will  be  admitted,  I  think,  that  there  is  an  un- 
doubted want  of  precision  in  the  use  of  terms  in  the 
above  extracts.  On  the  one  hand,  we  are  told  that 
the  same  event  has  its  "objective  and  subjective 
aspect,"  that  "mechanical  and  logical  are  only  two 
contrasted  aspects  of  one  and  the  same  fact,"  and  that 
"  sensorial  changes  are  equivalent  to  sentient  changes." 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  pointed  out  that  sensible 
affections  are  **  assignable  to  visible  organs  of  sense," 
while  states  of  consciousness  are  "not  assignable  to 
visible  organs,"  and  that  "  a  sensation  or  a  thought  is 
alternately  viewed  as  a  physical  change  or  as  a  mental 
change."  Now  if  the  "event"  or  "fact"  is  " one  and 
the  same,"  it  cannot  be  assignable  to  different  organs ; 
if  there  are  two  "  events "  or  "facts,"  it  is  not  correct 
to  speak  of  them  as  "one  and  the  same."  As  Mr. 
Lewes  insists  upon  interpreting  everything  by  what 
we  know,  and  refuses  to  take  refuge  in  the  unknow- 
able,^ we  must  conclude  that,  as  the  two  sets  of  events 
are  distinct  to  us,  they  cannot  be  regarded  as  in 
themselves  "identical"  or  "equivalent,"  and  that  in 
predicating  identity  and  equivalence  of  them,  Mr. 
Lewes  only  means  to  insist  on  their  thorough-going 
parallelism ;  i.e.  that  there  never  is  a  "  molecular  change  " 
without  a  corresponding  "sentient  change,"  and  vice 
versa,  and  further  that  molecular  and  sentient  changes 
are  "identical"  only  in  the  sense  that  they  are  both 
alike  predicable  of  "  one  and  the  same "  organism,  of 
which  they  are  "  aspects." 

*  Study  of  Psychology,  §  38. 

'  See  especially  Probknu  of  Life  and  Mind,  yd.  ii.,  prob.  vL  2.  Cf.,  how- 
ever, Hodgson's  Phihaophy  of  Reflection,  vol.  i.,  p.  189  ff,  where  the  con- 
tradictory utterances  of  Mr.'  Lewes  are  cited  and  discussed. 


IV.J 


LE  IVES'S  THEOR  Y  OF  KNO  WLEDGE. 


101 


Now  this  is  none  the  less  a  dualism  that  it  masque- 
rades as  a  monism.  A  monism  it  cannot  be,  unless 
the  mere  assertion  of  the  identity  of  the  two  aspects  is 
allowed  to  pass  muster  as  a  proof  of  that  identity. 
The  series  of  feelings  which  constitutes  the  "subjective" 
aspect  goes  on  independently  of  the  series  of  move- 
ments in  the  organism,  and  of  all  relation  to  intelligence. 
As  the  subjective  aspect  cannot  be  at  the  same  time 
the  objective,  the  two  cannot  logically  be  brought 
into  any  relation  with  each  other.  As  described  by 
Mr.  Lewes,  feeling  is  no  more  comprehensive  of  the 
molecular  movements  than  the  molecular  movements 
comprehend  feeling;  we  have  simply  a  series  of 
neural  changes,  and  a  series  of  feelings,  without  any 
explanation  of  how  they  come  to  be  known  as  standing 
in  necessary  relation  to  each  other.  They  are  said 
to  be  related,  but  they  are  tacitly  separated  from  each 
other,  and  assumed  to  be  independent.  No  other 
explanation  indeed  is  consistent  with  the  premises  of 
Mr.  Lewes:  for  a  series  of  feelings  cannot  be  aware 
of  itself  as  a  series,  and  without  such  consciousness 
of  itself,  a  consciousness  of  the  neural  changes  is 
impossible.  The  root  of  the  imperfection  in  this 
conception  of  subject  and  object  consists  in  the  abstract 
separation  of  intelligence  as  knowing,  both  from  the 
series  of  feelings  and  from  the  molecular  movements. 
Thought  is  conceived  of  as  a  mere  passive  spectator 
of  the  subjective  and  objective  aspects,  and  conscious- 
ness as  a  light  that  reveals  but  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  constitution  of  its  objects.  But  when  the  object 
in  its  two  aspects  is  allowed  to  fall  apart  from  self- 
consciousness,  the  mental  states  necessarily  become  a 
mere  series  of  feelings  which,  as  Kant  says,  are  "as 
good  as  nothing  for  us  as  thinking  beings;"  and  the 


101! 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS        [chap. 


nervous  changes,  being  separated  at  once  from  the 
mental  states  and  from  the  supreme  unity  of  self- 
consciousness,  necessarily  sink  into  a  mere  succession 
of  movements  independent  of  all  relation  to  conscious- 
ness. Only  when  we  see,  that  without  the  activity 
of  intelligence  in  the  constitution  of  both  objects  alike 
no  real  knowledge  is  possible,  do  the  separate  elements 
of  knowledge  come  together  in  the  unity  of  a  world  at 
once  intelligible  and  real.  The  contrasted  ''aspects," 
in  short,  are  but  logical  abstractions,  which  are  not  in 
themselves  objects  of  knowledge  at  all,  but  merely 
elements  which,  when  regarded  as  in  essential  relation 
to  each  other  and  to  self-conscious  intelligence,  combine 
in  the  concrete  life  of  knowable  existence. 

It  may  perhaps  be  replied  that  Mr.  Lewes  is  right 
in  regarding  himself  as  a  monist,  because  he  denies 
the  existence  of  two  separate  agents,  the  organism  and 
the  mind,  and  maintains  that  there  is  but  one  agent, 
the  organism.  This,  however,  is  a  way  of  securing 
monism  that  makes  the  opposition  of  the  two  "aspects" 
unmeaning:  it  is  simply  an  assumption  of  the  correla- 
tivity  of  intelligence  and  nature,  expressed  in  terms 
that  rob  intelligence  of  its  constitutive  activity,  and 
make  the  explanation  of  real  knowledge  impossible. 
The  nature  of  any  known  reality,  as  Mr.  Lewes  is 
continually  reminding  us,  consist  in  the  sum  of  its 
properties.  There  is  not,  on  the  one  hand,  an  indepen- 
dent thing  or  substratum  beyond  knowledge,  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  known  properties  by  which  this 
substratum  reveals  itself  to  us;  but  the  only  reality 
is  the  properties  taken  together  as  a  whole.  The 
organism,  then,  we  must  not  for  a  moment  conceive 
of  as  an  unknown  something,  now  manifesting  mole- 
cular  changes,   now  sentient;'   it  is  simply  a  term 


IV.] 


LE IVES'S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


103 


designating  a  certain  complex  of  properties.  We 
group  the  one  set  and  call  them  body,  and  another 
set  and  call  them  mind,  but  body  and  mind  are  but 
names  connoting  respectively  the  molecular  and  the 
sentient  changes,  just  as  organism  is  a  more  general 
term  comprehending  both  under  itself.  "We  learn 
to  distinguish  the  different  parts  of  our  organism  and 
their  different  activities ;  generalizing  and  abstracting, 
we  get  the  conception  of  body  representing  one  group, 
and  of  mind  as  representing  another."^ 

Let  us  look  first  at  the  molecular  changes — the 
"  objective  "  aspect  of  the  organism — which  form  one 
of  the  groups  of  properties  comprehended  under  the 
general  term  organism.  Here  we  have,  Mr.  Lewes 
tells  us,  simply  the  "  mechanical  sequence  of  objective 
motions,  and  could  we  see  the  molecular  changes  in 
the  nerves,  centres  and  muscles,  we  should  still  see 
nothing  but  sequent  motions."^  So  far,  therefore,  the 
organism  is  a  term  for  molecular  movements.  And 
movements,  of  course,  pre-suppose  material  atoms  that 
move,  and  the  motion  of  material  atoms  must  be 
comprehended  under  the  higher  conception  of  force. 
Now  it  seems  evident  enough  that  so  far  we  are 
outside  of  the  region  of  sentiency  altogether.  An 
organism  conceived  of  simply  as  recipient  of  force,  is 
not  as  yet  conceived  of  as  sentient.  Were  there 
nothing  but  molecular  movements,  we  should  have 
no  reason  whatever  for  predicating  sentiency  of  the 
organism.  And  it  must  be  observed  that  excluding 
sentiency  of  every  kind,  and  therefore  consciousness, 
there  is  so  far  no  reason  for  calling  the  group  of 
movements  named  as  body  "objective"  rather  than 
"subjective;"  for,  as  Mr.  Lewes  himself  says,  "only 

'  Stwlij  of  Psychology,  %  U.  *  Ibid.,  §  17. 


104 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


when  sentient  activities  have  become  so  developed 
that  a  conscious  ego  or  personality  has  emerged  from 
them,  which  establishes  distinctions  between  one  class 
of  feelings  and  another,  can  this  famous  contrast  of 
object  and  subject  arise."* 

The  organism,  therefore,  conceived  of  as  a  group  of 
neural  units,  is  neither  object  nor  subject,  but  lies  out- 
side of  the  region  in  which  this  "  famous  contrast  "  has 
place.  There  is  another  group  of  properties,  however, 
the  "  sentient  changes,"  comprehended  under  the  term 
organism.  These  are  conscious  states,  or  at  least 
states  that  "  may  be  "  conscious.  As  these  states  are 
said  to  be  purely  "subjective,"  and  to  be  contrasted 
with  the  neural  changes  which  alone  are  objective,  they 
must  be  defined  as  simply  a  series  of  feelings.  And 
here  again  it  must  be  observed  that  there  is  no  distinc- 
tion of  object  and  subject,  for,  if  there  were,  it  would 
not  be  correct  to  classify  feelings  as  subjective  and 
movements  as  objective;  feelings  would  be  a  com- 
bination of  subject  and  object. 

But  these  two  groups  of  properties  are  classed  to- 
gether as  the  objective  and  subjective  aspects  of  one 
and  the  same  organism.  And  as  there  is  no  "  agent " 
but  the  organism,  the  distinction  of  objective  and 
subjective  must  be  made  by  the  organism.  Thus, 
while  the  two  groups  of  properties  are  separate  and 
distinct,  they  are  yet  brought  together  and  recognized 
as  objective  and  subjective  by  the  organism,  as  con- 
scious both  of  itself  and  of  its  contrasted  states. 

The  facts  then  are,  as  we  must  now  suppose,  that 
two  sets  of  functions  are  distinguished  as  respectively 
movements  and  feelings,  and  are  yet  brought  together 
by  the  organism  as  conscious  of  both  alike,  and  there- 

»  Stuily  of  Psychology,  §  11. 


•v.] 


LE IVES'S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


100 


as  con- 


fore  as  conscious  of  each  as  at  once  distinct  and  yet 
related  to  the  other.  Now,  an  organism  that  separatim 
between  its  own  subjective  and  objective  aspecfs,  ap- 
prehending two  distinct  sets  of  functions  <is  in  essential 
relation  to  each  other,  must  be  self-conscious — conscious 
of  self  as  a  unity  combining  these  opposite  "states." 
The  organism  thus  becomes  a  term  for  a  self-conscious 
being,  comprehending  at  once  subject  and  object.  We 
may,  if  we  please,  still  retain  the  term  organism,  but 
evidently  what  we  are  speaking  of  is  neither  move- 
ments nor  feelings,  but  that  which  comprehends  both 
alike  as  in  necessary  relation  to  itself.  Thus,  by  simply 
interpreting  Mr.  Lewes's  terms,  so  as  to  bring  out  their 
implications,  we  find  that  in  one  of  its  senses  the 
term  organism  is  an  outlandish  name  for  self-conscious 
intelligence. 

But  with  this  pleasant  recognition  of  an  old  friend 
with  a  new  face  the  opposition  of  movements  as  "  ob- 
jective "  and  feelings  as  "  subjective "  loses  its  plausi- 
bility. We  have  seen  that,  token  by  themselves,  they 
cannot  be  regarded  as  either  objective  or  subjective,  but 
are  both  equally  indifferent  to  such  a  distinction.  Ob- 
ject and  subject  exist  only  for  that  which  is  conscious 
of  the  distinction  of  object  and  subject.  Evidently, 
therefore,  movements  must  be  regarded  as  objective 
only  in  the  sense  that  they  exist  for  a  subject  conscious 
of  them — a  conscious  subject  which  Mr.  Lewes,  by 
an  unpardonable  abuse  of  language,  calls  the  organ- 
ism. What  movements,  apart  from  our  knowledge  of 
them,  may  possibly  be,  it  is  impossible  to  say.  They 
could  at  best  only  be  an  unknown  and  unknowable 
something  lying  beyond  the  realm  of  knowledge,  and 
such  an  "unknowable"  Mr.  Lewes,  above  all  others, 
is  debarred  from  admitting  by  his  frequently  expressed 


106 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


denial  of  any  one's  right  to  assert  the  reality  of  that 
which  is  unknown,  not  to  say  unknowable.  The 
"objective"  aspect  is  therefore  also  "subjective,"  in 
the  sense  that  it  exists  only  in  relation  to  a  conscious 
subject  of  it.  Similarly,  the  so-called  "subjective" 
aspect  is  not  purely  subjective,  since  a  feeling  apart 
from  its  object  is  unthinkable.  But  if  movements  and 
feelings  are  alike  subjective  and  objective,  i.e.,  exist 
only  as  relations  to  a  conscious  intelligence,  we  must 
no  longer  oppose  them  as  coordinate  and  independent 
phenomena,  but  must  regard  both  as  objects  of  an 
intelligence  that  has  each  before  it  and  in  essential 
relation  to  it  as  an  object  which  it  constitutes. 

Is  there,  then,  no  distinction  between  the  so-called 
"objective"  and  "subjective"  aspects?  Most  assur- 
edly there  is ;  but  it  is  not  the  distinction  of  the  "  ob- 
jective" from  the  "subjective" — both  alike  implying 
the  synthesis  of  object  and  subject — but  simply  the 
distinction  of  one  class  of  objects,  as  a  given  sum  of 
properties,  from  another  class.  A  series  of  molecular 
movements  cannot  be  identified  with  a  series  of  feelings, 
but  it  is  not  less  true  that  a  series  of  feelings  cannot  be 
identified  with  self-conscious  intelligence.  Self-con- 
sciousness is  the  ultimate  unity  comprehending  all 
relations  as  manifestations  of  itself.  And  hence  the 
difference  between  Metaphysic,  the  science  of  intelli- 
gence as  such,  and  Psychology,  the  science  of  man,  is, 
as  Kant  maintains,  that  between  the  general  science  of 
reality  and  the  science  of  a  special  aspect  of  reality. 
The  fundamental  principle  of  philosophy  is  the  unity 
of  subject  and  object,  and  psychology,  accepting  this 
principle,  must  go  on  to  enquire  into  the  character- 
istics of  that  unity  as  specified  in  the  sensitive  and 
conscious  nature  of  man.     This  will  be  more  clearly 


IV.] 


LEWES' S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


107 


The 


seen  if  we  go  on  to  ask  what  is  Mr.  Lewes's  conception 
of  the  relations  of  physiology  and  psychology. 

Starting  from  the  view  that  there  is  a  strict  parallel- 
ism between  the  objective  and  the  subjective  factors, 
Mr.  Lewes  goes  on  to  say,  that  "  psychology  is  some- 
what less,  and  somewhat  more  than  the  subjective 
theory  of  the  organism.  It  is  less,  because  restricted  to 
the  sentient  phenomena,  whereas  physiology  embraces 
all  vital  phenomena.  It  is  more,  because  it  includes 
the  relations  of  the  organism  to  the  social  medium, 
whereas  physiology  is  concerned  only  with  the  relations 
to  the  cosmos."^  The  parallelism  is  thus  restricted  to 
the  "molecular  changes"  of  the  nervous  system,  and  . 
the  "sentient  changes"  corresponding  to  them.  Physio- 
logy and  psychology  are  two  special  branches  of  the 
general  science  of  biology.  The  latter  "includes  plants, 
animals  and  man,  with  the  respective  subdivisions, 
phytology,  zoology  and  anthropology.  Each  of  these 
is  again  divided  into  morphology,  the  science  of  form, 
and  physiology,  the  science  of  function."  "  I  must 
reject  the  separation  of  psychology  from  biology  so 
long  as  I  am  unable  to  separate  mind  from  life."^ 
It  is  thus  evident  that  Mr.  Lewes  conceives  of  psycho- 
logy as  a  special  science  on  the  same  level  as  physiology. 
Both,  moreover,  deal,  not  with  the  structure  or  form 
of  the  organism,  but  with  its  functions;  hence  the 
diflference  between  them  must  be  in  the  different  func- 
tions of  which  they  take  note.  They  are  both  said  to 
be  biological  sciences,  because  they  deal  with  the 
functions  of  the  "  organism."  With  what  "  functions  " 
then  are  they  respectively  concerned?  Physiology  is 
limited  to  a  consideration  of  the  mechanical  functions, 
which  may  be  all  reduced  to   "molecular  changes." 

*  Sladg  oj  Psychology,  §  15.  '•'  Ibid.,  §  5. 


108 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


The  physiologist  "traces  the  sequence  of  stimulation 
through  sensory  nerve,  centre,  motor  nerve  and 
muscle."^  Physiology  is  the  theory  of  "  the  sentient 
functions  as  the  direct  activity  of  the  organs."  ^ 
Psychology,  on  the  other  hand,  deals  with  sentient 
functions,  with  "  feelings  as  such,  and  their  relations 
to  other  feelings,"  with  "changes  in  feeling,"  with 
"processes  which  are  conscious  processes,  or  which 
have  been  and  may  again  be  conscious."^  It  is  the 
theory  of  the  "soul,  its  functions  and  acquired  faculties, 
considered  less  in  reference  to  the  organism  than  in 
reference  to  experience  and  conduct."*  Physiology 
and  psychology  are  thus  concerned  respectively  with 
the  "  objective  "  and  the  "  subjective  "  aspects  of  the 
same  event.  "Physiology  deals  directly  and  chiefly 
with  the  objective  aspect  of  sentient  facts,  and  their 
relation  to  the  visible  organism,"  ^  i.e.  to  the  organism 
as  having  "solidity,  form,  colour,  weight  and  motion."* 
Psychology  deals  with  "  the  same  facts  in  their  sub- 
jective aspect  as  states  of  feeling,  not  as  organic 
changes  " ; '  with  the  "  ideas  and  volitions  that  consti- 
tute the  subjective,  intelligible  self"  *  But  although 
each  of  these  branches  of  biology  is  directly  concerned 
with  a  different  aspect  of  the  organism,  each  is  indirectly 
concerned  with  the  other  aspect  also,  for  both  deal  with 
the  sentient  organism.  Were  the  physiologist  to  limit 
himself  entirely  to  molecular  changes  "  the  sequences 
would  have  no  more  significance  for  him  than  similar 
sequences  in  a  machine ; "  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
psychologist,  if  he  is  to  "know  the  subjective  facts 
with  accuracy  and  fulness  .  .  must  learn  their  objective 
conditions  of  production."     Physiology  and  psychology 

'  study  of  Psychology,  §  8.  •'  Ibid.,  §  9.  »  IbUl  §  8.  *  JbiU.,  §  9. 

«7fcW.,  §8.  «yWt/.,§6.  ^  J  bid.,  §8.  «y6W.,  §6. 


IV.] 


LEWES'S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


109 


are  further  contrasted  as  the  science  of  "  the  conditions 
of  production  and  the  science  of  the  "  products."  The 
place  of  physiology  is  "  that  of  the  organic  conditions 
of  production ;  the  place  of  psychology  being  that  of 
the  products"  The  two  sciences  are  thus  complemen- 
tary of  each  other.  "Although  the  exclusive  province 
of  the  psychologist  is  that  of  the  sentient  changes  as 
products,  the  aid  of  physiology  is  needed  to  supply  the 
conditions  of  production ;  it  alone  can  disclose  the 
operation  of  changes  which  escape  subjective  appre- 
ciation." ^  Hence  "  all  psychological  processes  are 
objectively  organic  processes."* 

Physiology,  then,  in  so  far  as  it  is  limited  to  the 
mechanism  of  the  nervous  system,  is,  according  to  Mr. 
Lewes,  concerned  with  molecular  changes,  which  may 
further  be  regarded  as  related  to  the  stimuli  which 
produce  them;  in  other  words,  its  province  is  with 
changes  that  can  be  brought  under  the  categories  of 
motion  and  force.  Psychology,  on  the  other  hand, 
treats  of  feelings,  whether  these  are  actually  known 
as  feelings  by  the  agent  or  no.  And  this  distinction  of 
movements  and  feelings  Mr.  Lewes  naturally,  from 
his  point  of  view,  identifies  with  the  distinction  already 
considered  of  the  "objective"  and  the  "subjective"  aspect 
of  the  organism.  Now,  it  must  be  repeated  that  this 
distinction  of  objective  and  subjective  has  really  no 
proper  application,  until  the  relation  of  the  movements 
and  the  feelings  to  a  conscious  intelligence  is  recog- 
nized. And  in  the  next  place,  it  must  be  remarked 
that  when  the  relation  of  movements  and  feelings  to  a 
conscious  Intelligence  is  recognized,  there  is  no  longer 
any  propriety  in  calling  the  former  "objective"  and 
the  latter  "  subjective ;"  each  is  objective  or  subjective 

>  Study  of  Psychology,  §  8.  =  Ibid.,  §  19. 


110 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


according  to  our  point  of  view.  The  "molecular 
movements"  may  be  regarded  as  "subjective,"  when 
they  are  contemplated  as  objects  of  a  personal  con- 
sciousness; the  feelings  may  be  regarded  as  "objective" 
when  they  are  opposed  to  the  self  to  which  they  are 
related.  In  other  words,  subject  and  object  only  exist 
in  relation  to  each  other.  But  Mr.  Lewes  further 
contrasts  physiology  aa  the  science  of  the  "  conditions 
of  production,"  with  psychology,  the  science  of  the 
"  products."  Now  it  is  of  course  a  truism  that  apart 
from  the  molecular  changes  of  the  nervous  system, 
there  could  not  be  in  the  individual  man  any  succession 
of  feelings,  and  therefore  there  could  not  be  any 
consciousness  of  feelings.  Nevertheless  the  molecular 
changes  are  not  the  cause  of  the  feelings.  For,  for 
one  thing,  these  movements  are  dependent  upon  stimu- 
lation by  an  extra-organic  force,  and  this  is  as  much  a 
"  condition"  of  production  as  the  movements.  But  the 
great  objection  to  this  contrast  of  "  conditions  of  pro- 
duction" and  "  products"  is  that  it  really  abstracts  not 
only  from  the  new  element  introduced  by  conscious- 
ness, but  even  from  the  new  element  introduced  by 
the  presence  of  life.  Mr.  Lewes  says  that,  were 
the  physiologist  to  limit  himself  to  molecular  changes, 
"the  sequences  would  have  no  more  significance  for 
him  than  similar  sequences  in  a  machine."  And  the 
fact  is  that  they  have  "no  more  significance"  to  the 
physiologist  as  such  than  "the  sequences  in  a  machine." 
Molecular  movements  are  molecular  movements,  no 
matter  whether  they  occur  in  a  "machine"  or  in  an 
animal  organism.  It  no  doubt  is  a  very  imperfect 
account  of  a  living  being  simply  to  describe  the  mole- 
cular movements  that  occur  in  its  nervous  system ;  but 
the  "  imperfection"  lies  solely  with  those  who  take  this 


[chap. 

lecular 
when 
Bil  coll- 
ective" 
ley  are 
ly  exist 
further 
iditions 
of  the 
bt  apart 
system, 
ccession 
be  any 
lolecular 
For,  for 
n  stimu- 
i  much  a 
But  the 
3  of  pro- 
racts  not 
anscious- 
uced  by 
at,  were 
changes, 
jance  for 
A.nd  the 
to  the 
aachine." 
ents,  no 
or  in  an 
mperfect 
he  mole- 
tem ;  but 
take  this 


IV.] 


LEWES' S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


Ill 


as  a  sufficient  account  of  life,  not  with  the  physiologist 
as  such,  who  has  completed  his  task  when  he  has  done 
so,  and  who  puts  forward  no  theory  as  to  the  position 
of  the  facts  of  his  science  in  a  general  scheme  of  know- 
ledge and  existence.  Mr.  Lewes  talks  as  if  the  physi- 
ologist could  not  advance  a  step  without  recognizing 
that  he  is  dealing  with  the  "  objective"  aspect  of  the 
organism,  or  the  "  conditions  of  production."  In  truth, 
the  physiologist  need  not  pronounce  any  opinion  on  the 
question  at  all,  and  as  a  physiologist  it  is  not  his  business 
to  pronounce  any  opinion.  But  while  the  physiologist 
must  be  freed  from  overlooking  the  nature  of  the 
sentient  organism,  Mr.  Lewes  cannot.  For  to  speak 
of  molecular  movements  as  the  conditions  of  production 
of  feeling  and  consciousness,  is  simply  to  apply  the 
category  of  cause  and  effect  where  it  becomes  meaning- 
less. A  movement  in  the  sentient  organism  is  not  the 
cause  of  which  a  feeling  is  the  effect.  We  can  follow 
up  the  line  of  molecular  movement  from  the  vibration 
of  a  candle,  through  the  vibration  of  the  ether,  to  the 
vibration  of  the  nervous  system,  and  we  end  as  we 
began  with  molecular  movement.  If  we  please,  we 
may  call  the  molecular  movements  last  considered  an 
"  aspect"  of  the  organism,  but  we  have  no  right  to  call 
it  the  "objective"  as  opposed  to  the  "subjective" 
aspect  of  the  organism,  for  it  is  no  more  "  objective" 
than  the  vibration  of  the  molecules  constituting  the 
candle.  We  have  therefore  no  right  to  pass  from  this 
"molecular"  aspect  of  the  organism  to  its  "sensitive" 
aspect,  without  allowing  for  the  change  in  our  point 
of  view.  Contemplated  in  its  molecular  aspect,  the 
organism  not  only  does  not  differ  from  a  machine, 
but  it  does  not  differ  from  a  stone.  The  highest 
category  we  can  apply  to  it  is  that  of  reciprocal  action^ 


112 


/ 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


and  that  we  can  equally  apply  to  the  knocking  of  two 
stones  against  each  other.  When  therefore  we  advance 
from  this  "molecular"  aspect  of  the  organism  to  its 
"sensitive"  aspect,  we  are  compelled  to  substitute  a 
new  and  higher  conception  of  the  "  organism."  It  is 
not  right  even  to  speak  of  the  extra-organic  thing  as 
the  cause  or  force,  of  which  the  molecular  movement 
in  the  organism  is  the  effect;  we  must  at  least  recognize 
that  the  co-operation  of  the  molecules  of  the  organism 
is  required  before  there  can  be  any  "  stimulation." 
Much  less  even  can  it  be  correct  to  speak  of  the  mole- 
cular movements  as  the  "  conditions  of  production"  of 
feelings.  The  most  essential  condition  of  production  is 
the  life  manifested  in  the  organism,  and  apart  from 
that,  the  molecular  movements  are  nothing.  While 
therefore  we  must  recognize  that  molecular  movements 
are  presupposed  in  the  existence  of  sensations  as  animal 
feelings,  there  is  in  these  sensations  a  new  factor  which 
is  not  implied  in  the  molecular  movements.  We  may 
if  we  please  contrast  this  "  sentient"  aspect  with  the 
"  molecular"  aspect,  but  it  is  absurd  to  contrast  them 
as  " objective"  and  "subjective."  It  is  perfectly  true 
that  there  is  no  sensation  without  an  appropriate  mole- 
cular movement,  but  only  in  the  sense  in  which  there  is 
no  molecular  movement  in  the  organism  without  a  cor- 
responding molecular  movement  in  the  extra- organic 
world.  The  relation  is  therefore  not  a  parallelism,  but 
a  subordination.  The  molecular  movements  take  on  a 
new  hue  by  being  viewed  as  pertaining  to  a  living 
being ;  life  in  fact  becomes  their  "  condition  of  produc- 
tion." For  while  there  are  molecular  movements  which 
exist  apart  from  life,  these  particular  molecular  move- 
ments ^an  only  take  place  in  a  living  organism ;  and  if 
we  in  any  way  alter  the  nature  of  the  living  organism,  we 


[chap. 

of  two 
dvance 
to  its 
itute  a 
'    It  is 
[ling  as 
vement 
cognize 
•ganism 
ilation." 
e  mole- 
tion"  of 
iction  is 
rt  from 
While 
vements 
s  animal 
)r  which 
We  may 
vith  the 
,st  them 
jtly  true 
,te  mole- 
.  there  is 
ut  a  cor- 
i-  organic 
ism,  but 
ake  on  a 
a  Uving 
■  produc- 
its  which 
ar  move- 
;  and  if 
mism,  we 


IV.] 


LE IVES'S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


113 


alter  the  molecular  movements  correspondently.  Hence 
the  movements  in  the  higher  animals  are  very  different 
from  the  movements  in  the  lower ;  the  complexity  and 
adaptation  of  the  parts,  which  is  one  '*  aspect"  of  the 
intensity  of  the  life,  is  the  condition  of  the  special 
molecular  movements.  It  is  necessary  therefore  to 
insist  strenuously  upon  the  subordination  of  the 
mechanism  to  sentience  (in  the  sense  explained).  We 
must  refuse  to  recognize  the  adequacy  of  the  phrase- 
ology which  speaks  of  molecular  movements  as  the 
cause  of  which  sensations  are  the  effect.  If  we  are  to 
apply  the  category  of  cause  and  effect  at  all,  we  must 
rather  call  the  "sentience"  the  cause  of  the  molecular 
movements,  since  apart  from  the  sentient  being  these 
particular  movements  could  not  take  place.  We  have 
in  fact  to  view  sentience  as  the  ideal  aspect  of  that 
co-operation  of  organs  which  is  the  essential  condition 
of  life,  and  which  alone  entitles  us  to  speak  of  an 
"  organism." 

Thus  we  have  the  mechanism  and  the  organism, 
manifesting  themselves  respectively  in  molecular  move- 
ments and  in  feelings.  Higher  still  we  have  conscious- 
ness. Just  as  in  passing  from  molecular  movements  to 
feelings,  we  have  a  subordination  of  the  former  by  the 
latter,  so,  in  a  still  more  striking  way,  we  havo  now 
the  subordination  of  movements  and  of  feelings  to  con- 
sciousness. And  this  subordination  of  course  varies  in 
different  individuals  in  accord?ince  with  their  intelli- 
gence (which  is  just  another  name  for  the  subordination). 
The  essential  difference  between  life  and  consciousness 
lies  in  that  subordination  of  all  feelings  to  a  single  self- 
'.onsciousness,  which  is  the  *?ondition  of  experience. 
Now  for  the  first  time  the  distinction  of  "  object "  and 
"  subject "  appears  ;  but  it  so  presents  itself  as  to  show 


11 


\ 


\ 


\ 


114 


KAN2'  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS,        [chap. 


the  absurdity  of  opposing  feelings  as  "  subjective"  to 
"  movements"  as  objective.  Feelings  comprehend  and 
explain  movements,  consciousness  comprehends  and 
explains  both.  Thus  both  feelings  and  movements  are 
alike  objects  of  consciousness,  and  are  at  once  objective 
and  subjective,  since  they  are  possible  only  as  relations 
to  consciousness.  Now  if  this  is  at  all  a  correct  view 
to  take,  it  is  evident  that  Mr.  Lewes's  conception  of  the 
relations  of  physiology  and  psychology  cannot  be  ac- 
cepted. As  a  science  of  molecular  movements,  physi- 
ology does  not  fall  within  the  range  of  psychology,  and, 
in  fact,  has  no  further  bearing  on  psychology  than  to 
illustrate  the  relation  of  sentient  and  conscious  life. 
But  this  just  means  that  psychology  is  a  philoso- 
phical science,  and  therefore  has  to  consider  intelli- 
gence as  displayed  in  the  manifestations  of  living 
and  conscious  beings.  Psychology,  in  fact,  is  com- 
pelled, whether  it  will  or  no,  to  go  upon  certain 
metaphysical  presuppositions,  because  metaphysic  en- 
quires into  the  relation  of  subjects  and  object,  and  it  is 
impossible  to  treat  of  consciousness  without  asserting 
or  implying  some  theory  of  those  relations. 

As  there  are  two  aspects  in  which  the  organism  may 
be  contemplated,  so,  it  is  held  by  Mr.  Lewes,  there  are 
two  ways  in  which  we  may  endeavour  to  solve  the 
problem  of  psychology — the  way  of  "observation  of 
external  appearances,"  and  the  way  of  "  introspection," 
the  latter  differing  from  the  former  "  only  in  that  the 
phenomena  observed  are  subjective  states  or  feelings, 
and  not  objective  states  or  changes  in  the  felt."^ 

Now  the  supposition  that  such  a  method  of  introspec- 
tion is  possible,  rests  uppn  an  untenable  separation  of 
feeling  and  its  objects.     It  is,  of  course,  perfectly  true 

^  Study  of  Psychohgy,  %  62. 


/ 


[chap. 

ive"  to 
nd  and 
Is  and 
ints  are 
)jective 
slations 
ct  view 
Q  of  the 

be  ac- 
,  physi- 
?y,  and, 
than  to 
)us  life, 
philoso- 

intelli- 
f  living 
is  com- 

certain 
ysic  en- 
xnd  it  is 
sserting 

sm  may 
lere  are 
)lve  the 
ation  of 
)ection," 
that  the 
eelings, 

trospec- 
ation  of 
!tiy  true 


IV.] 


LE IVES'S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


115 


that  a  man  experiences  feelings  that  are  experienced 
by  no  one  else,  but  it  is  not  true  that  he  can  experience 
a  mere  succession  of  feelings,  i.e.y  a  succession  of  feelings 
occurring  in  his  own  mind  apart  from  all  relation  to 
thought  and  its  objects.  A  being  conceived  of  as  but 
the  medium  of  a  succession  of  feelings  is  a  being  that 
is  not  conscious.  Apart  from  reference  to  a  thinking 
self — a  self  which  is  not  a  mere  colourless  and  passive 
medium,  but  is  active  in  the  constitution  of  the  feelings 
that  pass — there  is  no  knowledge  of  feelings,  and  there- 
fore no  experience.  If  we  imagine  a  being  to  whom 
each  feeling  in  turn  arises  and  passes  away  without 
being  fixed  in  relation  to  a  central  self,  we  get  the 
nearest  conceivable  approach  to  introspection.  But 
such  a  being  could  never  form  a  theory  of  itself,  be- 
cause, not  only  would  it  have  no  power  of  connecting 
the  data  of  its  experience  in  a  system  of  thought,  not 
only  would  it  be  unable  to  draw  inferences,  but  it  could 
have  no  dUita  from  which,  by  inference,  to  construct  a 
system.  We  may  suppose  the  lower  animals  to  be 
in  this  condition ;  but  then  the  lower  animals  do  not 
form  a  system  of  psychology,  or  connect  their  feelings 
in  a  coherent  w^ole  of  experience.  Thus  the  observa- 
tion of  merely  "  subjective  states  "  is  an  impossibility, 
because  there  are  no  merely  "  subjective  states "  to 
observe.  Every  feeling  that  is  known,  and  enters 
into  the  context  of  experience,  is  by  that  fact  a  re- 
lation between  subject  and  object,  or  depends  for  its 
constitution  upon  the  intelligence  to  which  it  is 
related.  We  cannot  observe  bare  feelings,  because 
the  fact  that  they  are  observed,  t.e.,  are  referred 
to  the  unity  of  self-consciousness,  makes  them  not 
mere  passive  feelings,  but  thoughts  or  relations. 
Introspection,  therefore,  in  so  far  as  it  is  said  to  be 


116 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


1 1 


the  "observation  of  subjective  states  or  feelings,"  is 
an  absurdity. 

Not  less  certain  is  it  that  "  observation  of  external 
appearances"  is  an  impossibility.  We  can  certainly 
have  a  knowledge  of  a  world  in  space,  and  in  that 
sense  we  can  observe  "  external  appearances  " ;  but  it 
is  not  possible  to  observe  that  which  is  purely  "  ob- 
jective," in  contrast  to  "  subjective  states  or  feelings." 
For  that  which  is  known  as  an  object,  becomes  by 
that  very  fact  a  relation  to  consciousness  ;  and  only  so 
does  it  enter  into  and  become  part  of  the  world  of  ex- 
perience. Why  then  is  a  distinction  usually  made 
between  introspection  and  observation  ?  The  answer 
is  simple  enough.  In  the  first  place,  there  are  feelings 
which  we  do  not  think  of  ascribing  to  the  extra-organic 
world,  but  which  we  refer  to  the  organism  itself,  and  in 
this  sense  we  may,  if  we  please,  speak  of  these  as  "  sub- 
jective states  or  feelings."  In  truth,  however,  they 
are  no  more  mere  feelings,  than  extra-organic  objects 
are  feelings,  for  they  exist  in  experience  only  as  rela- 
tions to  a  conscious  intelligence,  and  therefore  are  at 
once  objective  and  subjective.  In  the  second  place, 
introspection  and  observation  may  be  contrasted  as  the 
less  to  the  more  complex.  Thus  we  may  say  that  in 
our  ordinary  consciousness  we  have  a  sensation  of  light, 
and  that  this  is  known  by  simple  introspection ; 
whereas,  if  we  wish  to  get  a  knowledge  of  the  process 
by  which  we  come  to  have  that  sensation,  we  must 
appeal  to  "  observation."  But  the  contrast  of  feeling 
and  object,  introspection  and  observation,  is  a  false 
one.*  We  are  not  entitled  to  say  that  the  sensation  of 
light  is  purely  subjective,  on  the  ground  that  we  do  not 

*  This  false  contrast  runs  through  the  whole  of  Fechner's  "  Psycho/'hysik" 
and  Wundt's  "  PhygiologUche  Pityeliologie." 


■  1 


uhysik" 


iV.] 


LEWES'S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


117 


know  its  conditions  of  production  in  the  organism ;  it 
is  just  as  much  au  object,  determined  by  relation  of  the 
permanent  self  to  it,  as  is  the  knowledge  of  the  retina 
and  the  nervous  system.  The  contrast  here  is  not  be- 
tween subjective  and  objective  at  all,  but  between  less 
and  more  concrete  knowledge,  between  simple  relations 
and  complex  relations.  In  considering  the  nature  of 
knowledge,  as  we  are  compelled  to  do  when  we  speak 
of  methods  of  psychology,  we  have  no  right  to  speak 
of  the  organism  as  if  it  could  be  known  to  exist  apart 
from  relation  to  an  intelligent  apprehension  of  it ;  and 
in  formulating  our  knowledge,  we  must  insist  upon  the 
strict  continuity  in  the  development  of  knowledge,  and 
therefore  in  the  precedence  of  the  less  to  the  more 
complex. 

It  will  still  further  illustrate  the  critical  theory  of 
knowledge  if  we  contrast  it  with  Mr.  Lewes's  "  psycho- 
geny,"  according  to  which  knowledge  is  held  to  be 
"partly  connate,  partly  acquired,  partly  the  evolved 
product  of  the  accumulated  experience  of  ancestors, 
and  partly  of  the  accumulated  experiences  of  the  indi- 
vidual.'" Kant's  view  of  the  origin  of  knowledge,  it  is 
held  by  Mr.  Lewes,  is  fundamentally  erroneous,  because 
it  supposes  the  individual  to  bring  with  him  a  priori 
conditions  of  knowledge,  and  even  a  priori  experiences. 
And  the  reason  of  the  imperfection  is  that  biology  and 
psychology  were  not  at  the  time  it  was  formed  suflfici- 
ently  advanced  to  suggest  the  true  interpretation. 
Mr.  Lewes,  therefore,  claims  that  he  has  given  the 
only  theory  of  knowledge  which  reconciles  the  conflict- 
ing claims  of  the  a  priori  and  a  postenon  schools  of 
philosophy.  This  theory  maintains  that  the  individual 
inherits  what  may  be  called  "  a  priori  conditions  of 

'  Problems  of  Life  and  Mitul,  vol.  i.,  p.  120. 


118 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


knowledge,  and  even  a  priori  experiences  .  .  .  which 
must  determine  the  result  of  our  individual  a  posteriori 
experiences."  Such  a  inrion  conditions  of  knowledge 
and  experiences  are  for  the  individual  a  priori ;  that  is, 
they  are  not  acquired  by  his  own  individual  experience, 
but  were  acquired  by  his  ancestors  and  have  been  trans- 
mitted by  them  to  him.  Still  they  were  obtained  by  ex- 
perience, and  hence  are  true  only  within  experience.  Kant 
is  therefore  mistaken  in  supposing  that  "the  mind  brings 
with  it  a  fund  of  a  priori  knowledge  in  which  no  em- 
pirical influence,  personal  or  ancestral,  is  traceable.'" 
Had  he  only  seen  that  a  priori  knowledge  is  simply 
"the  organized  experiences  usually  termed  instinct, 
which  we  inherit  from  our  ancestors,  and  which  form, 
so  to  speak,  part  of  our  mental  structure/'  he  would 
have  also  seen  that  his  view  of  a  prion  knowledge 
is  altogether  a  mistake.  We  may  be  said  to  be  bom 
with  "a  knowledge  of  space,  with  a  knowledge  of 
causality,  &c.,  because  although  these  registered  tend- 
encies were  originally  framed  out  of  sensible  experi- 
ences, we  who  inherit  the  structure  so  modified  only 
need  the  external  stimulus,  and  forthwith  the  action  of 
that  structure  produces  the  pre-determined  result."  ^ 

I  have  already  examined  Mr.  Lewes's  view  of  neural 
process  and  sentience  as  the  subjective  and  objective 
aspects  of  the  one  organism.  What  I  propose  at 
present  to  consider  is  whether  the  knowledge  of  Nature 
as  a  coherent  system  of  objects  is  really  explained  on 
the  "  psychogenetic  "  theory  expressed  in  the  remarks 
just  quoted.  I  shall  say  nothing  as  to  Mr.  Lewes's 
misunderstanding  of  Kant's  theory,  which  will  be  at 
once  apparent  to  any  one  who  has  followed  the  account 
of  it  given  above.     I  shall  rather  ask  whether  Nature, 

'  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,  vol.  i.,  p.  440.  '  Ihid.,  p.  446. 


v.] 


LE IVES'S  THEORY  Oh  KNOWLEDGE. 


no 


as  a  world  of  knowable  objuctb  revealed  to  cuusciouB- 
ness,  can  be  accounted  for  on  Mr.  Lewes's  premises. 
Does  the  doctrine  of  evolution,  when  extended  by  Mr. 
Lewes  so  as  to  include  the  ev«  )lution  of  a  known  world 
in  consciousness,  do  what  it  pretends  to  do  %  Does 
it  really  supersede  Kant?  Does  it  not  rather  fail 
altogether  to  grapple  with  Kant's  problem  ? ' 

In  his  "  psychogenetic  "  theory  of  knowledge  Mr. 
Lewes  makes  certain  assumptions  which  he  may, 
perhaps,  be  quite  entitled  to  make,  but  which,  at  any 
rate,  it  is  important  to  see  that  ho  does  make.  In  the 
first  place,  he  assumes  that  nature  or  "  the  cosmos  " 
exists  independently  of  its  relation  to  consciousness, 
and  that  consciousness  is  gradually  evolved.  The 
object  is  "  not  the  other  side  of  the  subject,  but  the 
larger  circle  which  includes  it."  True,  "the  cosmos 
arises  in  consciousness : "  "  the  objective  world,  with 
its  manifold  variations,  is  the  differentiation  of  exist- 
ence, due  to  feeling  and  thought ; "  but  this  differen- 
tiation is  the  result  of  the  forces  manifested  by  the 
cosmos,  as  acting  on  the  living  organism.  Hence,  in 
the  second  place,  it  is  assumed  that  organisms  exist  to 
be  acted  upon  by  the  forces  of  the  cosmos.  As  an 
evolutionist  Mr.  Lewes  would  no  doubt  say  that 
originally  animal  organisms  were  "  evolved  "  from  cos- 
mical  forces ;  but  this  has  no  immediate  bearing  on 
the  psychogenetic  theory  of  knowledge.  Let  us  sup- 
pose, then,  that  the  cosmos  as  possessed  of  various 
forces  exists,  and  that  animal  organisms  have  been 
evolved  from  them.  The  question  will  then  be : 
Granting  animal  organisms  to  have  come  into  exist- 
ence, and  to  be  gradually  developed  by  their  reaction 

*With  what  follows  compare  Mr.  Greeu's  criticism  of  Lcwcs's   "psycho- 
geny,"  to  which  I  am  much  indebted.    Contemporarij  Review,  xxxii.  pp.  762-72. 


120 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


against  material  forces,  can  it  be  shown  how  the 
knowledge  of  the  world  of  nature  grows  up,  as  the 
result  of  such  continuous  action  and  re-action?  Mr. 
Lewes  holds  that  it  can,  and  it  is  in  the  account  which 
he  gives  of  the  evolution  of  consciousness  from  the 
unconscious  that  we  are  at  present  interested. 

An  organism  exists  only  in  relation  to  the  cosmical 
medium  or  to  its  environment.  And,  although  we 
distinguish  each  organ  or  function  logically,  we  must 
be  careful  to  observe  that  no  organ  or  function  really 
exists  or  operates  independently,  but  only  in  relation 
to  the  complex  of  organs  and  functions  and  to  the 
medium  in  which  it  is  placed.  Each  function  of  an 
organ  is  the  product  of  the  interaction  of  structure  and 
stimulus.  The  structure  of  the  organism,  e.g.,  "is 
built  up  from  materials  originally  drawn  from  the 
external  medium,  but  proximately  drawn  from  its 
internal  medium,  or  plasma."  Nutrition  is  a  process 
which  involves  the  co-operation  of  the  organism  and  the 
inorganic  material,  and  both  are  required  for  the  final 
product.  Now,  "  there  is  a  marked  tendency  in  organic 
substance  to  vary  under  varying  excitation,  which 
results  in  the  individualization  of  the  parts,  so  that 
growth  is  accompanied  by  a  greater  or  less  differen- 
tiation of  structure."  But  the  parts  "are  not  only 
individualized  into  tissues  and  organs,  but  are  all 
connected."  Again,  while  the  reaction  of  an  organ  is 
determined  by  its  structure  at  the  time  it  reacts,  "  yet 
the  very  reaction  itself  tends  to  establish  a  modification 
which  will  alter  subsequent  reactions ; "  "  by  the  exer- 
cise of  an  organ  its  structure  becomes  diflferentiated, 
and  each  modification  ■  onders  it  fitted  for  more  energetic 
reaction  and  for  new  modes  of  reaction."  Function 
and  structure  are  thus  mutually  dependent.     Finally, 


IV.] 


LEWES' S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


121 


« 


as  the  structure  is  modified  by  its  reactions  on  stimula- 
tion these  modifications  "  tend  to  become  transmitted 
to  offspring."  Thus,  gradually,  a  great  change  in  the 
structure,  and  therefore  in  the  functions,  of  organs  is 
produced.  Thus  the  vital  organism  is  evolved  from 
the  bioplasm ;  in  simpler  language,  the  living  organism 
assimilates  inorganic  substance,  and  so  grows,  differen- 
tiates, changes,  and  transmits  its  modified  structure  to 
offspring.^ 

Let  us  now  see  "how  the  psychical  organism  is 
evolved  from  what  may  be  analogically  called  the 
psychoplasm."  Here  we  do  not  consider  the  whole 
vital  organism,  but  only  its  "  sensitive  aspects ; "  we 
"  confine  ourselves  to  the  nervous  system."  The  move- 
ments of  the  bioplasm  consist  of  molecular  compositions 
and  decompositions,  out  of  which  arises  the  whole 
mechanism  or  structure  of  the  organism.  The  bioplasm 
may  be  viewed  in  two  aspects,  the  process  of  assimila- 
tion and  the  material  assimilated.  Similarly,  the  psy- 
choplasm  may  be  viewed  as,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
nervous  structure  or  medium,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  function  of  the  nervous  structure.  As  the  bioplasm 
has  molecular  movements,  so  the  psychoplasm  has 
"  neural  tremors."  "  The  forces  of  the  cosmical  medium, 
which  are  transformed  in  the  physiological  medium 
[the  whole  vital  organism]  build  up  the  organic  struc- 
ture, which  in  the  various  stages  of  its  evolution  reacts 
according  to  its  statical  conditions,  themselves  the 
result  of  preceding  reactions."  The  forces  of  the 
cosmical  medium  thus  act  in  conjunction  with  the 
organism  itself,  and  the  product  is  the  special  structure 
of  the  organism.  This  organic  structure,  again,  is 
gradually  modified  by  the  exercise  of  the  vital  functions 

*Pro6fe»w  (j/'X(/e  a/jd  i/jrtrf,  vol.  i.,  pp.  115-118. 


122 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


of  the  organism,  and  hence  the  reactions  under  the 
same  external  stimuli  are  altered.  And  "it  is  the 
same  with  what  may  be  called  the  mental  organism. 
Here,  also,  every  phenomenon  is  the  product  of  two 
factors,  external  and  internal,  impersonal  and  personal, 
objective  and  subjective.  Viewing  the  internal  factor 
solely  in  the  light  of  feeling,  we  may  say  that  the 
sentient  material,  out  of  which  all  the  forms  of  consci- 
ousness are  evolved,  is  the  psychoplasm  incessantly 
fluctuating,  incessantly  renewed.  Viewing  this  on  the 
physiological  side,  it  is  the  succession  of  neural  tremors, 
variously  combining  into  neural  groups."  This  evolu- 
tion of  all  the  forms  of  consciousness  is  experience,  i.e., 
"organic  registration  of  assimilated  material."  The 
psychoplasm  then  is  "the  mass  of  potential  feeling 
derived  from  all  the  sensitive  affections  of  the  organ- 
ism, not  only  of  the  individual  but  through  heredity  of 
the  ancestral  organisms.  All  sensations,  perceptions, 
emotions,  volitions  are  partly  connate,  partly  acquired, 
partly  the  evolved  products  of  the  accumulated  experi- 
ences of  ancestors,  and  partly  of  the  accumulated 
experiences  of  the  individual,  when  each  of  these  have 
left  residua  in  the  modifications  of  the  structure."^ 

This  view  of  the  origin  of  knowledge  may  perhaps 
be  expressed  somewhat  more  simply.  The  organism,  it 
is  held,  is  a  combination  of  independent  organs.  But 
these  organs  act  only  in  relation  to  the  forces  of  the 
external  world.  Now  we  can  distinguish,  although  we 
cannot  separate,  the  structure  of  the  organism  from  the 
function  it  discharges.  Thus  the  organism,  if  we  look 
only  at  its  vital  aspect,  without  directing  our  attention 
to  its  sensitive  aspect,  assimilates  inorganic  substances, 
or  works  them  up  into  its  own  structure.     But  this 

^  Problems  of  Life  a)ul  Mind,  voL  i.,  pp.  118-123. 


IV.] 


LE IVES'S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


123 


this 


process  of  assimilation  has  an  influence  on  the  structure 
itself,  and  hence  an  influence  on  the  process  of  assimi- 
lation. The  structure  gradually  changes,  and  so  does 
the  process ;  and  so,  as  one  living  being  gives  rise  to 
another,  the  changes  in  the  structure  of  the  organism 
of  the  parent  give  rise  to  a  structure  in  the  offspring 
different  from  that  with  which  the  parent  began  life. 
This  gradual  change  in  structure,  and  consequently  in 
the  function  relative  to  structure,  results  in  the  course 
of  innumerable  generations  in  an  organic  structure  and 
function  very  unlike  the  structure  and  function  of  the 
first  animal  of  the  series.  Now  from  this  we  can  see 
how  experience  is  gradually  evolved :  how  "the  cosmos 
arises  in  consciousness."  The  nervous  system  is  the 
special  structure  of  which  sentience  is  the  function. 
Given  a  certain  nervous  structure,  and  a  certain  stimulus, 
and  the  product  will  be  a  certain  impression  or  feeling. 
But  the  nervous  structure  is  not  always  the  same,  but 
varies  from  generation  to  generation.  The  vital  organ- 
ism changes  under  the  influence  of  its  own  reaction 
against  the  forces  of  the  cosmical  medium,  and  in  course 
of  time  the  organism  is  very  much  altered.  And  the 
nervous  system,  as  part  of  the  organism,  of  course 
changes  along  with  the  other  organs.  As  therefore 
the  general  structure  of  the  organism  alters,  so  also 
does  the  special  structure  of  the  nervous  system.  That 
structure  is  adapted  to  receive  external  stimuli.  But 
according  to  the  state  of  the  nervous  structure  at  a 
given  time  will  be  the  character  of  the  reaction  it 
manifests.  And  as  the  reaction  of  the  nervous  struc- 
ture has  an  effect  upon  the  nervous  structure  itself,  the 
consequence  is  that  it  changes,  and  correspondently 
with  it  the  feelings  which  are  the  product  of  the  mutual 
action  of  the  external  stimuli  and  the  nervous  structure 


] 


124 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


undergo  modification.  Now  we  can  look  at  the  nervous 
system  either  from  the  external  or  from  the  internal 
point  of  view.  From  the  external  point  of  view,  we 
have  neural  tremors  which  combine  to  form  neural 
groups;  from  the  internal  point  of  view  we  have 
feelings.  But  feelings  are  the  "  sentient  material,  out 
of  which  the  forms  of  consciousness  are  evolved."  And 
experience  is  a  "registration  of  feeling;"  hence  the 
"  cosmos  which  arises  in  consciousness  "  is  a  product 
of  the  organism  in  relation  to  the  forces  of  the  cosmical 
medium.  As  the  structure  of  the  nervous  system 
changes,  so  do  the  feelings  which  are  the  product  of 
its  reaction.  Hence  each  organism,  inheriting  the  ner- 
vous structure  of  its  ancestors,  has  an  a  priori  part  of 
knowledge  transmitted  to  it,  as  well  as  an  a  postenwi 
part  which  it  acquires  for  itself.  For  as  the  struc- 
ture is  relative  to  the  function,  change  in  the  structure 
implies  change  in  the  experience.  Coming  therefore 
into  the  world  with  a  special  structure  handed  down  as 
a  legacy  from  the  ceaseless  action  and  reaction  of 
medium  and  function,  each  organism  inherits  part  of 
the  garnered  wealth  of  experience  acquired  by  all 
preceding  organisms.  This  explains  why  part  of  our 
knowledge  seems,  and  in  a  sense,  is,  a  pnori  or  connate. 
One  ought  to  be  grateful  to  Mr.  Lewes  for  expressing 
the  doctrine  of  the  evolution  of  experience  in  so  definite 
a  form.  So  long  as  it  is  simply  asserted  vaguely  that 
the  revolution  in  our  biological  conceptions  caused  by 
the  acceptance  of  the  Darwinian  theory  of  development 
must  compel  us  to  give  a  new  account  of  the  nature  of 
knowledge,  it  is  difiicult  to  resist  the  claim.  But  when 
we  see  the  specific  application  of  the  biological  notion 
of  development  to  the  explanation  of  knowledge,  I 
think  it  becomes  very  manifest  that  there  is  nothing  in 


IV.] 


LEWES' S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


125 


I 


the  "  new  psychology  "  which  really  helps  to  settle  the 
problem  of  knowledge  as  it  was  stated  and  partially 
solved  by  Kant. 

On  careful  consideration  it  becomes  plain  that  Mr. 
Lewes  does  not  avoid  that  separation  of  intelligence  and 
nature  which  he  rightly  regards  as  the  essential  weak- 
ness of  the  old  empirical  psychology,  but  simply  brings 
it  bac^.  in  a  new  form.  In  fact,  it  is  difficult  to  see 
how  the  continuous  development  of  the  whole  animal 
world,  should  prove  the  evolution  of  the  conscious  from 
the  unconscious,  any  more  than  the  evolution  of  indi- 
vidual living  men  from  human  ancestors  should  prove 
it.  Nor  is  there  any  reason  why  Kant,  who  saw 
nothing  in  the  latter  fact  to  throw  doubt  on  his  conclu- 
sions, should  be  overwhelmed  by  the  former,  supposing 
him  to  be  alive  now,  and  familiar  with  the  recent 
developments  of  biology  and  psychology.  For,  whether 
the  individual  man  is  developed  from  human  ancestors 
only,  or  finds  his  pedigree  go  back  also  to  non-human 
ancestors,  the  conditions  under  which  he  comes  to  know 
a  world  of  connected  objects  would  seem  to  be  very 
much  the  same.  In  the  order  of  time,  it  is  plain 
enough  that  unconscious  processes  precede  conscious 
processes  :  that  each  man  is  at  first  a  mere  animal,  with 
only  potentialities  of  knowledge ;  but  the  clearest  re- 
cognition of  this  fact  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  denial 
of  the  independence  of  the  "cosmos"  in  intelligence. 
As,  however,  Mr,  licwes,  and  evolutionists  generally, 
are  of  a  different  opinion,  let  us  look  at  the  matter 
more  closely. 

As  we  have  seen,  Mr.  Lewes  does  not  attempt  in 
his  "  psychogenetic  "  theory  to  explain  what  is  implied 
in  the  existence  of  living  organisms,  but  assuming  these 
to  exist,  he  goes  on  to  enquire  into  the  way  in  which 


126 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


nature,  or  the  cosmos,  "  arises  in  consciousness."  The 
explanations  he  gives  therefore  concern,  not  the  exist- 
ence of  living  beings,  but  the  process  by  which  they 
are  gradually  changed  or  evolved.  Each  organism  as 
living  must  be  nourished  by  the  assimilation  of  inor- 
ganic substances,  and  this  assimilation  is  not  a  mere 
transference  of  those  substances  into  the  organism,  but 
the  working  up  of  them  into  living  substance.  The 
organism  is  therefore  an  essential  factor  in  the  con- 
version of  the  inorganic  into  the  organic  ;  the  internal 
medium  is  as  essential  to  the  final  result  as  the  external 
medium.  Organic  structure  is  built  up  by  the  forces 
of  the  cosmic  medium  co-operating  with  the  organism 
as  vital.  And  the  differentiation  of  structure,  resulting 
in  the  course  of  ages  in  the  evolution  of  new  types  of 
organism,  is  the  result  of  the  continuous  interaction  of 
the  organism  and  the  external  medium.  The  organic 
structure  in  relation  to  external  forces  is  gradually 
modified  by  the  function  which  that  structure  condi- 
tions. For  the  reaction  of  the  organism  on  the  forces 
of  the  cosmic  medium  leaves  residua  in  the  structure 
which  alter  it,  and  hence  in  each  new  phase  of  evolu- 
tion there  is  a  modification  of  structure,  and  therefore 
a  modification  of  function.  And  this  explains  the  way 
in  which  existing  organisms  are  connected  with  the 
remotest  organisms.  The  continuous  accumulation  of 
slight  differences  in  the  structure  goes  on  'pari  passu 
with  a  continual  change  in  the  character  of  the  func- 
tions which  that  structure  conditions. 

Now  so  far  there  is  nothing  to  which  Kant  or  his 
followers  need  object.  It  may  be  all  very  true,  and  very 
important  in  its  place ;  but  it  does  not  seem  to  explain 
in  any  way  how  "  the  cosmos  arises  in  consciousness." 
Aristotle  has  said  what  is  virtually  the  same  thing, 


':?5!p^?ig5tw««'«iw?i'"? 


IV.] 


LEWES' S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


127 


his 
very 
)lain 
less." 
ling, 


although  of  course  he  did  not  suppose  the  ancestors  of 
man  to  run  further  back  than  man.     It  is  the  next  step 
that  contains  the  peculiar  doctrine  of  the  psychology  of 
evolution.    There  is  one  part  of  the  organism,  it  is  said, 
to  which  the  mental  life  is  related  in  a  closer  and  more 
intimate  way  than  to  the  organism  as  we  have  yet  con- 
sidered it — viz.,  the  nervous  system  and  the  special 
organs  connected  with  it ;  and  the  nervous  system  is 
only  one  of  the  differentiations  of  the  organism.     Now 
this  of  course  is  perfectly  true ;  but  at  the  same  time  it 
must  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  framing  a  theory  of  the 
organism,  we  must  take  due  note  not  only  of  the 
differentiations  which  occur,  but  of  the  unity  which  is 
differentiated.     Now  the  organism  regarded  merely  as 
vital,  i.e.f  as  organic  structure  capable  of  assimilating 
inorganic  substances,  is  a  less  concrete  unity  than  the 
organism  regarded  as  differentiated  in  a  special  nervous 
structure,  with  a  correspondent  function  of  sensation. 
Here  too  there  is  a  relation  between  structure  and  the 
forces  of  the  cosmic  medium,  but  it  is  a  relation  of  a 
different  kind  from  that  involved  in  nutrition.     The 
organism  has  a  structure  fitting  it  for  discharging  the 
function  of  nutrition,  but  it  has  also  a  structure  so 
differentiated  as  to  fit  it  for  responding  to  stimuli  and 
discharging  the  function  of  sensibility.    Thus  in  passing 
from  the  general  structure  which  is  the  condition  of 
nutrition,  to  the  specific  structure  which  is  the  con- 
dition of  sensation,  we  must  not  only  attend  to  the  dif- 
ferentiation of  the  organism,  but  we  must  also  realise 
clearly  that  the  organism  now  connotes  a  new  sum  of 
relations.     I  refer  to  this,  not  for  its  own  sake,  but  for 
its  bearing  on  the  general  method  by  which  Mr.  Lewes 
endeavours  to  explain  how  "  the  cosmos  arises  in  oon- 
sciousness." 


128 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


The  organism,  then,  must  now  be  regarded  as  con- 
noting both  the  structure  which  conditions  nutrition, 
and  the  structure  which  conditions  sensation.  And 
when  we  fix  our  attention  on  the  structure  of  the 
nervous  system,  we  find  that  the  function  which  it, 
or  rather  the  whole  organism  through  it,  discharges, 
has  an  effect  on  the  structure  of  the  nervous  system 
itself.  "  Pathways  "  are  established,  which  make  the 
nervous  system  ready  to  respond  "  whenever  the  new 
excitation  is  discharged  along  the  old  channels."  In 
other  words,  the  response  of  the  nervous  system  to  an 
external  stimulus  becomes  different  by  the  fact  of  its 
responding,  and  as  the  nervous  system  is  gradually 
modified,  so  also  is  the  function,  and  hence  the  response 
is  different.  Function  and  structure  being  always 
relative  to  each  other,  we  can  understand  how  in  the 
course  of  many  generations  organisms  of  an  altered 
structure  are  generated,  which  respond  differently  to 
the  same  external  stimuli. 

This  is  what  seems  to  be  involved  in  Mr.  Lewes' 
remarks  on  the  "  Psychoplasm,"  and  to  it  Kant,  I 
should  say,  would  have  made  no  special  objection. 
There  is  nothing  in  it  but  an  extension  to  the  whole 
animal  creation,  not  excluding  man,  of  what  was  long 
held  as  to  the  connexion  of  animals  of  the  same  species. 
But  evidently  we  have  not  yet  got  to  the  explanation 
of  how  "the  cosmos  arises  in  consciousness."  For 
what  is  the  response  of  a  nerve  under  stimulation  ? 
Mr.  Lewes  himself  tells  us  that  it  is  a  "neural  tremor," 
and  that  neural  tremors  are  "  variously  combined  into 
neural  groups."  It  must  be  observed,  however,  that 
Mr.  Lewes  now  adds  a  new  element,  which  he  dis- 
tinguishes and  yet  identifies  with  neural  tremors  and 
neural  groups.     For  he  holds  that  what  is  on  the 


into 
that 
e  dis- 
-s  and 
the 


IV.] 


LE IVES'S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


129 


objective  side  "the  succession  of  neural  tremors 
variously  combining  into  neural  groups,"  r  > objectively 
a  "  sentient  material."  This  "  sentient  material "  must 
be  the  product  of  the  nervous  structure  as  stimulated 
by  the  "  forces  of  the  cosmical  medium  " :  it  must,  in 
other  words,  be  a  succession  of  impressions. 

It  is  unnecessary  here  to  repeat  what  I  have  said  as  to 
the  propriety  of  distinguishing  the  neural  tremors  as  ob- 
jective from  the  succession  of  impressions  as  subjective. 
But  I  shall  ask  the  reader  to  observe,  that  the  nervous 
structure  is  now  regarded  as  the  condition  at  once  of 
neural  tremors  and  of  feelings,  and  that  these  must  be 
distinguished  from  each  other.  And  here  we  come  to 
close  quarters.  It  is  easy  to  understand  what  is 
meant  by  a  writer  who  tells  us  that  "  pathways "  are 
established  in  the  nervous  structure  by  its  excitations, 
and  that  this  affects  the  structure  itself,  causing  it  to 
react  differently  on  the  same  stimulus.  But  what  is 
meant  by  saying  that  "  the  evolution  of  mind  is  the 
establishment  of  definite  paths  ? "  "  Definite  paths  "  in 
what  1  "  Mind  "  is  a  term,  as  Mr.  Lewes  gives  us  to 
understand,  connoting  the  purely  sentient  phenomena 
of  the  organism,  i.e.  it  is  a  term  expressing  a  combina- 
tion of  feelings.  But  feelings  cannot  have  "  definite 
paths  "  established  in  them  in  the  same  sense  in  which 
definite  paths  may  be  established  in  the  nervous 
structure.  When  a  writer  speaks  of  such  "paths," 
the  metaphor  suggests  the  transmission  of  an  excitation 
along  a  nerve  to  the  nerve  centre,  and  in  this  sense  the 
phrase  has  a  perfectly  intelligible  meaning.  But  a 
succession  of  sensations  is  a  series  of  transient  feelings 
following  each  other  in  time,  and  it  does  not  seem  as  if 
we  could  properly  speak  of  the  "establishment  of 
definite  paths  "  in  connexion  with  them.     If  there  aro 


180 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


''  paths "  in  feelings,  what  is  it  that  goes  along  with 
the  "  paths  ? "  A  nerve,  if  we  conceive  of  it  as  made 
up  by  atoms,  may  have  a  "  definite  path  established  in 
it,"  since  the  vibration  which  constitutes  the  excitation 
as  produced  by  the  external  stimulus,  will  travel  in  a 
certain  direction.  But  here  it  is  the  nervous  structure 
which  has  the  path,  and  the  neural  tremors  are  affections 
which  each  nerve-atom  has  in  turn.  Are  we  then  to  say 
that  the  sensation  travels  along  the  nerve-atoms?  This 
can  hardly  be  the  case,  because  the  sensation  does  not 
exist  except  when  the  nerve-vibration  reaches  the  brain. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  then,  I  think,  that  it  is  of  the 
nervous  structure  Mr.  Lewes  is  thinking  when  he  speaks 
of 'definite  paths"  being  "established,"  and  that,  as 
applied  to  feelings  in  consciousness,  the  phrase  has  no 
proper  meaning  at  all.  Nevertheless,  as  we  shall  im- 
mediately see,  the  "  psychogenetic "  theory  of  know- 
ledge owes  its  plausibility  enturely  to  the  transference 
to  feelings  in  consciousnesf,  of  language  which  can 
properly  be  applied  only  to  neural  tremors. 

We  have  seen  then  that  the  organism  is  differentiated 
as  a  nervous  structure  which  has  the  function  of  nerve 
excitation.  Now  the  transmission  by  heredity  of  a 
particular  nerve  structure,  with  its  correspondent 
function,  one  can  understand.  But  can  there  be  a 
transmission  of  the  feelings  which  are  the  products  of 
the  interaction  of  the  nerve  structure  and  the  external 
stimuli  1  Mr.  Lewes  implies  that  there  can.  Let  us 
see  how  he  gives  plausibility  to  the  supposition. 

The  "  sentient  material "  is  spoken  of  as  "  forming 
the  psychological  medium."  Now  this  "  sentient 
material"  may  either  mean  (1)  the  nervous  system  as 
to  its  structure,  or  (2)  the  feeling  which  is  the  function 
correspondent  to  this  special  structure. 


I 

i 


■^jt^il^jjg^i^lwtw.ff'.Twr-.-**-- 


IV.] 


LE IVES'S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


131 


rmiDg 
itient 
3m  as 
iction 


(1)  As  Mr.  Lewes  says  that  the  sentient  material 
forms  the  psychological  mediumy  we  naturally  take  his 
view  to  be  that  the  nervous  structure  is  the  ''medium" 
which  determines  the  evolution  of  "  the  cosmos  as  it 
arises  in  consciousness."  The  whole  tenor  of  his 
remarks  is  most  consistent  with  this  supposition. 
For  if  the  sentient  material  is  equivalent  to  the 
nervous  structure,  we  can  understand  how  it  should 
gradually  change  under  stimulation,  and  how  by  the 
influence  of  heredity,  a  nervous  structure  very  different 
from  what  we  might  call  the  primary  nervous  structure 
should  be  "  evolved."  The  "sentient  material "  on  this 
interpretation  will  mean  the  nervous  structure  as  the 
condition,  or  rather  part-condition,  of  a  sequence  of 
feelings.  By  the  "  sentient  material "  therefore  must 
be  understood,  not  the  "  manifold  of  sense "  of  which 
Kant  speaks — the  flux  of  feelings  coming  and  going 
perpetually — but  the  material  structure,  which  for  us 
is  the  condition  of  our  having  such  a  "manifold  of 
sense."  Taking  the  "  sentient  material "  in  this  sense, 
there  is  a  manifest  propriety  in  speaking  of  the 
psychoplasm,  which  is  but  another  name  for  the 
nervous  system,  as  "incessantly  fluctuating,  incessantly 
renewed."  It  is  "incessantly  fluctuating,  incessantly 
renewed,"  because  it  is  only  by  perpetual  repair  of 
waste  that  it  ministers  to  life,  and  because  it  is  inces- 
santly undergoing  stimulation  and  reacting  against  the 
forces  of  the  cosmical  medium.  And  we  can  also 
understand,  how  by  the  influence  of  heredity,  or  rather 
by  the  exercise  of  its  function  of  sensation,  the 
organism  should  in  the  course  of  ages  be  greatly 
modified,  and  therefore  be  the  condition  of  feelings 
different  from  those  of  which  its  former  structure  was 
the  condition.    All  this  is  easily  understood ;  but  what 


132 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


is  not  so  easy  to  understand  is  how  the  "sentient 
material"  so  defined  can  be  "the  mass  of  potential 
feeling  derived  from  all  the  sensitive  affections  of  the 
organism,  not  only  of  the  individual,  but  through 
heredity  of  the  ancestral  organisms."  If  the  "  sentient 
material"  is  equivalent  to  the  nervous  structure  as 
part-condition  of  feeling,  it  cannot  be  a  "mass  of 
potential  feeling;"  it  must  differ  from  the  "mass  of 
potential  feeling  "  as  "  condition  of  production  "  from 
"  product,"  or  "  medium  '  from  "  function."  If,  there- 
fore, Mr.  Lewes  is  right  in  calling  the  "sentient 
material"  the  "  medium,"  he  is  utterly  wrong  in  calling 
it  a  "  mass  of  potential  feeling  derived  from  all  the 
sensitive  affections  of  the  organism."  The  nervous 
structure  is  not  the  feeling  which  it  makes  possible : 
while  the  one  is  co-relative  to  the  other,  they  may  not 
be  identified,  any  more  than  matter  can  be  identified 
with  force.  A  centre  is  not  a  circumference  although 
the  one  cannot  be  thought  apart  from  the  other. 

(2)  There  is  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  Mr.  Lewes 
does  identify  the  "  sentient  material"  out  of  which  the 
cosmos  is  to  arise  with  the  nervous  structure  as  internal 
"  medium."  But  it  is  just  as  certain  that  he  takes  it 
in  the  sense  of  the  Kantian  "  manifold  of  sense  " — the 
succession  of  feelings  which  is  the  "  product "  of  the 
interaction  of  internal  and  external  media,  i.e.,  of  nerv- 
ous structure  and  external  stimuli.  Now  taking  the 
"  sentient  material,"  or  "  mass  of  potential  feeling,"  in 
the  sense  of  individual  feelings,  it  is  not  easy  to  see 
how  there  can  be  any  transmission  or  evolution  of 
them.  How  can  any  one  have  another's  feeling? 
When  a  feeling  is  experienced,  it  immediately  gives 
place  to  another  feeling,  and  it  never  returns.  The 
same    individual    therefore    cannot    ever    experience 


IV.] 


LEIVES*S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


133 


the  muxe  feeling  over  again.  And  if  this  is  true  of 
each  individual  in  regard  to  his  own  experience,  it  must 
be  still  more  true  in  regard  to  that  experience  which  is 
said  to  be  "  the  evolved  product  of  the  accumulated 
experiences  of  ancestors."  Feelings  cannot  be  repeated 
and  hence  they  cannot  be  transmitted.  That  there  can 
be  no  evolution  of  feeling  is  also  evident,  since  evolu- 
tion implies  identity  in  change :  but  in  a  mere  series  of 
feelings  there  is  no  identity  and  therefore  no  evolution. 
Mr.  Lewes  therefore  when  he  says  that  experiences 
leave  "  residua  in  the  modifications  of  the  structure ; " 
when  he  speaks  of  the  "  controlling  effect  of  the  estab- 
lished pathways,"  without  which  "  every  excitation 
would  be  indefinitely  irradiated  throughout  the  whole 
organism  ;"  when  he  tells  us  of  "  the  establishment  of 
definite  paths  "  by  which  mind  is  fitted  "  for  the  recep- 
tion of  definite  impressions ; "  and  when  he  refers  to 
"registered  modifications  of  feelings,"  by  which  feelings 
"  must  always  be  reproduced,  whenever  the  new  excit- 
ation is  discharged  along  the  old  channels ;"  in  all 
this  he  is  speaking  in  language  that  is  quite  mean- 
ingless, unless  he  is  thinking,  not  of  the  succession  of 
feelings  out  of  which  experience  is  to  be  evolved,  but 
of  the  nervous  structure  as  the  condition  of  such  feel- 
ings. Certainly,  the  actual  having  of  sensation,  leaves 
"  residua  in  the  modifications  of  the  structure  ;  "  but  it 
does  not  leave  residua  in  the  sensations  that  are  had. 
The  nervous  structure  changes,  and  so,  no  doubt,  does 
the  sensation  which  is  its  "  function  "  or  "  product ;  "• 
but  we  can  speak  of  sensations  being  modified,  only 
when  we  mean  to  say  that  one  sensation  is  not  the 
same  in  content  with  another.  So,  when  we  hear  of 
the  controlling  effect  of  the  "  established  paths,"  we 
must  suppose  that  the  nervous  structure  as  a  condition 


134 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


f'' 


of  sensation  is  referred  to,  since  there  can  be  no 
"  established  paths  "  in  a  mere  sequence  of  sensations. 
And  when  we  are  told  that  "  feelings  must  always  be 
reproduced  whenever  the  new  excitation  is  discharged 
along  the  old  channels,"  we  must  suppose  Mr.  Lewes 
to  mean  that  a  feeling  similar  in  content  with  another 
formerly  felt,  is  felt  whenever  the  nervous  system  is 
stimulated  in  the  same  way.  But  all  this  only  shows 
that,  in  identifying  the  "  sentient  material "  with  the 
mere  sequence  of  feelings,  Mr.  Lewes  must  give  up  his 
view  of  the  transmission  of  the  "  sentient  material." 
What  is  really  transmitted  is  the  structure,  modified 
by  the  exercise  of  its  function,  and  so  responding  in  a 
different  way  to  stimuli.  But  no  modification  of  the 
nervous  structure  will  account  for  the  origin  of  the 
cosmos  in  consciousness.  We  may  explain  in  this  way 
how  the  "  sentient  material" — the  manifold  of  sense — 
alters,  but  we  have  not  shown  how  experience  develops 
because  we  have  not  shown  how  it  begins.  Something 
cannot  be  developed  out  of  nothing,  experience  out  of 
non-experience.  The  changes  in  the  nervous  system, 
gradually  produced  by  the  accumulated  activity  of 
innumerable  individuals  lineally  connected,  and  the 
corresponding  change  in  the  products,  does  not  account 
for  the  origin  of  the  cosmos  in  consciousness,  because  it 
does  not  account  for  the  very  simplest  experience,  the 
experience  that  there  is  something  known  by  me.  Thus 
whether  we  take  the  "  sentient  material,"  as  (1)  the 
nervous  structure  conceived  of  as  the  part-condi'  *  )n  of 
feeling,  or  as  (2)  the  feelings  of  which  the  nervous 
structure  is  the  condition  or  medium ;  in  either  case 
we  are  no  nearer  an  explanation  of  knowledge  than 
when  we  began. 
Mr.  Lewes  has,  therefore,  in  order  to  make  plausible 


.  V 


[chap. 


IV.] 


LEWES' S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


135 


)n  of 

3rvous 

case 

than 

isible 


.  s 


V-, 


the  derivation  of  the  knowable  world  from  the  changes 
of  the  organism,  to  make  a  further  unwarrantable 
identification — the  identification  of  a  series  of  feelings 
with  the  consciousness  of  a  world  of  connected  facts. 
Just  as  the  nervous  structure  is  confused  with  the 
sensation  which  is  its  function,  so  a  series  of  feelings 
is  confused  with  the  consciousness  of  such  feelings,  i.e., 
with  the  relation  of  real  objects  to  the  unity  of  self- 
consciousness.  The  "sentient  material"  or  "mass  of 
potential  feeling"  is  that  "out  of  which  all  the  forms 
of  consciousness  are  developed;"  but  on  the  other 
hand  experience  is  called  "  the  organic  registration  of 
assimilated  material."  Now  it  is  true  that  out  of  the 
"manifold  of  sense,"  not  as  a  mere  manifold  but  as 
the  particular  element  in  knowledge  reflected  on 
the  universal,  "all  the  forms  of  consciousness  are 
*  developed."  Our  knowledge  undoubtedly  comes  to 
us  in  fragments,  and  these  fragments  we  may  call 
the  "  sentient  material "  of  knowledge.  But  observe 
that  this  "sentient  material"  is  not  a  mere  feeling 
as  it  is  for  a  being  that  has  no  self,  but  the  reflection 
of  something  real  on  the  self.  As  universal,  real  know- 
ledge does  not  begin  in  mere  sensation  but  in  sensation 
informed  by  thought.  Sensation  is  an  immediate  feel- 
ing, passing  with  the  moment ;  knowledge  even  in  its 
simplest  phase  implies  the  judgment  that  "  something 
is."  Hence  if  we  call  experience  the  "  registration  of 
assimilated  material,"  we  must  understand  it  to  be 
a  registration  which  implies  the  reference  of  the 
material  assimilated,  i.e.,  the  feeling,  to  a  universal 
self.  Mr.  Lewes,  however,  supposes  that  the  regis- 
tration is  somehow  an  organic  process,  and  hence  that 
experience  develops  by  the  gradual  alteration  in  the 
nervous   structure    as   medium,   and  the  consequent 


il 


13d 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap 


alteration  in  the  '^  sentient  material."    As,  however, 
the  organism  as  having  a  succession  of  feelings  must 
be  taken  to  connote  less  than  the  organism  as  self- 
conscious,  the  evolution  of  the  organism  in  the  one 
sense  does  not  imply  its  evolution  in  the  other  sense. 
Experience  cannot  possibly  evolve  before  it  begins, 
and  it  only  begins  when  the  mere  succession  of  feelings 
is  converted  into  a  system  of  real  objects.     Thus  the 
cosmos  does  not  arise  in  consciousness  from  the  inter- 
action of  nervous  structure  and  external  stimuli,  but 
only  from   the  gradual  evolution  of  intelligence  in 
relation  to  the  objects  which  it  makes  possible.     And 
if  feelings  cannot  be  transmitted,  much  less  can  self- 
consciousness.     An   organic    structure   as    gradually 
altered  by  successive  stimulations,  and  responses  to 
stimulations,  is  inherited;   but  experience  is  nothing 
apart  from  self-consciousness,  and  self-consciousness  is 
not  handed  down  from  one  being  to  another.    When 
Mr.  Lewes  talks  of  knowledge  being  a  priori,  he 
confuses  the  organic  conditions  of  our  having  sensation 
with  the  experience  of  sensations  as  objects.     Such 
experience  is  nothing  for  us  as  thinking  beings ;  it  is 
but  the  potentiality  of  our  having  knowledge;  and, 
unless  there  were  a  universal  self  distinct  from  the 
nervous  structure  and  the  succession  of  feelings,  the 
knowledge  of  the  cosmos  would  never  arise  in  con- 
sciousness at  all.     External  forces  as  stimuli,  and  the 
nervous  structure  as  reacting  on  stimuli,  are  nothing 
for  consciousness  but  a  mere   "manifold  of  sense" 
unless  we  suppose  the  self  as  synthetic  to  relate  that 
manifold  to  itself,  and  so  to  give  rise  to  a  known  world. 
But  as  the  mere  manifold,  as  Kant  has  shown,  is  not  an 
object  of  knowledge,  but  only  an  element  in  knowledge, 
it  is  not  possible  to  show  that  self-consciousness  is 


IV.] 


LEWES'S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


137 


^ 


evolved  from  that  which  only  exists  in  relation  to 
self-consciousness.  Abstract  from  intelligence  itself, 
and  therefore  from  all  relation  to  intelligence,  and  the 
world  becomes  a  mere  "unknowable."  The  supposition 
that  Kant's  theory  of  knowledge  is  aflFected  by  the 
recent  advances  in  biology  and  psychology  arises  from 
a  confusion  between  the  transmission  of  a  modified 
organism,  and  the  transmission  of  experience.  The 
organism  is  indeed  transmitted,  but  experience  is  not 
transmitted :  it  is  appropriated  in  virtue  of  intelligence. 
In  the  above  remarks  I  have  gone  somewhat  beyond 
the  letter  of  Kant's  system,  but  I  do  not  think  that 
I  have  said  anything  inconsistent  with  its  spirit.  The 
essential  point  is  the  necessary  correlativity  of  con- 
sciousness and  *^«  objects,  a  correlativity  such  that  the 
object  must  b^  ;?  ed  over  into  consciousness  and  not 
consciousness  ;.: .«  the  object.  It  is  the  recognition  of 
this  essential  unity  of  all  known  objects  in  intelligence 
that  constitutes  the  peculiar  merit  of  Kant,  and  makes 
the  publication  of  the  Critique  an  epoch  in  modern 
speculation. 


138 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE   PRINCIPLES   OP   JUDGMENT.     DR.    STIRLING'S 
INTERPRETATION. 


1 


CJTILL  following  the  lead  of  formal  logic,  Kant,  after 
considering  the  pure  conceptions,  goes  on  to  con- 
sider the  pure  judgments  of  the  understanding,  or  the 
fundamental  propositions  which  formulate  the  unity  of 
individual  objects  and  the  unity  of  their  mutual  connec- 
tion. These  judgments  or  propositions  embody  the 
last  result  of  the  investigation  into  the  problem  of 
critical  philosophy  in  its  positive  aspect,  viz. :  How  are 
synthetic  judgments  a  priori  possible  ?  The  materials 
for  the  final  answer  have  already  been  given  in  the 
Esthetic,  taken  along  with  the  deduction  and  schema- 
tism of  the  categories,  and  little  remains  except  to  show 
in  detail  how  the  elements  implied  in  real  knowledge  are 
joined  together  in  a  system  constituting  the  known 
world.  Kant,  however,  after  his.  manner,  goes  over  the 
old  ground  again,  and  shows,  but  now  more  in  detail,  on 
the  one  hand  that  the  opposition  of  intelligence  and 
nature,  from  which  the  dogmatist  starts,  cannot  explain 
the  actual  facts  of  our  knowledge ;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  these  facts  may  be  explained  if  we  recog- 
nize the  constructive  power  of  intelligence  in  nature. 
By  a  roundabout  road  he  has  come  back  to  the  problem, 


v.] 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  JUDGMENT. 


139 


Hume's  statement  of  which  "roused  him  from  his 
dogmatic  slumber/'  but  he  has  come  back  enriched  with 
the  spoils  of  a  large  conquest  of  new  territory.  Not 
only  has  the  single  question  as  to  the  application  to 
real  objects  of  the  law  of  causality  expanded  into  the 
comprehensive  question  as  to  the  fundamental  laws  of 
nature  as  a  whole,  but  the  point  of  view  from  which  the 
relations  of  intelligence  and  nature  are  contemplated 
has  been  completely  changed.  Philosophy  no  longer 
perplexes  itself  with  the  irrational  problem,  How  do 
we  come  to  know  objects  existing  as  they  are  known 
beyond  the  confines  of  our  knowledge  %  but  occupies 
itself  with  the  rational  and  soluble  problem  as  to  the 
elements  involved  in  our  knowledge  of  objects  standing 
in  the  closest  relations  to  our  intelligence. 

Even  in  our  ordinary  consciousness,  in  which  we  do 
not  think  of  questioning  the  independent  reality  of  t.\e 
world  as  we  know  it,  we  draw  a  rough  distinction  be- 
tween objects  immediately  perceived,  and  the  relations 
connecting  them  with  each  other.  Things,  with  their 
distinctive  properties,  seem  to  lie  spread  out  before  us 
in  space,  and  by  simply  opening  our  eyes  we  apparently 
apprehend  them  as  they  are.  On  the  other  hand  we 
regard  these  objects  as  continuing  to  exist  even  when 
we  do  not  perceive  them,  and  as  acting  and  reacting 
upon  each  other.  Thus,  although  in  an  unreflective  or 
half-unconscious  way,  we  draw  a  distinction  in  our 
ordinary  every-day  consciousness  between  individual 
objects  and  their  relation  to  one  another.  Moreover, 
the  separate  parts  of  individual  objects  and  the  degrees 
of  intensity  they  display  we  also  recognize,  and  we 
count  and  measure  them.  Corresponding  to  this  broad 
distinction  between  objects  and  their  relations,  we  have 
respectively  the  mathematical  and  physical  sciences. 


140 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


Mathematics,  abstracting,  in  the  first  instance,  from 
objects  in  space  and  time,  fixes  upon  the  relations  of 
space  and  time  themselves,  and  after  dealing  with  these 
abstractions,  it  goes  on  to  apply  the  results  thus  reached 
to  individual  objects.  The  physical  sciences,  borrowing 
from  mathematics  its  results,  proceed  to  inquire  into 
the  connections  of  objects  with  each  other.  Thus, 
mathematics  and  physics  deal  respectively  with  the 
spatial  and  temporal  relations  of  individual  objects,  and 
with  their  dynamical  relations.  It  is  at  this  point  that 
critical  philosophy  begins  its  task.  In  the  science  of 
mathematics,  on  the  one  hand,  and  in  the  physical 
sciences,  on  the  other  hand,  our  knowledge  of  nature  is 
systematized ;  and  the  problem  of  philosophy  is  to  show 
what  are  the  essential  conditions  of  such  systematic 
knowledge.  Assuming  the  results  of  mathematics  and 
physics  to  be  true,  the  question  still  remains,  whether 
nature,  regarded  either  as  a  complex  of  individual 
objects,  or  as  a  system  of  laws,  is  independent  of  the 
activity  of  thought.  This  problem  neither  of  those 
sciences  has  taken  any  notice  of.  The  mathematician 
goes  on  making  his  ideal  constructions  without  for  a 
moment  questioning  the  necessary  truth  of  the  conclu- 
sions he  reaches,  and  therefore  without  attempting  to 
show  from  the  nature  of  knowledge  how  we  can  know 
them  to  be  true.  The  physicist  assumes  that  matter  is 
real,  and  that  it  is  endowed  with  forces  of  attraction 
and  repulsion,  expressible  in  mathematical  symbols, 
but  it  is  no  part  of  his  task  to  justify  that  assumption. 
But  philosophy,  aiming  to  explain  the  inner  nature  of 
knowledge,  cannot  evade  the  double  problem :  first, 
what  justifies  the  supposition  that  mathematical  propo- 
sitions are  necessarily  true,  and  are  applicable  to  the 
individual  objects  we  perceive?  and,  secondly,  what 


V 


v.] 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  JUDGMENT. 


141 


lion, 
e  of 

rst, 
opo- 

the 
irhat 


i 


justifies  us  in  assuming  that  there  are  real  substances, 
real  connections,  and  real  coexistences  ?  Now,  looking 
more  particularly  at  the  nature  of  that  which  is  known 
in  relation  to  knowledge,  we  may  further  divide  the 
known  world  as  perceived  into  concrete  objects  and  the 
spatial  and  temporal  determinations  of  such  objects. 
We  may,  in  other  words,  ask  what  is  implied  in  the 
ordinary  experience  of  indiv'-  la"  ngs,  and  in  the  fa  u 
that  we  can  count  or  measure  them  ,  as  well  as  what  is 
implied  in  the  scientific  application  of  quantity  to  such 
objects,  and  in  the  rules  of  quantity  considered  by 
themselves.  As  a  complete  theory  of  knowledge  must 
explain  the  possibility  of  the  various  kinds  of  knowledge 
which  we  undoubtedly  possess,  it  must  be  shown  how 
we  come  to  know  individual  objects,  and  to  apply 
quantitative  relations  to  them.  Philosophy  has  therefore 
at  once  to  justify  the  universality  and  necessity  of 
mathematical  propositions,  and  to  explain  by  what  right 
mathematics  is  applied  to  individual  things.  The  pos- 
sibility of  mathematics,  regarded  simply  as  a  science 
determining  the  relations  of  space  and  time,  has  been 
explained  in  the  Esthetic,  where  it  was  pointed  out  that 
space  and  time  are  a  priori  forms  of  perception.  The 
general  result  of  the  ^Esthetic  was  to  show  (1)  that  the 
demonstrative  character  of  mathematical  judgments 
arises  from  the  fact  that  these  rest  upon  specifications 
of  the  forms  of  space  and  time,  which  belong  to  the 
constitution  of  our  perceptive  faculty,  and  (2)  that 
mathematical  judgments  are  not  mere  analyses  of  pre- 
existing conceptions  of  numbers,  figures,  etc.,  but  are 
synthetical  judgments  resting  upon  the  active  construc- 
tion of  numbers  and  figures  themselves.  But  the 
elements  of  knowledge  implied  in  mathematical  propo- 
sitions, and  in  their  application  to  individual  objects. 


142 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


can  only  now  be  completely  set  forth.  For  in  these 
there  are  implied,  not  only  the  forms  of  space  and  time, 
but  certain  pure  conceptions  or  categories.  It  should 
be  observed  that  the  question  as  to  the  application  of 
mathematics  has  nothing  to  do  with  our  reasons  for 
determining  special  objects  by  mathematical  formulse  ; 
we  are  not  asking,  for  example,  how  we  can  determine 
the  distance  of  the  sun  from  the  earth,  but  simply  how 
we  are  entitled  to  apply  the  category  of  quantity  to  any 
object  whatever  in  space.  In  answering  this  question, 
philosophy  abstracts  in  the  meantime  from  the  actual 
relations  of  things  to  each  other,  as  well  as  from  the 
concrete  properties  of  things,  and  from  the  specific  de- 
terminations of  space  and  time.  It  has  to  point  out 
what  is  implied  in  the  knowledge  of  any  individual 
object  of  perception  ;  but  it  does  not  seek  to  determine 
what  are  the  specific  differences  of  objects.  These 
differences  may  be  summarily  expressed  by  the  term 
''  manifold,"  and  as  this  manifold  involves  a  relation  to 
our  perceptive  faculty,  it  may  be  called  the  "  manifold 
of  sense."  The  meaning  of  the  term  "  manifold"  there- 
fore varies,  according  as  we  are  referring  to  the  proper- 
ties of  individual  things,  to  their  spatial  and  temporal 
relations,  or  to  the  determinations  of  space  and  time 
themselves.  In  considering  the  principles  which  justify 
the  application  of  mathematics  to  phenomena,  Kant 
uses  the  term  in  all  these  senses,  but  in  no  case  does  he 
mean  by  it  more  than  what  may  be  called  isolated 
points  of  perception,  that  is,  mere  differences  taken  in 
abstraction  from  their  unity.  From  the  point  of  view, 
then,  of  the  Critical  philosophy,  the  objects  of  percep- 
tion are  not  real  external  objects,  but  merely  the 
sensible,  spatial  or  temporal  parts  out  of  which  objects 
are  put  together.     The  manifold,  e.g.,  of  a  house  is 


v.] 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  JUDGMENT. 


143 


Len  in 
I  view, 
jrcep- 
the 
bjects 
ise  is 


the  spatial  parts  or  the  sensible  units  which  together 
make  it  an  object,  and  mark  it  out  in  space ;  the  mani« 
fold  of  a  line  is  the  parts  or  points,  by  the  successive 
construction  of  which  the  line  is  determined.  This 
mere  manifold,  which  is  really  only  an  abstract  element 
in  known  objects,  is  all  that  is  due  to  perception  ;  the 
unity  of  the  manifold  is  contributed  entirely  by  the  ^ 
understanding. 

Turning  now  to  the  relations  of  objects,  as  distin- 
guished from  objects  themselves,  we  can  see  that  our 
problem  is  somewhat  changed.  So  far  we  have  sup- 
posed real  things  to  be  known ;  now  we  must  inquire 
what  justification  there  is  for  that  assumption.  Grant- 
ing that  we  can  prove  all  objects  in  space  and  time  to 
have  extensive  and  intensive  quantity,  we  must  still 
ask  on  what  ground  we  affirm  that  there  are  real  sub- 
stances, real  sequences,  and  real  coexistences.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that,  in  our  ordinniry  consciousness, 
we  have  the  conceptions  of  substance,  cause,  and  reci- 
procity; but  philosophy  must  be  able  to  show  that 
these  conceptions  have  an  application  to  real  object*. 
Our  question,  then,  is  as  to  the  possibility  of  ultimate 
rules  or  principles  of  judgment,  which  are  at  the  same  \ 
time  fundamental  laws  of  nature.  In  those  universal 
principles,  which  the  scientific  man  assumes  in  all  his 
investigations,  and  which  form  the  prolegomena  to 
scientific  treatises,  we  have  indeed  a  body  of  universal 
truths;  but  they  are  limited  in  their  application  to 
external  nature.  Our  aim  is,  on  the  other  hand,  to 
discover  and  prove  the  objective  validity  of  the  prin- 
ciples which  underlie  nature  in  general,  as  including 
both  external  and  internal  objects;  or,  what  is  the  same 
thing,  to  show  that  there  are  synthetical  judgments 
belonging  to  the  constitution  of  our  intelligence,  which 


144 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


account,  and  alone  account,  for  the  existence  and  con- 
nection o^  real  objects. 

In  accordance  with  the  distinction  of  individual 
objects  and  the  relations  of  individual  objects,  the 
principles  of  judgment  naturally  separate  into  two 
groups,  which  we  may  distinguish  respectively  as  the 
matheimatical  and  the  dynamical  principles.  Following 
the  clue  of  the  categories,  we  find  that  these  groups 
again  subdivide  into  two  sets  of  propositions.  Mathe- 
matical principles  prove  (1)  that  individual  perceptions, 
whether  these  are  simple  determinations  of  space  and 
time,  or  concrete  objects,  are  extensive  quanta,  and  (2) 
that  in  their  content  individual  objects  have  intensive 
quantity  or  degree.  In  the  dynamical  principles  it  is 
shown  (1)  that  there  are  real  substances,  real  sequences, 
and  real  coexistences,  and  (2)  that  the  subjective  criteria 
of  knowledge  are  the  possibility,  the  actuality,  or  the 
necessity  of  the  objects  existing  in  our  consciousness. 

From  what  has  been  said,  it  will  be  easily  understood 
why  Kant  divides  the  principles  of  judgment  into  two 
classes,  the  mathematical  and  the  dynamical.  The 
former  are  not  mathematical  propositions,  but  philoso- 
phical propositions,  formulating  the  process  by  which 
the  axioms  and  definitions  of  mathematics  are  known 
and  applied  to  concrete  objects.  For  the  method  of 
philosophy  is  quite  distinct  from  the  method  of  mathe- 
matics. The  mathematician  immediately  constructs 
the  lines,  points,  and  figures  with  which  his  science 
deals,  and  only  in  that  construction  does  he  obtain  a 
conception  of  them.  The  proposition  that  a  straight 
line  is  the  shortest  distance  between  two  points,  is  not 
obtained  by  the  analysis  of  the  conception  of  a  straight 
line,  but  from  the  actual  construction  of  it  as  an 
individual  perception.    The  axioms  and  definitions  of 


v.] 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  JUDGMENT, 


145 


mathematics  are,  therefore,  immediately  verified  in  the 
perception  or  contemplation  of  the  objects  to  which 
they  refer.  Philosophy,  on  the  other  hand,  must  show 
how  there  can  be  conceptions  which  yet  apply  to  per- 
ceptions ;  how,  for  example,  we  are  justified  in  saying 
that  there  is  a  real  connection  between  events.  Any 
direct  reference  to  immediate  perception  is  here  inad- 
missible, for  from  such  perception  no  universal  proposi- 
tion can  be  derived.  The  two  principles  that  "all 
perceptions  are  extensive  quanta,^*  and  that  "  the  real 
in  all  phenomena  has  intensive  quantity  or  degree,"  are 
called  mathematical,  because  they  justify  the  assump- 
tion that  the  axioms  and  definitions  of  mathematics  are 
necessary,  and  at  the  same  time,  because  they  account 
for  the  application  of  mathematics  to  individual  things. 
As  to  the  first  point,  the  axioms  in  mathematics  reat 
upon  the  immediate  perception  of  the  object  constructed 
by  the  determination  of  space  and  time.  And  while 
the  necessary  truth  of  such  axioms  admits  of  no  doubt, 
philosophy,  having  undertaken  the  task  of  showing  the 
relation  of  intelligence  to  all  its  objects,  must  be  able 
to  point  out  what  in  the  constitution  of  intelligence 
gives  them  their  binding  force.  The  axioms  of  percep- 
tion therefore,  express  in  the  form  of  a  proposition  the 
supreme  condition  under  which  mathematical  axioms 
stand ;  showing  that  unless  the  mind,  in  constructing 
the  pure  perceptions  on  which  those  axioms  rest, 
possessed  the  function  or  category  of  quantity,  there 
could  be  no  necessity  in  a  mathematical  proposition. 
"Even  the  judgments  of  pure  mathematics  in  their 
simplest  axioms  are  not  exempt  from  this  condition 
[the  condition  that  synthetical  judgments  stand  under 
a  pure  conception  of  the  understanding].  The  princi{)le 
that  a  straight  line  is  the  shortest  distance  between 


146 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENCUSH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


two  points,  presupposes  that  the  line  is  subsumed  under 
the  conception  of  quantity,  which  certainly  is  no  mere 
perception,  but  has  its  seat  in  the  understanding  alone.'" 
Besides  showing  the  possibility  of  mathematical  propo< 
sitions,  the  axioms  of  perception  and  anticipations  of 
observation  justify  the  application  of  mathematics  to 
known  objects.  A  complete  theory  of  knowledge  must 
evidently  explain  why  the  ideal  constructions  of  the 
mathematician  hold  good  of  actual  objects  in  the  real 
world,  for  the  propositions  of  mathematics  might  be 
true  in  themselves,  and  yet  might  have  only  the  co- 
herence of  a  well-arranged  system  of  fictions.  In 
showing  how  there  can  be  a  knowledge  of  the  laws  of 
nature,  we  must,  therefore,  explain  what  justifies  the 
scientific  man  in  making  free  use  of  the  conclusions  of 
mathematics.  Now  there  is  a  distinction  between  the 
way  in  which  we  establish  the  mathematical  and  that 
in  which  we  establish  the  dynamical  principles.  In 
both  cases  we  have  to  show  that  the  pure  conceptions 
of  the  understanding  apply  to  real  objects.  But,  in 
the  case  of  the  mathematical  principles,  we  deal  directly 
with  individual  objects  as  immediately  presented  to  us, 
without  making  any  inquiry  into  the  connection  of 
these  objects  with  each  other,  or  into  their  relations  to 
a  knowing  subject.  This  is  the  reason  why  the  cate- 
gories of  quantity  and  quality,  unlike  those  of  relation 
and  modality,  have  no  correlates.  Taking  individual 
perceptions  just  as  they  stand,  without  seeking  for  any 
law  binding  them  together,  we  necessarily  exclude  all 
relation.  To  prove  the  mathematical  principles,  we 
must  show  that  they  rest  upon,  and  presuppose,  the 
categories  of  quantity  and  quality ;  but  this  we  can  do 
simply  from  the  contemplation  of  the  immediate  deter- 

*  rroUgomma,  tr.,  §  20,  p.  75. 

^      ,        ■      ■-  A  .       '      *• 

'■"■:-      ■\      ■ 


v-J 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OP  JUDGMENT. 


Ml 


br  any 
Lde  all 


minations  of  space  and  time ;  and  hence  the  evidence 
for  them  may  be  said  to  be  direct  or  intuitive.  And 
as  these  principles,  in  referring  to  immediate  unrelated 
objects  of  perception,  show  how  the  parts  of  the  object 
are  put  together,  they  may  be  called  constitutive,  in 
distinction  from  the  dynamical  principles,  which,  as 
binding  together  concrete  objects  already  constituted 
as  concrete,  may  properly  be  called  regulative.  Every 
object  of  perception  must  conform  to  the  mathematical 
principles,  since  these  show  what  are  the  essential  con- 
ditions without  which  there  could  be  no  individual 
objects  for  us.  The  dynamical  principles,  again,  are 
not  principles  of  dynamics,  such  as  Newton's  three  laws 
of  motion ;  for  these,  while  they  are  necessarily  true,  do 
not  reach  the  universality  of  principles  of  judgment, 
but  apply  only  to  corporeal  existences.  The  dynamical 
principles  are  so  called  because  they  express  the  ulti- 
mate conditions,  without  which  there  could  be  no 
science  of  nature  at  all.  The  analogies  and  postulates 
are  dynamical,  because  they  show  how  we  can  account 
for  the  relations  of  objects  to  each  other,  or  to  the  sub- 
ject knowing  them.  Thus,  when  it  is  said  that  matter 
has  repulsive  and  attractive  forces,  it  is  evidently  pre- 
supposed that  one  material  object  acts  upon  another, 
and  hence  that  there  is  a  causal  connection  betwee/; 
them.  The  justification  of  this  assumption  of  real 
connection  is  the  task  of  philosophy.  Now,  this  cannot 
be  done  by  directly  bringing  the  immediate  objects  of 
perception  under  the  categories  of  relation  and  n;>  odality. 
For  the  dynamical  principles  do  not  hold  good  of  per- 
ceptions simply  as  such,  but  involve  the  connection  or 
relation  of  such  perceptions.  Hence  they  cannot,  like 
mathematical  principles  be,  directly  proved.  The  mere 
fact  that  individual  objects,  to  be  known  at  all,  must 


148 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


\ 


be  known  as  in  space  and  time,  shows  that  they  must 
conform  to  the  nature  of  space  and  time,  and  must 
therefore  admit  of  the  application  of  mathematical 
formulae  to  them  ;  but  it  does  not  show  that  they  must 
be  connected  with  each  other.  Hence,  in  the  proof  of 
the  dynamical  principles,  it  is  necessary  to  show  that 
rf3al  objects  are  something  more  than  immediate  per- 
ceptions, that  real  events  cannot  be  immediately  appre- 
hended, and  that  the  coexistence  of  real  objects  is  not 
accounted  for,  if  we  suppose  them  to  be  directly  per- 
ceived or  contemplated.  The  real  existence  therefore 
of  known  objects,  which  it  was  not  necessary  to  inquire 
into  in  the  proof  of  the  mathematical  principles,  comes 
directly  to  the  front  in  the  investigation  of  the  reality 
and  connection  of  objects.^ 

The  first  step  toward  a  full  comprehension  of  the 
Principles  of  Judgment  is  to  realize  with  perfect  clear- 
ness that  Kant  does  not,  in  the  fashion  of  a  dogmatic 
philosopher,  separate  absolutely  between  nature  and 
intelligence,  things  and  thoughts,  sense  and  under- 
standing. Unless  we  put  ourselves  at  the  right  point 
of  view,  and  make  perfectly  clear  to  ourselves  the 
necessary  relativity  of  the  known  world  and  the  world 
of  knowledge,  the  reasoning  of  Kant  must  seem  weak, 
irrelevant,  and  inconclusive.  That  Dr.  Stirling  has 
not  done  so  seems  to  me  plain  from  the  fact  that  he 
Supposes  those  principles  to  be  abstract  rules,  which 
are  externally  applied  to  knowledge  independently 
supplied  by  the  senses.  The  net  result  of  the  Esthetic, 
as  I  understand  Dr.  Stirling  to  say,  is,  that  space  and 
time,  together  with  the  objects  contained  in  them,  are 
not  realities  without,  but  ideas  within.  And  from  the 
Analytic,  taken  in  conjunction  with  the  ^Esthetic,  we 

»  Kritik,  pp,  154-5,  477  ff.,  103,  166-8,  191,  369.     Prolegomena,  §§  26-26. 


^ 


v.] 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  JUDGMENT. 


U9 


further  learn  that  sense  gives  us  a  knowledge  of  indi- 
vidual facts  or  objects,  but  only  in  the  arbitrary  order 
of  a  mere  succession  in  time  ;  while  the  understanding 
brings  those  facts  or  objects  under  the  categories,  and 
so  makes  necessary  or  objective  what  before  was  merely 
arbitrary  or  subjective.  On  the  one  side,  therefore, 
we  have  the  "manifold  of  sense,"  a  term  which  is 
applied  not  to  "  a  simple  presentation  alone,  but  even 
to  such  compound  presentations  as  the  phenomena  in 
any  case  of  causalty  ;"^  on  the  other  side  we  have  the 
rule  of  judgment,  under  which  the  manifold  is  sub- 
sumed. And  Dr.  Stirling  objects,  with  manifest  force 
and  conclusiveness,  that  this  account  of  the  relations 
of  sense  ai.d  understanding  is  untrue,  and  the  proofs  of 
the  various  principles  utterly  inconclusive,  since  no 
rule  of  judgment  could  possibly  make  any  succession 
of  perceptions  necessary,  unless  there  were  already 
necessity  in  the  perceptions  themselves. 

I  accept  unreservedly  this  criticism  of  Kant's  theory, 
as  interpreted  by  Dr.  Stirling.  If  sense  gives  us  a 
knowledge  of  real  objects,  facts,  or  events,  it  is  per- 
fectly superfluous,  and  worse  than  superfluous,  to  bring 
in  the  faculty  of  thought  to  do  that  which  has  been 
done  already.  First  to  attribute  knowledge  to  one 
faculty,  and  then  to  introduce  a  new  faculty  to  explain 
it  over  again,  is  sure  evidence  of  the  failure  of  a  philo- 
sophical theory  to  accomplish  the  end  for  which  it  was 
designed.  But  I  cannot  believe  Kant  to  have  blun- 
dered in  this  fashion.  The  vigorous  blows  which  Dr. 
Stirling  believes  himself  to  be  showering  upon  Kant, 
really  fall  only  upon  a  simulacrum  which  he  has 
fashioned  for  himself  out  of  Kant's  words  read  in  a 
wrong  sense.     It  is  as  well  at  least  that  it  should  be 

•  Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  xiv.  76. 


150 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


distiuctly  understood  that,  in  accepting  Dr.  Stirling's 
interpretation  of  Kant's  theory  of  knowledge,  we  at 
the  same  time  commit  ourselves  to  his  radical  con- 
demnation of  it.  For  my  own  part,  I  must  decline  to 
follow  Dr.  Stirling  either  in  his  interpretation  or  in 
his  condemnation. 

It  is  not,  as  I  venture  to  think,  a  fair  representation 
of  the  uiEsthetic  to  say  that  it  merely  makes  space  and 
time,  and  the  objects  in  them,  ideas  within  the  mind, 
instead  of  actual  realities  without  the  mind.  I  find  it 
difficult  to  attach  a  precise  meaning  to  such  language 
as,  that  "we  know  an  actual  outer  space,  an  actual 
outer  time,  and  actual  outer  objects,  all  of  which  are 
.  .  .  things  in  themselves,  and  very  fairly  perceived  by 
us  in  their  own  qualities."^  This  may  mean  that  space 
and  time,  together  with  individual  objects  and  events, 
are  completely  independent  in  their  own  nature  of  all 
relation  to  intelligence.  It  may  be,  in  short,  an  ac- 
ceptance of  the  common-sense  realism  which  one  is 
accustomed  to  associate  with  the  name  of  Dr.  Reid. 
In  that  case,  I  prefer  Kant  to  Dr.  Stirling.  But  if 
the  meaning  is,  as  I  am  fain  to  think,  that  space,  time, 
and  concrete  things  are  not  dependent  for  their  reality 
upon  us,  although  they  are  relative  to  intelligence,  I 
do  not  understand  why  Kant  should  be  so  strongly 
rebuked  for  making  space  and  time  forms  of  perception 
instead  of  sensible  things.  One  may  surely  reject  the 
subjectivity  of  space  and  time,  and  yet  see  in  the 
Esthetic  a  great  advance  on  previous  systems.  A 
theory  may  have  in  it  an  alloy  that  lessens  its  absolute 
value,  and  may  yet  contain  a  good  deal  of  genuine 
gold.  Kant's  view  of  space  and  time,  were  it  only  for 
the  necessity  it  lays  upon  us  of  conceiving  the  problem 

,1        '  Jourii.  Sjiec.  Phil.,  xiii.  11.  .        , 


v.] 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  JUDGMENT. 


151 


of  knowledge  from  an  entirely  new  point  of  view,  and 
of  seeking  for  a  theory  truer  than  itself,  possesses  an 
importance  difficult  to  over-estimate.  I  do  not  see 
how  any  one  who  has  undergone  the  revolution  in  his 
ordinary  way  of  thinking,  which  the  critical  philosophy, 
when  thoroughly  assimilated,  inevitably  eflfects,  can 
any  longer  be  contented  simply  to  announce  that  space 
and  time  are  realities,  without  feeling  himself  called 
upon  to  explain  at  the  same  time  what  relation  they 
bear  to  intelligence.  Ordinary  Eealism,  and  its  off- 
spring, psychological  Idealism,  have  received  their 
death-blow  at  Kant's  hands,  and  no  attempt  to  resus- 
citate them  can  be  of  any  avail.  Kant  himself,  at 
least,  was  firmly  convinced  that,  in  maintaining  space 
and  time  to  be  forms  of  our  intelligence  on  its  per- 
ceptive side,  he  was  initiating  a  reform  of  supreme 
importance  in  philosophy.  Dr.  Stirling  speaks  of 
Kant's  doctrine  of  the  external  world  exactly  as  if  it 
were  identical  with  the  sensationalism  of  such  thinkers 
as  Mr.  Huxley  and  Mr.  Spencer.  But  it  is  surely 
one  thing  to  say  that  space  and  time  are  given  to  us 
in  feelings  set  up  in  us  by  an  object  lying  beyond  con- 
sciousness, and  another  thing  to  say  that  they  belong 
to  the  very  constitution  of  our  intelligence  in  so  far  as 
it  is  perceptive.  If  space  and  time  are  forms  of  per- 
ception, we  can  no  longer  go  on  asking  how  a  world  of 
objects  lying  beyond  the  mind  gets,  in  some  mysterious 
way,  into  the  mind.  Kant  never,  in  his  philosophical 
theory,  makes  any  attempt  to  prove  the  special  facts 
of  our  ordinary  knowledge,  or  the  special  law",  of  the 
natural  sciences ;  these  he  simply  assumes  as  data 
which  it  is  no  business  of  his  to  establish.  But,  al- 
though he  leaves  the  concrete  world  just  as  it  was 
before,  he  does  not  leave  the  philosophical   theory 


162 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


commonly  put  forward  to  explain  it  just  as  it  was. 
From  the  critical  point  of  view,  things  can  no  longer 
be  regarded  as  unintelligible  abstractions,  as  they  must 
be  in  any  theory  which,  by  extruding  them  from  the 
inner  circle  of  knowledge,  virtually  makes  them  un- 
knowable ;  being  brought  into  relation  with  our  intel- 
ligence, there  is  no  barrier  to  their  being  known  and 
comprehended.  I  cannot  see  that  it  is  doing  Kant 
justice  simply  to  say  that  space  and  time,  and  the 
objects  filling  them,  which  before  were  without  the 
mind,  are  by  him  brought  within  the  mind.  He  cer- 
tainly holds  them  to  be  "  within,"  but  they  are  within, 
not  as  transient  feelings,  but  as  permanent  and  un- 
changeable constituents  of  knowledge,  belonging  to 
the  very  nature  of  human  intelligence.  Omit  the 
"  human,"  and  we  have  a  view  of  the  external  world, 
which  is  consistent  with  its  reality,  in  the  only  intel- 
ligible meaning  of  the  term,  and  which  yet  denies 
space  and  time  to  be  subjective  any  more  than  objec- 
tive. Kant  here,  as  always,  is  greater  than  he  was 
himself  aware  of,  and  that  seems  to  me  criticism  of 
a  very  unsympathetic  and  uninstructive  sort  which 
closely  scans  the  mere  outward  form  of  his  theory,  and 
fails  to  see  behind  the  form  an  idea  rich  in  suggestive- 
ness  and  far-reaching  in  its  issues. 

Dr.  Stirling's  appreciation  of  the  Esthetic  seems  to 
me  to  be  inadequate ;  his  view  of  the  relations  of  sense 
and  understanding,  as  expounded  in  the  Analytic,  I 
regard  as  a  complete  inversion  of  the  truth.  The 
objects  of  sense  fall  completely  apart  from  the  forms  of 
thought.  A  broad  distinction  is  drawn  between  per- 
ceptions and  judgments  about  perceptions,  and  sense  is 
supposed  to  have  completed  its  work  before  thought 
begins  to  operate.     The  Cntique  we  must,  therefore. 


^' 


/ 


IS  to 
sense 
[tic,  I 
The 
Ims  of 
per- 
ise  is 
)ught 
sfore, 


I 


v.] 


rHE  PRINCIPLES  OF  JUDGMENT. 


153 


regard  as  a  phenomenology,  tracing  the  successive 
phases  through  which  our  knowledge  passes  on  its  way 
to  necessary  truth.  All  our  knowledge  is  at  first 
simply  an  immediate  apprehension  of  special  facts, 
coming  to  us  without  order  or  connection;  and  only 
afterwards,  when  thought  brings  into  play  its  schema- 
tized categories,  is  necessity  imposed  upon  our  percep- 
tions. I  maintain,  on  the  contrary,  that  sense  does 
not  give  a  knowledge  of  individual  objects,  facts,  or 
events ;  that  of  itself  it  gives  us  no  knowledge  what- 
ever; and  that  understanding  does  not  externally 
impose  necessity  upon  perceptions,  but  is  essential  to 
the  actual  constitution  of  known  objects,  facts,  or 
events.  The  Critique  I  therefore  regard,  not  as  a 
phenomenology,  but  as  a  metaphysic,  i.e.,  as  a  syste- 
matic account  of  the  logically  distinguishable,  but  not 
the  less  real,  elements  that  together  make  up  our 
knowledge  in  its  completeness.  The  importance  of 
the  issue  at  stake  may  perhaps  excuse  the  repetition  of 
some  points  I  have  already  tried  to  explain. 

The  Critique  may  almost  be  said  to  part  into  two 
independent  halves,  in  the  first  of  which  Kant  speaks 
from  the  ordinary  or  uncritical  point  of  view,  and  in 
the  second  of  which  he  advances  to  the  critical,  or 
purely  philosophical  point  of  view.  This  implicit 
division  arises  partly  from  the  fact  that,  as  Kant  never 
attempts  to  prove  a  single  qualitative  fact  or  special 
law  of  nature,  in  referring  to  the  data  which  he  has  to 
explain  he  naturally  speaks  in  the  language  of  every- 
day life,  and,  therefore,  seems  to  be  accepting  the 
common-sense  view  of  things ;  but  it  partly  arises  also 
from  his  accepting  the  account  of  the  process  of  know- 
ledge given  in  formal  logic  as  true  outside  of  the 
sphere  of  philosophy  proper.     According  to  the  ordi- 


i 


ij 


154 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


nary  conception  of  our  knowledge  of  things,  sense 
immediately  reveals  to  us  actual  objects  lying  outside 
of  our  consciousness,  and  passively  taken  up  into  it. 
In  speaking  of  the  facts  demanding  philosophical  ex- 
planation, Kant  does  not,  as  he  might  have  done,  deny 
this  assumption  at  the  very  threshold  of  his  inquiry, 
but  seeks  gradually  to  undermine  it  by  showing 
the  conclusions  to  which  it  leads.  Moreover,  Kant's 
own  theory  of  knowledge  harmonizes  with  the  ordinary 
view  in  these  two  points;  (1)  that  sense  or  feeling 
supplies  to  us  all  the  concrete  element  in  our  know- 
ledge of  external  objects,  and  (2)  that  it  also  reveals  to 
us  the  particular  feelings  belonging  to  ourselves  as 
individuals.  Notwithstanding  this  partial  agreement, 
however,  the  divergence  of  criticism  and  dogmatism  is 
radical  and  complete.  For  it  is  one  thing  to  say  that 
sense  contributes  the  concrete  element  in  knowledge, 
and  quite  a  different  thing  to  say  that  it  gives  us  a 
knowledge  of  concrete  objects.  The  latter  statement  is 
only  true  of  sense,  understood  in  the  loose  and  popular 
meaning  of  the  term,  as  when  we  speak  of  "  sensible 
objects,"  or  the  "  world  of  sense."  Taken  simply  as  an 
expression  o^ihefact  that  we  have  a  knowledge  of  exter- 
nal objects,  and  that,  as  it  seems,  by  immediate  appre- 
hension of  them,  such  language  may  be  allowed  to  pass ; 
but,  in  the  philosophical  meaning  of  the  term,  sense  is  a 
name  for  the  particular,  not  for  the  individual.  This 
follows  directly  from  Kant's  conception  of  space  and 
time  as  forms  of  perception,  not  realities  perceived. 
So  long  as  these  forms  were  supposed  to  be  actual 
realities  existing  in  themselves,  apart  from  any  relation 
to  us,  it  seemed  correct  enough  to  say  that  by  sense 
we  directly  receive  into  our  minds  at  once  individual 
objects,  and  the  space  and  time  in  which  they  are 


v.] 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  JUDGMENT. 


15ft 


contained.  But,  if  space  and  time  are  not  realities 
without  our  consciousness,  but  potential  forms  coming 
into  existence  for  consciousness  on  occasion  of  know- 
ledge, it  is  evident  that  our  view  of  the  relation  of 
objects  to  knowledge  must  be  radically  changed,  and 
therefore  our  view  of  that  which  belongs  to  sense 
as  distinguished  from  thought.  Things  which  exist 
beyond  our  consciousness  cannot  be  contained  in  space 
and  time,  which  exist  only  within  consciousness.  The 
distinction  of  the  inner  from  the  outer  world  is  no 
longer  a  distinction  of  ideas  within  the  mind,  from 
material  or  actual  realities  without  the  mind ;  internal 
feelings  and  external  objects  are  alike  within  conscious- 
ness, being  logically  distinguishable,  but  not  really 
separable.  The  contrast  of  internal  and  external 
objects  arises,  so  far  as  sense  is  concerned,  from  the 
fact  that  external  objects  are  informed  by  space  as  well 
as  by  time,  while  our  internal  life  passes  in  time 
alone;  but  otherwise  our  perceptions,  and  what  we 
know  as  objects  of  perception,  are  composed  of  the 
same  elements.  Knowledge  always  comes  to  us  in 
successive  apprehensions ;  and  this  is  true,  whether  we 
look  at  our  feelings  as  in  time,  or  at  known  objects  as 
in  space.  Now,  as  sense  is  the  faculty  by  which  we 
immediately  contemplate  the  particular  taken  by  itself, 
it  contributes  a  mere  "  manifold,"  which  is  not  yet  an 
individual  object,  but  only  the  sensuous  material  for 
such  an  object.  On  the  internal  side  we  have  a  series 
of  feelings,  perpetually  coming  and  going,  and,  there- 
fore, destitute  of  universality,  unity,  or  connection. 
Isolate  this  mere  series,  as  the  dogmatist  does,  from 
objects  in  space,  and  these  feelings  are  not  knowable 
even  as  a  series.  On  the  other  hand,  separate  the 
external  from  the  internal,  and  the  former  becomes 


166 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


unknowable  and  unintelligible.  This  is  the  sum  of  the 
Refutation  of  Idealism.  Sense,  therefore,  while  it  con- 
tributes the  particulars  implied  in  our  actual  knowledge 
of  objects,  cannot  of  itself  give  us  any  knowledge  what- 
ever. We  might  as  well  claim  that,  from  the  mere 
form  of  space  or  time,  we  can  know  definite  objects,  as 
hold  that  the  special  senses  reveal  to  us  concrete  things. 
The  dogmatist  makes  the  problem  of  knowledge  very 
easy  for  himself  by  assuming  that  we  immediately 
apprehend  actual  objects;  the  axituality  he  assumes, 
and  the  knowledge  of  actuality  he  figures  to  himself  as 
a  direct  glance  of  sense.  But  now  that  sense  is  seen 
to  be  capable  of  supplying  only  a  series  of  unconnected 
particulars,  a  new  mode  of  explanation  must  be  adopted. 
The  actuality  of  things  must  be  explained,  and  not 
simply  assumed ;  and  the  manner  in  which  the  mere 
particularity  of  sense  becomes  for  us  the  knowledge  of 
individual  objects  must  be  shown.  The  individuality 
of  things,  so  far  as  sense  is  concerned,  vanishes  with 
their  supposed  independence  of  our  intelligence,  and 
we  are  left  by  the  progress  of  philosophical  reflection, 
with  a  mere  "  manifold  of  sense,"  an  unconnected  con- 
geries of  particulars,  entirely  destitute  of  unity,  c^.  icc- 
tion,  or  system.  To  explain  our  actual  knowledge  of 
objects  and  of  their  connections  with  each  other,  we 
require  to  produce  the  universal  element  belonging  to 
our  intelligence,  by  the  action  of  which  on  the  particu- 
lars of  sense  real  knowledge  takes  place.  We  have 
discovered  the  faculty  of  differences;  we  must  now 
show  what  is  the  faculty  of  unity,  and  how  it  produces 
the  various  kinds  of  unity  which  we  can  see  to  be 
implied  in  our  actual  knowledge. 

It  will  be  evident  from  what  has  been  said,  how  Dr. 
Stirling  has  been  led  to  suppose  that  Kant  regards 


v.] 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  JUDGMENT. 


107 


sense  as  giving  us  a  knowledge  of  individual  objects  or 
facts.  Unless  we  resolutely  keep  before  our  minds  the 
fact  that  the  Critique  is  an  analysis  of  the  logical  con- 
stituents of  our  actual  knowledge,  and  not  an  account 
of  the  temporal  stages  by  which  the  individual  and 
the  race  advance  to  knowledge  of  the  highest  kind,  we 
shall  inevitably  confuse  the  popular  with  the  critical 
point  of  view.  When  he  is  leading  up  to  his  own 
theory,  and  simply  stating  the  facts  he  has  to  explain, 
or  when  he  is  criticizing  the  dogmatic  theory  of  his 
predecessors,  Kant  naturally  speaks  as  if  sense  immedi- 
ately reveals  to  us  special  objects  or  events.  From 
the  philosophical  point  of  view,  however,  sense  he 
conceives  of  as  the  faculty  which  supplies  to  us  the 
isolated  differences  which  thought  puts  together  and 
unites  into  individual  objects  or  connections  of  objects. 
The  "manifold  of  sense"  is,  therefore,  simply  that 
element  in  knowledge  which  supplies  the  particular 
differences  of  known  objects.  And  these  differences, 
of  course,  vary  with  the  special  aspect  of  the  known 
world  which  at  the  time  is  sought  to  be  explained.  In 
the  Axioms  of  Perception,  for  example,  in  which  Kant 
is  seeking  to  show  that  individual  objects  in  space  and 
time  are  necessarily  extensive  quanta,  the  special  fact 
of  knowledge  to  be  explained  is  the  apprehension  of 
objects  as  made  up  of  parts  forming  individual  aggre- 
gates. These  parts  Kant  regards  as  directly  perceived 
or  contemplated.  The  "  manifold "  may  be  the  parts 
of  a  line,  the  parts  of  any  geometrical  figure,  or  even 
particular  figures  regarded  as  constituents  of  more 
complex  perceptions ;  or,  again,  it  may  be  the  parts  of 
individual  objects  in  space.  But  in  all  of  these  cases 
the  particulars,  as  due  to  sense,  are,  wlien  taken  by 
themselves,  mere  abstractions;  they  are,  in  fact,  not 


IM 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS        [chap. 


even  known  as  particulars  apart  from  the  synthetio 
activity  of  imagination,  as  guided  by  the  category  of 
quantity.     To  have  a  knowledge  of  the  parts  of  a  line, 
or  the  parts  of  a  house,  as  parts,  is  to  know  at  the  same 
time  the  combination  of  those  parts.     But  the  combin- 
ation takes  place  for  us  only  through  the  act  by  which 
we  successively  determine  space  to  particular  parts, 
and  in  that  determination  combine  them.    Thus,  in  the 
knowledge  of  the  line,  there  are   implied   both  the 
particular  element  of  sense  and  the  universal  element 
of  thought.    We  do  noi  first  perceive  the  line  and  then 
apply  the  category,  but,  in  perceiving  the  line,  we  apply 
the  category.     And  as  in  all  recognition  of  objects  in 
space  we  necessarily  determine  the  particulars  of  sense 
through  the  schema,  as  silently  guided  by  the  category, 
we  may  express  this  condition  of  our  knowledge  in  the 
proposition,  "  All  percepts  are  extensive  quanta.'*   This 
proposition,  therefore,  rests  upon  a  discrimination  of 
the  elements  which  we  are  compelled  to  distinguish  in 
explaining  how  we  know  any  individual  object  to  be  a 
unity  of  parts ;  it  is  not  a  proposition  which  we  acquire 
by  reflection  before  we  know  objects  to  be  extensive 
quanta.     Observing  that  all  external  objects  which  we 
can  possibly  know  must  be  in  space,  and  having  seen 
space  to  be  a  necessary  form  of  thought,  we  can  say 
axiomatically  that  every  precept  is  an  extensive  quantum; 
but  this  proposition  is  not  one  which  precedes  the 
knowledge  of  objects  as  quanta,  but  one   which  is 
required  to  explain  the  fact  of  such  knowledge.     On 
Dr.  Stirling's  view,  sense  gives  us  a  knowledge  of  indi- 
vidual objects  as  extended,  and  thought  "varnishes" 
this  knowledge  with  necessity.^     How  Kant  could 
possibly  suppose  sense  to  give  us  the  perception  of 

^Journ.  Spec.  Pidl,,  xvf.  \QZ. 


v.] 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  JUDGMENT. 


109 


On 
ndi- 


of 


things  in  space,  without  at  the  same  time  determining 
these  as  extensive  quanta,  I  am  unable  to  understand. 
But,  in  truth,  Kant  makes  no  such  supposition ;  what 
he  holds  is  that  spatial  objects  are  known  as  extensive 
quanta  in  the  act  by  which  the  productive  imagination 
determines  their  parts  successively,  under  control  of 
the  category  of  quantity.  The  necessity  is  implied 
in  our  actual  knowledge,  and  philosophical  reflection 
merely  shows  it  to  be  there. 

The  "manifold,"  again,  assumes  a  different  aspect 
when  Kant  goes  on  to  deal  with  the  dynamical  prin- 
ciples. Here  the  question  is  no  longer  in  regard  to  the 
quantitative  parts  of  external  objects,  but  in  regard  to 
the  philosophical  justification  of  the  permanence,  the 
causal  connection,  and  the  mutual  influence  of  these 
objects.  In  our  ordinary  and  scientific  knowledge  we 
take  it  for  granted  that  we  know  real  objects,  which  do 
not  pass  away  with  the  moment,  but  persist  or  are 
permanent.  Permanence,  in  fact,  is  the  mark  by  which 
we  ordinarily  distinguish  actual  existences  from  passing ' 
feelings  or  creations  of  the  imagination.  To  show 
philosophically  how  this  assumption  is  justified  from 
the  nature  of  our  intelligence  is  the  object  of  the  First 
Analogy  of  Experience.  Now,  the  ordinary  explana- 
tion of  the  permanence  or  actuality  of  an  external 
object  is,  that  we  simply  see,  apprehend,  or  observe  the 
object,  and  immediately  know  it  to  be  permanent. 
But  the  consequence  of  this  assumption,  as  the  psycho- 
logical Idealist  has  seen,  is  that  the  actual  object  itself 
is  not  apprehended  or  perceived  at  all.  So  far  as  the 
theory  can  show,  we  have  indeed  a  consciousness  of 
ideas  or  feelings  supposed  to  represent  actual  objects, 
but  we  do  not  really  come  in  contact  with  those  objects 
themselves.    Kant,  taking  up  the  problem  at  this  stage, 


160 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS, 


[chap. 


points  out  what  is  really  implied  in  a  series  of  feelings 
or  ideas,  and  from  this  he  shows  the  necessity  of  the 
action  of  thought  on  sense  for  the  knowledge  of  actual 
objects  as  permanent.  The  "manifold"  here  is  indi- 
vidual objects  regarded  simply  as  revealed  in  the  direct 
glance  of  sense.  If  we  immediately  apprehend  or  per- 
ceive objects  which  are  permanent,  we  cannot  have  more 
before  us  than  separate  percepts,  coming  the  one  after 
the  other.  I  open  my  eyes  and  see  a  house ;  I  move 
my  eyes  and  see  a  tree,  then  a  mountain,  etc. ;  but  I 
cannot,  as  is  usually  supposed,  see  the  house,  tree, 
mountain,  etc.,  to  be  permanent  substances.  At  each 
successive  moment  a  fresh  presentation  of  sense  comes 
before  me ;  and,  as  immediate  apprehension  does  not  go 
beyond  the  moment,  I  can  say  nothing  about  objects 
when  they  are  not  actually  present.  Thus,  the  ordinary 
explanation  of  the  permanence  of  things  really  reduces 
actual  objects  to  successive  affections  or  feelings,  coming 
and  going  like  the  phantasms  of  a  dream.  They  are  a 
mere  "  manifold  of  sense,"  a  number  of  unrelated  feel- 
ings, really  incapable  of  revealing  to  us  any  actual  or 
permanent  thing.  The  true  explanation  of  the  fact 
that  we  have  a  knowledge  of  permanent  external  things 
or  substances  must  bring  in  an  element  quite  distinct 
from  sense,  and  this  is  the  element  of  thought.  The 
mere  isolated  particulars  of  sense  never  could  give  us  a 
knowledge  of  actual  objects ;  only  thought  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  manifold  of  sense  can  do  so.  Kant,  then, 
does  not  hold,  as  Dr.  Stirling  supposes,  that  sense  first 
gives  us  a  knowledge  of  actual  things,  while  thought 
comes  after  and  makes  this  special  knowledge  universal 
and  necessary.  On  the  contrary,  he  argues  that  if  we 
are  to  explain  the  actual  fact  that  we  do  have  a  know- 
ledge of  permanent  things,  we  must  not  say  that  sense 


[chap. 

)lingB 
if  the 
ictual 

indi- 
direct 
ir  per- 
)  more 
3  after 

move 

but  I 
,  tree, 
.t  each 
comes 
not  go 
objects 
•dinary 
•educes 
coming 
are  a 
)d  feel- 

ual  or 
fact 

things 

istinct 
The 

TQ  US  a 

njunc- 
1,  then, 
36  first 
lought 
iversal 
if  we 
I  know- 
sense 


'I 


v.] 


r/fE  PRINCIPLES  OF  JUDGMENT. 


\%\ 


le 


gives  us  a  knowledge  of  real  substances,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  that  it  supplies  only  the  particular  differences 
of  things,  leaving  to  thought,  in  conjunction  with  the 
imagination,  the  combination  or  unification  of  those 
differences.  Kant  simply  shows,  by  an  inquiry  into 
the  mental  conditions,  without  which  a  given  kind  of 
knowledge  would  be  impossible,  what  are  the  logically 
distinguishable  elements  in  that  knowledge;  and  to 
convert  such  purely  metaphysical  distinctions  into 
temporal  phases  in  the  development  of  our  knowledge 
is  to  turn  his  theory  upside  down. 

A  proper  comprehension  of  the  way  in  which  cri- 
ticism transforms  the  dogmatic  or  psychological  con- 
ception of  the  nature  of  sense  makes  the  corresponding 
transformation  of  the  ordinary  view  of  the  nature  of 
thought  easily  intelligible.  As  sense  supplies  the 
particular  element  in  knowledge,  so  thought  reduces 
the  particular  to  unity.  From  the  dogmatic  point  of 
view  judgment  is  always  a  process  of  analysis.  Kant 
does  not  deny  that  analytical  judgments  are  valuable 
within  their  own  sphere,  but  he  denies  that  they  in  any 
way  enable  us  to  solve  the  problem  of  philosophy. 
For  such  judgments,  valuable  as  they  are  in  bringing 
clearly  before  our  minds  what  we  already  know  in  an 
obscure  and  half-unconscious  way,  cannot  explain  the 
process  by  which  we  obtain  a  knowledge  of  actual 
things  and  their  connections.  The  analysis  of  such 
pure  conceptions  as  substance  and  cause  can  never 
establish  the  application  of  these  conceptions  to  real 
objects,  but  only  brings  out  explicitly  what  we  mean 
when  we  speak  of  substances  or  causes.  Analytical 
judgments  thus  fall  outside  of  the  domain  of  philosophy 
proper.  They  .vejt  upon  the  purely  formal  principle 
of  contradiction.     If  we  but  express  in  the  predicate 


162 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


what  is  implied  in  the  subject,  and  do  not  attach  to  the 
subject  a  predicate  inconsistent  with  it,  we  conform  to 
the  only  condition  demanded  by  the  analytic  judg- 
ment. The  affirmative  proposition,  "body  is  extended," 
satisfies  this  condition,  since  "  extension"  is  an  attribute 
implied  in  the  conception  of  "body;"  the  negative  pro- 
position, ''body  is  not  immaterial,"  satisfies  it  equally, 
since  it  merely  excludes  from  the  conception  of  body 
an  attribute  contradictory  of  it.  We  can  thus  see 
wherein  the  essential  vice  of  the  dogmatic  theory  of 
judgment  consists.  The  dogmatist  supposes  we  may 
establish  the  objective  application  of  a  conception 
by  simply  showing  that  a  given  judgment  is  not  self- 
contradictory.  Wolff,  e.gr.,  tiiought  he  could  prove  the 
conception  of  causality  to  be  true  of  real  things, 
because  that  conception,  when  analysed,  yields  the 
judgment,  "Whatever  is  contingent  has  a  cause." 
But  the  judgment  is  purely  analytical,  only  expressing 
explicitly  what  is  implicit  in  the  conception  of  the 
"  contingent."  How,  then,  are  we  to  account  for  the 
application  of  conceptions  to  real  things?  How,  in 
other  words,  can  we  show  that  there  are  judgments 
which  are  synthetical,  and  yet  rest  upon  conceptions  ? 
This  question,  insoluble  on  the  dogmatic  method,  may 
be  answered  by  the  critical  method. 

We  have  seen  that  sense  can  contribute  only  the 
particular  element  in  knowledge,  and  i-hat  the  uni>  ersal 
element  is  supplied  by  thought.  A  conception  there- 
fore, on  which  a  synthetical  judgment  is  to  rest  can  be 
nothing  but  a  pure  universal,  having  in  it  no  concrete 
element.  In  all  thinking  which  yields  real  knowledge 
the  particulars  of  sense  must  be  reduced  to  unity  by 
being  referred  to  a  single  supreme  self,  for,  on  any 
other  supposition,  there  would   be  no  unity  in  our 


; 


v.] 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  JUDGMENT. 


163 


jy  the 

ersal 

bhere- 

tan  be 

icrete 

jledge 

ry  by 

any 
our 


knowledge  as  a  whole.  It  is  nothing  to  the  point  that 
we  may  not,  in  our  ordinary  consciousness,  be  aware 
that  the  self  is  the  supreme  condition  of  any  real 
knowledge.  It  is  enough  if  we  can  show  that  in  all 
knowledge  of  reality  the  "  I  "  must  be  present,  and 
must  manifest  its  presence  in  the  actual  fact  of  know- 
ledge. Certainly,  if  we  take  the  self  apart  from  its 
activity,  as  manifested  in  knowing,  we  cannot  get 
beyond  the  merely  analytical  judgment,  1  =  1;  but, 
when  we  seek  to  explain  actual  knowledge,  we  are 
compelled  to  see  that,  were  there  no  identical  "  I," 
expressing  its  activity  in  uniting  the  particulars  of 
sense,  we  could  have  no  connected  knowledge.  The 
**  I  think,"  or  "  I  unite,"  is,  however,  but  the  general 
expression  of  the  condition  of  any  real  knowledge. 
But,  as  all  knowing  is  definite  knowing,  or  the  think- 
ing of  the  real  world  in  specific  ways,  to  intelligence 
as  thinking  there  must  belong  universal  forms  or 
functions  of  unity,  enabling  us  to  reduce  the  manifold  of 
sense  to  definite  unity,  order,  and  system.  How  do 
we  know  that  to  thought  there  belong  such  forms  or 
functions?  Wo  know  it  from  the  fact  that  in  our 
actual  knowledge,  the  reality?  of  which  no  one  doubts, 
we  do  form  real  judgments.  The  fact  that  there  are 
such  judgments  we  do  not  seek  to  prove ;  our  object 
is  simply  to  show  what  the  constitution  of  our  thought 
must  be  in  order  to  explain  the  fact.  Now,  if 
the  self  is  the  supreme  condition  of  unity,  and  the 
categories  the  forms  potentially  capable  of  reducing 
the  special  manifold  of  sense  to  specific  unities,  we  can 
see  how  real  judgments  are  possible,  and  what  will  be 
their  character.  A  real  judgment  must  be  the  act  by 
which  a  category,  or  pure  universal,  comes  together 
with  a  manifoH  of  sense.    One  other  point,  however. 


164 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


must  be  mentioned  in  order  to  complete  our  account  of 
the  conditions  of  real  knowledge.  All  our  knowledge 
comes  to  us  in  successive  acts,  and  hence  real  judg- 
ments must  operate  upon  the  manifold  of  sense  under 
the  form  of  time.  We  must,  therefore,  explain  how 
actual  knowledge  is  possible,  in  accordance  with  the 
fact  that  we  know  real  objects  and  their  connection  in 
a  series  of  cognitions.  Accordingly,  it  will  be  our  aim 
in  setting  forth  the  various  classes  of  real  judgments  to 
point  out  how  the  manifold  of  sense  is  related  to  the 
schemata  or  general  determinations  of  time. 

I  have  endeavoured,  in  the  account  just  given  of  the 
relations  of  thought  and  sense,  to  emphasize  the  view 
which  I  take  of  the  Critique,  that  it  is  an  exposition 
of  the  constituent  elements  which  -we  may  logically 
distinguish  in  knowledge,  not  an  account  of  the  order 
in  which  our  knowledge  is  developed  in  time.  In  every 
recognition  of  an  external  object  as  an  extensive  or 
intensive  quantity,  we  bring  into  operation  the  cate- 
gories of  quantity  and  quality  respectively,  and  this 
we  do  in  the  act  by  which  we  successively  combine 
tlie  particulars  of  sense.  In  our  actual  knowledge  of  a 
given  substance,  a  given  connection  of  events,  or  given 
objects  as  mutually  influencing  each  other,  we  connect 
the  manifold  of  sense  under  the  silent  guidance  of  the 
categories  of  substance,  cause,  and  reciprocity,  and 
connect  them  according  to  their  respective  schemata. 
And  when  we  express  what  is  implied  in  any  of  these 
actual  cognitions,  we  are  able  to  state  the  principle 
in  a  universal  form,  because  the  categories,  as  belong- 
ing to  the  very  nature  of  our  thinking  intelligence, 
necessarily  combme  the  manifold  always  in  the  same 
way.  The  principles  of  judgment  are  therefore  at  once 
philosophical  propositions  and  ultimate  laws  of  nature. 


\  ■     I 


V.J 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  JUDGMENT. 


166 


\  -      \ 


Just  as  a  mathematical  judgment  is  a  proposition 
belonging  to  the  science  of  mathematics,  and  at  the 
same  time  a  law  manifested  in  the  particular  object  to 
which  the  proposition  refers;  just  as  any  scientific 
proposition  goes  to  form  the  body  of  the  science  to 
which  it  belongs,  and  yet  formulates  a  law  to  which 
all  facts  of  a  certain  kind  must  conform ;  so  the  philo- 
sophical judgment  that  "all  precepts  are  extensive 
quanta^'  or  that  "  in  all  changes  of  phenomena  sub- 
stance is  permanent,"  is  not  only  a  proposition  belong- 
ing to  the  science  of  philosophy,  but  a  law  or  principle 
manifested  in  our  actual  knowledge.  When  Kant 
speaks  of  bringing  phenomena  under  a  rule  of  the 
understanding,  he  does  not  mean  that  we  first  know 
the  phenomena  in  question,  and  then  bring  them  under 
the  rule,  but  he  means  that,  unless  they  were  brought 
under  the  rule  in  the  act  of  knowing  them,  they  could 
not  be  known  as  real  in  the  particular  way  which  at 
the  time  we  have  under  consideration.  When,  indeed, 
we  reflect  upon  our  knowledge,  we  express  the  act  by 
which  thought  unites  the  manifold  of  sense  in  the  form 
of  a  rule  or  proposition ;  but  our  reflection  does  not 
create  the  rule,  but  only  recognizes  it.  Had  not  t  lie 
rule  been  silently  employed  in  the  actual  process  of 
knowing  the  real  object  or  connection,  we  should,  uuver 
discover  it.  Did  Kant  really  mean  to  say  ihat  we 
first  know  real  facts  by  sense,  and  afterwards  subsume 
them  under  conceptions,  his  polemic  against  dograafcis:n 
would  be  a  huge  ignoratio  elenchi ;  for,  on  this  inter- 
pretation of  his  theory,  the  facts  known  by  sense  fall 
completely  apart  from  the  conceptions  supposed  to 
redure  them  to  unity,  and  the  possibility  of  real  judg- 
ments becomes  inexplicable.  So  miserable  a  failure  in 
his  explanation  of  knowledge  I  refuse  to  attribute  to 


K'il 

■  m 


166 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


I  f[ 


Kant.  His  real  view  is  that  thinking  intelligence 
either  constitutes  objects  as  such,  or  connects  objects 
with  each  other,  by  operating  upon  the  detached  mani- 
fold of  sense.  In  the  apprehension  of  a  house,  e.  g.^  I 
must  have  not  only  the  separate  impressions  coming 
to  me  as  my  eye  runs  over  it,  but  I  must  put  t'^gether 
its  spatial  parts  in  the  act  of  generating  them  :  and,  as 
the  parts  are  put  together  under  the  guidance  of  the 
category  of  quantity,  in  apprehending  the  house  I  at 
the  same  time  know  it  as  an  extensive  quantum. 

Kant  makes  no  attempt  to  connect  together  the 
various  principles  of  judgment;  on  the  contrary,  he 
regards  each  as  independent  and  complete  in  itself. 
And  it  is  easy  to  understand  why  he  takes  this  view. 
Starting  as  he  does  from  the  notion  of  knowledge  as 
completed,  and  embodied  more  especially  in  the  mathe- 
matical and  physical  sciences,  he  naturally  seeks  only 
to  demonstrate  that  such  knowledge  is  inconceivable, 
if  we  persist  in  making  an  absolute  separation  of  intelli- 
gence and  naturo,  instead  of  conceiving  of  nature  as 
constituted  in  its  universal  aspect  by  necessary  forms 
of  perception  and  of  thought.  In  seeking  to  explain 
the  demonstrative  certainty  of  mathematical  proposi- 
tions, and  their  application  to  individual  objects,  and 
in  seeking  to  show  what  '^.re  the  universal  laws  of 
nature,  he  simply  takes  up  one  aspect  of  knowledge 
after  another  and  points  out  the  intellectual  elements 
involved  in  it.  Dealing,  not  with  the  temporal 
origin  of  knowledge,  but  with  the  logical  constituents 
involved  in  it,  he  sets  the  various  elements  of  know- 
ledge apart  by  themselves,  and  combines  them  in  a 
system,  the  form  of  which  is  chiefly  due  to  his  own 
external  reflection.  But  while  Kant  does  not  so  much 
render  the  "  very  form  and  pressure "  of  thought,  as 


as 


v.] 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  JUDGMENT. 


167 


/ 


simply  place  its  elements  side  by  side;  and  while  he 
is  very  far  from  tracing  out,  in  all  its  delicate  com- 
pleteness, "  the  diamond  net "  with  which  intelligence 
envelops  the  particulars  of  sense,  his  presentation  of 
the  various  principles  of  judgment  half  unconsciously 
follows  the  natural  order  of  logical  evolution.  It  is 
well  also  to  observe  that  although  he  speaks  of  those 
principles  as  the  highest  laws  of  knowledge,  and 
therefore  of  natui'e  as  a  whole,  Kant  really  concen 
trates  his  attention  on  external  nature;  in  fact,  he 
has  expressly  pointed  out  that  the  rules  of  the  under- 
standing are  verifiable  only  in  relation  to  objects 
in  space.  On  the  other  hand,  he  virtually  assumes 
space  to  be  already  determined,  and  only  seeks  to  show 
how  its  parts  can  become  known  to  us  successively. 
In  the  first  principle,  formulating  the  axioms  of  per- 
ception, he  abstracts  from  all  the  concrete  wealth  of 
the  universe,  and  from  all  the  connections  of  things, 
and  limits  himself  to  the  question  as  to  how  space 
and  objects  in  space  are  known  as  in  time.  And  the 
answer  he  gives  naturally  is,  that  every  individual 
object  of  perception  is  an  extensive  quantum,  known 
to  us  in  the  successive  addition  of  units,  as  guided  by 
the  unseen  influence  of  the  category  of  quantity.  In 
what  other  way  the  external  object  may  be  determined, 
Kant  does  not  here  inquire,  but  confines  himself  to  the 
proof  of  the  proposition,  that  no  external  object  is 
knowable  at  all  without  being  known  as  an  extensive 
quantum.  His  next  step  is  to  ask  whether  in  the 
knowledge  of  external  objects  there  is  any  universal 
and  necessary  characteristic;  and  he  finds  that  while 
we  cannot  anticipate  the  special  properties  of  things, 
since  these  are  perpetually  changing  on  us,  we  can 
anticipate  that  all  objects  capable  of  being  known  at  all 


168 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS. 


must  have  intensive  quantity  or  degree.  So  far  the 
question  has  not  been  raised  as  to  what  constitutes  the 
reality,  the  connection  and  the  mutual  influence  of 
objects.  But  this  question  is  forced  upon  us  the 
moment  we  make  affirmations  in  regard  to  the  relations 
of  objects.  We  can  no  longer  refer  to  our  perceptions 
in  proof  of  the  reality  of  our  knowledge.  We  have 
therefore  to  show  by  what  right  we  assume  objects  to 
be  permanent  and  actually  connected.  In  the  three 
Analogies  of  Experience  this  question  is  taken  up,  and 
it  is  pro*  3d,  first,  that  the  knowledge  of  real  objects 
involves  he  application  of  the  category  of  substance 
to  the  mrv'jifold  of  sense  through  the  schema  of  the 
permanent  secondly,  that  the  knowledge  of  real 
sequorvjes  can  only  be  explained,  if  we  presuppose 
the  sch*^  Ti  f  f  order  in  time,  as  limiting  the  category 
to  the  paiucular  determinations  of  sensible  perception; 
and  lastly,  that  the  knowledge  of  real  external  objects, 
as  mutually  influencing  each  other,  implies  the  schema 
of  co-existence  in  time,  as  standing  under  the  category 
of  reciprocity.  In  the  Postulates  of  Empirical  Thought, 
Kant,  having  now  considered  external  objects  as  such, 
and  external  objects  as  related  to  each  other,  raises  the 
question  as  to  the  relation  of  external  things  to  our 
thought  of  them.  And  the  subjective  criteria  of  know- 
ledge he  finds  to  lie  in  the  possibility,  the  actuality 
and  the  necessity  of  our  ideas.  The  final  result  of 
the  whole  investigation  is  to  rr  rerse  'completely  the 
ordinary  conception  of  the  relations  of  inteli^gence 
and  nature.  The  world  of  re;!/  things  is  not  an 
independent  congeries  of  real  things  externally  taken 
up  into  our  minds,  but  a  system  of  objects  constituted 
for  us  by  the  activity  of  our  intelligence  as  acting  on 
the  particulars  of  sense. 


169 


CHAPTER  VI. 


the 
3nce 

an 
Iken 
ited 

on 


■'.' 


V 


PROOF    OF    THE    PRINCIPLES    OF    JUDGMENT. 

I.  TTNDER  the  title  of  Axioms  of  Perception,  the 
^  first  of  the  two  mathematical  principles  of 
judgment,  Kant  shows  how  the  schematized  category 
of  quantity,  when  applied  to  the  manifold  of  sense, 
determines  all  possible  objects  of  knowledge  as  exten- 
sive quanta.^  The  proof  is  of  the  simplest  character, 
being  in  fact  almost  explicitly  stated  in  the  explana- 
tion of  the  schema  of  number.^  An  extensive  quantum, 
as  Kant  says,  is  one  in  which  we  proceed  from  part  to 
part  in  the  construction  of  a  whole.  Thus  a  line  is 
generated  by  producing  it  part  by  part,  beginning  with 
a  point,  and  at  the  same  time  putting  together  the 
parts  thus  successively  generated.  So  every  time, 
however  short  it  may  be,  is  produced  by  generating  in 
succession  one  moment  "iter  another,  and  at  the  same 
time  conjoining  the  moments  in  a  whole.  Now,  no 
object  can  possibly  be  known  to  us  except  as  informed 
by  space  or  time,  or  by  buth.  But  space  and  time  are 
forms  of  our  perceptior.  which  become  objects  of  know- 
ledge only  by  being  determined  to  individual  spaces 
and  times.  It  is  evident  therefore  that  all  possible 
objects  of  perception  must  be  extensive  quanta.     They 

•  Krltik,  pp.  155-8.  »  Ibid.,  p.  144. 


170 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


are  not  things  in  themselves  but  phenomena,  and  must 
therefore  conform  to  the  condition  under  which  space 
and  time  are  determined  in  the  apprehension  of  any 
object  in  space  or  time.  The  same  synthetical  process 
by  which  space  and  time  are  determined  to  the  unity 
of  individual  spaces  and  times  is  presupposed  in  the 
determination  of  concrete  objects  as  in  space  and  time, 
and  therefore  all  perceptions  are  extensive  quanta. 

This  constitutes  the  whole  of  Kant's  proof  of  the 
proposition  that  all  perceptions  are  extensive  quanta, 
but  some  remarks  are  added  for  the  purpose  of  show- 
ing (1)  that  this  principle  affords  the  only  ultimate 
explanation  of  mathematical  axioms  and  numerical 
formulae,  and  (2)  that  it  alone  justifies  us  in  saying 
that  mathematics  is  applicable  to  all  possible  objects 
of  experience.  (I)  That  there  are  axioms  in  geometry, 
as  the  science  of  pure  extension,  arises  from  the  nature 
of  the  pure  imagination,  which  by  its  schema  of  number 
generates  figures  in  space  by  successively  adding  part 
to  part.  The  propositions,  **  between  two  points  only 
one  straight  line  is  possible,"  and  "  two  straight  lines 
cannot  enclose  a  space,"  are  axioms,  because  they  are 
universal  and  yet  rest  upon  a  synthesis  of  pure 
perceptions.  Numericial  formulae,  again,  are  syntheti- 
cal and  a  priori,  but  as  they  are  not  universal  but 
individual  propositions  they  do  not  attain  to  the  rank  of 
axioras.  In  the  proposition  7  +  5  =  12,  I  am  com- 
pelled to  go  to  pure  perception  in  order  to  pass  from 
subject  to  predicate,  and  hence  the  judgment  is 
synthetical  and  a  prion ;  but  on  the  other  hand,  it  is 
not  universal  but  individual,  because  the  synthesis  of 
units  making  up  12  can  only  take  place  in  one  way, 
although  no  doubt  the  use  of  the  numbers  is  afterwards 
universal.     In  the  construction  of  a  triangle  I  am  not 


i  ^ 


/ 


VI.] 


PROOF  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES. 


171 


tied  down  to  any  one  way  of  producing  it,  but 
may  construct  the  lines  and  angles  as  I  please,  pro- 
vided I  conform  to  the  schema  of  a  triangle,  whereas 
7,  5  and  12  are  individual  numbers  which  can  be 
produced  by  the  productive  imagination  only  in  one 
way.  Again  the  propositions,  "  if  equals  be  added  to 
equals  the  wholes  are  equal,"  and  "  if  equals  be  taken 
from  equals  the  remainders  are  equal,"  are  not  axioms, 
because  they  are  not  obtained  by  a  synthesis  of  pure 
perceptions.  In  the  very  conception  of  the  relation  of 
equals  as  expressed  in  the  subject  of  each  of  these  pro- 
positions, there  is  implicit  a  conception  of  the  equality 
expressed  in  the  predicate,  and  hence  the  propositions 
are  not  synthetical  but  analytical.  (2)  The  applica- 
bility of  mathematics  to  phenomena  at  once  arises  from 
the  principle,  that  all  perceptions  are  extensive  quanta, 
and  can  be  established  in  no  other  way.  So  long  as  it 
was  supposed  that  real  objects  are  things  in  thems'^lves, 
it  was  impossible  to  avoid  falling  into  contradiction  and 
confusion  when  an  explanation  was  attempted  of  the 
relation  of  mathematical  judgments  to  concrete  things. 
Thus  it  was  maintained  that  the  mathematical  principle 
of  the  infinite  divisibility  of  lines  and  angles  is  only 
true  of  geometrical  figures,  not  of  things  themselves. 
When,  however,  we  see  that  things  as  known  are  not 
independent  of  our  perceptive  faculty,  it  is  at  once 
evident  that  what  is  true  of  space  and  time  will  be 
equally  true  of  objects  in  space  and  time.  For  as  no 
object  is  knowable  at  all  except  as  determined  in  space 
and  time  by  the  synthesis  of  the  productive  imagina- 
tion, objects  as  known  must  necessarily  conform  to  the 
nature  of  space  and  time  as  determinate.  To  deny  that 
mathematics  is  applicable  to  objects  is  to  make  objects 
things  in  themselves,  and  so  to  destroy  the  possibility 


! 


172  KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 

of  mathematics  itself.  Unless  space  and  time  are 
forms  oi  our  perception,  mathematical  judgments  can- 
not be  at  once  synthetical  and  a  priori;  and  if  they  are 
foriiis  of  perception,  known  objects  cannot  be  things  in 
themselves,  and  theie  is  therefore  no  reason  whatever 
for  denying  the  applicability  to  them  of  mathematical 
judgments. 

It  is  important  to  observe  that  Kant  does  not  here 
mean  to  affirm  that  perception  first  gives  us  a  know- 
ledge of  individual  objects,  which  are  afterwards  brought 
under  the  category  of  quantity.  "  What  quantity  sub- 
sumes," says  Dr.  Stirling,  **  is  v  series  [of  crude  sense- 
presenti  '  ionsj  in  time,  like  part  succeeding  like  part  in 
pure  contingency  of  sequence  till  the  category  acts."  * 
This  way  of  stating  the  matter  converts  Kant's  meta- 
physical theory  of  the  elements  implied  in  real  know- 
ledge into  an  accouni;  of  the  transition  from  our  ordinary 
to  our  reflective  consciousnf^s.s  of  things.  The  "crude 
sense-pre.sentations"  which  form  the  particular  element 
in  our  knowledge  of  determinate  objects  are  but  a  de- 
tached manifold  of  sense,  completely  wanting  in  unity 
and  universality.  Strictly  speaking,  the  **  manifold  " 
is  not  even  a  series,  fo.  time  is  determined  by  the 
synthetic  imagination,  which  is  itself  ruled  and  guided 
by  the  category.  Apart  from  the  category  of  quantity, 
there  can  be  no  knowledge  of  an  object  as  a  whole 
made  up  of  parts.  It  is  therefore  not  correct  to  say, 
that  like  part  succeeds  like  part  in  pure  contingency 
till  the  category  acts.  How  can  there  be  any  con- 
sciousness of  a  series  of  like  parts  except  by  a  deter- 
mination of  time  through  the  productive  Imagination  ? 
How  again  can  there  be  any  consciousness  of  a  unity 
of  like  parts  except  by  application  of  the  category  of 

'  Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  xiv.  76. 


VI.] 


PROOF  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES. 


173 


"  1 


'\ 


quantity  to  the  schema  of  the  imagination  ?  The 
various  elements  of  knowledge,  as  Kant  himself  says, 
constitute  a  "  closed  sphere  "  in  which  each  exists  only 
in  relation  to  the  others.  The  true  view,  therefore,  is, 
not  that  we  first  have  a  knowledge  of  objects  in  space 
and  time  and  then  apply  to  them  the  category  of  quan- 
tity, but  that  in  our  knowledge  of  such  objects  the 
application  of  the  category  is  presupposed.  'J Ho  we 
do  not,  in  our  ordinary  consciousness,  set  the  ogory 
of  quantity  distinctly  before  our  minds  is  not1  to 
the  point ;  it  is  enough  if  it  can  be  shown  tixut,  in 
reasoning  back  from  our  ordinary  knowledge,  we  are 
compelled  to  suppose  that  besides  the  sensuous  mani- 
fold there  are  implied  those  other  elements  of  know- 
ledge which  act  in  combination,  although  they  are 
logically  separable  from  each  other. 

II.  The  conclusion  to  which  the  first  principle  of  judg- 
ment leads  is  that,  looking  at  objects  of  knowledge, 
simply  as  objects,  i.e.,  apart  from  their  connection  with 
each  other,  we  do  determine  them  as  extensive  quanta, 
and  that  this  is  consistent,  and  alone  consistent,  with 
what  has  been  shown  in  the  Esthetic,  viz.,  that  space 
and  time  are  forms  of  perception.  Kant,  of  course, 
does  not  prove  that  space  and  time  are  extensive 
quanta,  but  simply  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that 
they  are  so :  what  he  proves  is  that  every  possible 
object  of  our  perception  must  be  an  extensive  quantum, 
because  it  could  not  be  known  as  an  object,  unless  we 
had  the  forms  of  space  and  time  as  belonging  to  our 
perceptive  faculty.  As  space  and  time  are  forms  of 
our  perception,  we  cannot  get  rid  of  them,  and  cannot 
perceive  without  them,  and  therefore,  however  the 
special  objects  of  perception  may  vary  in  their  proper- 

'  Prolegomena,  §  39,  p.  111. 


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23  WEST  MAIN  STREET 

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o^ 


174  KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 

ties,  they  must  he  extensive  quanta.  So  far  nothing 
has  been  determined  as  to  the  special  nature  of  the 
manifold  of  sense,  considered  in  itsdf.  Abstracting 
from  everything  in  objects  except  their  existence  in 
space  and  time,  it  has  been  shown  that  to  be  known  as 
in  space  and  time,  they  must  be  brought  under  the 
category  of  quantity,  schematized  as  number.  The 
next  step  is  to  show  that  the  manifold  of  sense,  con- 
sidered in  its  separate  units,  must  be  brought  under 
the  category  of  quality,  schematized  as  degree.  The 
proof  of  this  proposition  is  given  in  the  Anticipations 
of  Observation.  ^ 

In  all  observations  of  real  things  there  is  implied, 
besides  the  pure  perceptions  of  space  and  time,  a  par- 
ticular element  contributed  by  sense  which  constitutes 
the  real  in  our  knowledge  of  objects.  Now  this  real, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  not  obtained  by  the  successive  addition 
of  like  units,  but  is  given  in  a  single  moment  of  time, 
cannot  have  extensive  quantity.  At  the  same  time* 
each  sensation  or  part  of  the  manifold  has  a  certain 
intensity,  since  it  may  be  represented  as  capable  of  a 
gradual  decrease  to  zero,  and  of  a  gradual  increase  from 
zero  upwards.  And  this  is  intensive  quantity  or 
degree,  which  may  be  defined  as  a  unity  in  which 
multiplicity  is  apprehended,  not  by  the  aggregation  of 
parts,  but  by  approximation  to  zero.  Any  given  mani- 
fold of  sense  has,  therefore,  a  degree,  intermediate 
between  which  and  zero  there  is  always  a  series  of 
possible  realities.  Every  colour  and  every  temperature 
has  a  degree,  which  as  real  is  never  the  least  possible ; 
in  other  words,  the  real  in  every  phenomenon  has  in- 
tensive quantity  or  degree. 

After  showing  that  the  real  in  known  objects  neces- 

>  KrUik,  pp.  158-165. 


VI.] 


PROOF  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES. 


175 


sarily  has  degree,  Kant  adds  one  or  two  general 
remarks.  (1)  The  title  Anticipations  of  Observation 
is  employed  to  suggest,  that  we  can  tell  beforehand 
that  any  specific  impression  whatever  must  have  an 
intensive  quantity,  which,  however  small  it  may  be,  is 
always  greater  than  zero.  This  is  a  very  remarkable 
fact,  inasmuch  as  sensation  is  exactly  that  element  in 
knowledge  in  relation  to  which  we  are  purely  receptive. 
The  explanation  is,  that  we  are  here  dealing,  not  with 
a  particular  quality,  which  is  always  empirical,  but 
with  the  quantity  of  that  quality :  hence  we  are  con- 
cerned with  one  of  the  essential  conditions  of  knowable 
existence.  (2)  It  is  further  to  be  observed  that  all 
quantities,  whether  extensive  or  intensive,  are  con- 
tinuous.^ Space  and  time  are  not  composed  of  separate 
parts  which  are  put.  together  to  make  up  space  or  time 
as  a  unity,  for  space  and  time  are  only  limited  by 
themselves ;  in  other  words,  the  so-called  limitations 
of  space  and  time  really  continue  them.  Such  quan- 
tities may  also  be  called  flowing,  because  the  synthesis 
of  the  productive  imagination  in  generating  them  is  a 
continuous  progress  in  time.  When  this  synthesis  is 
interrupted,  or  alternately  stopped  and  renewed,  we 
have  indeed  an  aggregate  of  several  objects.  Thus 
thirteen  shillings,  as  so  many  coins,  is  not  a  quantum, 
but  an  aggregate  or  sum ;  but  each  unit  in  this  sum,  as 
divisible  to  infinity,  is  a  quantum.  (3)  That  this  prin- 
ciple is  of  great  importance  in  its  applications  may 
easily  be  shown,  even  without  anticipating  what  belongs 
to  pure  physics.  If  the  real  in  a  knowable  object 
must  always  have  a  degree,  it  is  evident  that  we  can 


>  This,  of  course,  althougli  it  is  set  down  under  the  head  of  the  Anticipa- 
tiotu,  is  a  general  remark  on  the  relation  of  the  two  mathematical  principles,  as 
is  also  the  remark  immediately  following. 


176 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


never  have  experience  of  a  space  or  time  which  is  abso- 
lutely empty.  For  as  every  affection  of  sense  has  a 
degree,  and  every  knowable  object  contains  an  element 
contributed  by  sense,  apart  from  the  determination  of 
the  manifold  of  sense  by  the  schema  of  degree,  no 
object  can  be  known  to  us  at  all.  Moreover,  as  the 
real  may  pass  through  an  infinite  number  of  degrees, 
but  can  never  reach  absolute  zero,  the  degree  of  a  phe- 
nomenon may  be  indefinitely  decreased,  while  the  space 
which  it  occupies  remains  exactly  the  same.  The  heat 
in  a  room,  e.^.,  may  pass  through  an  infinite  number 
of  degrees  without  leaving  any  part  of  the  room  un- 
occupied. This  is  indeed  denied  by  almost  all  natural 
philosophers.  Any  diminution  of  degree  in  the  same 
volume  or  extension  of  matter,  implies,  according  to 
them,  a  decrease  of  extensive  quantity.  It  is  argued 
that  as  the  quantity  of  matter  in  different  bodies  of 
equal  volume  is  unequal,  there  must  be  empty  spaces 
between  the  particles  of  every  body.  But  this  reason- 
ing rests  upon  the  metaphysical  assumption,  that  the 
real  in  spaqitf  is  determined  purely  by  the  number  of 
parts  existing  side  by  side,  and  that  each  part  has 
exactly  the  same  degree  of  intensity.  It  is  overlooked 
that  equal  spaces  may  be  completely  filled  by  infinitely 
various  degrees  of  reality.  Decrease  in  intensive  quan- 
tity does  not  necessarily  imply  decrease  in  extensive 
quantity.  There  is  nothing  to  prevent  us  from  sup- 
posing that  the  former  changes,  while  the  latter  re- 
mains the  le.  We  cannot,  of  course,  say  a  priori 
what  the  v  ^ree  of  reality  in  any  given  case  will  be ; 
but  we  can  say  that  every  phenomenon  must  have 
some  degree  of  reality,  and  that  no  part  of  knowable 
space  can  be  perfectly  empty.^ 

*  It  will  be  observed  that  Kant  virtually  asserts  the  logical  priority  of  the 


V..] 


PROOF  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES, 


177 


III.  Having  shown  what  is  implied  in  the  knowledge 
that  individual  objects  are  extensive  and  intensive 
quanta,  Kant  passes  in  the  Analogies  of  Experience,  to 
a  consideration  of  the  various  ways  in  which  those 
objects  are  connected  together.^  As  this  part  of  the 
Critical  philosophy  has  provoked  a  good  deal  of  adverse 
criticism,  it  will  be  advisable  to  give  a  somewhat 
detailed  statement  of  it. 

1.  The  First  Analogy^  is  that  of  the  permanence  of 
substance,  and  is  thus  formulated  :  "  In  all  alternation 
of  phenomena  substance  is  permanent,  and  its  quantum 
in  nature  neither  increases  nor  diminishes."  The  proof 
is  as  follows :— It  is  evident  that  in  our  ordinary  and 
scientific  consciousness  we  distinguish  between  real 
objects  and  the  transient  states  which  occur  in  the 
individual  mind.  A  real  object  is  one  that  we  regard 
as  permanent.  Can  we  then  explain  from  the  nature 
of  our  knowledge  how,  from  the  conception  of  the 
permanent,  we  are  entitled  to  ascribe  permanence  to 
objects  1  With  the  real  sequences  of  events  and 
the  real  co-existences  of  objects  we  are  not  here 
concerned,  but  only  with  the  permanence  which  we 
attribute  to  substances.  Granting,  thep,  that  there  are 
objects  in  space  and  time,  can  we  justify  the  assump- 
tion that  these  objects  are  permanent  ?  Now  we  are 
dealing  here  purely  with  phenomena,  i.  e.,  with  objects 
in  space  and  time,  not  with  things  in  themselves  exist- 
ing independently  of  our  knowledge.  How  then  can 
it  be  shown  that  thesf  objects  do  not  pass  away  with 
the  moment  but  persist  through  time  ? 

category  of  quality  to  that  of  quantity :  in  the  determination  of  real  objecta 
/  as  extensive  quanta  their  determination  as  intensive  quanta  is  implicit.    This 
agrees  with  what  was  said  above  in  Chap.  v.  aa  to  the  relation  of  the  various 
principles  of  judgment. 

»  KrUik,  pp.  165-192.  «  Ibid,  pp.  169-173. 

M 


178 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


If  we  look  merely  at  the  succession  of  our  own 
mental  states,  i.  e.,  our  feelings  as  they  occur  in  time, 
we  are  unable  to  show  that  there  are  real  objects 
distinct  from  them,  which  do  not  perpetually  change 
upon  us  from  moment  to  moment.  If  our  knowledge 
were  reducible  to  a  mere  series  of  feelings,  instead  of 
saying  that  objects  are  permanent  we  should  rather 
say,  granting  that  we  could  make  any  judgments  at 
all,  that  all  known  objects  are  in  perpetual  flux.  "  In 
mere  sequences,"  as  Kant  says,^  "existences  always 
vanish  and  reappear,  and  have  never  the  least  quan- 
tity." Abstract  from  everything  in  knowledge  but 
a  succession  of  mental  states,  and  we  have  simply  a 
series  of  feelings  having  no  temporal  duration  or 
quantity ;  and  from  such  a  mere  series  any  knowledge 
of  real  objects  having  a  temporal  duration  or  quantity 
cannot  possibly  be  extracted.  There  must,  then,  be 
some  mental  element  distinct  from  a  mere  series  of 
feelings,  which  enables  us  to  affirm,  that  there  are  real 
objects  which  are  permanent.  Can  we  point  out  what 
that  element  is  ? 

Now  all  objects  of  perception  are  of  course  in  time; 
for  time,  as  the  Esthetic  has  proved,  is  the  necessary 
condition  withoii|t  which  we  could  have  no  perception  of 
objects  at  all.  Time  we  must  regard  either  as  a  mere 
potential  imm,  belonging  to  our  perceptive  faculty  but 
not  entering  intqpur  actual  j)erceptions  except  in  relation 
to  known  objects,  or, as  determined  to  individual  mom- 
ents, each  of  which  follows  upon  the  preceding  and  is 
over  before  the  succeeding  moment  begins.  It  is  im- 
possible therefore  to  account  for  the  permanence  of  real 
objects  simply  from  time.  In  itself  time  is  simply  a  form 
of  perception,  and  therefore   nothing  for  knowledge. 

« KrUik,  p.  170. 


< 


V,.] 


PROOF  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES. 


17d 


Time,  again,  in  its  several  moments  cannot  be  identified  V 
with  the  duration  of  objects,  because  duration  is  not  a 
uccession  of  moments,  but  a  succession  which,  so  to 
peak,  stands  still.     When  we  say  that  an  object  is 
permanent,    we    mean    that    it    endures    while    the 
moments  of  time  pass  away,  and  as  the  moments 
of  time  do  not  themselves  endure,  but  are  perpetu- 
ally   arising    and    disappearing,    the    knowledge    of 
tlnngs  as  permanent  cannot  be  obtained  either  from 
time  in  itself,  or  from  time  in  its  separate  moments. 
Still,  the  permanence  of  things    must  imply  some 
relation  between  the  manifold  of  sense  and  time.    The 
three  possible  relations  of  objects  in  time  are  perman- 
ence, sequence,  and  co-existence.     Time  itself  neither 
endures  nor  passes  away;  nor  again  does  it  co-exist ; 
but  objects  or  events  may  endure,  succeed,  or  co-exist. 
Hence  the  permanence  of  objects  can  be  accounted  for 
onlv  by  bringing  them  into  relation  with  time.     It  is 
therefore  in  the  relation  of  the  manifold  to  time,  that 
we  must  seek  for  the  explanation  of  substance  as  per-    ^ 
manent.    That  there  is  a  permanent  in  our  knowledge  ^  ^^  (-t»~-^f 
we  are  compelled  to  suppose,  unless  we  are  prepared^; 
to  deny  all  perception  of  change.    And  even  if  we  '^ .,  .^ 
deny  all  change  in  the  properties  of  objects,  we  must*-  '  '■* 


....^<-. 


d^U 


...L 


at  least  admit  that  we  have  a  consciousness  of  our 
own  feelings  as  successive.     But  such  a  consciousness  H- ,  7 , 
evidently  implies,   that  there   is    in    knowledge    an-^'",   ""j,'^ 
element  which  cannot  be  identified  with  the  mere"'    ''"y /j. 
sequence  of  our  feelings.     Apart  from  the  conception    '  )i;X')lUf\ 
of  the  permanent  as  contributed  by  the  understanding,  ut.  i  ^^.L-   , 
there  could  be  no  consciousness  of  objects  as  per-  '^^I  .?1/V!i<^ " 
manent.     Without  the  permanent,  in  short,  we  could  ^  ..  >  vt^^  ' -w. 


have  no   time -relations.      "To    use    an    expression 

which  seems  rather  paradoxical,  only  the  permanent -'^--  ""^i^ 


-v 


'^_A±. 


■L: 


J~ 


180 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


.changes,  and  the  transitory  can  undergo  no  change." 
/The  permanent,  then,  which  is  the  schematized  cate- 
gory of  substance,  must  be  presupposed  in  order  to 
account  for  our  knb^ledge  of  any  real  object  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  niere  series  of  our  feelings.  The 
principle  of  substance  t^us  shows  us  how  we  are 
entitled  to  make  the  synthetical  a  priori  judgment, 
that  in  all  alteration  of  phenomena  substance  is  per- 
manent. Apart  from  the  category  of  substance, 
schematized  as  the  permanent,  we  could  have  no  know- 
ledge of  any  changes  whatever,  and  therefore  no 
knowledge  even  of  our  feelings  as  changing.  Every 
object  that  is  determined  as  real  is  necessarily  brought 
under  the  schema  of  the  permanent ;  in  fact,  real 
existence  and  permanence  are  identical  conceptions. 
And  as  all  real  objects  are  necessarily  permanent,  the 
ch  inges  which  they  undergo  cannot  effect  their  reality; 
and  hence  the  quantum  of  substance  can  neither  be 
increased  nor  diminished. 

Our  knowledge,  then,  of  real  objects  presupposes  the 
schema  of  the  permanent.  Unless  all  changes  of 
phenomena  were  connected  together,  there  could  be  no 
unity  in  our  experience,  and  unity  in  experience  implies 
unity  of  events  in  time.  This  may  be  shown  indirectly. 
Suppose,  says  Xant,  that  an  absolutely  new  object 
should  come  within  our  knowledge,  i.e.,  an  object  not 
known  to  us  by  the  changes  observed  to  take  place  in 
it.  Such  an  object  must  either  (1)  be  known  as  a 
change  relatively  to  the  permanent,  in  which  case  it  is 
not  a  newly  originated  object,  but  only  a  change  in 
that  which  already  exists;  or  (2)  we  must  suppose  that 
our  experience  is  split  in  two.  (1)  An  absolutely  new 
substance  is  one  that  previously  did  not  exist  in  time, 
and,  therefore,  is  not  capable  of  being  known  as  existing 


VI.] 


PROOF  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES. 


Ul 


I 


in  time.  Now  we  can  have  no  experience  of  pure 
time,  but  only  of  events  in  time.  Hence,  if  we  are  to 
know  this  new  object  as  coming  into  existence  at  a 
certain  moment  of  time,  we  must  be  able  to  fix  the 
moment  of  its  origination  by  a  reference  to  that  which 
is  already  known  as  existing  in  time.  But  to  perceive 
that  a  new  object  has  enierged  in  time  is  to  recognise 
that  a  change  has  taken  place  in  our  knowledge  of 
objects,  and  such  recognition  is  possible  only  if  the  new 
object  is  brought  into  the  same  time  with  that  previ- 
ously existing;  in  other  words,  the  new  object  is 
known  as  a  change,  and  change  is  nothing  apart  from 
the  permanent,  in  contrast  to  which  it  becomes  known. 
The  object  supposed  newly  to  originate  cannot,  there- 
fore, be  known  as  originating.  (2)  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  new  object  is  not  brought  into  relation  with 
the  old,  then  our  experience  must  be  divided  into  two 
halves,  having  no  connection  with  each  other.  And, 
as  all  experience  implies  time,  the  new  object  must  be 
in  one  time  and  the  old  object  in  another  time.  But 
it  is  absurd  to  say  that  there  are  two  times,  existing 
side  by  side ;  and  hence  there  cannot  possibly  be  any 
experience  of  an  absolutely  new  object.  All  experi- 
ence of  real  objects  is,  therefore,  simply  an  experience 
of  change  in  that  which  is  pt^rmanent. 

Kant's  proof  of  the  principle  of  substance  may  be 
shortly  summarised  as  follows.  There  can  be  no  know- 
ledge of  objects  as  real,  if  we  suppose  known  objects  to 
be  things  in  themselves  lying  beyond  consciousness ; 
for,  on  this  supposition,  our  knowledge  must  be  ob- 
tained from  a  mere  series  of  feelings,  or  must  rest  on 
the  mere  conception  of  substance.  But  a  mere  series 
of  feelings  is  but  an  alternation  of  feelings,  revealing 
no  object  that  persists  beyond  the  moment;  and  a 


H 


189 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


mere  conception  does  not  entitle  us  to  make  any 
affinnation  about  real  existences.  Nor,  again,  can  it 
be  said  that  the  permanence  of  existences,  which  is 
essential  to  their  reality,  may  be  explained  by  saying 
.that  time  is  permanent,  and,  therefore,  feelings  in  time 
may  be  known  as  permanent  by  relation  to  time.  For 
time,  as  a  mere  form,  is  no  object  of  knowledge,  and 
time,  as  individual  moments,  has  no  unity  in  it.  The 
reality  of  things  is,  therefore,  made  possible  only  by 
the  relation  of  the  manifold  of  sense  to  the  schema  of 
the  permanent,  as  guided  by  the  category  of  substance, 
which  again  stands  under  the  supreme  unity  of  self- 
consciousness.' 

To  this  proof  of  the  principle  of  substance  Kant 
adds  some  remarks,  which  are  intended  to  show  that 
it  has  been  tacitly  assumed,  even  by  those  who  were 
unaware  of  the  method  by  which  it  may  be  proved. 
The  principle  of  the  permanence  of  substance  has  been 
taken  for  granted  by  the  unphilosophical  mind,  al- 
though, of  course,  it  has  not  been  brought  into  explicit 
consciousness.  It  has  also  been  assumed  by  the  philo- 
sopher, in  the  form  that  "  in  all  changes  in  the  world 
substance  remains,  and  only  its  accidents  vary."  But 
while  it  has  been  assumed,  no  one  has  attempted  to 
prove,  it.  It  has,  in  fact,  been  accepted  as  a  self-evi- 
dent proposition,  and  has,  therefore,  virtually  been 
supposed  to  be  a  merely  analytical  judgment,  resting 
upon  the  bare  conception  of  substance.  To  say  that 
"  substance  is  permanent,"  is  simply  to  express  in  the 
predicate  what  is  already  implied  in  the  subject.    By 

*  Here  again  it  should  be  noted,  that  just  aa  quantity  logically  presupposes 
quality,  bo  both  presuppose  substance,  since  no  actual  object,  and  therefore  no 
determination  of  an  actual  object,  is  knowable  apart  from  the  schema  of  the 
permanent. 


VI.] 


PROOF  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES. 


ISS 


an  analysis  of  the  conception  of  substance,  we  can,  of 
course,  obtain  the  judgment,  "substance  is  permanent," 
for  in  the  conception  of  substance  we  already  have  im- 
plicitly the  attribute  of  permanence.  ^  But  it  is  one 
thing  to  show  that  we  have  the  conception  of  sub- 
stance, and  another  thing  to  demonstrate  that  this  con- 
ception is  applicable  to  real  objects.  Now  this  is  just 
what  no  dogmatic  philosophy  can  possibly  establish. 
The  only  proof  admissible  is  a  transcendental  one,  and 
that  proof  we  have  supplied  by  showing  that,  apart 
from  the  conception  of  permanence,  there  can  be  no 
knowledge  of  an  object  as  real.  The  analytical  judg- 
ment, "substance  is  permanent,"  therefore  pre-supposes 
the  synthetical  judgment  that  in  all  phenomena  there 
is  something  permanent,  of  which  all  changes  are  but 
modes.  Now  we  can  see  why  the  permanence  of  sub- 
stance has  been  so  commonly  assumed.  The  conditions 
of  knowledge  are  such  that  no  object  can  be  known  at 
all  without  being  determined  as  permanent,  and  hence 
it  is  easy,  by  mere  analysis  of  our  knowledge,  to  obtain 
the  analytical  proposition,  that  substance  is  permanent. 
As  we  have  ourselves  contributed  the  element  of 
permanence  to  objects,  an  analysis  of  our  knowledge 
must,  of  course,  bring  it  to  light. 

Other  cases  in  which  the  principle  of  substance  is 
virtually  assumed  may  be  given.  The  natural  philo- 
sopher lays  down  the  principle,  that  "  matter  is  inde- 
structible," and  this  is  evidently  only  another  form  of 
the  principle  that  substance  does  not  change,  but  only 
its  accidents.  So  the  ancient  sayings,  Qigni  de  nihilo 
nihil  and  In  nihilum  nil  posse  reverti,  presuppose  the 
same  principle.  These  propositions,  however,  are  not 
true  of  things  in  themselves,  but  only  of  things  in 

»  Cf.  Prokgomena,  §§  3,  47,  ami  48. 


/ 


184 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


space  and  time  or  phenomena.  That  they  rest  on  the 
synthetical  a  piiori  principle  of  substance,  is  evident 
from  the  fact  that  they  apply  to  the  past  and  the 
future  as  well  as  to  the  present,  and,  therefore,  affirm 
absolutely  and  without  any  limitation,  that  all  changes 
are  modes  of  the  permanent. 

2.  Kant  has  now  shown  that  to  have  an  experience 
of  objects  in  space  and  time,  we  must  be  capable  of 
determining  objects  as  extensive  quanta,  and  as  inten- 
sive quanta ;  and  that  to  know  them  as  real,  we  must 
determine  objects  as  permanent,  notwithstanding  the 
changes  they  undergo.  Thus,  experience  of  real  objects 
is  shown  to  depend  upon  the  constitution  of  our  intel- 
lect, in  so  far  as  we  determine  objects  as  extensive 
quantity,  as  having  a  degree  in  regard  to  their  proper- 
ties, and  as  being  individually  considered  permanent 
or  persisting  through  successive  moments  of  time.  He 
now  goes  on  to  consider  what  is  implied  in  the  changes 
which  objects  undergo :  in  other  words,  to  show  that  a 
real  sequence  of  events  implies  the  intellectual  schema 
of  necessary  sequence  or  irreversible  order  in  time. 
The  Second  Analogy  of  Experience,  in  which  the  proof 
of  the  causal  connection  of  events  is  set  forth,^  is,  as 
Dr.  Stirling  remarks,  one  of  the  most  confused  passages 
in  the  whole  of  Kant's  writings.  It  may,  however,  be 
reduced  to  a  moderate  compass  by  the  rejection  of  the 
first  two  paragraphs,  which  were  added  in  the  second 
edition,  and  which  simply  give  an  outline  of  the  general 
argument  as  contained  in  the  first  edition  ;  and  by  the 
elimination  of  the  reply  to  the  objection  that  there  are 
causal  connections  which  are  not  successive,  but  simul- 
taneous, and  of  the  remarks  on  the  conception  of  force, 
which  properly  belong  to  the  metaphysic  of  nature, 

»  Kritik,  pp.  173  187. 


I 


^ 


VI.] 


PROOF  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES, 


IM 


\ 


and  will  be  considered  in  their  proper  place.  The 
discussion,  thus  brought  within  moderate  limits,  may 
be  divided  into  three  sections  (not  explicitly  distin- 
guished by  Kant),  containing  respectively  a  statement 
of  the  facts  admitted  by  every  one,  a  criticism  of  the 
ordinary  explanation  of  causality,  and  a  proof  of  Kant's 
own  theory. 

(1.)  The  special  topic  under  consideration  is  whether 
we  can  account,  from  the  nature  of  our  knowledge,  for 
the  real  sequence  of  events,  and  whether  we  are  entitled 
to  assert,  universally  and  necessarily,  that  events  are 
connected  together  in  causal  relations  to  each  other. 
Kant,  as  usual,  starts  from  the  facts  of  experience,  as 
they  are  held  by  us  all.  Those  facts,  as  far  as  we  are 
concerned  with  them  in  dealing  with  the  question  of 
causality,  are  these,  (a)  We  do,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
distinguish  between  the  arbitrary  sequence  of  our  own 
mental  states  and  the  orderly  sequence  of  events,  just 
as  we  distinguish  between  the  arbitrary  sequence  of 
our  feelings  and  the  co-existence  of  the  quantitative 
parts  of  individual  objects.  Thus,  to  take  an  illustra- 
tion of  the  second  case,  we  observe  the  parts  of  a  house 
in  succession,  but  every  one  knows  that  those  parts  are 
really  co-existent,  and  not  successive.  (6)  What  we 
ordinarily  mean  by  a  real  sequence  is  equally  obvious. 
We  do  not  suppose  that  the  parts  of  a  house  are  suc- 
cessive, although  we  observe  them  in  succession,  but  we 
do  suppose  that  a  boat  drifting  down  a  stream  is  an  in- 
stance of  a  real  sequence.  It  is  quite  obvious  that  the 
parts  of  the  stream  successively  occupied  by  the  boat 
must  be  passed  through  in  order,  and  the  sequence  we, 
therefore,  regard  as  real. 

(2.)  These,  then,  are  the  facts  to  be  explained  :  the 
distinction  between  an  arbitrary  sequence  in  the  order 


186 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


of  our  perceptions,  and  an  orderly  sequence  in  real 
events.  What,  then,  is  a  real  sequence  ?  and  what  is 
the  explanation  usually  offered  in  proof  of  the  assump- 
tion that  every  real  event  is  connected  with  events 
going  before  it  ? 

Now  (a)  a  real  sequence,  if  there  be  such,  cannot, 
as  is  ordinarily  supposed,  be  contrasted  with  the  arbit- 
rary sequence  of  our  individual  mental  states,  as  changes 
taking  place  in  things  in  themselves  with  the  mere 
succession  of  those  states.  Kant  does  not  here  enter 
into  any  proof  that  we  cannot  know  things  in  them- 
selves, but  contents  himself  with  remarking  that,  as  in 
this  view,  changes  are  supposed  to  occur  in  objects 
lying  beyond  the  sphere  of  our  knowledge,  we  are  un- 
able to  say  anything  whatever  as  to  real  sequences; 
the  only  sequences  we  can  possibly  know  are  sequences 
within  consciousness,  and  real  sequences  are  ex  hypo- 
thesi  beyond  consciousness,  and,  therefore,  unknowable. 
We  are,  in  fact,  as  Hume  pointed  out,  compelled  to 
reduce  real  sequences  to  certain  individual  sequences 
of  our  mental  states,  only  arbitrarily  associated  toge- 
ther, and  not  known  as  really  connected.  Instead  of 
a  knowledge  of  real  sequences,  we  are  reduced  to  a 
mere  play  of  ideas. 

(6)  In  accordance  with  the  false  supposition  that 
known  objects  exist  independently  of  consciousness, 
the  dogmatist  supposes  causality  to  be  known  by  mere 
observation.  We  observe  or  perceive,  it  is  said,  that 
two  events — say  fire  and  heat — are  conjoined  in  this 
way,  that  the  fire  as  cause  first  exists,  and  then  is  fol- 
lowed by  the  heat  as  effect;  and  we  find,  by  com- 
parison of  the  perceptions  which  we  make  at  different 
times,  that  fire  always  goes  first,  and  heat  comes 
second.     Similarly,  we  discover,  by  a  comparison  of 


' 


VI.] 


PROOF  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES. 


187 


perceptions   made  at  various  times,  that  there   are 
many  events  connected  in  a  definite  order,  as,  e.g.^ 
snow  and  cold,  sun  and  heat,  etc.     From  the  compari- 
son of  these  various  instances  of  the  orderly  sequence 
of  events  on  each  other,  we  abstrac*^  the  universal  rule, 
that  all  events  have  a  cause.    Now,  there  are  two 
objections  to  this  view.     It  is  supposed  by  it  that  we 
not  only  observe  real  events,  but  that  we  observe  real 
sequences  in  events.      But   (a)   this   explanation  of 
orderly  sequence  makes  the  principle  of  causality  a 
merely    analytical    or    tautological    proposition.      Of 
course,  granting  that  we  have  somehow  obtained  the 
conception  of  causality,  i.e.,  of  the  orderly  sequence  of 
events  on  each  other,  we  can,  by  a  mere  analysis  of 
our  conception,  obtain  the  proposition:  "Every  event 
has  a  cause."     But  we  only  obtain  it  because  we  have 
assumed  it  beforehand.     We  are  supposed  to  observe 
real  sequences  in  particular  cases,  and  to  combine  these 
in  a  general  proposition  by  an  act  of  reflection.     But 
this  overlooks  the  all-important  point,  that  an  analytical 
judgment  cannot  add  anything  to  our  knowledge,  but 
can  only  express  what  is  already  implicit  in  it.     In 
other  words,  the  ordinary  view  does  not  explain  the 
origin  of  the  principle  of  causality,  but  merely  assumes 
it,  and  assumes  it  in  defiance  of  the  fact  that  from  a 
mere  conception  we  cannot  pass  over  to  reality.    Hence 
the  fact  that  by  analysis  we  can  bring  the  principle  of 
causal  relation  into  logical  clearness,  presupposes,  as  in 
all  other  cases,  that  that  principle  is  based  upon  a  prior 
synthesis.     We  are  able  to  prove  the  analytical  pro- 
position, "  Every  event  has  a  cause,"  only  because  we 
have  previously  by  a  synthetical  process  made  the 
sequence  of  real  events  possible.    Thus,  we  do  not 
obtain  the  conception  of  cause  by  reflecting  on  real 


188 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


sequences,  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  conception  or  cate- 
gory of  cause  is  the  condition  of  there  being  for  us  any 
real  sequences.  (6)  Even  granting  that  from  observa- 
tion we  obtain  a  knowledge  of  certain  real  sequences, 
we  are  not  entitled  to  affirm  that  all  events  must  have 
a  cause.  Induction  or  generalization  cannot  take  us 
beyond  the  facts  on  which  the  induction  or  generaliza- 
tion is  founded.  Now,  all  that  we  can  have  observed 
is  that,  within  our  limited  observation,  certain  events 
always  follow  certain  other  events.  The  proper  form, 
therefore,  of  the  principle  of  causality  should  be :  So 
far  as  I  have  observed,  every  event  has  a  cause.  But 
this  is  only  a  general,  not  a  universal  proposition,  and 
hence  it  falls  short  of  the  true  principle  of  causality. 

(3.)  We  are  now  in  a  position  to  appreciate  Kant's 
own  proof  of  the  principle  of  the  causal  relation  of 
events.  It  contains  three  steps  :  (a)  a  mere  sequence 
of  feelings  or  ideas,  gives  no  criterion  for  distinguishing 
an  orderly  sequence  of  events  from  an  arbitrary  sequence 
of  individual  feelings  or  ideas;  (6)  real  sequence  cannot 
be  obtained  by  an  observation  of  separate  events  as  in 
time;  (c)  real  sequences  can,  therefore,  only  be  ex- 
plained on  the  supposition  that  the  understanding, 
acting  through  the  schema  of  order  in  time,  makes  the 
knowledge  of  real  sequences  possible. 

(a)  We  saw  above  that  the  mere  sequence  of  mental 
states  cannot  be  contrasted  with  the  real  sequence  of 
events,  as  mere  ideas  in  the  mind  with  real  changes 
going  on  beyond  the  mind.  For  this  supp  ses  real 
events  to  lie  beyond  the  sphere  of  our  knowledge,  and 
hence  to  be  ex  hypothesi  unknown.  The  real  sequences 
we  have  to  explain,  if  there  are  such,  must  be  sequences 
not  without,  but  within  consciousness  :  in  other  words, 
they  are  changes  taking  place  in  real  objects  existing 


VI.] 


PROOF  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES. 


189 


in  space  and  time,  as  distinguished  from  our  feelings 
or  ideas,  which  exist  only  in  time.  Thus  both  our 
feelings  and  real  events  are  alike  in  consciousness,  or 
can  exist  only  as  they  are  known  to  exist.  Both  are 
alike  objects  of  consciousness — using  the  term  "objects" 
in  the  most  general  sense,  as  anything  present  to  our 
consciousness.  Now,  the  difficulty  we  have  to  resolve 
is  this :  if  all  objects  alike  are  in  consciousness,  how 
does  it  come  that  we  distinguish  the  sequence  of  our 
feelings  from  the  sequence  of  real  events?  Manifestly, 
it  cannot  be  because  our  feelings  are  successive,  while 
events  are  not,  for  both  are  alike  successive.  As  real 
events  are  in  consciousness,  they  can  only  be  present 
to  our  consciousness  in  succession.  How,  then,  do  we 
come  to  distinguish  subjective  sequences  from  objective 
sequences  1  The  old  distinction,  that  subjectivu  se- 
quences are  in  the  mind  and  objective  sequences  with- 
out the  mind,  is  not  tenable  ;  and  we  must,  therefore, 
find  in  the  nature  of  our  knowledge  the  explanation  of 
the  undoubted  contrast  we  draw  between  these  two 
kinds  of  sequence.  Objectivity  of  sequence  must  have 
a  different  meaning  from  the  ordinary  one :  every 
sequence  of  real  events  must  be  a  combination  of 
determinations  existing  only  for  consciousness.  Now, 
it  is  at  once  evident  that  we  need  not  seek  for  the 
distinction  in  the  content  of  the  real  object  or  real 
event,  for  this  content  can  be  nothing  more  than  ideas 
of  some  kind,  which  by  a  process  of  thought  have 
become  contrasted  with  mere  ideas,  existing  only  as 
subjective  states.  In  other  words,  the  distinction  must 
lie  in  some  mental  form  being  applied  in  the  case  of  the 
objective  sequence,  which  is  not  brought  into  play  in  the 
case  of  the  subjective  sequence.  There  must  be  a  rule  or 
law  of  thought,  accounting  for  the  difference  between  the 


}rv 


//,  u 


/...r,, 


^> 


liu 


190 


>  i~t  ^,K  J- — 1< Z- ^",,  ^  _ 

/-.    .1     v.,       -/   (>»..   .,,//.. 

AT^iV^Z'  ^^7?  iy/S  ENGLISH  CRITICS. 

c.  t       ...     ' 


..,f 


/  '-t/f. 


'U  . 


'fri 


Vu.;i 


I  •/,_,•. 


< 


'5.r 


4:  .„,„.  .        '' 

U  ;      J    i  I,  '>.  ""■ 


;".t;.,,^ 


two  kinds  of  sequence ;  and  it  is  the  presence  of  this 
rule  or  law  of  thought  which  makes  the  sequence  of 
*^what  we  call    real  events  objective.      An  objective 
sequence,  in  other  words,  is  simply  a  sequence,  which, 
as  irreversible,  is  necessary  and  universal.    "We  have, 
then,  to  explain  how  we  come  to  distinguish  the  ob- 
;<Jective  sequences  of  events  from  the  subjective  sequences 
- -^  of  our  feelings,  and  to  do  so  while  recognising  that 
'^*'   both  sequences  are  alike  in  consciousness.     Now,  it  is 
,  /    ^.  mamfest  that  knowledge  of  any  real  event  can  be  ob- 
'   -    ; ' '    tained  only  if  we  distinguish  it  from  an  event,  different 
/ ,  ';l^/'jf,4,'  in  content,  going  before  jt;  for  (as  we  saw  before  in 
xL-i  H'--  *  f    r^^®  proof  of  substance)  a  single  event,  or  rather  deter-'I*  1' 
/_mination!  is  not  capable  of  being  known,  any  more  thari't. .'. 
^    '   empty  time  itself.      In  order,  therefore,  to  have   a^ '&". ' 
knowledge  of  a  real  sequence,  a  transition  from  one^fX 
object  of  consciousness  to  another  must  take  place.  •T'-va.v 
But  evidently  this  alone  is  not  sufficient  to  account  for-'v^  , 
a  knowledge  of  real  sequences.     For  all  objects  of  con-^  • '  >" 
sciousness  occur  to  us  in  succession,  and  hence  in  all 
there  is  a  transition  from  one  state  to  another  different 
from  it.     The  parts  of  a  house,  e.g.,  I  observe  succes- 
sively, and  hence  in  my  consciousness  there  is  a  transi- 
tion from  one  state  to  another,  and  a  transition  which 
implies  sequence  in  time.     No  one,  however,  supposes 
that  the  parts  of  the  house  are  successive,  although 
they  present  themselves  successively  to  my  conscious- 
ness.    On  the  other  hand,  the  presentation  in  my  con-  , 
sciousness  of  the  successive  occupancy  of  the  parts  of 
a  stream  by  a  drifting  boat,  is  also  successive ;  but 
here  we  do  not,  as  in  the  case  of  the  house,  suppose 
that  the  boat  occupies  the  parts  of  the  stream  co-exist- 
ently,  but,  on  the  contrary,  we  regard  it  as  occupying 
them  only  in  succession.     How,  then,  are  we  to  account 


\ 


I 


J 


''•/. 


'        ( 


LIS 

of 
ve 

K 

fo- 
es 
lat 
is 
)b- 
jnt 

ar--"-      '  '-^/ 
■■,.'j  -if. 

All .  >...— «.i^  a. 

liv'  -   .*..</., 

a«,  'fe  ':-'—«• 

C/ »  i--  ^ 

>n,©  ''•^  ~"  '^*''* 
ce.^ -".--■'• 
for-p-,^ 

all 

)nt 
es- 
isi- 
ch 

3es 


h 
iis- 


g' 


t)n- 
of 
)ut 
)se 

.st- 

nt 


VI.] 


PROOF  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES. 


191 


for  the  fact  that)  while  all  consciousness  implies  a  tran- 
sition from  one  state  to  another,  we  nevertheless  dis- 
tinguish between  a  real  succession  of  events  and  a  mere 
succession  of  individual  feelings.  !Now,  if  we  look  at 
the  instances  already  given,  we  see  that,  while  the  ob- 
jects are  in  both  presented  successively,  we  do,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  regard  the  two  successions  as  essentially 
different.  And  the  difference  lies,  not  in  the  fact  that 
the  manifold  is  in  the  one  case  presented  to  ourconscious- 
ness  in  succession  and  not  in  the  other,  but  that  the 
manifold  of  the  house  is  presented  to  our  consciousness 
in  any  order,  while  the  manifold  of  the  boat  is  only 
presented  in  one  invariable  order.  The  explanation  of 
the  difference  must,  therefore,  be  sought,  not  in  any 
difference  in  objects  of  consciousness  as  such — as  if 
some  were  co-existent  and  others  sequent — nor  in  any 
contrast  of  ideas  within  the  mind  and  objects  without 
the  mind,  but  in  a  difference  in  the  nature  of  the 
sequence.  That  there  are  real  sequences  of  events, 
just  as  there  are  co-existing  parts  of  individual  objects 
as  extensive  quanta,  no  one  doubts;  the  point  is  to 
explain  how,  consistently  with  the  fact  that  all  objects 
are  alike  objects  of  consciousness,  we  come  to  mark  off 
subjective  from  objective  successions.  The  explanation 
must  be  sought  in  the  nature  of  thought  itself;  for,  as 
has  been  said,  all  objects  are  objects  of  consciousness, 
and  so  far  on  the  same  level.  There  must  be  a  rule  or 
law  of  thought,  which  accounts  for  the  fact  that  we 
determine  a  certain  manifold  of  sense  to  an  invariable 
order  in  time.  Apart  from  such  a  rule,  we  should 
never  distinguish  objective  from  subjective  sequences 
at  all ;  at  the  most  we  should  have  but  a  "  play  of 
representations,"  coming  and  going,  but  ^^ving  us  no 
knowledge  of  objects  as  connected  in  time.     We  could 


192 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


^h- 


d-'--^ 


not  say :  This  event  follows  another,  but  only :  This 
state  of  consciousness  follows  another. 

(6)  It  may,  perhaps,  be  said  that  the  sequence  of  real 
events  as  objects  of  consciousness  can  be  proved  from  the 
fact  that  objects  of  consciousness  are  always  E^ccessive. 
But  such  an  explanation  is  at  once  precluded  by  the 
consideration  that  objects  of  consciousness  are  not  cap- 
able of  being  fixed  in  an  invariable  order  by  a  simple 
*/  /  'jI.L*'^!:  reference  to  time.  For  time  per  se  is  not  capable  of 
being  known;  it  is  not  something  that  can  be  observed, 
as  outside  of  us,  but  a  mere  potential  form,  that  comes 
into  knowledge  only  in  relation  to  known  objects. 
But,  if  all  objects,  internal  as  well  as  external,  are 
relative  to  consciousness,  we  come  back  to  the  difficulty 
of  explaining  why  we  distinguish  objective  from  sub- 
jective sequences ;  and  this  shows  that,  to  explain  how 
a  knowledge  of  real  events  is  possible,  w^e  must  pre- 
suppose the  schema  of  orderly  succession  as  a  rule  of 
thought.  Tl^at  there  is  an  order  in  known  events  every 
one  admits.  (This  order  in  time  is  not,  however,  capable 
of  being  accounted  for  by  saying  that  we  observe  certain 
states  of  objects,  and  determine  them  to  an  order  by 
reference  to  time.^  For  such  states,  if  we  abstract  from 
the  order  in  which  they  occur,  are  separate  from  each 
other,  and  a  separate  state  is  not  capable  of  being  as- 
signed any  order,  even  by  reference  to  time.  For  time 
is  not  itself  observable  ;  it  is  not  a  real  object  in  which 
the  states  of  the  phenomena  can  be  observed ;  taken  by 
itself  it  is  a  mere  form  of  perception.  A  single  event, 
in  short,  has  no  determinate  place  in  time,  and  there- 
fore no  order  in  time.  Order  in  time  can  therefore 
only  be  known  by  the  relation  of  states  to  each  other 
as  actually  sequent. 

(c)  As  then,  all  objects  are  relative  to  consciousness. 


i 


i 


VI.] 


PBOOF  OF  THE  PRJJSiCIPLES. 


193 


and  are  successively  presented  in  consciousness,  and 
as  no  distinction  of  sequences  from  co -existences  can 
be  found  in  time  itself,  the  rule  by  which  an  ob- 
jective sequence  is  distinguished  from  a  subjective  se- 
quence must  be  found  in  the  Understanding.  It  is  a 
common  fallacy  to  suppose  that  the  Understanding  has 
no  function  but  that  of  analysing  or  bringing  into 
clearness  what  is  already  given  in  our  knowledge  of 
real  objects.  The  real  fact  is  that  Understanding,  so 
far  from  simply  analysing  our  knowledge  of  real  ob- 
jects, or,  in  other  words,  our  perceptions,  first  makes 
such  knowledge  possible.  There  could  be  no  percep- 
tion or  experience  of  a  real  sequence  were  it  not  that 
Understanding  reduces  a  certain  manifold  of  sense  to 
order,  and  so  makes  an  experience  of  real  sequences 
possible.  In  the  present  case,  Understanding,  having 
Causality  as  its  category^^or  function  of  unity,  pre- 
scribes a  law  or  rule  to  the  ^manifold,  by  means  of  the 
schema  of  order  in  time,  and  so  makes  an  invariable 
sequence  in  time  possible.  The  orderly  sequence  of 
objects  of  consciousness  is  therefore  due  to  Understand- 
ing. And,  of  course,  like  every  law  of  thought,  the 
sequence  is  necessary  and  universal :  as  there  can  be  no 
knowledge  of  a  real  sequence  apart  from  the  activity  of 
the  Understanding  acting  through  the  schema  of  order 
in  time,  we  can  affirm  universally  and  necessarily,  that 
all  changes  must  conform  to  the  law  of  causal  con- 
nection. We  can  therefore  say  that  all  the  changes  in 
nature  are  subject  to  this  law.  In  other  words,  all  real 
sequences  stand  under  the  synthetical  unity  of  self- 
consciousness,  without  which  there  would  be  for  us 
no  unity  in  nature,  and  therefore  no  nature  at  all.^ 


I  Kant  adds  to  this  proof  the  remark  that  Causality  presupposes  Substan- 
tiality, since  every  effect  as  a  real  change  is  relative  to  a  pernianent  subject, 


194 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


11 


3.  The  Third  Analogy  of  Experience,^  which  need 
not  detain  us  long,  is  intended  to  show  that  "  all  sub- 
stances, in  so  far  as  they  can  be  observed  as  co-existing 
in  space,  are  in  complete  reciprocity.  In  the  First 
Analogy  Kant  showed  that,  while  our  perceptions 
always  come  to  us  in  succession,  they  can  be  known 
as  successive  only  in  contrast  to  that  which  is  not 
successive  but  permanent.  In  the  Second  Analogy  it 
has  been  shown  that  there  are  irreversible  sequences 
in  knowledge  which  cannot  be  accounted  for  from  a 
mere  sequence  of  perceptions,  since  perceptions  are  not 
irreversible  in  the  order  of  their  occurrence.  Now  he 
goes  on  to  show  that,  while  our  perceptions  are  always 
successive,  we  nevertheless  have  a  knowledge  of  real 
co-existences,  which  are  distinguishable  at  once  from 
the  arbitrary  sequence  of  our  perceptions,  and  from  the 
necessary  sequences  of  real  events.  In  proving  that  sub- 
stances mutually  influence  each  other,  Kant  therefore 
presupposes  both  the  conception  of  substance  and  the 
conception  of  causality. 

Substances  we  ordinarily  regard  as  co-existing  when 
they  are  in  one  and  the  same  time.  Keal  events,  on 
the  other  hand,  we  regard  as  coming  after  one  another, 
or  existing  only  in  successive  times.  Now,  th^t  which 
is  actually  successive  cannot  be  apprehended  in  any 
order  but  one,  and  Jience,  when  we  find  that  our  appre- 
hension may  proceed  either  from  A  through  B,  C,  and 
D  to  E,  or  inversely  from  E,  through  D,  C,  and  B  to 
A,  we  regard  that  which  is  apprehended  as  not  sequent 
but  co-existent.    This,  then,  is  the  fact  to  be  explained. 

Now,  granting  that  substances  are  in  the  same  space, 

The  oonvene  truth,  that  Substantiality  presupposes  Causality,  is  indicated  in 
the  "Metaphysic  of  Nature,"  where  Matter  and  Force  are  shown  mutually  to 
imply  each  other.     See  below.  Chap.  viii. 
» Kritlk,  pp.  187-190. 


. 


VI.] 


PROOF  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES. 


196 


lyto 


we  must  either  say  that  they  mutually  influence  each 
other,  or  that  they  are  completely  isolated  from  each 
other  in  space.  If  we  adopt  the  latter  supposition,  we 
must  suppose  them  to  exist  in  absolutely  empty  space. 
But  if  they  are  so  completely  separated  from  each 
other,  it  would  be  impossible  to  determine  that  they 
coexist  in  one  time.  For,  granting  that  we  may  ap- 
prehend first  one  and  then  another  in  succession,  still 
we  could  not  in  any  way  connect  the  objects  thus 
separately  apprehended;  and  being  unable  to  bring 
them  into  relation  with  each  other,  we  should  not  be 
able  to  say  whether  they  were  coexistent  or  successive. 
Our  perceptions  would  no  doubt  be  successive,  but  as 
all  perceptions  are  successive,  we  could  not  say  whether 
the  objects  perceived  were  successive  or  co-existent. 
We  must  therefore  suppose  substances  not  to  be  iso- 
lated from  each  other,  but  to  be  mutually  connected. 
And  as  a  substance  can  only  be  related  to  another 
substance  through  its  states,  the  states  of  ^^^  co-existing 
substances  must  be  the  product  of  their  oiutual  influ- 
ence on  each  other.  But  that  without  which  there  can 
be  no  real  knowledge  is  necessary,  being  implied  in  the 
constitution  of  our  intelligence ;  and  hence  all  know- 
able  objects  are  constituted  as  co-existent  by  the  activity 
of  thought  which  determines  them  in  relation  to  time  by 
the  schema  of  coexistence. 

IV.  The  Postulates  of  Empirical  Thought,^  which 
complete  the  consideration  of  the  Principles  of  Judg- 
ment, simply  state  explicitly  what  are  the  conditions 
under  which  real  knowledge  is  possible,  and  contain 
nothing  that  is  not  implied  in  the  explanation  of  what 
those  conditions  are.  (1)  The  First  Postulate  is,  that 
"  that  which  harmonises  with  the  formal  conditions  of 

»^r«iJt,  pp.  192-197. 


196 


KANT  AND  H/S  ENGLISH  CRITICS.       [chap. 


1/ 

1 


experience  is  possible."    The  formal  conditions  of  ex- 
perience are,  as  we  know,  space  and  time,  and  the 
categories  as  mediated  by  the  schemata.     Now,  if  we 
take  any  determination  of  space,  such  as  a  triangle,  it 
seems  at  first  sight  as  if  the  mere  fact,  that  the  concep- 
tion is  given  in  the  act  by  which  the  triangle  is 
constructed,  were  enough  to  show  that  an  object  cor- 
responding to  it  may  be  found;   in  other  words,  it 
seems  to  be  possible  to  show  by  the  dogmatic  method 
that  mathematics  is  applicable  to  real  things.     But 
this,  as  a  critical  examination  of  real  knowledge  has 
made  abundantly  clear,  is  a  mistake.     Could  it  not  be 
shown  that  the  conditions  which  make  the  determina- 
tion of  the  pure  form  of  space  possible  are  also  the 
conditions  without  which   no  real  objects  could  be 
known  by  us,  we  should  not  be  able  to  show  that  the 
a  priori  constructions  of  geometry  are  more  than  pro- 
ducts of  the  imagination.     This,  however,  is  what  has 
been  established ;  and  hence  we  are  entitled  to  affirm 
that  the  mathematical  determinations  of  space  and 
time  are  at  the  same  time  possible  determinations  of 
real  objects.     All  quantitative  determinations,  in  fact, 
as  conditioned  by  the  categories  in  relation  to  space 
and  time,  are  determinations  of  things  as  to  their  pos- 
sibility.     Harmony  with  the  a  priori  conditions  of 
knowledge  may  therefore  be  employed  as  a  test  of  the 
possibility  of  real  things.     (2)  In  order,  however,  to 
know  that  an  object  is  not  only  possible  but  actual, 
something  more  is  required  than  non-violation  of  the 
formal  conditions  of  knowledge.     An  actual  object  can 
be  known  only  when  sense  supplies  a  manifold  which 
can  be  related  to  the  category  through  the  schema. 
The  mere  conception  of  a  thing,  however  complete  it 
may  be,  cannot  be  identified  with  actual  knowledge  of 


^ 


of 
the 

to 
ual, 
the 
can 
lich 
ma. 


VI.] 


PROOF  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES. 


197 


a  thing;  for  the  latter,  sense  must  co-operate  with 
thought.  Still,  even  before  actual  experience  takes 
place,  we  are  able  to  tell  what  is  capable  of  being  ex- 
perienced, in  those  cases  in  which  we  can  bring  into 
play  the  Analogies  of  Experience,  which  are  conditions 
of  the  connection  of  things.  We  cannot  have  a  direct 
perception  of  magnetic  particles,  but  we  are  entitled  to 
infer  their  existence  in  all  bodies  from  their  effects ; 
and,  guided  by  the  analogies  of  experience,  we  know 
that,  were  our  senses  finer,  we  should  have  a  direct 
perception  of  them.  The  Second  Postulate  of  Empiri- 
cal Thought,  therefore,  is,  that  "that  which  coheres 
with  the  material  conditions  of  experience  is  actual." 
(3)  Lastly,  "that  the  connection  of  which  with  the  actual 
is  determined  according  to  universal  conditions  of  ex- 
perience, is  necessary."  The  necessity  in  question  is  not 
the  merely  logical  necessity  which  depends  upon  the 
law  of  contradiction,  but  the  necessity  of  actual  exist- 
ences. Now,  the  connection  of  one  knowable  object 
with  another  cannot  be  shown  from  mere  perceptions, 
but  only  from  the  relation  of  perceptions.  Nor,  again, 
can  it  be  based  upon  the  pure  conception  of  substance, 
because  substances  are  connected  together  only  by 
their  states.  Hence  the  criterion  of  necessity  rests 
upon  the  principle  of  causality.  When  certain  causes 
in  nature  are  given,  we  are  enabled  to  know  what  their 
effects  must  be ;  but  apart  from  the  principle  of  caus- 
ality there  could  be  no  nature,  and  therefore  no  science 
of  nature. 


198 


CHAPTER  VII. 


OBJECTIONS   TO   HANTS    PROOFS   OF  SUBSTANTIALITY   AND 
CAUSALITY    EXAMINED. 


A  N  examination  of  the  objections  of  Mr.  Balfour 
and  Dr.  Stirling  to  what  they  regard  as  the 
critical  method  of  proving  the  Principles  of  Judgment, 
will  perhaps  help  to  bring  Kant's  doctrine  into  bolder 
relief,  and  to  make  the  force  of  the  reasoning  by  which 
it  is  established  better  felt. 

I  shall  first  consider  Mr.  Balfour's  criticism  of  the 
First  Analogy. 

"  The  first  difficulty,"  he  says,  "  which  occurs  to  me, 
and  which  perhaps  others  may  feel,  refers  to  that 
'  transcendental  necessity  *  which  is  the  very  pith  and 
marrow  of  the  whole  demonstration,  both  in  the  Befut- 
ation  and  in  the  First  Analogy.  Is  it  really  true  that 
change  is  nothing  to  us  as  thinking  beings  except  we 
conceive  it  as  in  relation  to  a  permanent  and  unchanging 
substance  1  For  my  part,  however  much  I  try  to 
bring  the  matter  into  clear  consciousness,  I  feel  myself 
bound  by  no  such  necessity.  For  though  change  is, 
doubtless,  unthinkable,  except  for  what  Mr.  Green 
calls  a  combining  and  therefore,  to  a  certain  extent,  a 
persistent  consciousness,  and  though  it  may  have  no 
meaning  out  of  relation  to  that  which  is  not  change. 


' 


VII.] 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANT'S  PROOFS, 


\n 


IS. 


DO 


I 


this  not-change  by  no  means  implies  permanent  sub- 
stance.  On  the  contrary,  the  smallest  recognizable 
persistence  through  time  would  seem  enough  to  make 
changr  in  time  intelligible  by  contrast ;  and  I  cannot 
help  thinking  that  the  opposite  opinion  derives  its  chief 
plausibility  from  the  fact  that  in  ordinary  language 
permanence  is  the  antithesis  to  change ;  whence  it  is 
rashly  assumed  that  they  are  correlatives  which  imply 
each  other  in  the  system  of  nature.  It  has  to  be  noted 
also,  that  Kant,  in  his  proof  of  the  '  First  Analogy/ 
makes  a  remark  (quoted  and  approved  by  Mr.  Caird) 
which  almost  seems  to  concede  this  very  point,  for  he 
says  (Crit.,  p.  140) :  '  Only  the  permanent  is  subject  to 
change :  the  mutable  suffers  no  change,  but  rather 
alternation;  that  is,  when  certain  determinations  cease, 
others  begin.'  Now,  there  can  be  no  objection,  of 
course,  from  a  philosophical  point  of  view,  to  an 
author  defining  a  word  in  any  sense  he  pleases ;  what 
is  not  permissible  is  to  make  such  a  definition  the  basis 
of  an  argument  as  to  matters  of  fact ;  yet  the  above 
passage  suggests  the  idea  that  Kant's  proof  of  the 
permanence  of  substance  is  not  altogether  free  from 
this  vice.  If  (by  definition)  change  can  only  occur  in 
the  permanent,  the  fact  that  there  is  change  is  no 
doubt  a  conclusive  proof  that  there  is  a  '  permanent.' 
But  the  question  then  arises.  Is  there  change  in  this 
sense  1  How  do  we  know  that  there  is  anything  more 
than  alternation  which  (by  definition)  can  take  place  in 
the  mutable  ?  All  Transcendentalists  convince  by 
threats.  *  Allow  my  conclusion,'  they  say,  *  or  I  will 
prove  to  you  that  you  must  surrender  one  of  your  own 
cherished  beliefs.'  But  in  this  case  the  threat  is  hardly 
calculated  to  frighten  the  most  timid  philosopher. 
There  must  be  a  permanent,  say  the  Transcendentalists, 


200 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


r 


or  there  can  be  no  change ;  but  this  surely  is  no  very 
serious  calamity  if  we  are  allowed  to  keep  alternation, 
which  seems  to  me,  I  confess,  a  very  good  substitute, 
and  one  with  which  the  ordinary  man  may  very  well 
content  himself."  ^ 

It  is  objected  by  Mr.  Balfour,  to  take  the  last  point 
first,  that  Kant  himself  grants  that  we  can  have  a 
knowledge  of  alternation^  as  distinguished  from  change, 
and  that,  as  alternation  will  not  prove  absolute  per- 
manence but  only  persistence  through  a  limited  time, 
the  proof  of  substance  is  defective  on  the  very  face  of 
it.  The  concession,  however,  which  Kant  is  supposed 
to  make  is  not  really  made  by  him.  Mr.  Balfour  has 
simply  misunderstood  what  "  alternation,"  in  the  words 
quoted,  is  intended  to  signify.  When  Kant  says  that 
the  "  mutable  undergoes  no  change  but  only  alterna- 
tion," so  far  from  granting  that  the  mutable  can  be 
known,  his  argument  is,  on  the  contrary,  that  it  cannot 
be  known,  and  therefore  is  useless  to  account  for  the 
permanence  of  real  objects.  Knowledge  of  a  real  ob- 
ject, as  distinguished  from  a  series  of  transient  feelings, 
is  a  knowledge  of  that  which  does  not  pass  away  with 
the  moment,  but  persists  through  successive  moments 
of  time.  But  if  we  eliminate  from  our  explanation  of 
knowable  reality  this  conception  of  persistence  through 
time,  we  are  left  with  a  number  of  isolated  differences, 
that  are  not  changes,  but  simply  an  alternation  of  the 
mutable,  i.e.,  a  succession  of  differences  perfectly  desti- 
tute of  unity.  The  "  mutable,"  in  other  words,  is  a 
term  signifying  what  I  have  elsewhere  called  detached 
points  of  impression,  as  "  alternation  "  is  the  mere  suc- 
cession of  such  impressions,  not  even  knowable  as  a 
succession.     Kant  could  not  admit  that  the  mutable  is 

,  ■  iVJnrf,  xii.,  p.  493. 


■ 


'; 


VII.] 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANT'S  PROOFS 


201 


IS  a 
iched 

suc- 
las  a 
3le  is 


knowable  without  committing  himself  to  the  absurdity 
of  granting  that  a  mere  element  of  knowledge  is  know- 
able  in  itself.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  he  holds  nothing  so 
absurd.  All  consciousness  of  change,  he  argues,  is  the 
consciousness  of  a  transition  from  one  determination  of 
an  object  to  another,  and  such  consciousness  is  incon- 
ceivable if  each  determination  is  separated  from  every 
other.  But  unless  thought  has  a  function  by  which  it 
brings  the  several  determinations  of  things  into  rela- 
tion with  each  other,  there  can  be  no  consciousness  of 
change.  Mere  alternation,  or  the  successive  rise  and 
disappearance  of  such  determinations,  is  nothing  for 
consciousness,  and  hence  all  caange  presupposes  per- 
manence. Mr.  Balfour  has  so  completely  missed  the 
point  of  the  argument,  that  he  converts  Kant's  proof 
of  the  impossibility  of  a  knowledge  of  mere  alternation 
or  mutation  into  an  admission  of  its  reality. 

When  we  clearly  see  Kant's  reason  for  distinguishing 
between  change  and  alternation,  the  positive  objection 
brought  by  Mr.  Balfour  against  the  proof  of  the  per- 
manence of  substances  loses  much  of  its  plausibility. 
The  objection  is,  that  in  order  to  have  a  knowledge  of 
change  it  is  not  necessary  "  to  conceive  it  in  relation  to 
a  permanent  and  unchanging  substance ; "  it  is  enough 
to  have  a  knowledge  of  something  which  persists 
through  even  the  smallest  amount  of  time.  Now,  I 
think  it  is  quite  evident,  from  the  form  of  this  objec- 
tion, that  Mr.  Balfour  here  borrows  the  weapons  of  the 
dogmatist,  as  the  philosophical  sceptic  is  very  prone  to 
do.  The  objection  at  once  strikes  one  as  an  echo  of 
Hume's  account  of  identity  as  "a  succession  of  inter- 
rupted perceptions."  ^  I  perceive  an  object  as  now  and 
here,  and  so  long  as  I  keep  my  eyes  upon  it  I  know  it 

^Cf.  Green's  ^ume,  vol.  i.,  p- 256. 


\ 


202 


KANT  AND  BIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


\i 


to  exist ;  but  when  I  turn  my  eyes  upon  another  object, 
and  no  longer  perceive  the  first,  how  can  I  say  that  it 
exists  ?  All  that  I  am  entitled  to  say  is  that  I  perceive 
an  object  to  exist  through  a  limited  time ;  I  am  not 
entitled  to  say  that  it  must  persist  through  all  time. 
Kant,  according  to  Mr.  Balfour,  argues  that  I  cannot 
have  any  knowledge  of  change  without  presupposing 
the  absolute  permanence  of  substance ;  but  he  forgets 
that  the  persistence  of  an  object  through  the  smallest 
amount  of  time  is  ''enough  to  make  change  in  time 
intelligible  by  contrast."  Now,  it  is  vain  to  deny  that 
this  objection  goes  on  the  supposition  that  objects  exist 
independently  of  consciousness,  and  are  passively  appre- 
hended by  sense,  without  any  aid  from  the  constitutive 
power  of  thought.  Apart  from  the  assumption  that 
we  are  entitled  to  affirm  the  reality  of  an  object  so  long 
only  as  it  is  perceived,  I  do  not  see  that  it  has  any 
weight  whatever.  To  give  a  complete  answer  to  this 
objection  it  would  be  necessary  to  go  over  again  the 
whole  of  the  course  by  which  we  have  already  come. 
As  this  would  be  rather  tedious,  I  shall  simply  indicate 
the  line  of  reply  that  Kant's  system  suggests.  A  series 
of  impressions — occupying  say  a  minute — is  enough, 
Mr.  Balfour  would  say,  to  give  us  the  consciousness  of 
change.  And  no  doubt  this  is  true,  if  by  impressions 
we  mean  impressions  that  are  referred  to  a  single  self 
as  the  necessary  condition  of  any  unity  whatever.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  by  a  series  of  impressions  is  to  be 
understood  an  unrelated  manifold  of  sense,  it  must  be 
said  that  such  a  series,  continued  for  ever,  would  never 
yield  the  consciousness  of  change.  Now,  unless  we  are 
to  assume  that  the  object  said  to  be  known  as  persisting 
for  a  minute  is  a  thing  in  itself,  having  an  independent 
reality  apart  from  all  relation  to  our  intelligence,  the 


') 


VII.] 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANT'S  PROOFS. 


203 


J 


consciousness  of  change  must  be  accounted  for  from  the 
nature  of  thought,  as  combining  the  impressions  of 
sense  successively  presented  to  the  mind.  And  such  a 
consciousness  of  change  must  be  at  the  same  time  a 
consciousness  of  the  impressions  as  occurring  in  succes- 
sive moments.  The  consciousness  of  a  change  of  im- 
pressions as  relative  to  time  must  therefore  involve  the 
consciousness  of  a  something  which  endures,  in  contrast 
to  which  the  passing  moments  of  time  are  recognized. 
And  this  permanent  must  be  supplied  by  thought, 
unless  we  suppose  it  to  attach  to  an  object  independent 
of  consciousness;  for  apart  from  the  impressions  of 
sense  and  the  successive  moments  of  time,  there  is  no 
other  source  of  the  permanent.  It  is  objected,  how- 
ever, that  this  does  not  prove  absolute  permanence. 
The  answer  is,  that,  as  there  are  no  things  except  those 
which  are  constituted  by  the  activity  of  thought  in 
relation  to  the  impressions  of  sense,  all  change  must  be 
equally  a  relation  of  a  manifold  of  sense  in  time  to 
thought ;  and  hence  no  change  whatever  can  take  place 
apart  from  relation  to  the  one  time  in  which  all  impres- 
sions occur.  On  any  other  supposition  our  knowledge 
would  have  no  continuity,  but  would  be  broken  up  into 
fragments.  The  very  same  reasoning,  therefore,  by 
which  the  knowledge  of  something  as  persisting  through 
a  limited  time  is  explained,  also  establishes  the  know- 
ledge of  something  absolutely  permanent,  i.e.,  existing 
through  all  time.  We  can  therefore  say,  universally 
and  necessarily,  that  every  knowable  object  is  per- 
manent, because  the  condition  of  an  object  being  known 
at  all  is  its  relation  to  a  permanent  self.  Unless  Mr. 
Balfour  denies  the  unity  of  experience  and  the  unity  of 
time,  I  do  not  see  how  he  can  refuse  to  admit  that  all 
change  is  relative  to  the  conception  of  the  permanent : 


204 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


and  the  permanent  as  changing  is  substance.  Part  of 
the  difficulty  Mr.  Balfour  feels  in  accepting  Kant's 
proof  of  the  permanence  of  substance  seems  to  arise 
from  the  fact  that  he  supposes  objects  to  be  not  only 
independent  of  all  relation  to  intelligence,  but  also 
independent  of  each  other.  Accordingly,  it  seems  as 
if  we  might  pass  from  one  to  the  other  and  recognise 
each  in  turn  as  existing  during  the  time  it  is  perceived. 
But  if  it  be  admitted  that  all  impressions  are  related 
to  a  single  self,  which  is  present  to  each  as  it  arises,  it 
is  manifest  that  what  we  call  individual  substances  owe 
their  individuality  to  the  distinguishing  power  of  in- 
telligence, and  hence  that  the  distinction  of  one  object 
from  another  is  merely  relative.  A  substance  is  simply 
a  certain  sum  of  properties  gathered  together  into  a 
unity  and  fixed  as  permanent  by  relation  to  intelligence. 
If,  therefore,  the  properties  are  real  at  all,  the  act  by 
which  they  are  constituted  into  a  unity  fixes  them  as 
permanent  for  all  time.  Kant,  it  should  be  observed, 
makes  no  attempt  to  prove  the  reality  of  the  properties; 
these  he  assumes  to  be  real  or  given  to  us,  and  he 
directs  his  attention  to  the  task  of  explaining  what  is 
implied  in  their  real  existence ;  in  other  words,  he 
endeavours  to  show  that,  unless  on  supposition  of  the 
constitutive  power  of  intelligence,  there  could  be  no 
real  knowledge  at  all.  Substance  is,  therefore,  simply 
the  product  of  that  function  of  thought  by  which  real 
properties  are  united  in  relation  to  time;  and  hence 
the  knowledge  of  existence  implies  the  unity  of  self- 
consciousness,  as  determined  by  the  category  of  sub- 
stance. 

That  Mr.  Balfour  is  really  criticizing  Kant  from  the 
dogmatic  point  of  view,  according  to  which  known 
objects  are  conceived  to  be  independent  of  all  relation 


vn.] 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANT'S  PROOFS. 


206 


b- 
16 

rn 
)n 


to  intelligence,  seems  to  be  shown  beyond  doubt  by  the 
second  difficulty  he  raises  against  the  acceptance  of  the 
proof  of  substance.     "Let  us  grant  for  the  sake  of 
argument,"  he  says,  "that  change  in  general,  or  the 
succession   of  our    mental   states  in   particular,   can 
only  be   perceived  in  relation  to  a  permanent  some- 
thing, then  I  ask  (and  this  is  the  most  obvious  objec- 
tion) why,  in  order  to  obtain  the  permanent  something, 
should  we  go  to  external  matter?    As  the  reader  is 
aware,  the  *  pure  ego  of  apperception'  supplies,  on  the 
Kantian  system,  the  unity  in  reference  to  which  alone 
the  unorganized  multiplicity  of  perception  becomes  a 
possible  experience ;  and  it  seems  hard  to  understand 
why  that  which  supplies  unity  to  multiplicity,  may  not 
also  supply  permanence  to   succession.      Kant    has, 
indeed,  anticipated  this  objection  and  replied  to  it ; 
but  as  I  understand  the  objection  much  better  than  I 
do  the  reply,  I  will  content  myself  with  giving  the 
latter,  without  comment,  in  Kant's  own  words :  *  We 
find,'  he  says,  '  that  we  possess  nothing  permanent  that 
can  correspond  and  be  submitted  to  the  conception  of  a 
substance  as  intuition,  except  matter.     ...     In  the 
representation  7,  the  consciousness  of  myself  is  not  an 
intuition,  but  a  merely  intellectual  representation  pro- 
duced by  the  spontaneous  activity  of  a  thinking  subject. 
It  follows  that  this  /  has  not  any  predicate  of  intuition, 
which,  in  its  character  of  permanence,  could  serve  as 
correlate  to  the  determination  of  time  in  the  internal 
sense — in  the  same  way  as  impenetrability  is  the  cor- 
relate of  matter  as  an  empirical  intuition.' — {Critique, 
p.  168.)     Though  I  do  not  profess  altogether  to  under- 
stand the  reasoning,  it  is,  at  all  events,  clear  from  it, 
that  *  the  permanent'  whose  existence  is  demonstrated, 
must  be  an  object  of  perception.     .     .     .     We  may,  I 


206 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


think,  assume  from  the  whole  tenor  of  Kant's  argu- 
ment, as  well  as  from  his  categorical  assertions,  that  the 
substance  of  which  he  speaks  is  a  phenomenal  thing. 
But  if  it  be  perceived,  and  if  it  be  a  phenomenon,  where 
is  it  to  be  found  1  In  the  perpetual  flux  of  nature, 
where  objects  do  indeed  persist  for  a  time,  but  where 
(to  all  appearance)  nothing  is  eternal,  who  has  had  ex- 
perience of  this  unchanging  existence  ?  By  a  dialecti- 
cal process,  probably  familiar  to  the  reader,  we  may 
with  much  plausibility  reduce  what  we  perceive  in  an 
object  to  a  collection  of  related  attributes,  not  one  of 
which  is  the  object  itself,  but  all  of  which  are  the 
changing  attributes  or  accidents  of  the  object.  But  if 
this  process  be  legitimate,  the  *  substratum'  of  these 
accidents  is  either  never  perceived  at  all,  or  at  all 
events  is  only  known  as  a  relation.  In  neither  case 
can  it  be  the  permanent  of  which  Kant  speaks,  since  in 
the  first  case  it  is  not  an  object  of  immediate  perception  ; 
in  the  second  it  can  hardly  be  regarded  as  an  object 
at  all."  ^ 

Mr.  Balfour  first  asks  why  the  "  pure  ego  of  apper- 
ception," which  "supplies  unity  to  multiplicity,  may 
not  also  supply  permanence  to  succession."  Now,  as 
we  saw  in  our  examination  of  the  Kefutation  of  Idealism, 
and  again  in  considering  the  Deduction  of  the  Cate- 
gories, the  pure  "  I,"  taken  in  abstraction  from  the 
other  elements  of  knowledge,  is  regarded  as  a  mere 
abstraction,  and  hence  as  devoid  of  all  determination. 
It  is  only  when  it  is  brought  into  relation  with  the 
multiplicity  of  sense  that  it  is  seen  to  be  the  supreme 
condition  of  synthesis.  From  Kant'B  point  of  view,  the 
"I"  and  the  manifold  of  sense  aiG  but  the  extreme 
poles  of  knowledge,  between  which  other  elements  of 

>  Mind,  xii.,  494. 


vu.] 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANT'S  PROOFS. 


207 


knowledge  lie,  which  are  not  leus  essential  to  the  con- 
stitution of  known  reality.     The  pure  "  I,"  taken  by 
itself,  is  simply  the  abstraction  of  relation  to  conscious- 
ness, and  hence  it  is  incapable  of  being  brought  into 
relation  with  the  mere  difference  of  sense,  without  the 
intermediation  of  more  concrete  forms  of  intelligence. 
Relation  to  consciousness  is  simply  the  most  general  ex- 
pression of  what  is  implied  in  any  knowledge  whatever. 
But  actual  knowledge  is  not  knowledge  in  general,  but 
concrete  or  specific  knowledge.      Hence  it  must  be 
shown  what  are  the  specific  ways  in  which  the  manifold 
is  related  to  the  **I,"  before  an  explanation  can  be 
given  of  knowledge  as  we  actually  have  it.     These 
specific  ways  of  relating  the  manifold  to  the  "  I "  are 
the  categories,  which  as  functions  producing  unity  in 
certain  definite  ways  at  once  specify  the  "I,"  and  uni- 
versalize the  manifold  by  combining  it  under  the  deter- 
minate universals,  which  we  call  the  categories.     The 
manifold,  again,  cannot  be  directly  referred  to  the  "  I," 
even  by  the  aid  of  the  categories,  because  the  latter  do 
not  contain  any  time-element,  or  any  space-element,  and 
knowable  objects  must  be  determined  as  in  time  or  in 
both  space  and  time.     In  other  words,  the  "I"  is  the 
most  abstract  element  of  knowledge  at  the  one  extreme, 
as  the  manixold  is  the  most  abstract  element  at  the 
other;    and  the  two  extremes  must  be  mediated  by 
elements  more  concrete  than  either.     "When,  therefore, 
Mr.  Balfour  asks  why  the  "  I,"  which  "  supplies  unity 
to  multiplicity,  may  not  also  supply  permanence  to  suc- 
cession," the  answer  is  (1)  that  the  " I"  does  not  "sup- 
ply unity  to  multiplicity,"  and  (2)  that  that  which  is 
conceived  a&  out  of  time,  cannot  relate  anything  to 
itself  in  time.     (1)  It  is  no  doubt  true  that  the  "  I "  is 
said  by  Kant  to  be  the  supreme  condition  of  the  unity 


m. 


208 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


of  the  differences  of  sense,  but  it  is  not  of  itseZ/' capable 
of  introducing  unity.  In  explaining  the  possibility  of 
knowledge  our  success  depends  upon  the  thoroughness 
with  which  we  detect  and  relate  to  each  other  all  the 
elements  of  knowledge.  But  to  say  that  the  "  I "  of 
itself  "  supplies  unity  to  multiplicity,"  is  to  suppose 
that  two  elements  of  knowledge  which  even  in  combin- 
ation are  nothing  apart  from  other  elements  equally 
essential,  may  of  themselves  constitute  knowledge.  It 
is  the  ''  I "  as  thinking  in  relation  to  the  manifold  of 
sense  as  brought  under  the  general  determination  of 
time,  which  "  supplies  unity  to  multiplicity,"  not  the 
"  I "  in  itself.  No  doubt  Kant  expresses  himself  some- 
times in  a  way  which  suggests  that  the  "  I "  is  a  real 
thing  existing  apart  from  its  determinations  ;  but  such 
passages  as  that  quoted  by  Mr.  Balfour,  in  which  it  is 
pointed  out  that  the  "  I  think"  is  merely  the  abstrac- 
tion of  relation  to  consciousness,  serve  to  correct  those 
in  which  the  "  I"  seems  to  be  regarded  as  an  indepen- 
dent substance.  (2)  It  should  now  be  manifest  why 
it  is  not  possible  for  Kant  to  derive  permanence  from 
the  "  pure  ego  of  apperception."  Permanence  can  only 
be  explained  as  the  relation  of  the  manifold  to  the  "I/' 
by  intermediation  of  the  categories  and  the  schemata. 
The  "  permanent "  signifies  neither  time  alone,  nor  the 
manifold  alone,  but  the  relation  of  the  manifold  to  time, 
as  conditioned  by  the  functions  of  unity  belonging  to 
the  understanding.  From  the  bare  "  I,"  as  the  mere 
abstraction  of  thinking  in  general,  no  ingenuity  can 
extract  the  idea  of  an  object  as  relative  to  a  determin- 
ate time.  Nor  again  can  the  "I,"  viewed  as  the  subject 
of  transient  states  of  consciousness,  be  regarded  as  the 
source  of  the  permanent,  because,  from  Kant's  point  of 
view,  mental  states  are  in  themselves  a  mere  manifold, 


c 


JAP. 

tble 

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ibin- 

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.     It 

Id  of 

on  of 

t  the 

Bome- 

%  real 

li  such 

1  it  is 

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epen- 

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from 

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vii.l 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANT'S  PROOFS 


209 


incessantly  coming  and  going,  ana  aerefore  having  no 
permanent  correlate.  Accordingly,  he  holds  that  it  is 
only  in  relation  to  an  external  object,  as  constituted  by 
that  function  of  synthesis  which  we  call  substance,  that 
we  can  have  any  knowledge  of  the  permanent.  An 
external  object,  it  must  be  remembered,  is  not  a  thing 
in  itself,  but  a  thing  in  space  ;  and  hence  it  is  the  pro- 
duct of  thought  as  relating  the  spatial  manifold  to  time 
as  a  whole.  Kant,  therefore,  in  deriving  the  permanent 
from  the  outer  object  and  not  from  inner  feelings,  is 
simply  maintaining  in  another  way  that  knowledge 
must  be  explained  by  reference  to  all  its  elements. 
Separate  perceptions  from  all  relation  to  objects  in 
space,  and  there  remains  but  an  alternation  or  mutation 
of  feelings,  of  which  we  cannot  become  conscious,  be- 
cause we  can  neither  know  them  as  in  time,  nor  in 
their  distinction  from  each  other.  The  "  pure  ego  of 
apperception  "  is  therefore  powerless  to  recognise  merely 
transient  states  of  feeling,  because  the  element  of  time, 
and  the  element  of  permanent  relation,  are  by  hypo- 
thesis absent. 

Mr.  Balfour,  however,  seems  to  be  so  uncertain  as  to 
what  Kant's  view  of  the  "  pure  ego  of  apperception  " 
is,  that  he  does  not  very  strongly  insist  upon  the 
objection  that  the  pure  "  I  "  ought  to  be  sufficient  to 
"supply  permanence  to  succession,"  but  immediately 
goes  on  to  raise  what  he  evidently  regards  as  a  more 
formidable  objection.  To  be  known  at  all,  the  "per- 
manent" of  Kant,  he  argues,  must  be  an  object  of 
perception,  or  phenomenal  thing.  Now,  such  an  object 
cannot,  it  would  seem,  be  perceived  in  itself,  but  only 
in  its  changing  attributes  or  accidents.  The  permanent 
must  therefore  be  a  substratum  underlying  the  acci- 
dents.    Hence  either  (1)  it  is  not  an  object  of  percep- 


o 


310 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS         [chap. 


tion,  or  (2)  it  is  a  mere  relation,  and  therefore  not  an 
object  at  all. 

This  objection  rests  upon  a  false  separation  of  an 
object  from  its  relations.  "  Either  a  perceived  object 
is  a  mere  substratum,  or  it  is  a  mere  relation."  But 
what  if  it  is  neither  the  one  nor  the  other,  but  both  in 
one?  This  at  least  is  Kant's  view,  and  hence  Mr. 
Balfour's  dilemma  shares  the  common  fate  of  dilemmas 
in  being  by  no  means  exhaustive.  (1)  The  permanent, 
it  is  said,  may  be  held  by  Kant  to  be  a  "  substratum  " 
of  changing  attributes  or  accidents.  Here,  again,  Mr. 
Balfour  cannot  get  rid  of  the  parallax  of  dogmatism. 
First  setting  up  the  fiction  of  a  material  thing  lying 
beyond  consciousness,  and  yet  inccnpistently  supposed 
to  be  capable  of  being  apprehended,  we  go  on  to  ask 
what  a  thing  is  for  a  mind  standing  apart  from  it. 
One  by  one  the  attributes  of  this  supposed  object  are 
transferred  to  consciousness,  and  there  is  left  at  last 
simply  an  abstract  "  substratum  "  supposed  to  underlie 
the  attributes  apprehend  "i^l.  What  we  perceive  in  an 
object  is  thus  reduced,  in  Mr.  Balfour's  words,  to  "  a 
collection  of  related  attributes,  not  one  of  which  is  the 
object  itself."  Now,  it  seems  almost  superfluous  to  say 
that,  although  Kant  speaks  of  substance  as  a  substra- 
tum of  accidents,  he  has  no  thought  of  asserting  the 
existence  of  a  substratum  such  as  Mr.  Balfour  speaks 
of.  As  we  have  repeatedly  seen,  Kant  is  quite  famil- 
iar with  the  "  dialectical  process  "  here  referred  to,  but 
he  employs  it  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  the 
dogmatic  e,xplanation  of  knowledge  is  essentially 
vicious,  resting  as  it  does  upon  the  assumption  that 
known  objects  are  things  in  themselves.  What  Mr. 
Balfour  calls  "a  collection  of  related  attributes,"  Kant 
terms  the  "  manifold  of  sense  " ;  and  just  because  such 


an 


to  "a 


VII.] 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANT'S  PROOFS. 


?tl 


a  "manifold"  is  nothing  for  knowledge,  he  hoi  i  rhat 
we  are  compelled  to  introduce  other  elements  which 
are  essential  to  the  constitution  of  reality.  Accord- 
ingly, Kant  would  at  once  demur  to  the  phrase  "  col- 
lection of  related  attributes,"  on  the  ground  that 
relation  does  not  belong  to  sense,  but  to  thought — or 
rather  to  thought,  as  determined  by  schemata  of  the 
productive  imagination.  Instead  of  saying  that  be- 
neath or  behind  the  known  attributes  of  things  there 
is  an  unperceived  "  substratum,"  Kant  maintains  that 
there  is  a  "  permanent "  supplied  by  the  pure  imagina- 
tion under  control  of  the  category.  The  fiction  of  a 
thing  in  itself  is  therefore  nothing  whatever  for  know- 
ledge, and  hence  Kant  is  not  called  upon  to  show  how 
a  "  substratum"  may  be  perceived.  His  "substratum" 
is  a  general  form  of  intelligence  required  to  account  for 
the  perception  of  objects,  not  something  underlying 
an  object  independent  of  consciousness.  Persistence 
through  time,  or  the  relation  of  the  manifold  to  time 
as  a  whole,  is  the  only  substratum  he  can  allow,  and 
not  any  ghost  of  abstraction  remaining  after  elimina- 
tion of  all  the  definite  properties  of  independent 
realities.  The  permanent  is  thus  simply  another  name 
for  the  capacity  of  relating  all  modes  of  perception  to 
a  single  time.  When  Kant  calls  this  permanent  a 
"substratum,"  he  is  probably  looking  at  the  matter 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  data  from  which  philoso- 
phy starts  in  its  explanation  of  knowledge.  From  this 
point  of  view  it  is  natural  to  say  that  under  all  the 
changing  attributes  of  real  objects  there  is  something 
which  does  not  change.  But  when  we  pass  to  the 
critical  point  of  view,  it  is  more  correct  to  say  that  the 
substratum  overlies  those  attributes,  than  that  it  under- 
lies them,  although  it  may  be  said  to  underlie  the 


in 


212 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS. 


[chap. 


categories  and  the  "pure  ego  of  apperception."  (2) 
Ah  the  permanent  of  Kant  is  not  a  "  substratum,"  in 
Mr.  Balfour's  sense  of  the  term,  so  neither  is  it  a  mere 
relation.  Here,  again,  it  must  be  observed  that  Mr. 
Balfour  is  under  the  influence  of  that  dualism  of  sub- 
ject and  object  which  is  the  characteristic  mark  of 
dogmatism.  An  object  lying  beyond  consciousness  is 
presupposed,  and  it  is  then  supposed  to  be  reduced  to 
"a  collection  of  related  attributes."  If  now  we  abstract 
from  the  attributes,  and  concentrate  our  attention  upon 
their  relation  to  each  other,  we  get  the  conception  of  a 
mere  relation;  and  this  we  may  call  the  permanent, 
because  it  is  implied  in  the  consciousness  by  which 
each  attribute  is  related  in  turn  to  another.  But  such 
an  abstract  relation  cannot  be  identified  with  a  per- 
manent object.  Now,  it  is  evident  that  just  as  Mr. 
Balfour  in  reducing  substance  to  a  mere  substratum 
abstracts  from  all  the  relations  of  intelligence  to  an 
object,  so  here  he  abstracts  from  all  the  differences 
which  are  essential  to  the  constitution  of  the  individu- 
ality of  an  object.  But  this  is  exactly  what  Kant 
refuses  to  do.  The  mere  abstraction  of  relation  to  con- 
sciousness is  just  the  pure  "  I  think,"  which,  as  Kant 
points  out,  cannot  of  itself  explain  how  a  knowledge  of 
objects  is  possible.  No  doubt  the  manifold  of  sense, 
or  the  particular  element  in  knowledge,  must  be  related 
to  the  one  single  and  identical  self,  but  this  relation  is 
not  of  itself  the  same  as  a  known  object.  The  particu- 
lar is  as  necessary  to  the  constitution  of  a  substance 
as  the  universal.  Moreover,  the  universal  form  of 
thought,  as  standing  under  the  "  I,"  must  be  brought 
into  relation  with  time  as  a  unity  before  the  knowledge 
of  an  object  as  permanent  can  be  accounted  for.  Nor 
am  I  aware  that  any  follower  of  Kant,  any  more  than 


VII.] 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANTS  PROOFS, 


213 


in 


Kant  himself,  reduces  an  object  to  mere  relatiouH. 
There  is  no  mysterious  process  by  which  the  concrete 
element  in  knowledge  may  be  reduced  to  abstract 
relations.  It  is  one  thing  to  say  that  all  the  real 
differences  of  things  are  relative  to  intelligence,  and 
quite  a  different  thing  to  say  that  all  reality  is  reduc- 
ible to  abstract  relations.  The  special  properties  of 
things  are  not  to  be  conjured  out  of  existence,  charm 
we  with  ever  so  wondeiful  subtlety :  but  this  is  not 
inconsistent  with  the  philosophical  principle,  that  those 
properties  do  not  belong  to  things  in  themselves.  To 
deny  the  knowability  of  that  which  is  virtually  de- 
fined as  the  unknowable  is  at  once  good  sense  and 
good  philosophy ;  to  deny  the  reality  of  the  specific 
differences  of  objects  is  mere  nonsense.  While  he 
could  not  without  palpable  absurdity  make  substance 
an  object  independent  of  intelligence,  or  an  abstract 
relation  to  consciousness,  Kant  is  surely  right  in  saying 
that  every  real  object  exists  for  us  only  because  we 
have  by  the  constitution  of  our  intelligence  the  ca- 
pacity of  relating  the  specific  differences  of  things  to  a 
single  universal  self,  and  determining  them  in  relation 
to  time  as  a  unity. 

It  should  not  be  difficult,  after  these  considerations, 
to  show  that  substance  is  not  a  perception,  or  phe- 
nomenal thing,  as  Mr.  Balfour  strangely  supposes 
Kant  to  be  compelled  to  affirm.  A  substance  is 
neither  a  mere  substratum,  nor  a  mere  relation,  but  the 
unity  of  the  manifold  of  sense  as  related  to  the  schema 
of  the  permanent,  which  again  is  relative  to  the  cate- 
gory of  substance,  one  of  the  functions  of  thought. 
Perception,  ia  the  critical  sense  of  the  term,  is  not  the 
apprehension  of  an  independent  object,  but  the  consti- 
tution of  that  object  as  a  known  reality.     A  schema- 


214 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


tized  category  cannot  be  identified  with  a  mere  feeling 
or  perception,  but  is  the  condition  without  which  there 
could  be  no  perception  whatever.  In  perception  as 
the  knowledge  of  a  real  object,  there  is  implied  the 
co-operation  of  sense,  imagination,  and  thought.  The 
whole  Critical  philosophy  in  its  positive  aspect  leads  up 
to  the  conclusion,  that  an  object  existing  independently 
of  our  intelligence  cannot  possibly  be  known.  Sub- 
stance is  therefore  not  a  perception,  in  the  sense  of  a 
simple  apprehension,  but  a  condition  or  law  of  percep- 
tion. The  manifold  of  sense  must  be  combined  in  one 
time,  and  as  it  is  in  itself  a  mere  sequence  it  must  be 
related  to  that  which  is  not  merely  sequent  but  per- 
manent. Thus  the  "  permanent "  is  implied  in  the  fact 
that  we  have  perception,  but  it  is  not  itself  a  percep- 
tion. A  perception  is  for  Kant  always  a  particular, 
and  the  particular,  as  supplied  by  the  special  senses,  is 
detached  in  its  parts,  and  therefore  requires  to  be  united 
in  specific  ways.  In  the  present  instance  the  unity  of 
the  manifold  consists  in  the  relation  of  it  to  that  which 
is  not  evanescent  but  permanent.  Substance  can  only 
be  said  to  be  an  object  because  it  is  the  universal  con- 
dition of  there  being  an  object  for  us ;  it  is  a  relation, 
because  it  implies  the  reference  of  the  changing  to  that 
which  does  not  change.  To  call  substance  an  object 
or  a  relation  is  to  take  one  element  of  knowledge  in 
abstraction  from  another,  without  which  it  is  merely 
a  logical  abstraction ;  only  in  the  relation  of  the  par- 
ticulars of  sense  to  the  universal  of  thought,  and  of 
both  to  time  as  a  unity,  can  we  obtain  an  explanation 
of  what  we  mean  by  the  permanence  or  reality  of  a 
known  object. 

Let  us  now  look  at  Mr.  Balfour's  criticism  of  Kant's 
proof  of  the  principle  of  Causality.     To  this  proof  two 


1^ 


VII.] 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANTS  PROOFS. 


2U 


\: 


objections  are  made.  (1)  If  it  can  be  said  to  prove 
that  sequence  in  the  object  is  "  according  to  a  rule,"  it 
is  only  by  showing  in  the  first  instance  that  sequence 
in  the  subject  is  arbitrary ;  so  that  the  causation  proved 
is  at  all  events  not  universal.  (2)  It  does  not  prove, 
or  attempt  to  prove,  that  there  is  actually  all  objective 
sequence  according  to  a  necessary  rule,  but  only  that  if 
there  is  an  objective  sequence  it  must  be  according 
to  a  necessary  rule,  because  otherwise  it  could  not 
be  distinguished  from  the  subjective  sequence.  Now, 
these  are  very  different  propositions ;  and  the  second 
or  conditional  one  might  be  admitted  to  its  full 
extent  without  admitting  the  truth  of  the  first  or  un- 
conditional one,  which  is  for  purposes  of  science  the 
supposition  of  which  proof  is  required.^ 

(1)  Mr.  Balfour's  first  objection  is  that  Kant,  while 
pretending  to  prove  that  all  sequences  are  causal,  only 
proves  at  the  most  that  some  sequences  are  causal; 
and  hence  the  conclusion  is  inconsistent  with  one  of 
the  premises.  Now,  without  at  present  enquiring 
whether  Kant  is  justified  in  opposing  the  arbitrary 
sequence  of  our  perceptions  to  the  necessary  sequence 
of  events,  it  has  to  be  said  that  he  does  not,  in  the 
proof  of  causality,  make  any  attempt  to  show  that  all 
sequences  are  causal.  The  sequences  of  which  he  is 
speaking  are  sequences  of  real  events  as  occurring  in 
the  external  world.  His  argument  is  that,  unless  in- 
telligence suppUed  the  schema  of  order  in  time,  under 
guidance  of  the  category  of  causality,  we  could  never 
have  experience  of  an  invariable  sequence  of  events  in 
the  world  of  nature.  The  principle  of  causality  is  not 
"  universal,"  in  the  sense  of  being  presupposed  in  any 
sequence  whatever,  but  only  in  the  sense  that  it  is  the 

1  i/Ind,  xii,  p.  fiOO 


216 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


universal  condition  of  all  those  sequences  which  we 
regard  as  objective,  and  distinguish  from  the  subjective 
sequence  of  our  feelings.  As  I  have  already  said, 
Kant  begins  his  proof  by  pointing  out  that,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  we  do  draw  a  strong  contrast  in  our  ordinary 
consciousness  between  a  mere  sequence  of  feelings  and 
a  real  sequence  of  events.  1' he  former  we  regard  as 
arbitrary,  the  latter  as  invariable.  Adopting  this  dis- 
tinction, Kant  goes  on  to  show  that  the  dogmatist,  by 
virtually  reducing  both  kinds  of  successions  to  mere 
series  of  feelings,  abolishes  the  distinction  between 
them,  and  therefore  is  unable  to  account  for  objective 
successions  at  all.  And  observe  that  the  procedure 
of  the  dogmatist  is  not  to  convert  subjective  sequences 
into  objective,  but,  on  the  contrary,  to  reduce  objective 
sequences  to  subjective.  But,  objects  Kant,  if  we 
eliminate  all  objective  successions  we  cannot  be  con- 
scious even  of  our  perceptions  as  a  series,  since  there 
is  no  longer  any  reason  for  contrasting  the  one  with 
the  other.  From  the  dogmatic  point  of  view,  therefore, 
we  have  as  material  for  the  explanation  of  real  events 
nothing  but  a  "  mere  play  of  representations."  This 
argument  depends  for  its  force  upon  the  contrast  be- 
tween the  dualistic  and  the  critical  method  of  conceiv- 
ing of  the  relation  between  knowledge  and  reality. 
Just  as  Kant  argues,  in  the  Refutation  of  Idealism^ 
that  when  we  start  from  the  assumption  that  real 
objects  are  things  in  themselves,  existing  apart  from 
our  consciousness  of  them,  we  cannot  even  explain 
how  we  come  to  have  a  consciousness  of  our  own  feel- 
ings as  in  time,  since  a  mere  series  of  feelings  has 
no  permanent  correlate,  making  it  knowable  by  con- 
trast ;  so,  in  the  proof  of  causality,  his  reasoning  is, 
that  the  dogmatic  assumption  of  the  independence  of 


VII.] 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANTS  PROOFS. 


217 


real  objects  leaves  us  with  nothing  but  an  arbitrary 
sequence  of  feelings,  having  in  them  no  order  or  con- 
nection, a  sequence  which  cannot  even  be  known  to  be 
arbitrary,  since  there  is  nothing  invariable  with  which  it 
can  be  contrasted.  While,  therefore,  Kant  does  not 
deny  that  a  series  of  feelings,  taken  by  itself,  is 
arbitrary,  he  yet  maintains  that  if  we  suppose  all  our 
knowledge  to  be  reduced  to  such  a  series,  it  is  impos- 
sible that  we  could  ever  have  had  a  knowledge  of  se- 
quences that  are  not  arbitrary  but  invariable.  It 
will  be  jbserved  that  Kant  does  not  make  any  attempt 
to  show  that  we  do  have  a  consciousness  of  invariable, 
as  distinguished  from  variable  sequences.  Any  such 
attempt  would  in  fact  be  utterly  inconsistent  with  his 
method  of  proof,  which  in  all  cases  consists  in  reason- 
ing back  from  the  facts  of  experience  to  the  conditions 
of  knowledge.  And  surely  it  would  be  a  very  super- 
fluous and  absurd  proceeding  to  attempt  a  proof  of  the 
fact  that  a  boat  in  drifting  down  a  stream  occupies 
each  part  of  the  stream  in  succession.  Assuming  it  to 
be  a  fact  that  we  distinguish  between  such  invariable 
sequences  and  those  which  are  variable,  he  asks 
how  this  fact  is  to  be  accounted  for,  consistently  with 
the  nature  of  knowledge.  It  cannot  be  explained,  he 
maintains,  on  the  supposition  that  real  successions  are 
changes  of  things  in  themselves;  for  the  dualism  of 
subject  and  object  leads  to  the  reduction  of  our 
knowledge  of  events  to  a  mere  series  of  feel- 
ings, which  cannot  possibly  be  identified  with  an 
orderly  succession  of  real  events.  Even  granting, 
therefore,  that  we  could  have  a  consciousness  of  succes- 
sive feelings,  without  bringing  them  into  relation  with 
changes  that  are  not  merely  successive  but  invariable, 
we  should   still    not    be    able    to    explain    how   we 


218 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


1, 


come  to  have  an  experience  of  objective  sequences. 
But  such  a  consciousness  is  impossible,  for  only  in 
contrast  to  that  which  is  not  arbitrary  but  in- 
variable can  we  have  the  consciousness  of  our  feelings 
as  variable.  The  gist  of  the  argument  against  the 
dogmatic  explanation  of  causality  lies  in  pointing  out 
that  the  latter  overlooks  the  correlativity  of  invariable 
and  variable  successions.  Just  as  a  feeling  is  knowable 
only  in  contrast  to  the  permanent,  so  an  arbitrary 
sequence  of  feelings  is  knowable  only  in  contrast  to 
order  in  time.  Having  thus  disposed  of  the  ordinary 
explanation  of  causality,  by  taking  advantage,  as  it  will 
be  observed,  of  Hume's  reduction  of  knowledge  to  a 
mere  association  or  arbitrary  succession  of  feelings, 
Kant  goes  on  to  show  how,  from  the  critical  point 
of  view,  the  experience  of  an  invariable  or  objective 
sequence  of  events  may  be  accounted  for.  The  con- 
trast is  no  longer,  as  with  the  dogmatist,  between  a 
succession  of  feelings  in  the  individual  mind,  and 
a  series  of  events  without  the  mind,  but  between 
two  distinct  kinds  of  sequence  both  of  which  occur 
within  consciousness.  It  is  not  correct  to  contrast, 
without  explanation,  "sequence  in  the  object,"  with 
"  sequence  in  the  subject."  In  one  sense  all  sequences 
as  in  the  subject  may  be  called  "subjective."  But 
in  the  sense  in  which  Kant  here  uses  the  term  a 
"subjective  sequence"  means  one  that  belongs  to 
the  individual  as  such,  and  therefore  one  that  is 
not  true  universally  or  for  all  men.  And  Kant's 
criterion  for  distinguishing  a  "subjective"  from  an 
"  objective "  sequence  is  that  the  former  is  variable 
and  arbitrary,  while  the  latter  is  invariable  and  there- 
fore necessary.  Mr.  Balfour  seems  to  identify  "sub- 
jective" with  "in  the  mind  of  the  individual,"  and 


I 


VII.] 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANT'S  PROOFS. 


219 


"objective"  with  "in  the  object  external  to  the  mind 
of  the  individual."  But  Kant,  as  I  have  shown  above, 
expressly  cautions  us  against  this  Liistake.  We  are 
not  to  suppose,  he  says,  that  the  question  is  as  to 
things  in  themselves,  i.e.  objects  without  the  mind ;  we 
are  to  observe  that  the  question  is  purely  in  regard  to 
events  capable  of  coming  into  relation  with  our  con- 
sciousness. Now  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  fact  that 
there  are  subjective,  i.e.  arbitrary,  sequences  can  in 
any  way  invalidate  the  proof  that  there  are  objective 
or  invariable  sequences,  made  necessary  and  universal 
by  relation  to  the  understanding.  Mr.  Balfour  seems 
to  think  that  because  causality  is  said  to  be  universal 
it  must  be  applicable  to  all  possible  successions.  This 
however  is  not  what  Kant  attempts  to  show.  His 
object  is  to  prove  that  all  real  sequences — all  those 
which  we  distinguish  as  changes  in  the  object  or  in 
nature — are  necessary,  and  hence  that  we  can  say 
of  the  principle  of  causality,  that  it  is  applicable  to 
every  possible  change  in  real  objects.  That  there  are 
sequences  which  are  not  changes  in  real  objects,  Kant 
would  say,  no  more  invalidates  the  proof  of  causality, 
than  the  fact  that  there  are  permanent  or  co-existent 
objects.  The  principle  is  necessary  and  universal  in  so 
far  as  it  is  applicable.  This  Kant  shows  by  starting 
from  the  admitted  fact  that  we  do  distinguish  be- 
tween real  events  and  the  sequence  of  our  individual 
feelings.  And  his  contention  is,  that  unless  we  pre- 
suppose a  rule  of  thought  making  the  former  possible, 
we  should  be  compelled  to  reduce  both  to  a  mere  series 
of  feelings — in  other  words,  we  should  never  distinguish 
invariable  from  arbitrary  sequence  at  all.  Kant  there- 
fore asks  (1)  what  meaning  this  invariable  sequence  has 
for  us  on  the  supposition  that  all  objects  have  an  exis- 


220 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


tence  only  in  "elation  to  consciousness,  and  (2)  what  is 
the  justification,  if  it  can  be  justified,  of  the  affirmation 
of  necessity  according  to  causality  of  every  possible 
succession  of  real  events.  That  objects  exist  only  for 
consciousness  he  regards  as  proved  in  the  Esthetic, 
but  he  adds  here  that,  on  any  other  supposition,  we 
can  have  no  knowledge  of  anything  real  whatever. 
The  affirmation  of  necessity  in  the  way  of  caus- 
ality he  justifies  by  showing  that  there  can  be 
no  knowledge  of  any  real  sequence,  unless  we 
suppose  that  Understanding,  as  distinguished  from 
Perception,  constitutes  order  in  time.  For  as  there 
could  be  no  order  in  time,  and  therefore  no  real  changes 
apart  from  Intelligence  as  synthetic,  it  follows  that, 
abstracting  from  the  content  of  any  particular  succes- 
sion, we  can  say :  Every  possible  real  sequence  is  nec- 
essary and  universal.  In  other  words,  in  each  cognition 
of  a  real  change  there  are  involved  two  elements  (1) 
the  special  content  of  the  sequence,  and  (2)  the  uni- 
versal form,  i.e.  order  in  time,  the  schematized  category 
of  causality.  As  therefore  the  particular  is  not  know- 
able  as  an  event  or  real  sequence  except  by  the  aid  of 
the  form  of  thought,  it  follows  that  order  in  time  is 
the  condition  of  any  knowledge  of  a  real  or  invariable 
sequence.  For  a  form  of  thought  cannot  be  put  off  or 
on  at  will :  it  belongs  to  the  essential  constitution  of 
intelligence,  and  hence  intelligence  can  only  come  into 
operation  in  the  specific  way  of  determining  order  in 
time,  in  relation  to  a  manifold  of  perception.  There  is 
therefore  no  inconsistency  between  Kant's  premises 
and  the  conclusion  he  reaches.  What  he  seeks  to 
establish  is  that  our  knowledge  of  real  or  invariable 
sequences  can  be  explained  only  on  the  supposition 
that  intelligence  brings  the  mere  manifold  of  sense  under 


VII.] 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANT'S  PROOFS. 


221 


the  schema  of  order  in  time,  and  not  otherwise  we  should 
have  at  the  most  a  mere  association  of  feelings,  desti- 
tute of  all  order  and  connection.  The  contrast  of  feel- 
ings and  events  is  but  one  phase  of  the  general  contrast 
between  objects  in  space  and  time,  and  feelings  as 
passing  in  time  alone. 

(2)  The  second  objection  advanced  by  Mr.  Balfour 
is  that  Kant  does  not  prove,  but  simply  assumes,  that 
there  are  objective  sequences,  since  he  only  shows  that 
"  i/*  there  is  an  objective  sequence  it  must  be  according 
to  a  rule."  The  answer  I  should  be  disposed  to  make 
to  this  criticism  has  been  anticipated  in  what  has  just 
been  said.  I  do  not  think  that  Mr.  Balfour  has  pro- 
perly realized  what  Kant  here  means  by  "  objective." 
Judging  from  the  general  tenor  of  Mr.  Balfour's  remarks, 
I  should  think  that  by  an  objective  sequence  he  figures 
to  himself  an  actual  change  in  a  world,  the  consti- 
tution of  which  is  independent  of  all  relation  to 
intelligence.  From  this  point  of  view,  a  "  subjective  " 
succession  is  one  which  occurs  within  the  mind  of  an 
individual  subject,  who  is  the  recipient  of  feelings  pro- 
duced by  the  action  of  a  world  supposed  to  exist  in 
independence  of  all  consciousness  of  it ;  and  an  "  ob- 
jective "  succession  will  be  one  that  takes  place  in  the 
world  thus  imagined  to  lie  beyond  the  confines  of 
knowledge.  As  the  series  of  feelings  is  assumed  to  be 
completely  independent  of  the  series  of  events  in  the 
real  world,  the  objection  naturally  arises,  that  from  the 
former  we  cannot  obtain  any  knowledge  of  the  latter. 
How  then,  it  may  be  asked,  is  the  sequence  of  events 
in  an  objective  world,  a  world  that,  as  defined,  is 
beyond  knowledge,  to  become  known  at  all  ?  Only,  it 
would  seem,  if  we  assume  it  to  be  "objective."  In 
other  words,  it  is  not  possible  to  show  that  there  is 


399 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


any  objective  sequence  except  that  which  we  ourselves 
imiigine. 

I  am  compelled  to  suppose  that  it  is  in  some  such 
way  as  this  that  Mr.  Balfour  regards  Kant's  view 
of  causality,  because  I  cannot  otherwise  understand 
how  he  should  raise  the  objection,  that  Kant  does  not 
prove  but  simply  assumes  the  objectivity  of  real  suc- 
cessions. Mr.  Balfour  can  hardly  mean  to  say,  that 
Kant  should  have  proved  that  as  a  matter  of  fact  we 
distinguish  sequences  that  are  invariable  from  those 
that  are  arbitrary.  Kant,  like  everybody  else,  takes 
this  for  granted.  The  point  in  dispute  is  not  as  to  the 
fact  of  such  a  distinction  being  made,  but  as  to  the 
philosophical  explanation  of  that  fact.  Let  us  suppose 
it,  then,  to  be  granted,  that  in  our  ordinary  conscious- 
ness we  distinguish  between  the  succession  of  real 
events  and  the  succession  of  our  feelings,  and  that  we 
regard  the  former  as  invariable  and  the  latter  as  vari- 
able. Now  we  may  oppose  the  one  to  the  other 
as  a  change  in  objects  without  the  mind  as  com- 
pared with  a  change  of  feelings  within  the  mind, 
and  the  one  change  we  may  call  "  objective,"  while 
the  other  we  may  call  "subjective."  This  is  the 
dogmatic  or  psychological  view,  and,  unless  I  entirely 
misunderstand  him,  it  is  the  view  which  Mr.  Balfour 
attributes  to  Kant.  Accordingly  it  is  objected  that  to 
contrast  an  "  objective  "  with  a  "  subjective  "  sequence 
as  the  invariable  or  necessary  to  the  variable  or  con- 
tingent, is  only  to  make  the  tautological  judgment : 
"  An  objective  sequence  must  be  according  to  a  neces- 
sary rule."  The  objection  is  undoubtedly  pertinent,  if 
Kant  opposes  objective  and  subjective,  not  only  as 
invariable  and  variable,  but  as  a  sequence  without 
the  mind  to  one  within  the  mind.     For  as  a  philo- 


1 


VII.] 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANT'S  PROOFS, 


223 


iJ 


sophical  theory  is  by  its  very  nature  an  explanation 
of  the  possibility  of  knowledge,  we  are  not  entitled 
to  assunif*  that  which,  explicitly  or  implicitly,  denies 
the  po.je>ibility  of  knowledge.  But,  if  we  are  con- 
fined in  our  knowledge  to  our  own  mental  states, 
it  is  vain  to  attempt  any  explanation  of  the  way 
in  which  we  come  to  have  a  knowledge  of  an 
"  objective  "  sequence.  By  definition  all  objects  and 
all  changes  of  objects  are  beyond  knowledge,  and  that 
which  is  beyond  knowledge  cannot,  of  course,  be  known. 
The  distinction,  therefore,  between  the  two  kinds  of 
succession  must  be  purely  imaginary  ;  or  at  any  rate  we 
can  never  show  it  not  to  be  imaginary  :  it  is  really  a 
distinction  between  different  states  of  our  own  mind, 
not  one  between  states  of  our  own  mind  and  events 
lying  beyond  them.  Of  what  use  is  it,  we  may  there- 
fore ask,  to  show  that  "  objective "  sequences  are 
invariable  in  their  succession  while  our  feelings  are 
variable  so  long  as  the  former  are  only  supposed  to  be 
"  objective  ? "  We  can,  of  course,  suppose  anything 
we  please,  but  "  for  purposes  of  science  "  we  have 
proved  nothing.  The  sequences  with  which  science 
deals  are  not  an  invariable  succession  of  feelings,  but 
changes  in  reql  objects,  and  prove  what  we  may  of  the 
former,  we  determine  nothing  whatever  in  regard  to 
the  latter. 

Now,  the  criticism  which  I  have  here  supposed  Mr. 
Balfour  to  direct  against  Kant  is  thoroughly  endorsed 
by  Kant  himself  Any  one  who  has  followed  me  so 
far  will  at  once  see  that  it  is  just  one  way  of  stat- 
ing the  ever-recurring  charge  that  dogmatism,  as 
limited  to  a  mere  series  of  feelings,  cannot  account 
for  reality  at  all.  The  objection  of  Mr.  Balfour  is 
therefore  no  objection  to  Kant,  but  an  endorsement  so 


I 


'■  % 


224 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


far  of  the  critical  position.  I  say  "  so  far,"  because  the 
positive  aspect  of  Kant's  system  is  persistently  ne- 
glected in  all  Mr.  Balfour's  criticisms.  So  far  as  Kant 
accepts  Hume's  demonstration  of  the  impossibility  of 
a  knowledge  of  real  objects  or  real  changes,  on  the 
dogmatic  assumption  that  thought  and  reality  are 
abstract  opposites,  Mr.  Balfour  is  able  to  follow  him  ; 
but  he  loses  the  thread  so  soon  as  Kant  goes  on  to  substi- 
tute criticism  for  dogmatism.  It  is  easy  to  show  that 
it  is  so  in  the  present  instance.  To  begin  with,  an 
"  objective  "  sequence  is  not  distinguished  by  Kant 
from  a  "  subjective  "  sequence  as  a  series  of  feelings  in 
the  individual  mind  from  a  series  of  events  in  a  world 
lying  beyond  the  mind.  This  opposition  of  intelligence 
and  nature  Kant  summarily  rejects,  as  uieaningless  and 
self-contradictory  ;  and  not  only  does  he  do  so  in  gene- 
ral, but  he  distinctly  does  so  in  the  very  proof  of 
causality  which  Mr.  Balfour  is  considering.  We  are 
not,  he  says,  to  look  upon  the  sequence  of  real  events 
as  a  change  going  on  in  things  in  themselves,  but  as  a 
change  in  phenomena.'  Could  the  ordinary  opposition 
of  "subjective"  and  "objective"  be  more  explicitly 
denied  1  Now  this  denial  carries  very  important  con- 
sequences with  it.  Although  the  ordinary  contrast  of 
"  objective  "  and  "  subjective  "  must  be  rejected,  there 
is  no  reason  for  rejecting  the  ordinary  distinction  of 
invariable  from  variable  successions ;  in  fact,  this  is 
the  distinction  upon  which  we  must  now  fix  our  atten- 
tion. For  as  all  sequences  are  alike  in  consciousness, 
it  is  absurd  to  contrast  a  series  of  feelings  with  real 
events  as  the  mental  with  the   extra-mental.      The 


*■ "  Were  phenomena  things  in  themselves,  no  man  could  possibly  guess,  from 
the  sequence  of  his  ideas,  how  the  manifold  may  be  connected  in  the  object, 
&c."    Kritik,  p.  175.     Cf.  Prolegomena,  §  27,  p.  87. 


HAP. 


Vll.] 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANT'S  PROOFS. 


225 


the 

ne- 

Lant 

y  of 
the 

are 

tiim; 

ibsti- 
that 

b,  an 

Kant 

igs  in 

world 

igence 

3S  and 
gene- 
oof  of 

Je  are 

events 

it  as  a 

osition 
ilicitly 
t  con- 
rast  of 
there 
ion  of 
this  is 
atten- 
usness, 
th  real 
The 

less,  from 
tbe  object, 


question  therefore  is  how  the  contrast  of  arbitrary  and 
invariable  sequences  is  to  be  accounted  for.  Now  It  is 
useless  to  attempt  any  identification  of  a  variable 
series  of  feelings  with  an  invariable  succession  of 
events,  for  feeling  of  itself  is  a  mere  "manifold,"  having 
no  unity  in  itself,  and  therefore  incapable  of  knowing 
itself  as  a  series.  It  is  only,  in  fact,  in  the  contrast  of 
feelings  as  variable  in  their  succession  with  events  as 
invariable,  that  we  can  ha^e  a  consciousness  of  a  series 
of  feelings  at  all.  Order  in  time  must  therefore  be  due 
to  our  intelligence  on  its  intellectual  side.  A  function 
of  the  understanding  combining  the  mere  difference  of 
sense  in  a  unity  must  be  supposed.  And  this  function 
can  act  only  in  relation  to  time,  for  all  sequences  are  in 
time.  It  is  therefore  only  in  relation  to  intelligence  as 
bringing  the  manifold  of  sense  under  the  schematized 
category  of  order  in  time,  that  the  knowledge  of  an 
invariable  succession  is  possible  for  us.  Every  real 
sequence  is  therefore  ipso  facto  a  universal  and  neces- 
sary one.  For  if  it  is  true  that  before  we  could  have 
a  knowledge  of  any  real  change  intelligence  must 
have  been  silently  operating,  we  are  entitled  to  say, 
that  no  sequence  has  been  or  can  be  known  to  be  in- 
variable which  is  not  brought  under  the  category  of 
causality.  The  ordinary  objection  to  the  universality 
and  necessity  of  the  principle  of  causality  falls  to  the 
ground,  when  it  is  shown  that  even  a  single  invariable 
succession  of  one  event  on  another  tacitly  involves  the 
connection  with  each  other  of  all  events  that  can  ever 
possibly  be  experienced.  It  can  no  longer  be  said,  as 
the  empiricist  does  say,  that  we  cannot  go  beoynd  the 
general  proposition,  that  all  the  events  we  have  known 
were  uniformly  sequent ;  for  as  no  sequence  could  have 
been  known  as  uniform  apart  from  the  activity  of  intel- 


I 


i; 


226 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


!  i 


I    I' 


ligence,  so  none  ever  nan  he  known  as  uniform  except 
in  relation  to  the  same  activity.  A  uniform  sequence, 
in  short,  is  one  which  is  necessary  and  universal. 
Hence,  even  prior  to  the  definite  experience  of  par- 
ticular events,  we  are  entitled  to  say,  that  when  we  do 
have  such  experience,  it  must  be  of  events  connected 
according  to  the  principle  of  causality.  We  cannot  of 
course  anticipate  what  those  events  may  be,  but  we 
can  affirm,  universally  and  necessarily,  that  no  change 
in  knowable  objects  can  take  place  which  is  not  condi- 
tioned by  a  prior  change. 

The  rest  of  Mr.  Balfour's  criticism  is  directed  against 
what  he  calls  Kant's  second  proof,  which  goes  on  the 
supposition  that  all  sequences  are  causal,  and  attempts 
to  show  that,  in  Mr.  Caird's  words,  "  the  judgment  of 
sequence  cannot  be  made  without  presupposition  of  the 
judgment  of  causality."^  I  shall  not  examine  Mr. 
Balfour's  objections  to  this  argument,  for,  after  the 
most  careful  examination  of  Kant's  words,  I  am  unable 
to  see  that  it  is  really  contained  in  the  proof  of  the 
Second  Analogy.  For  the  supposition  that  it  is,  Mr. 
Balfour,  of  course,  is  not  responsible,  and  he  even  hints 
that  "  some  doubt  might  perhaps  be  thrown  on  whether 
Kant  intended  formally  to  put  it  forward  as  a  proof  at 
all."  In  this  particular  case,  I  think  that  Mr.  Caird's 
desire  to  make  Kant  consistent  with  himself  has  led 
him  to  find  what  does  not  really  exist.  Inconsistent 
as  it  is  with  his  general  theory  of  knowledge,  there  is 
little  doubt  that  Kant  does  hold  that  we  can  have  a 
consciousness  of  a  mere  series  of  feelings,  although  only 
in  contrast  to  the  objective  sequence  of  events.  This, 
as  Mr.  Caird  himself  points  out,  is  one  of  the  instances 
in  which  Kant  has  insufficientlv  liberated  himself  from 

/    ^  Min(},  xii.,  p.  501.    Cf.  Caird's  Phihmphy  of  Kant,  pp.  454  ff. 


VII.] 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANT'S  PROOFS, 


227 


the  psychological  point  of  view.  For,  however  true  it 
may  be  that,  looking  at  the  temporal  phases  of  our 
knowledge,  wo  seem  to  have  a  mere  series  of  feelings, 
detached  from  all  relation  to  real  objects  and  events, 
it  is  not  true  that  any  mere  scries  of  feelings  can  be 
known  apart  from  the  relations  by  which  the  world  is 
constituted  for  us  as  real.  Kant,  however,  undoubtedly 
distinguishes  between  our  perceptions  as  occurring  in 
an  arbitrary  order,  and  real  sequences  as  occurring  in  a 
fixed  or  unchanging  order,  and  this  distinction  he  makes 
the  starting-point  of  his  proof  of  the  principle  of  caus- 
ality. He  does  not,  therefore,  attempt  to  show  that 
all  sequences  are  causal,  but  only  that  those  are  causal 
which  we  ordinarily  regard  as  occurring  in  an  invariable 
order.  Mr.  Caird  does  not,  perhaps,  sufficiently  dis- 
tinguish between  Kant's  facts  and  his  philosophical 
proof.  Thus,  it  is  plain  that  in  contrasting  the  case  of 
a  boat  drifting  down  stream  with  the  perception  of  a 
house,  Kant  is  simply  referring  to  the  way  in  which 
we  ordinarily  distinguish  an  invariable  or  causal  se- 
quence from  a  variable  or  arbitrary  one.  Both  are 
perceptions  or  apprehensions,  in  the  ordinary  sense 
of  the  term,  and  both,  when  viewed  from  the  critical 
point  of  view,  involve  categories :  the  one  the  category 
of  causality,  and  the  other  the  category  of  quantity.  So 
far  as  perception  goes,  both  are  merely  arbitrary,  and 
therefore  subjective,  but  the  former  involves  the  cate- 
gory of  causality,  while  the  latter  does  not.  Limiting  his 
attention  entirely  to  the  question  of  real  sequences, 
Kant  asks  how  these  are  to  be  accounted  for, 
consistently  with  the  nature  of  our  intelligence ;  and 
he  answers  that  we  should  never  in  our  ordinary 
consciousness  distinguish  between  objective  and  sub- 
jective sequences,  were  it  not  that  we  apply  in  the 


228 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


1  II 


I  I 


^ 


former  case  the  category  of  causality  while  in  the  latter 
we  do  not.  He  does  not,  therefore,  say  that  we  can 
have  no  knowledge  of  any  sequences  except  those  that 
are  causal,  but  merely  that  we  should  never  distin- 
guish fixed  from  variable  sequences,  but  for  the 
reference  of  that  manifold  of  sense,  which  we  find  by 
an  analysis  of  the  knowledge  of  real  changes,  to  the 
one  supreme  self  as  applying  the  function  of  causality 
by  the  aid  of  the  schema  of  order  in  time.  This  he 
regards  as  a  sufficient  answer  to  Hume,  because 
Hume's  denial  of  real  sequences  rests  upon  the  suppo- 
sition thai}  all  changes  in  the  world  occur  in  things  in 
themselves  lying  beyond  consciousness.  No  doubt  it 
is  only  in  keeping  with  Kant's  general  system  to  say 
that  in  the  observation  of  a  house  there  is  a  causal 
sequence  implied  in  the  movement  of  the  eye.  But 
such  a  sequence,  it  must  be  observed,  is  just  as 
much  in  the  object  known  as  the  drifting  of  a  boat 
down  stream,  since  the  eye  as  moving  is  a  material 
thing  in  space,  and  therefore  distinct  from  the  series  of 
feelings  of  which  it  is  the  organic  condition.  The  real 
difficulty  in  Kant's  discussion  of  causality  lies  in  the 
assumption  that  there  can  be  in  consciousness  a  mere 
series  of  feelings,  and,  as  Mr.  Caird  points  out,  in  the 
separation  of  causality  from  substantiality.  The  former 
imperfection  arises  from  the  intrusion  of  a  psychological 
consideration  into  a  purely  critical  or  metaphysical 
investigation  ;  the  latter,  from  Kant's  method  of  taking 
up  one  phase  of  knowledge  after  another,  and  consider- 
ing it  by  itself;  but  both  are  instances  of  the  imperfect 
development  of  Kant's  thought,  and  cannot  be  got  rid 
of  except  by  a  remodelling  of  his  system. 

Although  I  cannot  accept,  without  modification,  Mr. 
Caird's  view  of  the  proof  of  causality,  I  entirely  agree 


VII.] 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANT'S  PROOFS 


329 


with  him  in  holding  that  that  proof  goes  on  the  principle 
that  no  real  sequence  can  be  known  at  all  unless  we 
suppose  thought,  in  conjunction  with  the  schema,  to  co- 
operate with  sense.  And  hence  I  am  compelled  to  reject 
unreservedly  Dr.  Stirling's  explanation  and  criticism  of 
the  proof  of  causality.  That  criticism  is  very  much 
the  same  as  Mr.  Balfour's,  and  rests,  as  it  seems  to 
me,  on  a  like  misapprehension  of  what  Kant's  theory 
really  is.  According  to  Dr.  Stirling,  Kant  has  two 
ways  of  satisfying  himself  that  the  principle  of  caus- 
ality is  a  necessary  and  universal  truth ;  or  rather,  he 
has  a  less  and  a  more  explicit  statement  of  his  proof, 
the  former  being  contained  in  the  Cntique,  the  latter  in 
the  Prolegomena.  Both  in  the  Second  Analogy  and 
in  the  Prolegomena,  he  argues  that  the  connection  of 
antecedent  and  consequent  is  a  rule  of  judgment  which 
the  understanding  applies  to  certain  objects  given  inde- 
pendently by  perception.  In  other  words,  Kant  holds 
that  we  first  have  by  perception  the  knowledge  of 
events  simply  as  events,  and  only  afterwards  proceed 
to  apply  to  these  the  category  of  causality  schematized 
as  order  in  time.  Thus,  we  have  by  perception  a 
knowledge  of  the  fact  that  a  stone  grows  hot,  and  we 
have  also  a  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  the  sun  shines 
on  it  This  knowledge  perception  gives  us  before 
understanding,  in  this  special  case,  has  come  into 
operation  at  all.  But  having  a  perception  of  these 
two  facts,  and  having  in  our  minds  the  category  of 
causality,  we  recognise  that  here  is  a  case  in  which 
that  category  is  appHcable,  and  so  we  judge,  universally 
and  necessarily,  that  the  sun  warms  the  stone.  The 
first  judgment,  which  precedes  in  time  (and  not  merely 
logically)  the  second,  is  a  judgment  of  perception ;  the 
other  is  a  judgment  of  experience  or  understanding. 


230 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


Kant  in  the  Second  Analogy  does  not  distinctly  say 
this,  because  he  had  not  got  his  theory  into  a  perfectly 
clear  form  before  his  own  mind ;  in  fact,  he  was  evi- 
dently, as  the  prolix  and  confused  proof  of  the  Second 
Analogy  shows,  not  satisfied  himself  with  his  proof; 
but  at  last  in  the  Prolegomena  he  had,  after  long  medi- 
tation and  perplexity,  got  the  thing  into  a  clear  form, 
and  settled  down  in  contentment  with  his  distinction 
of  the  judgment  of  perception  and  the  judgment  of 
experience. 

Now  to  this  proof  of  causality,  Dr.  Stirling  objects 
that  it  is  no  proof  at  all,  but  a  pure  assumption.  For 
how  are  we  to  know  when  to  apply  the  principle  of 
causality  ?  If  there  is  no  necessary  sequence  in  the 
perception  of  the  facts  or  events  connected,  what  righ^ 
have  we  to  say  that  they  are  connected?  The  sun 
warms  the  stone,  but  for  aught  we  can  show  to  the 
contrary,  the  stone  might  warm  the  sun.  Unless,  in 
short,  we  had  in  perception  the  knowledge  of  real 
sequences,  we  should  not  be  entitled  to  say  that  there 
is  any  causa  nexus.  "  Did  not  sense  itself,  namely, 
offer  material  irreversible  sequences,  the  category  of 
cause  and  effect  would  be  null  and  void ;  it  would  never 
be  called  into  play  at  all ;  for  it  is  only  on  reception  of 
an  irreversible  first  and  second  that  the  logical  function 
of  antecedent  and  consequent  will  consent  to  act — ^will, 
on  plea  of  analogy,  consent  to  receive  such  first  and 
second  into  its  own  necessary  nexus." ^ 

I  should  like  preliminarily  to  remark  here,  that  Dr. 
Stirling's  reconstruction  of  Kant's  psychological  state 
in  writing  the  Second  Analogy  and  the  Prolegomena, 
I  regard  rather  as  complimentary  to  Dr.  Stirling's 
power  of  imagination,  than  as  based  upon  any  real 

'  Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  xiv.  78. 


M 


VII.] 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANT'S  PROOFS. 


231 


fcDr. 

state 

■aena, 

ing's 

real 


evidence.  As  a  matter  of  fact  Kant  is  so  far  from 
having  any  doubt  of  the  validity  of  his  proof  of 
causality  as  given  in  the  Cnttque,  that  he  expressly 
draws  attention  to  the  proof  of  the  analogies  of  experi- 
ence as  an  evidence  of  the  triumph  of  the  transcendental 
method.^  Dr.  Stirling  here  attributes  to  Kant  a  feeling 
of  dissatisfaction  felt  only  by  himself.  As  to  the  main 
issue,  I  should  feel  compelled  to  endorse  Dr.  Stirling's 
criticism  of  the  proof  of  causality,  were  it  not  that  I 
believe  it  to  rest  upon  a  misconception.  I  do  not 
believe  that  Kant  regards  perception,  when  understood 
in  the  critical  sense,  as  giving  a  knowledge  of  separate 
events,  which  are  afterwards  externally  brought  under 
the  rule  of  causality.  So  far  from  this  being  Kant's 
view,  it  seems  to  me  to  be  exactly  the  view  which  he 
wrote  the  Critique  to  expose.  For,  the  category,  when 
separated  absolutely  from  the  perception  or  experience 
of  events,  becomes  merely  a  conception  in  the  mind. 
On  the  one  side  we  have  a  perception  of  real  objects, 
on  the  other  side  a  category,  but  there  is  no  reason 
whatever  why  the  one  should  ever  come  into  connec- 
tion with  the  other.  Now  Kant  argues,  over  and  over 
again,  that  out  of  a  mere  conception  we  can  get  nothing 
but  an  analytical  proposition,  a  proposition  that  cannot 
be  shown  to  have  any  application  to  real  objects  or 
events  at  all.  His  view,  as  I  have  tried  to  state  it 
above,  is  not  that  perception  gives  a  knowledge  of  real 
events  as  separated  from  each  other  and  not  perceived 
to  be  in  any  order,  but  that,  if  we  say  perception  is  the 
sole  source  of  knowledge  we  cannot  account  for  our 
experience  of  real  sequences  at  all.  Dr.  Stirling, 
although  he  elsewhere  almost  fiercely  insists  upon  it, 
does  not  here  take  into  account  the  fact  that  Kant 


ill 


'  Proki/omena,  §  27,  p.  86.     Cf.  g  23, 


p.  88. 


232 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


always  presupposes  the  facts  of  ordinary  knowledge, 
and  merely  endeavours  to  point  out  the  elements 
implied  in  them.  The  relation  between  the  under- 
standing and  perception,  so  far  as  the  critical  point  of 
view  is  concerned,  is  a  relation  of  logically  distinguish- 
able, but  really  inseparable,  elements  of  knowledge, 
not  of  two  different  Hnds  of  knowledge.  "  It  is 
universally  admitted,"  says  Kant  in  effect,  "that  we 
have  experience  of  the  real  sequence  of  particular 
events.  This  I  assume  as  a  fact,  and  proceed  to 
account  for  it.  Now  I  deny  that  we  can  know  any 
objects  except  those  coming  within  consciousness, 
and  referred  to  a  single  self.  But  if  we  seek  to 
account  for  real  sequences  from  mental  states 
coming  one  after  the  other,  without  seeking  any  aid 
from  a  universal  and  necessary  form  of  thought,  we 
must  prove  order  in  events  or  real  sequences  simply 
from  the  succession  of  those  states.  There  is,  then, 
no  sequence  except  a  purely  arbitrary  one;  for  our 
mental  states,  apart  from  a  combining  or  synthetical 
self-consciousness,  have  no  order  in  them.  In  other 
words,  we  cannot,  unless  we  presuppose  a  necessary 
and  universal  form  of  thought,  explain  how  we  could 
ever  have  had  the  experience  of  a  real  or  invariable 
sequence."  So  far  therefore  from  holding  that  percep- 
tion gives  us  a  knowledge  of  real  events,  which  are 
afterwards  connected  by  the  understanding,  Kant 
argues  that  we  should  never  have  any  knowledge  of 
events  as  real  at  all  unless  the  understanding  had  been 
at  work — although  in  the  first  instance  only  blindly 
or  unreflectively — in  constituting  the  connection  of 
events.  Deny  the  activity  of  the  understanding,  and 
we  should  not  have  an  experience  of  change  at  all. 
Dr.  Stirling,  in  other  words,  has  converted  Kant's 


VII.] 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANTS  PROOFS. 


233 


)ercep- 
jh  are 

Kant 
ige  of 
d  been 
>lmdly 
on  of 
and 

,t  all. 

ant's 


distinction  of  the  logical  elements  involved  in  the 
knowledge  of  real  sequences  into  a  temporal  succes- 
sion of  two  independent  judgments.  It  is  of  course 
true,  that  from  the  phenomenal  point  of  view,  we  do 
have  an  experience  of  real  changes,  before  we,  by 
analysis,  express  what  is  involved  in  that  experi- 
ence in  the  form  of  a  reflective  judgment.  Hence  we 
may  say,  that  we  Jirst  have  a  perception  or  experi- 
ence of  events  as  separate,  and  then  discover  the  rule 
under  which  these  are  subsumed.  But,  as  Kant 
expressly  says,  the  analytical  judgment  presupposes 
the  synthetical :  we  could  not  by  analysis  Jlnd  the 
judgment  of  causality,  were  it  not  that,  from  the  con- 
stitution of  our  knowing  faculties,  we  had  previously 
put  it  there. 

Dr.  Stirling  would  perhaps  reply  by  pointing  out 
that  we  have  experience  of  real  successions  that  are 
not  causal.  That  o!  course  is  true  in  a  sense,  and 
it  was  hardly  necessary  for  Dr.  Stirling  to  display 
so  much  erudition  in  proving  it.  But  a  real  succession 
means  for  Kant  a  sequence  of  events  following  each 
other  in  an  invariable  order.  Day  and  night  certainly 
follow  each  other,  and  yet  they  are  not  causally  con- 
nected. But  Kant  nowhere  attempts  to  prove,  as  Dr. 
Stirling  himself  admits,  why  we  in  special  cases  distin- 
guish one  sequence  as  invariable  and  another  as  vari- 
able :  he  simply  accepts  the  fact.  And  what  he  says 
is,  that  such  a  sequence  as  day  and  night  is  not  a  real 
change  in  the  sense  that  we  suppose  the  one  to  follow 
from  the  other :  we  can  in  fact  easily  see  that  here  the 
order  is  only  in  our  perceptions,  and  hence  it  is  arbi- 
trary or  subjective.  No  doubt  the  succession  of  night 
and  day  implies  that  there  is  a  causal  sequence  some- 
where, but  it  is  not  such  that  night  is  the  cause  of  day. 


234 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


That  supposition  is  at  once  nullified  by  the  fact  that  if 
night  follows  day,  so  also  day  follows  night,  whereas  in 
every  causal  succession  event  A  must  go  first  and 
event  B  must  come  second.  The  problem  is  :  granting 
that  there  are  real  sequences,  how  are  we  to  account 
for  them  philosophically?  Kant's  reply  is  that  to 
know  events  as  really  sequent  is  to  know  them  as 
already  under  a  rule  of  the  understanding,  because 
otherwise  they  would  not  be  real,  but  arbitrary  or  sub- 
jective. But  a  purely  arbitrary  succession  can  never 
account  for  any  real  change  whatever ;  and  as  no  one 
doubts  that  there  are  real  changes,  this  supposition 
leads  to  absurdity. 

As  Dr.  Stirling  interprets  Kant's  doctrine  of  caus- 
ality by  the  rule  of  contrary,  his  criticism  must  be 
regarded  not  as  overthrowing  but  as  supporting  it. 
"  Did  not  sense  itself,"  he  says,  "  offer  material  irrever- 
sible sequences,  the  category  of  cause  and  effect  would 
be  null  and  void :  it  would  never  be  called  into  play  at 
all."  Sense,  in  other  words,  does  not  give  us  merely 
an  arbitrary  succession  of  events,  but  implies  the  order- 
ing of  events  under  the  category  of  causality.  Now  if 
we  take  "sense,"  as  used  by  Dr.  Stirling,  to  mean 
what  Kant  calls  "  experience,"  the  view  here  expressed 
is  identical  with  that  which  it  is  supposed  to  overthrow. 
For,  any  experience  of  a  real  sequence  involves  at  once 
the  category  and  the  manifold  to  which  it  is  applied. 
There  can  therefore  be  no  knowledge  of  a  real  sequence 
apart  from  the  activity  by  which  thought  combines 
events  in  an  irreversible  order.  Reasoning  back  from 
any  instance  of  an  irreversible  series  of  events,  we  are 
compelled  to  grant  that  the  knowledge  of  such  a  series 
presupposes  the  category  of  causality,  i.e.  the  combina- 
tion of  events  in  one  invariable  order.     The  perception 


VII.] 


OBJECTIONS  TO  KANT'S  PROOFS. 


235 


of  change,  like  all  other  perceptions,  is  a  judgment, 
although  it  need  not  be  an  explicit  judgment;  and 
it  is  because  a  judgment  is  presupposed  in  it  that 
we  can  by  philosophical  analysis  show  it  to  be  there. 
If  Dr.  Stirling  should  still  object  that  even  on  the 
interpretation  of  his  theory  which  I  have  given,  Kant 
after  all  asmmes  an  irreversible  sequence,  I  can  only 
aT"  'er,  in  the  first  place,  that  so  also  does  Kant's  critic, 
wii  he  tells  us,  that  ►,  ioe  "  offers  material  irreversible 
sequences,"  and,  in  the  second  place,  that  philosophy, 
as  I  understand  it,  does  not  seek  to  originate  facts, 
but  only  to  give  a  self-consistent  explanation  of  them. 


236 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


I 


THE    METAPHYSIC   OF   NATURE. 


TXTITH  the  Principles  of  Judgment  ends  the  purely 
positive  part  of  the  Critique,  as  consisting  of  a 
systematic  discussion  of  the  a  priori  conditions  of 
knowledge,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  of  the  pure 
elements  of  knowable  objects.  The  universal  relations 
of  subject  and  object,  as  presupposed  in  all  knowledge 
of  reality,  have  been  brought  to  the  light  and  con- 
sidered in  their  connection  with  each  other.  The 
various  elements  implied  in  knowledge  are,  as  we  have 
seen,  at  the  one  extreme  the  "  I,"  as  the  supreme  con- 
dition of  any  knowledge  whatever,  and  at  the  other 
extreme  the  manifold  of  sense,  supplying  the  concrete 
differences  of  things ;  while  intermediate  between  these 
extremes  are  the  categories  as  specifications  of  intelli- 
gence, in  so  far  as  it  is  capable  of  reducing  the  particu- 
lars of  sense  to  unity,  and  the  schemata  as  universal 
ways  of  bringing  those  particulars,  in  relation  to  time, 
under  guidance  of  the  categories.  The  synthetic  pro- 
cess by  which  intelligence  constructs  for  itself  a  world 
of  objects  by  operating  upon  the  manifold  of  sense,  has 
been  explained  generally  in  the  principles  of  judgment. 
So  far,  however,  subject  and  object,  intelligence  and 
nature,  have  been  considered  in  their  most  general 


VIII.] 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  NATURE, 


237 


aspects,  or,  otherwise  stated,  "nature"  has  been  re- 
garded as  a  system  of  universal  laws  underlying  and 
making  possible  the  world  of  nature  as  a  whole,  not 
as  nature  in  the  more  specific  meaning  of  the  universal 
laws  of  matter  presupposed  in  the  totality  of  material 
or  corporeal  objects.  Kant,  howevei,  has  a  special 
treatise  ^  in  which  he  sets  forth  the  metaphysical  prin- 
ciples of  the  science  of  nature,  showing  how  intelli- 
gence, as  operating  upon  the  manifold  of  sense,  gives 
rise  to  the  world  of  matter.  The  manifold  of  sense  is 
now  specified  as  the  manifold  of  matter,  or  rather  as 
the  sensible  "material,"  by  operating  upon  ^vhich 
material  objects  become  known.  The  Metaphysic'  of 
Nature,  then,  contains  those  principles  which  are  the 
product  of  the  schematized  categories,  as  applied  to  a 
definite  manifold  of  sense,  the  material  world.  The 
schematized  categories  are  the  condition  of  any  know- 
ledge whatever ;  but  these,  when  brought  to  bear  upon 
material  objects  in  space,  give  rise  to  a  special  branch 
of  metaphysic,  a  sort  of  applied  metaphysic,  bearing 
some  such  relation  to  pure  metaphysic  as  applied  logic  is 
usually  supposed  to  bear  to  pure  formal  logic.  In  this 
applied  metaphysic  we  do  not  indeed  concern  ourselves 
with  the  special  laws  of  science,  or  the  definite  pro- 
perties of  things ;  but  neither  do  we  concentrate  our 
attention  solely  upon  the  conditions  of  knowledge. 
Taking  external  objects  in  their  universal  or  abstract 
relations,  we  set  forth  the  universal  laws  which  under 
lie  them.  Here,  as  always,  the  Categories  supply  the 
guiding  thread,  by  following  which,  as  we  may  be  sure, 
no  aspect  of  the  world  of  nature  will  be  overlooked. 
Matter  must  therefore,  in  accordance  with  the  four 

^  3fetap?nj8ische  Anfangsgrunde  der  Naturwlsnenschaft,  Wevke  IV.  pp.  357- 
462  (ed.  Hartenatein,  1867). 


ii 


238 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


classes  of  categories,  be  considered  in  respect  of  (1) 
quantity,  (2)  quality,  (3)  relation,  and  (4)  modality. 
Now,  matter,  looked  at  in  its  simplest  aspect,  is  defin- 
able as  that  which  is  capable  of  motion  in  space  ;  de- 
fined more  specifically,  it  is  that  which  occupies  space ; 
still  more  determinately,  it  is  that  which  in  moving  pos- 
sesses moving  force ;  and,  lastly,  in  relation  to  the  know- 
ing subject,  it  is  that  which,  as  capable  of  motion,  may 
be  an  oJyject  of  experience.  The  Metaphysic  of  Nature 
thus  divides  up  into  four  parts : — (1)  Phoronomy,  the 
metaphysic  of  motion ;  (2)  Dynamics,  the  metaphysic 
of  matter ;  (3)  Mechanics,  the  metaphysic  of  force ; 
and  (4)  Phenomenology,  the  metaphysic  of  external 
experience.  I  propose  to  give  the  substance  of  this 
Metaphysic  of  Nature,  both  because  it  is  practically 
the  concrete  for  the  abstract  of  the  Critique,  and  be- 
cause I  desire  to  compare  it  with  the  views  of  matter, 
motion,  and  force  held  by  Mr.  Spencer,  whose  theory 
may  be  taken  as  representative  of  all  that  is  most  val-  - 
uable  in  the  empirical  philosophy  of  nature  of  the  day. 
The  progress  of  physical  science,  and  especially  of  biol- 
ogy, has  brought  us  to  that  point  at  which  the  relations 
of  the  various  branches  of  knowledge  to  each  other  de- 
mand to  be  settled,  and  has  re-opened  the  problem  as 
to  the  ultimate  principles  on  which  the  special  sciences 
rest.  A  comparison  of  the  conclusions  reached  by  such 
a  writer  as  Kant,  at  once  a  specialist  in  natural  philo- 
sophy and  one  of  the  greatest  philosophers  of  any  age, 
with  those  of  a  writer  like  Mr.  Spencer,  who  has  a  firm 
grasp  of  the  special  principles  of  science  as  well  as  of  the 
philosophy  which  he  represents,  ought  to  be  instruc- 
tive, and  will  at  least  bring  out  into  greater  clearness 
the  points  of  difference  between  criticism  and  empiri- 
cism. 


VIII.] 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  NATURE. 


239 


1.  Matter  determined  in  its  simplest  aspect  as  "that 
which  is  capable  of  motion  in  space,"  is  the  object  of 
Phoronomy.  It  need  hardly  be  said  that  the  specific 
properties  or  relations  of  the  various  kinds  of  material 
bodies — solid,  liquid,  and  gaseous — do  not  fall  under 
consideration  of  any  branch  of  metaphysic,  but  are 
dealt  with  by  the  special  sciences.  In  Phoronomy, 
however,  we  abstract  not  only  from  these  properties, 
but  from  the  causal  connection  of  bodies  in  relation  to 
each  other,  and  even  from  the  quantity  of  matter  as 
such,  i.e.,  from  mass,  and  concentrate  our  attention  on 
the  motion  of  a  body,  as  a  property  belonging  to  it  in 
virtue  of  its  mere  existence  in  space.  Matter  may 
therefore  so  far  be  treated  as  if  it  were  simply  a  poi.it, 
endowed  with  the  capacity  of  marking  out  a  given 
space  in  a  given  time.  And  the  sole  determinations  of 
a  moveable  point,  as  abstracted  from  the  mutual  action 
of  forces  on  each  other  and  from  mass,  are  velocity  and 
direction.  The  task  of  Phoronomy,  therefore,  is  to 
determine  the  universal  relations  of  motion  as  specified 
in  velocity  and  direction — in  other  words,  to  construct 
the  quantitative  relations  of  motion  as  such.  Now,  the 
category  of  quantity  is  schematized  as  number,  or  the 
successive  addition  of  homogeneous  units ;  and  as 
nothing  is  homogeneous  with  motion  but  motion,  the 
purely  quantitative  consideration  of  matter  yields 
simply  the  composition  of  motions  in  respect  of  velocity 
and  direction. 

Matter,  then,  in  its  simplest  aspect,  is  defined 
as  that  which  is  capable  of  motion  in  space.  Space, 
however,  must  be  distinguished  on  the  one  hand  as 
relative  or  material,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  as  absolute 
or  pure.  There  is  no  question  here  as  to  the  relation 
of  space  to  our  faculty  of  knowledge.     It  may,  how- 


240 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


ever,  be  repeated  that  space  is  not  a  thing  in  itself,  or 
any  relation  of  things  in  themselves,  but  is  a  form  be- 
longing to  our  faculty  of  perception.  Here,  however, 
we  look  at  space,  not  in  relation  to  our  intelligence, 
but  as  an  object  of  knowledge,  and  hence  as  a  form  of 
the  external  or  material  world.  When,  therefore,  we 
speak  of  absolute  space,  it  must  not  be  supposed  that 
we  refer  to  a  space  in  itself,  a  space  independent  of  our 
knowledge,  and  therefore  not  capable  of  being  experi- 
enced. Absolute  space  is  simply  pure  or  indeterminate 
space,  conceived  of  as  that  in  which  relative  or  deter- 
minate spaces  are  contained.  Any  determinate  space 
marked  out  by  the  presence  of  material  bodies,  is  a 
space,  which  is  conceived  of  relatively  to  a  wider  space 
embracing  and  containing  it.  This  second  space  may 
again  be  conceived  of  as  embraced  by  a  still  wider 
space,  and  so  on  to  infinity. 

These  considerations  have  an  important  bearing  on 
the  conception  of  motion.  A  space  taken  in  abstrac- 
tion from  a  wider  space  embracing  it  is  not  knowable 
at  all;  and  hence  it  can  neither  be  said  to  be  at 
rest  nor  to  be  in  motion.  But  the  motion  of  matter 
is  a  motion  which  is  capable  of  being  known;  and 
hence  motion  can  take  place  only  in  empirical  or 
relative  space.  Now,  if  we  take  any  given  space, 
and  bring  it  into  relation  with  a  wider  space  embrac- 
ing it,  we  can  see  that  motion  is  purely  relative. 
Thus,  a  body  which  moves  relatively  to  the  space 
in  which  it  is  perceived  must  be  regarded  as  at 
rest,  if  we  suppose  this  space  to  move  in  a  wider 
space,  with  the  same  velocity  as  the  body,  but  in  a 
contrary  direction.  Space  in  itself,  or  motion  in  itself, 
is  therefore  an  absurdity.  Absolute  space  is  just  the 
negation  of  a  determinate  space.     We  can  always  con- 


VIII.] 


TffE  M  ETA  PHYSIC  OF  NATURE. 


241 


ceive  a  space  beyond  a  given  space  without  end,  but  to 
suppose  that  pure  or  indeterminate  space  is  an  actual 
thing  is  to  confuse  logical  universality  with  physical 
universality.  So  motion  in  itself  is  a  contradiction  in 
terms,  since  motion  is  always  relative  to  the  space 
in  which  it  occurs.  Motion  must,  therefore,  be 
defined  as  "the  change  of  the  external  relations  of  a 
thing  to  a  given  space."  The  common  definition  of 
motion  as  "  change  of  place  "  is  too  narrow,  and  holds 
good  only  of  the  motion  of  a  phyaiual  point.  The 
"place"  of  a  body  is  in  the  point  constituting  its 
centre,  and  this  may  remain  at  rest  while  the  body 
itself  moves,  as  when  the  earth  t'^rns  on  Hs  axis.  The 
definition  of  motion,  however,  as  the  « '  ango  of  rela- 
tions to  external  space,  is  consistoi^  with  all  the 
motions  of  bodies,  and  emphMii.^os  the  fact  ihat  all 
motion  is  relative.  Uesty  aga  n,  must  be  defined  as 
"permanent  presence  in  the  same  place."  It  is  nut 
correct  to  say  that  rest  is  simply  absence  of  motion ; 
for  the  negation  of  motion  as  =  0  does  not  admit  of 
mathematical  construction,  wheieas  rest,  when  regarded 
as  permanent  presence  in  the  same  place,  may  be  taken 
as  a  motion  with  infinitely  small  velocity,  and  therefore 
as  a  quantity. 

As  motion  is  relative  to  the  space  in  which  it  is 
observed,  it  is  a  riCitt or  of  indifference  whether  we 
regard  a  body  as  moving  in  a  space  which  is  at  rest,  or 
the  space  as  moving  while  the  body  remains  at  rest. 
When  we  limit  our  attention  to  the  space  in  relation  to 
which  a  body  is  regarded  as  in  motion,  without  view- 
ing it  as  encircled  by  a  wider  space,  we  naturally  look 
upon  the  body  as  moving  and  the  space  as  at  rest ; 
when,  on  the  other  hand,  we  bring  the  space  in  which 
the  body  is  observed  into  relation  with  a  wider  space, 


242 


KANl^  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


we  may  look  upon  the  space  as  moving  and  the  body 
as  at  rest.  And  as  each  space  is  either  in  motion  or 
at  rest,  according  to  our  point  of  view,  we  may  in  all 
cases  of  motion,  or  rather  of  motion  in  a  straight  line, 
regard  the  body  as  moving  in  a  space  which  is  at  rest, 
or  the  space  as  moving  in  an  opposite  direction  from 
the  body,  and  with  equal  velocity.  Moreover,  it  is 
quite  legitimate  to  divide  the  total  motion  into  two 
parts,  and  to  suppose  the  body  to  have  one  part  and 
the  space  to  have  the  other  part — although,  of  course, 
in  a  contrary  direction. 

The  quantity  of  motions  viewed  in  regard  to  their 
velocity  and  direction,  is  constructed  under  the  guid- 
ance of  the  category  of  quantity,  and  the  combination 
of  any  number  of  motions  may  be  reduced  to  the  com- 
bination of  two  motions,  since  every  synthesis  of  homo- 
geneous units  is  a  successive  addition  of  part  to  part. 
The  three  modes  of  quantity  are  unity,  plurality,  and 
totality ;  and  these  as  pure  forms  of  the  understanding 
must  be  brought  into  play  in  determining  the  quantity 
of  motion.  Hence  there  are  three  possible  cases.  (1) 
Two  motions  either  of  equal  or  of  unequal  velocity  may 
take  place  at  the  same  time  in  the  same  direction,  the 
product  being  a  motion  compounded  of  both ;  (2)  two 
motions,  whose  velocity  is  either  equal  or  unequal 
may  take  place  in  contrary  directions,  while  their 
combination  gives  rise  to  a  third  motion  in  the 
same  line;  (3)  two  motions,  whose  velocities  are 
either  equal  or  unequal,  may  take  place  in  different 
lines,  forming  an  angle,  and  their  composition  will 
result  in  a  third  motion  in  a  line  different  from 
either.  Thus  we  have  (1)  unity  of  line  and  direc- 
tion, (2)  plurality  of  direction  in  the  same  line, 
and    (3)    totality  both   of    directions  and  lines — the 


[chap. 


VIII.] 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  NATURE. 


243 


the  body 

notion  or 

aay  in  all 

ight  line, 

is  at  rest, 

stion  from 

)ver,  it  is 
into  two 
part  and 

of  course, 

d  to  their 
the  guid- 
)mbination 
3  the  com- 
is  of  homo- 
trt  to  part, 
irality,  and 
ierstanding 
le  quantity 
cases.     (1) 
elocity  may 
section,  the 
h ;  (2)  two 
or  unequal 
while  their 
ion   in    the 
locities   are 
in  different 
osition  will 
ferent   from 

and  direc- 
same   line, 

lines — ^the 


three  possible  ways  in  which  motion  is  determined 
as  a  quantum. 

2.  Assuming  matter  to  be  determined  in  regard  to 
its  motion  by  the  category  of  quantity,  we  have  now 
to  consider  how  it  is  still  further  determined  in 
Dynamics,  by  being  brought  under  the  category  of 
quality,  as  that  which  occupies  space.  In  so  far 
as  it  occupies  space,  matter  may  be  shown  to  imply 
two  opposite  forces  of  attraction  and  repulsion,  as 
essential  to  its  very  constitution.  But  while  we  have 
here  to  consider  matter  as  constituted  out  of  these  two 
forces,  we  yet  regard  it  only  as  imparting  motion  in 
virtue  of  its  inherent  forces,  not  as  itself  moving  and 
communicating  motion.  In  the  language  of  Mr.  Lewes, 
Dynamics,  in  the  Kantian  sense  of  the  term,  is  the 
science  of  matter  ''in  its  statical  aspect,"  as  distin- 
guished from  Mechanics,  which  treats  of  matter  "  in  its 
dynamical  aspect." 

The  mere  conception  of  the  existence  of  matter  in  space 
does  not  account  for  the  occupancy  of  space  by  matter. 
A  material  body  can  be  conceived  of  as  occupying  space 
only  when  it  is  regarded  as  resisting  the  entrance  of 
any  other  body,  and  tJierefore  as  endowed  with  a  mov- 
ing force  of  its  own.  A  body  can  enter,  or  strive  to  en- 
ter, a  given  part  of  space,  only  in  so  far  as  it  moves. 
Now  nothing  can  diminish  or  destroy  motion,  but 
motion  in  a  contrary  direction ;  and  hence  the  entrance 
of  one  body  into  the  space  occupied  by  another  can- 
not be  prevented  unless  the  latter  has  a  moving  force, 
which  acts  in  a  direction  contrary  to  the  motion  of  the 
former.  It  is  only  therefore  by  the  possession  of  a 
moving  force,  that  a  body  can  occupy  space  at  all. 

This  moving  force  is  a  force  of  repulsion,  which  may 
be  regarded  indifferently  as  that  by  which  a  material 


^1 


P 

I: 


I" 


■y*- 


244  KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap.. 

body  separates  another  body  from  itself,  or  as  that  by 
which  it  resists  the  approach  of  another  body  to  itself. 
And  each  part  of  matter  must  possess  a  repulsive  force, 
because  otherwise  matter  would  not  occupy  the  whole 
of  the  space  in  which  it  exists,  but  would  only  enclose 
it.  As  belonging  to  an  extended  body  in  all  its  parts, 
repulsion  is  a  force  of  extension,  expansion,  or  elasti- 
city. And  this  expansive  force  necessarily  has  a  finite 
degree  or  intensive  quality ;  for  a  force  incapable  of 
increase  in  intensity,  would  be  one  in  which  pn  infinite 
space  might  be  traversed  in  a  finite  time,  while  a 
force  incapable  of  decrease  would  be  one  from  which 
no  motion  in  a  finite  time  could  arise,  even  if  it  were 
multiplied  by  itself  to  infinity;  The  expansive  force  of 
any  material  body  can  therefore  be  conceived  of  as 
increasing  or  decreasing  in  intensity  to  infinity. 

An  inference  from  this  is,  that  the  space  occupied  by 
any  material  body  may  always  be  diminished,  since  a 
contrary  force  can  always  be  conceived,  capable  of  pre- 
venting it  from  expanding  itself  as  much  as  it  would 
otherwise  do.  This  contrary  force  may  be  called  a 
force  of  com'pres&ion.  Now  as  a  force  of  compression 
greater  than  the  force  of  expansion  possessed  by  a  given 
material  body  can  always  be  conceived,  matter  is  com- 
pressible to  infinity.  On  the  other  hand,  however  great 
it  may  be,  the  force  of  compression  must  have  a  finite 
degree  of  intensity,  and  hence  matter  although  infinitely 
compressible,  is  yet  impenetrable — i.e.,  its  occupancy  of 
space  cannot  be  absolutely  destroyed.  Moreover,  as 
the  essence  of  matter  consists  in  the  possession  of  an 
expansive  force  proceeding  from  each  point  in  all  direc- 
tions, the  smaller  the  space  into  which  a  body  is  com- 
pressed, the  greater  must  be  the  force  by  which  it 
strives  to  expand   itself.      The   impenetrability   here 


[chap.. 

that  by 
to  itself, 
live  force, 
,he  whole 
y  enclose 
its  parts, 
or  elasti- 
as  a  finite 
japable  of 
pn  infinite 
3,  while  a 
com  which 
if  it  were 
ive  force  of 
lived  of  as 

itv. 

pccupied  by 
led,  since  a 
ible  of  pre- 
as  it  would 
,e  called  a 
iompression 
I  by  a  given 
iter  is  com- 
ever  great 
,ve  a  finite 
rh  infinitely 
tcupancy  of 
oreover,  as 
ission  of  an 
in  all  direc- 
>ody  is  com- 
»y  which   it 
.bility  here 


VIII.] 


rif£  METAPHYSIC  OF  NATURE. 


245 


spoken  of,  which  always  increases  in  proportion  to  the 
degree  of  compression,  may  be  called  relative  impene- 
trability, and  the  occupancy  of  space  which  it  presup- 
poses may  be  called  the  dynamical  occupancy  of  space. 
Absolute  impenetrability  rests  upon  the  presupposition 
that  matter  is  absolutely  incompressible,  and  the  occu- 
pancy of  space  corresponding  to  it  may  be  called  the 
mathematical  occupancy  of  space.  The  mathematical 
conception  of  impenetrability  goes  on  the  supposition 
that  matter  is  in  its  ultimate  nature  not  only  impene- 
trable, but  incompressible.  It  is  argued  that  only  in  so 
far  as  there  are  empty  spaces  between  its  parts  is  a 
material  body  compressible  at  all ;  and  hence  impene- 
trability is  explained  by  supposing  each  atom  of  matter 
to  be  absolutely  impenetrable,  i.e.,  incompressible.  * 
Such  absolute  impenetrability  Kant  regards  as  a 
qualitas  occulta.  No  cause  is  assigned  of  impenetra- 
bility, but  it  is  virtually  asserted  that  matter  is  impene- 
trable just  because  it  is  so ;  in  other  words,  the  absolute 
impenetrability  of  matter  is  a  pure  assumption,  resting 
upon  an  abstraction  from  that  moving  frrce  without 
which  matter  cannot  be  conceived  as  occupying  space 
at  all. 

The  conception  of  matter  as  possessing  by  its  own 
nature  a  repulsive  force,  is  free  from  this  objection ; 
for  although  we  can  give  no  reason  why  such  a  force 
should  exist,  we  can  yet  explain  by  it  why  a  material 
body  offers  a  certain  degree  of  resistance  to  any  other 
material  body  which  tries  to  displace  it.  When  we  see 
that  matter  is  compr'^ssible  to  infinity,  inasmuch  as  we 
can  always  conceive  of  a  greater  contrary  force  as 
brought  to  bear  upon  i  fc,  we  also  see  that  by  the  occupancy 

^  Matter,  in  other  words,  is  composed  of  ultimate  atoms— the  "hard"  atoms 
of  the  physicist. 


4 


n 


246 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


of  space  we  must  understand  a  relative,  and  not  an  ab- 
solute, impenetrability. 

"We  have  seen  that  impenetrability  arises  from  the 
fact  that  each  part  of  a  material  body  is  endowed  with 
an  expansive  force,  by  which  it  is  able  to  repel  or 
remove  to  a  distance  the  parts  of  any  other  material 
body.  Now,  the  space  occupied  by  matter  is  mathe- 
matically divisible  to  infinity,  although  its  parts  are 
not  really  separable.  Each  part  of  matter  occupying 
space,  on  the  other  hand,  is  moveable  or  separable  in 
virtue  of  the  repulsive  force  with  which  it  repels  all 
other  material  parts,  and  is  in  turn  repelled  by 
them.  As  each  part  of  space  is  divisible  to  infinity, 
so  also  is  each  part  of  matter  which  occupies  space. 
And  the  divisibility  of  matter  means  the  physical 
divisibility  of  its  parts.  Each  part  of  matter  may 
therefore  be  regarded,  like  each  material  body,  as 
a  material  substance  divisible  to  infinity;  for  a  mate- 
rial substance  is  definable  as  that  which  is  moveable 
in  itself.  ^ 

This  proof  of  the  infinite  divisibility  of  matter  over- 
throws the  theory  of  the  monadists,  who  suppose  mat- 
ter to  be  composed  of  indivisible  points,  and  to  occupy 
space  purely  in  virtue  of  its  repulsive  force.  On  this 
view,  while  space  and  the  sphere  of  activity  of  a  sub- 
stance is  divisible,  the  substance  itself,  which  occupies 
space  and  manifests  force,  is  not  divisible.  But,  as  has 
been  shown,  there  is  no  point  in  an  occupied  space 
which  is  not  capable  of  being  regarded  as  a  material 
substance  endowed  with  repulsive  force,  and  as  itself 
moveable,  because  capable  of  being  acted  upon  by  other 
repulsive  forces.  This  may  be  still  further  shown  in 
the  following  way.  If  we  suppose  any  monad,  with 
a  given  sphere  of  activity,  to  be  placed  at  a  certain 


[chap. 
ot  an  ab- 

from  the 
)wed  with 
I  repel  or 
r  material 
is  mathe- 
parts  are 
occupying 
sparable  in 
,  repels  all 
spelled   by 
to  infinity, 
ipies  space, 
le  physical 
flatter  may 
J  body,  as 
for  a  mate- 
Ls  moveable 


vin.] 


THE  MET  A  PHYSIC  OF  NATURE. 


247 


point;  then,  as  space  is  divisible  to  infinity,  we  can 
suppose  an  infinity  of  monads  to  occupy  a  position 
between  the  firat  monad  and  the  point  to  which  its 
resistance  extends.  Each  of  these,  as  possessed  of  a 
force  of  repulsion  of  its  own,  and  as  repelled  by  the 
other,  must  be  moveable ;  and  hence  there  is  no  part 
of  space  occupied  by  matter  which  is  not  moveable — 
in  other  words,  each  part  of  matter  is  a  substance  en- 
dowed with  a  moving  force.  Matter,  therefore,  is  not 
indivisible,  as  the  monadist  supposes,  but  infinitely 
divisible. 

Observe,  however,  that  when  matter  is  said  to  be 
divisible  to  infinity,  it  is  not  meant  that  it  is  made  up 
of  an  infinite  number  of  parts,  as  the  dogmatic  philoso- 
pher maintains.  Divisibility  is  not  identical  with 
dividedness.  If  space  and  matter  were  things  in  them- 
selves, we  should  indeed  have  to  admit  either  that 
matter  is  composed  of  a  finite  number  of  parts,  or  that 
we  have  no  knowledge  of  it.  But  when  we  see 
that  matter  in  space  is  not  a  thing  in  itself  but  a 
phenomenon,  we  can  also  understand  how  it  may  be 
divisible  to  infinity,  and  yet  may  not  be  composed  of  an 
infinite  number  of  parts.  A  phenomenon  exists  only 
in  relation  to  our  thought  of  it,  and  hence  matter  is 
divided  just  in  so  far  as  we  have  carried  the  division. 
The  mere  fact,  therefore,  that  we  can  carry  on  the 
division  to  infinity,  does  not  show  that  there  is  in  a 
material  body  actually  an  infinite  number  of  parts. 
Nor  can  we  affirm  that  the  parts  of  matter  are  simple, 
because  these  parts,  as  existing  only  in  relation  to  our 
consciousness  of  them,  are  given  only  in  the  process  by 
which  they  are  divided  or  mentally  distinguished. 
Matter,  therefore,  is  not  composed  of  parts  which 
exist  as  simple  in  a  thing  external  to  knowledge,  but 


I! 
V 

ill 


(<( 


-.--r3;^.r9MB««i 


248 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


of  parts  determined  as  such  in  the  process  by  which 
matter  is  known  as  divisible. 

It  has  been  shown  that  without  impenetrability  there 
could  be  no  occupation  of  space  at  all,  and  that  impenetra- 
bility is  just  the  capacity  by  which  matter,  in  virtue  of  a 
moving  force,  extends  itself  in  all  directions.  A  force  of 
extension,  however,  cannot  of  itself  account  for  the  ex- 
istence of  matter  as  having  a  definite  quantity.  In  the 
first  place,  there  is  no  absolute  limit  to  extension  in  such 
a  force  itself;  and,  in  the  second  place,  there  is  nothing 
in  the  nature  of  space  to  prevent  the  infinite  expansion 
of  matter ;  for  the  intensity  of  the  force  of  extension, 
while  it  will  no  doubt  decrease  as  the  volume  of  matter 
expands,  can  never  sink  down  to  zero.  Apart,  there- 
fore, from  a  force  of  compression  acting  contrary  to 
the  force  of  repulsion,  matter  could  have  no  finite 
quantity  in  a  given  space,  but  would  disperse  itself  to 
infinity.  Nor  can  the  limiting  force  of  one  material 
body  be  found  in  the  repulsive  force  of  another  material 
body,  since  the  latter  also  requires  a  force  of  compres- 
sion to  determine  it  to  a  finite  quantity.  Besides  the 
repulsive  force  with  which  a  body  is  endowed,  we  must 
therefore  suppose  it  to  have  a  force  acting  in  the  op- 
posite direction — i.e.,  a  force  of  attraction.  And  this 
force,  as  essential  to  the  very  possibility  of  matter,  can 
not  be  peculiar  to  a  certain  kind  of  material  body,  but 
must  be  universal.  Both  the  force  of  repulsion  and  the 
force  of  attraction  are  therefore  essential ;  for  while  by 
the  former  matter  would  disperse  itself  to  infinity,  by  the 
latter  it  would  vanish  in  a  mathematical  point.  If 
merely  a  force  of  attraction  were  to  act,  the  distance 
between  each  part  of  matter  would  be  gradually 
lessened  until  it  disappeared  altogether,  since  one 
moving  force  can  only  be  limited  by  a  moving  force 


[chap. 
by  which 

lity  there 
upenetra- 
virtue  of  a 
A  force  of 
'or  the  ex- 
y.    In  the 
on  in  such 
is  nothing 
expansion 
extension, 
3  of  matter 
)art,  there- 
3ontrary  to 
B  no  finite 
•se  itself  to 
le  material 
ler  material 

compres- 

Jesides  the 

d,  we  must 

in  the  op- 

And  this 
matter,  can 

body,  but 
ion  and  the 
)r  while  by 

ity,  by  the 

point.     If 

le  distance 
gradually 
since  one 

)ving  force 


VIII.] 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  NATURE. 


249 


contrary  to  it.     These,  it  may  be  added,  are  the  only 
ultimate  forces;   for  as  matter,  apart  from  its  mass, 
may  be  considered  as  a  point,  any  two  material  bodies 
must  either  separate  from,  or  approach  to,  one  another 
in  the  straight  line  lying  between  them ;  and  the  motion 
of  separation  is  due  to  repulsion,  the  motion  of  approxi- 
mation to  attraction.  • 
Matter,  then,  is  constituted   by  the  two  opposite 
forces  of  repulsion  and  attraction.     There  is,  however, 
an  important  distinction  between  the  mode  of  operation 
of  these  forces.     Repulsion  acts  only  by  physical  con- 
tact, attraction  only  at  a  distance.     (1)  Physical  con- 
tact must  be  carefully  distinguished  from  mathematical 
contact.     The  latter  is  presupposed  in  the  former,  but 
the  one  cannot  be  identified  with  the  other.     Contact, 
in  the  mathematical  sense,  is  simply  the  limit  between 
any  two  parts  of  space,  a  limit  which  is  not  contained 
in  either  of  the  parts.     Two  straight  lines  cannot  in 
themselves  be  in  contact  with  each  other ;  but  if  they 
cut  each  other  they  meet  in  a  point  which  constitutes 
the  common  limit  between  them.     So  a  line  is  the 
limit  between  two  surfaces,  and  a  surface  the  limit 
between  two  solids.     Physical  contact,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  the  mutual  action  of  two  repulsive  forces  in 
the   common  limit  of  two  material  bodies,   or    the 
reciprocal    action    constituting    impenetrability.      (2) 
Attraction  never  acts  by  physical  contact,  but  is  always 
actio  in  distans,  or  action  through  empty  space.     For, 
as  has  been  shown,  a  force  of  attraction  is  essential  to 
the  determination  of  any  given  material  body  as  to 
intensive  quantity,  and  this  force  must  act  independ- 
ently of  the  physical  contact  of  bodies — i.e.,  through 
empty  space.     To  the  conception  of  attraction  as  action 
at  a  distance,  it  is  commonly  objected  that  matter  can- 


l.i  I 


'i  I 


250 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS        [chap. 


not  act  where  it  is  not.  How,  it  may  be  asked,  can  the 
earth  immediately  attract  the  moon,  which  is  thousands 
of  miles  distant  from  it  ?  To  this  Kant  replies  that 
matter  cannot  act  where  it  is,  on  any  hypothesis 
we  may  adopt,  since  each  part  of  it  is  necessarily 
outside  of  every  other.  Even  if  the  earth  and  the 
moon  were  in  physical  contact,  their  point  of  contact 
would  lie  in  the  limit  between  the  two  parts  touching 
each  other,  and  therefore  each  part,  to  act  on  the 
other,  must  act  where  it  ii  not.  The  objection,  there- 
fore, comes  to  this — that  one  body  can  only  act  on 
another  when  each  repels  the  other.  But  this  makes 
attraction  absolutely  dependent  on  repulsion,  if  it  does 
not  abolish  attraction  altogether — a  supposition  for 
which  there  is  no  ground  whatever.  Attraction  and 
repulsion  are  completely  independent  of  one  another, 
and  are  alike  necessary  to  the  constitution  of  a  material 
body.  s^ 

As  the  forces  of  repulsion  and  attraction  act  respec- 
tively by  physical  contact  and  through  empty  space, 
they  may  be  further  distinguished  as  superficial  and 
penetrative.  (1)  Each  part  of  a  body,  as  occupying 
space,  is  endowed  with  a  force  of  repulsion,  by  which 
it  repels  and  is  jelf  repelled.  The  parts  are  in  physi- 
cal contact,  and  each  sets  a  limit  to  the  expansion  of 
the  other  in  space,  and  is  itself  in  turn  limited  by  the 
other.  It  is  therefore  impossible  for  one  part  of  mat- 
ter to  repel  another,  unless  the  two  are  in  immediate 
physical  contact.  Hence  repulsion  acts  only  at  the 
surface  of  matter.  (2)  The  force  of  attraction,  again, 
does  not  act  by  physical  contact,  but  at  a  distance. 
By  the  possession  of  attraction  a  body  does  not  occupy 
space,  but  simply  exists  in  space,  without  limiting  any 
other  body  to  a  definite  part  of  space.     Accordingly, 


VIII.] 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  NATURE. 


2S1 


attraction  is  not  affected  by  the  interposition  of  any  num- 
ber of  bodies ;  in  other  words,  it  is  a  penetrative  force, 
which  is  always  proportional  to  the  quantity  of  matter. 
It  follows  from  this  that  the  force  of  attraction  extends 
through  the  spaces  of  the  world  to  infinity.  For  as 
attraction  is  essential  to  the  constitution  of  matter,  each 
part  of  matter  acts  invariably  at  a  diutance.  If  we 
suppose  that  there  is  a  definite  limit  beyond  which 
attraction  ceases  to  act,  we  must  account  for  this 
limitation  either  from  the  nature  of  the  matter  lying 
within  this  sphere  of  activity,  or  from  the  nature  of 
space.  The  former  supposition  is  inadmissible,  for 
attraction  is  not  affected  by  the  interposition  of  any 
number  of  material  bodies.  The  latter  supposition  is 
equally  inadmissible;  for  distance  in  space,  while  it 
decreases  the  intensity  of  attraction  in  inverse  ratio, 
cannot  reduce  it  to  zero.  There  is  therefore  nothing 
to  hinder  attraction  from  extending  through  space  to 
infinity. 

In  conclusion,  the  relation  of  tbe  dynamical  concep- 
tion of  matter  to  the  categories  of  quality,  under  which 
it  stands,  may  be  pointed  out.  The  various  modes  of 
quality  are  reality,  negation,  and  limitation.  (1)  The 
real  in  space  is  matter,  as  occupyirg  space  through  its 
impenetrability  or  repclsive  force.  (2)  The  force  of 
attraction,  which,  if  actu^?  by  itself,  would  reu.ice 
matter  to  a  mathematical  point,  or,  in  other  words, 
absolutely  destroy  it,  comes  under  the  category  of 
negation.  (3)  The  reflection  of  attraction  on  repulsion, 
by  which  the  quantity  of  matter  is  determined  to  a 
finite  degree,  is  the  subsumption  of  matter  as  occupying 
space  under  the  category  of  limitation. 

3.  The  final  determination  of  matter  is  made  in 
Mechanics,  in  which  matter  is  defined  as  •*  that  which 


if 
11 


i  [' 


:;  •■ 


252 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLI^JI  CRITICS.  [chap. 


has  moving  force,  in  so  far  as  it  is  itself  moveable." 
In  Dynamics  abstraction  is  made  from  the  actual 
motion  of  a  material  body,  and  no  properties  of  matter 
are  brought  under  consideration  except  those  which  are 
implied  in  the  occupation  of  space  by  moving  forces. 
This  conception  of  matter,  as  originally  endowed  with 
the  forces  of  attraction  and  repulsion,  is  necessarily 
presupposed  in  the  more  concrete  conception  of  matter 
as  actually  in  motion.  For,  manifestly,  a  material 
body  could  have  no  power  of  communicating  motion  to 
another  body,  were  it  not  itself  possessed  of  original 
forces :  a  body  could  not  impress  another  body,  lying 
in  the  line  of  its  motion,  with  a  motion  equal  to  its 
own,  did  not  both  possess  originally  a  force  of  repulsion; 
nor  could  one  body  cause  another  to  move  towards  it 
were  not  both  originally  endowed  with  a  force  of  at- 
traction. In  Mechanics  (in  the  metaphysical  sense)  the 
determination  of  matter  as  that  which  is  moveable,  in 
virtue  of  its  original  forces  of  attraction  and  repulsion, 
is  presupposed,  and  the  further  determination  of  mat- 
ter as  itself  moving  and  communicating  motion  is  made. 
A.nd  as  in  this  final  determination  of  matter  the  relation 
of  one  material  body  to  another  in  so  far  as  they  are 
contemplated  as  actually  moving  is  set  forth,  matter, 
mechanically  considered,  is  brought  under  the  category 
of  relation,  in  its  three  phases  of  substantiality,  caus- 
aUtij,  and  reciprocity. 

Now,  when  matter  is  regarded  as  itself  moving  and 
communicating  motion,  we  can  no  longer,  as  in  Phor- 
onomy,  regard  it  merely  as  that  which  has  velocity 
and  direction ;  nor  can  we  confine  our  attention  to  the 
original  forces  which  determine  it  to  the  occupa- 
tion of  space ;  but  we  must  ask  what  is  the  relation 
between  the  quantity  of  matter  and  the  quantity  of 


\ 


VIII.] 


THE  META PHYSIC  OF  NATURE. 


SOS 


motion.  By  the  quantity  of  matter  is  meant  the  sum 
of  the  parts  of  a  body  as  moveable  in  a  given  space. 
According  to  the  monadists,  matter  is  net  composed  of 
moveable  parts,  but  is  resolvable  intomathemv-^tical  points, 
having  in  their  relation  to  each  other  a  certain  degree. 
of  moving  force,  in  no  way  dependent  upon  the  number 
of  parts  lying  side  by  side,  or  out  of  each  other.  This 
separation  of  the  'legree  of  moving  force  from  the 
quantity  of  matter  as  a  sum  of  moveable  parts  is  quite 
inadmissible ;  for  matter  has  no  quantity  except  in  so 
far  as  it  consists  of  an  aggregate  of  parts,,  each  outside 
of  the  others.  These  parts,  regarded  as  all  moving  or 
acting  together,  are  the  mass  of  a  body,  and  a  body  is 
said  to  act  in  mass  when  its  parts  move  together  in  one 
direction  and  at  the  same  time  put  forth  their  moving 
forces.  The  quantity  of  matter  must  be  distinguished 
from  mass.  The  former  is  simply  any  combination  of 
moveable  parts ;  the  latter  is  a  combination  of  move- 
able parts  regarded  as  acting  together  in  a  body.  A 
fluid,  e.g.,  may  either  act  by  the  motion  of  all  its  parts 
at  once,  or  by  the  motion  of  its  several  parts  in  succes- 
sion. In  a  water-hammer,  or  in  water  enclosed  in  a 
vessel,  and  pressing  by  its  weight  on  a  balance,  water 
acts  in  mass ;  whereas  the  water  of  a  mill-stream  does 
not  act  on  the  float-board  of  an  undershot  wheel  with 
all  its  parts  at  once,  but  with  one  part  after  another. 
To  determine  the  quantity  of  matter  in  the  latter  case, 
we  must  therefore  find  out  the  quantity  of  tlie  whole 
body  of  water — i.e.,  that  quantity  of  matter  which,  in 
acting  with  a  certain  velocity,  would  produce  the  same 
effect.  Lastly,  the  quantity  of  motion  is  in  Mechanics 
the  quantity  of  matter,  or  the  mass,  multiplied  by  the 
velocity ;  not,  as  in  Phoronomy,  merely  the  degree  of 
velocity.      Now,   it   is  easy   to  show  that   the  only 


( 


254 


KANT  AND  HlLi  f^i^'QlfSH  CRITICS,        [chap. 


measure  of  the  quantity  of  matter  in  one  body  as  com- 
pared with  any  other,  is  the  quantity  of  motion  with 
given  velocity.  As  matter  is  divisible  to  infinity,  and 
therefore  is  not  made  up  of  a  number  of  simple  parts, 
we  cannot  determine  the  quantity  of  a  body  by  the 
direct  summation  of  its  parts.  It  is  true  that  in  two 
homogeneous  bodies  the  quantity  of  matter  is  pro- 
portional to  the  quantity  of  volume ;  but  the  former 
can  only  be  measured  by  a  comparison  of  either  body 
with  others  specifically  different,  and  this,  again,  can 
only  be  done  by  taking  the  velocity  of  the  bodies 
compared  as  equal,  and  so  determining  the  quantity  of 
motion  in  each. 

When  it  is  said,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  quantity 
of  matter  can  only  be  measured  by  the  quantity  of 
motion  with  given  velocity,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  the  quantity  of  motion  with  given  velocity,  is 
measured  by  the  quantity  of  matter  moved,  we  seem 
to  fall  into  a  vicious  circle,  and  to  leave  both  concep- 
tions quite  indefinite.  The  reasoning  is  not,  however, 
really  circular,  because  the  conception  of  the  quantity 
of  matter  is  not  identical  with  the  conception  of  the 
quantity  of  motion.  In  the  one  case,  we  regard  matter 
simply  as  a  sum  of  moveable  parts ;  in  the  other,  we 
consider  this  totality  of  parts  as  manifesting  itself  in 
motion.  The  quantity  of  matter  is  not  the  quantity  of 
repulsion  or  attraction,  but  the  quantity  of  svihslancey 
definable  as  the  moveable.  Alter  this  quantity,  with- 
out altering  the  velocity,  and  we  must  also  alter  the 
quantity  of  motion ;  hence  the  quantity  of  motion  de- 
pends upon  the  quantity  of  matter.  A  substance  is 
that  which  cannot  exist  as  a  predicate,  but  is  conceiv- 
able only  as  a  subject ;  and  matter,  as  occupying  spacr 
is  a  subject  which  cannot  be  determined  as  the  predi- 


vni.] 


THE  MET  A  PHYSIC  OF  NATURE. 


205 


cate  of  anythinfif  else.  A  material  body  is  defined  by 
its  actual  motion,  not  by  the  quantity  of  its  original 
forces.  Even  in  the  attraction  of  matter,  as  the  cause 
of  universal  gravitation,  the  attracting  body  imparts  to 
itself  a  velocity  of  its  own,  which  in  like  external  con- 
ditions is  exactly  proportional  to  the  number  of  its 
parts,  and  hence  the  quantity  of  matter,  although 
directly  measured  by  the  force  of  attraction,  is  indirectly 
determined  by  the  quantity  of  motion  of  the  attracting 
body. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  lay  down  the  laws  which 
apply  to  matter  as  considered  in  Mechanics.  These 
laws  are  three  in  number,  corresponding  to  the  three 
categories  of  relation,  viz.,  substance,  causality,  and 
reciprocity. 

(1)  "  In  all  changes  of  corporeal  nature,  the  quantity 
of  matter  remains  the  same  on  the  whole,  being  neither 
increased  nor  diminished."  In  the  First  Analogy  of 
Experience,  it  was  proved  that  no  new  substance  can 
possibly  come  into  existence  or  go  out  of  existence ; 
what  has  here  to  be  shown  is  merely  what  constitutes 
the  substance  of  matter.  Now  every  material  body, 
and  every  part  of  a  material  body,  that  can  exist  in 
space,  is  the  last  subject  of  all  the  properties  pertain- 
ing to  matter.  And  the  quantity  of  material  substance 
is  the  sum  of  its  moveable  parts,  as  existing  in  space, 
or  lying  outside  of  one  another.  Unless,  therefore,  a 
new  substance  could  originate,  or  be  destroyed,  the  sum 
of  the  parts  of  matter  constituting  its  quantity  can 
neither  be  increased  nor  diminished.  But  in  all  the 
changes  of  nature  substance  neither  originates  nor  is 
destroyed,  and  hence  the  quantity  of  matter  is  fixed 
and  unchangeable.  This  or  that  material  body  may 
change   in  quantity  by  an  addition  or  separation  of 


h 


Hill 

i'liii 


256 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


parts ;  but  the  sum  of  those  parts  cannot  be  altered, 
and  hence  the  quantity  on  the  whole  is  always  the 
same. 

(2)  The  second  law  of  Mechanics  is  that  "  all  changes 
in  material  bodies  are  due  to  an  external  cause,  or, 
that  every  body  persists  in  its  state  of  rest  or  motion  in 
the  same  direction  and  with  the  same  velocity,  unless 
it  is  compelled  to  alter  its  state  by  an  external  cause." 
In  the  Second  Analogy  of  Experience  it  was  proved 
that  every  change  must  have  a  cause ;  here  it  has  to 
be  shown  that  every  change  of  matter  must  have  an 
external  cause.  Now  the  only  determinations  of  matter 
are  those  which  imply  relations  to  space,  and  hence  all 
changes  of  matter  are  changes  of  motion.  Either  one 
motion  alternates  with  another,  or  motion  with  rest,  or 
rest  with  motion ;  and  of  each  of  these  changes  there 
must  be  a  cause.  But  matter  has  no  internal  deter- 
minations, and  hence  every  change  of  matter  is  due  to 
an  external  cause.  This  mechanical  law  should  alone 
be  called  the  law  of  inertia  {lex  inertiae).  The  law  that 
action  and  reaction  are  equal  and  opposite  expresses  a 
positive  attribute  of  matter,  and  is  therefore  improperly 
called  a  law  of  inertia.  When  matter  is  said  to  be 
inert,  all  that  h  implied  is  that  it  has  in  itself  no  life, 
and  therefor«^  no  capacity  of  self-determination.  Hence 
inertia  is  no  i  a  positive  effort  of  matter  to  maintain  its 
state,  but  :3imply  the  impossibility  of  change  except  on 
condition  of  the  action  of  an  external  cause. 

(3)  The  third  law  of  Mechanics  is  that  "  action  and 
reaction  are  always  equal  to  each  other."  In  the 
Third  Analogy  of  Experience  it  was  proved  that  all 
external  action  in  the  world  is  mutual.  Here  our 
object  is  to  show  that  this  mutual  action  {actio  miitica) 
is  at  the  same  time  reaction  (reactio).     In   f^stab- 


VIII.] 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  NATURE. 


267 


lishing  this  proposition,  Kant  makes  use  of  the  con- 
ception that  the  motion  of  a  body  in  relative  space  is 
the  same  thing  as  the  motion  of  another  body,  together 
with  the  space  in  which  it  exists,  in  a  contrary  direc- 
tion. As  all  motion  is  relative,  to  say  that  a  body  A 
moves  towards  a  body  B  is  the  same  thing  as  saying 
that  B  together  with  its  space  moves  towards  A.  If, 
therefore,  A  strikes  B,  we  must,  to  determine  the 
quantity  of  motion  of  each  after  impact,  divide  the 
velocity  between  A  and  B  in  the  inverse  ratio  of 
their  mass.  In  this  way  Kant  seeks  to  prove  the 
mechanical  law  that  reaction  is  always  equal  to  action,^ 
but  his  proof  need  not  be  given  here. 

These  three  laws  of  general  Mechanics  might  be 
called  respectively  the  law  of  subsistence  i^ex  subsisten- 
tice),  the  law  of  inertia  (lex  inertice),  and  the  law  of 
reaction  {lex  antagonismi).  That  they  exactly  corres- 
pond to  the  categories  of  substance,  cause,  and  recipro- 
city is  self-evident. 

4.  In  Phenomenology  matter  is  considered  simply 
in  its  relation  to  the  knowing  subject,  and  hence  it  is 
now  defined  as  that  which  can  be  an  object  of  experi- 
ence. What  has  here  to  be  shown  are  the  conditions 
under  which  it  may  be  determined  as  a  knowable 
object  by  the  predicate  of  motion.  Following  the 
clue  of  the  categories,  we  must  therefore  bring  matter 
as  moveable  under  the  categories  of  modality. 

(1)  "The  motion  in  a  straight  line  of  a  material 
body  relatively  to  empirical  space,  as  distinguished 
from  the  contrary  motion  of  the  space,  is  possible. 
Absolute  motion,  on  the  other  hand,  is  impossible.'^ 
Whether  we  say  that  a  body  moves  in  a  space  which 
is  at  rest,  or  that  the  space  moves  in  a  contrary  direc- 


t  9 


i 


'  Mftaph/t.  Anfnntf.  d.  Nahtr.,  pp.  441-2. 
K 


_  i  ■ 


:(:  ■ 


258 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS        [chap. 


tion  and  with  equal  velocity,  in  no  way  alters  the 
character  of  the  object,  but  is  merely  a  question  as  to 
the  point  of  view  of  the  knowing  subject.  Now,  when 
only  an  alternative,  as  distinguished  from  a  disjunc- 
tive judgment,  can  be  made  in  regard  to  an  object,  it 
is  left  undetermined  which  of  two  contrary  predicates 
really  applies  to  it.  Hence  the  motion  of  matter  in 
a  straight  line  in  empirical  space,  as  distinguished 
from  the  contrary  and  equal  motion  of  the  space, 
is  merely  a  possible  predicate.  Again,  as  motion 
is  a  relation,  both  of  its  correlates  must  be  known 
before  there  can  be  any  real  knowledge;  and  hence 
motion  in  a  straight  line,  apart  from  all  relation  to  an 
object  which  moves,  and  which  may  be  known  as 
moving,  .s  absolutely  impossible.  Absolute  motion,  in 
other  words,  cannot  possibly  be  known. 

(2)  "  The  circular  motion  of  a  material  body,  in 
distinction  from  the  contrary  motion  of  space,  is 
actual ;  whereas  the  contrary  motion  of  a  relative 
space  is  not  an  actual  motion  of  a  body,  but  a  mere 
illusion."  In  circular  motion  there  is  a  continual 
change  of  motion  from  the  straight  line,  and  therefore 
a  continual  origination  of  new  motion.  Now,  by  the 
law  of  inertia  no  motion  can  originate  without  an 
external  cause ;  and  by  the  same  law  a  body  continu- 
ally strives  to  go  on  in  tlie  straight  line  touching  the 
circle,  and  is  only  hindered  from  doing  iso  by  the  con- 
trary action  of  an  external  cause.  A  body  which 
moves  in  a  circle  therefore  shows  itself  to  be  possessed 
of  a  moving  force.  The  motion  of  space,  on  the 
other  hand,  cannot  be  due  to  any  moving  force.  Now, 
the  judgment  that  either  a  body  moves  or  that  its  space 
moves  in  a  contrary  direction,  is  a  disjunctive  judgment, 
in  which  either  alternative  excludes  the  other.     The 


VIII.] 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  NATURE. 


259 


circular  motion  of  the  body  is  therefore  actual,  and 
the  contrary  motion  of  relative  space,  as  it  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  connection  of  knowable  objects,  is  a 
mere  illusion. 

(3)  "  When  one  body  sets  another  in  motion,  an 
equal  and  opposite  motion  of  the  latter  is  necessary." 
This  proposition  follows  directly  from  the  third  law  of 
Mechanics.  In  all  communication  of  motion  reaction 
is  equal  to  action.  The  motion  of  the  body  which  is 
said  to  be  acted  upon  is  as  actual  as  the  motion  of  the 
body  which  is  said  to  act.  And  as  the  actuality  of 
this  motion  does  not  merely  rest  upon  an  external 
force,  but  follows  immediately  and  necessarily  from 
the  relation  of  moveable  bodies  m  space  to  each  other, 
the  motion  of  the  body  moved  is  necessary. 

These  three  propositions,  it  will  be  observed,  corres- 
pond respectively  to  matter  as  the  moveable,  as  the 
moveable  which  occupies  space,  and  as  the  moveable 
which  in  virtue  of  its  motion  has  moving  force ;  in 
otlier  words,  to  matter  as  determined  by  Phoronomy, 
by  Dynamics,  and  by  Mechanics  respectively.  It  is 
also  self-evident  that  they  bring  matter  under  the  cate- 
gories of  possibility,  •icl.uality,  and  necessity — the  three 
categories  of  Modal: -y. 


i  f" 
i  I 

I    I 

tt 


iy 


fli 


■     i: 


..I 


I     V 


260 


CHAPTER  IX. 

COMPARISON    OF  THE   CRITICAL  AND   EMPIRICAL  CONCEPTIONS 

OF   NATURE. 


n^HE  statement  of  the  main  positions  in  Kant's 
Metaphysic  of  Nature,  given  in  last  chapter,  will 
enable  us  to  see  how  the  critical  conception  of  the 
material  world  differs  from  the  empirical,  or,  as  Kant 
would  call  it,  the  dogmatic  conception  of  it.  The 
world  of  external  nature,  like  nature  in  general,  is 
regarded,  not  as  existing  independently  of  intelligence, 
but  as  constituted  for  us  by  the  activity  of  intelligence 
as  acting  upon  the  external  manifold  of  sense.  With 
this  critical  explanation  of  nature,  I  now  propose  to 
contrast  the  empirical  explanation  of  it  as  given  by 
Mr.  Spencer. 

1.  It  is  evident,  in  the  first  place,  that  in  determin- 
ing the  various  elements  which  make  up  our  knowledge 
of  the  material  world,  Kant  is  guided,  more  or  less 
consciously,  by  the  principle  that  the  true  method  of 
knowledge  consists  in  a  progress  from  the  less  to  the 
more  concrete,  not  in  a  progress  from  the  more  to  the 
less  concrete.  Absolute  space  he  regards  not  as  more 
real  than  empirical  or  relative  space,  but  simply  as  a 
mere  "  logical  universality,"  an  abstraction  from  any 
given  determinate  space.     Absolute  motion,  again,  as 


IX.] 


MR.   SPENCER'S    VIEW  OF  NATURE. 


261 


EPTIOXS 


Kant's 
ber,  will 
of  tlie 
a,s  Kant 
b.      The 
leral,  is 
igence, 
ligence 
With 
)pose  to 
iven  by 

iterrain- 
owledge 
or  less 
jthod  of 
3S  to  the 
■e  to  the 
as  more 
iply  as  a 
•om  any 
,gain,  as 


he  shows,  cannot  be  an  object  of  knowledge;  the 
only  motion  we  can  possibly  know  is  that  which  is 
relative  or  determinate.  Accordingly,  matter  is  suc- 
cessively determined  as  that  which  is  capable  of  motion 
— as  that  which  occupies  space  by  the  forces  of  repul- 
sion and  attraction — as  that  which  in  moving  com- 
municates motion — and  lastly,  as  that  which  exists 
only  in  relation  to  our  intelligence.  That  Kant  does 
not  always  clearly  separate  between  the  method  of 
abstiaction  and  the  method,  of  determination  by  more 
and  more  concrete  elements  is  no  doubt  true,  as  I  shall 
afterwards  try  to  show ;  but  it  is  equally  evident  that 
he  emphatically  rejects  the  reduction  of  concrete  know- 
ledge to  such  thin  and  impalpable  abstractions  as  space 
in  itself,  motion  in  itself,  matter  in  itself,  or  force  in 
itself.  The  world  of  nature  he  accordingly  conceives 
as  a  system  of  determinate  relations,  or  a  "  closed 
sphere,"  in  which  each  element  of  reality  exists  only 
in  relation  to  the  other  elements.  Space,  motion, 
matter,  and  force  preserve  their  distinctness,  and  yet 
they  are  not  separated  from  each  other  by  a  process  of 
unreal  abstraction,  but  are  so  connected  together  as  to 
combine  in  a  concrete  universe,  in  which  each  element 
is  not  only  relative  to  every  other,  but  is  likewise 
relative  to  intelligence. 

Now,  the  method  of  Mr.  Spencer,  unlike  that  of 
Kant,  is  a  method  of  abstraction,  although  at  times 
the  opposite  method  of  determination  is  followed.  The 
contrast  between  Kant  and  Mr.  Spencer  in  this  re- 
spect is,  that  while  the  former  only  drops  into  the 
method  of  abstraction  from  want  of  a  sufficiently 
firm  grasp  of  his  own  principles,  the  latter  deliberately 
adopts  the  method  of  abstraction,  and  is  only  inadvert- 
ently betrayed  into  making  use  of  the  method  of  detei- 


^ 


:.  it 


f 


^  I 


i 


ill 


:{ 


m 


^  ' 


•I 


262 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


mination.  In  attempting  to  justify  this  charge  I  shall 
confine  myself  mainly  to  the  third  chapter  of  the  second 
part  of  Mr.  Spencer's  First  Principles,  which,  speaking 
generally,  corresponds  to  Kant's  Phoronomy.  It  does 
not  require  very  much  reflection  upon  the  statements 
in  that  chapter  to  make  it  appar'^nt  that,  all  through, 
Mr.  Spencer  assumes  tha^j  thert  is  a  real  univeiTse 
existing  in  its  completeness  in  absolute  independence 
of  all  relation  to  intelligence.  Now,  there  is  no  rea- 
son to  deny  that  common  sense  and  natural  science, 
in  one  aspect  of  them,  seem  to  give  the  strongest 
support  for  this  supposition.  The  ordinary  atti- 
tude of  the  plain  man  is  that  of  a  spectator  who 
observes  directly  bofore  him  certain  real  things  and 
persons  that  he  seems  to  apprehend  as  they  exist  full- 
formed  and  complete  in  themselves.  His  doubts  as  to 
reality,  if  he  have  any,  do  not  concern  the  possible 
illusiveness  of  existing  things,  but  only  the  possibility 
of  misapprehension  on  his  own  part.  In  like  manner 
it  is  a  presupposition  of  the  observations  and  experi- 
ments of  the  scientific  man  that  the  world  exists  com- 
plete in  itself,  and  lies  there  ready  for  apprehension. 
He  knows  that  effort  on  his  own  part  is  the  condition 
of  the  knowledge  of  things,  but  he  never  supposes  that 
the  presence  or  absence  of  such  knowledge  has  any- 
thing to  do  with  the  reality  of  existence.  A  philoso- 
pher, therefore,  who  appeals  to  common  sense  and  to 
science  in  support  of  bis  assumption  that  the  world  is 
independent  of  conscious  intelligence,  has  the  apparent 
support  of  b  fch.  But  the  support  is  only  apparent. 
Ask  the  man  of  common  sense,  or  the  scientific  man 
who  is  innocent  of  philosophical  theory,  whether  the 
world  he  regards  as  real  is  not,  after  all,  a  world  of 
mere  appearances — a  world  which  seems,  but  is  not — 


[chap. 

[  shall 
second 
eaking 
[t  does 
3ments 
rough, 
aivenc 
ndenco 
ao  rea- 
jcience, 
rongest 
jr    atti- 
3r  who 
igs  and 
ist  full- 
its  as  to 
Dossible 
isibility 
manner 

experi- 
its  com- 

lension. 

>ndition 

;es  that 
|as  any- 
>hiloso- 
arid  to 
orld  is 

Ipparent 

(parent. 

Ilic  man 
bcr  the 
orld  of 

Is  not — 


ix.j 


MR.   SPENCER'S   VIEW  OF  NATURE. 


263 


and  he  can  only  be  made  to  understand  the  question 
by  a  series  of  explanations  that  take  him  beyond  his 
ordinary  point  of  view,  and  awaken  him,  as  by  a 
shock,  to  an  elementary  conception  of  the  problem  of 
philosophy.  Prior  to  this,  he  had  taken  for  granted 
that  knowledge  and  reality  are  one,  and  hence  it  is  just 
as  easy  to  show,  by  an  appeal  to  common  sense  and 
science,  that  reality  is  bound  up  with  intelligence,  as 
to  show  that  it  is  independent  of  intelligence.  The 
separation  of  thought  and  nature — knowledge  and 
reality — does  not  present  itself  to  ordinary  conscious- 
ness at  all ;  and  hence  the  empiricist  and  the  idealist 
may  with  equal  confidence  appeal  to  it,  secure  of  an 
apparent  support.  But  this  simply  shows  the  absurd- 
ity of  the  appeal.  Philosophy  begins  by  discerning 
the  possibility  of  a  breach  between  knowledge  and 
reality,  and  its  task  is  to  show  either  that  they  coincide 
or  that  they  do  not.  It  is  therefore  utterly  unpardon- 
able in  a  philosopher  to  begin  with  the  assumption  of 
the  independence  of  reality  on  intelligence,  for  such 
an  assumption  just  means  that  so  far  he  has  not  got  to 
the  philosophical  point  of  view.  Nor  is  this  all,  for 
such  a  supposition  is  not  only  unjustifiable,  but  it  leads 
to  a  perverted  view  of  the  relation  between  knowledge 
and  reality,  as  will  appear  from  an  examination  of  Mr. 
Spencer's  procedure. 

Between  the  first  view  of  the  world  as  a  congeries  of 
individual  objects  connected  together  by  the  superficial 
unity  of  space  and  time,  and  the  scientific  view  of  that 
world  as  a  system  of  forces,  there  lies  a  wide  interval 
during  which  intelligence  has  been  becoming  more  and 
more  active — on  the  one  hand  observing  the  infinite 
complexity  of  the  determinations  of  things,  and  on  the 
other  hand  finding  them  united  by  higher  and  closer 


(  ill 


2G4 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


II!' 


li 


bonds  of  unity.  But,  as  the  process  by  which  intelli- 
gence developes  itself  is  looked  upon  by  the  scientific 
man,  not  less  than  by  the  man  of  common  sense, 
simply  as  a  process  by  which  the  properties  and  tlie 
relations  of  objects  in  a  world  independent  of  conscious- 
ness are  discovered  by  the  individual  observer,  the 
correlative  evolution  of  intelligence  is  neglected. 
Science  finds  it  necessary  to  systematize  its  knowledge 
by  means  of  the  conceptions  of  matter,  motion,  and 
force,  but  these  conceptions  are  looked  upon  as  purely 
objective,  or  independent  of  thought.  In  this  assump- 
tion, science,  as  such,  is  perfectly  justified,  since  its 
task  is  to  point  out  what  ue  the  properties  and  the 
relations  of  things  to  each  wther — not  to  inquire  into 
the  relations  of  knowledge  and  reality.  But  he  who 
constructs  a  philosophical  theory  may  not  take  up  from 
the  special  sciences,  without  criticism,  the  conceptions 
they  are  compelled  to  use,  and  proceed  to  explain 
knowledge  on  the  assumption  of  the  complete  deter- 
mination of  objects  independently  of  intelligence.  This, 
however,  is  what  Mr.  Spencer,  in  the  present  instance, 
does.  The  order  his  exposition  ostensibly  follows  is  to 
treat  first  of  space  and  time,  then  to  go  on  to  matter  and 
motion,  and  to  end  with  force,  "  the  ultimate  of  ulti- 
mates,"  as  he  calls  it.  The  real  order  of  his  thought, 
however,  is  to  start  from  the  conception  of  force,  next 
to  go  on  to  motion  and  matter  as  presupposed  in  force, 
and  finally  to  come  to  time  and  space  as  implied  in 
motion  and  matter.  Now,  this  just  means  that  he 
assumes  the  independent  reality  of  the  wcild  as  it 
exists  for  science,  and  then  proceeds  by  analysis  to  get 
back  to  the  simplest  and  most  abstract  elements  of  that 
world.  The  true  order  is  exactly  the  reveise.  The 
world,  as   absolutely  unthinkable   apart  from  intelli- 


IX.] 


MR.   SPENCER'S   VIEW  OF  NATURE. 


265 


gence,  presupposes  the  putting  together  of  more  and 
more  concrete  elements,  so  that  while  space,  as  the 
mere  abstraction  of  external  individuality,  is  in  the 
order  of  thought  and  of  the  evolution  of  intelligence, 
the  abstractest  and  simplest  element  of  all,  force,  as 
comprehending  in  a  more  concrete  unity  time,  matter, 
and  motion,  is  the  last  and  highest  conception.  The 
process  of  abstraction  or  analysis  by  which  Mr. 
Spencer  gets  his  results  is  merely  a  process  by  which 
the  intelligible  character  of  the  universe  is  denied,  j".st 
because  it  is  tacitly  assumed.  , , 

The  next  step  of  Mr.  Spencer  is  to  explain  how  a 
world  already  assumed  to  be  known  gets  into  the  indi- 
vidual consciousness.  The  method  of  explanation  is 
exceedingly  simple.  It  consists  in  plausibly  explaining 
how  a  world  already  known  communicates  itself  to  the 
individual  through  his  senses.  The  senses  are  said 
immediately  to  reveal  objects  as  resisting,  and  the  feel- 
ing of  resistance  i3  identified  with  force.  As  the  con- 
ception of  force  already  presupposes  the  whole  process 
by  which  it  has  been  arrived  at,  we  thus  get,  by  an  act 
seemingly  of  the  simplest  kind,  the  materials  from 
which  motion,  matter,  etc.,  may  be  apparently  obtained 
by  analysis,  without  any  synthetic  activity  of  thought 
whatever.  All  the  elements  needed  to  constitute 
reality  are  thus  secured  beforehand,  and  we  have 
only  to  take,  at  each  fresh  stage  of  our  progress,  as 
much  from  the  intelligible  world  as  we  find  con- 
venient. Thus  the  dependence  of  real  existence 
upon  intelligence  is  got  rid  of  by  the  convenient 
method  of  assuming  beforehand  what  we  pretend 
to  derive  by  a  process  of  immediate  apprehension. 
Nothing  could  be  simpler,  and  nothing  more  use- 
less and  delusive,  than  a  method  such  as  this,  which, 


Mil 


I 


206 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CHITJC^. 


[CHAI'. 


whilo  it  pretends  to  descril  >  the  process  by  which 
the  knowledge  of  reality  is  obtained,  simply  sets 
forth  that  which  has  beeif  tacitly  assumed  at  the 
outset. 

The  derivation  givon  by  Mr.  Spuncor  of  space  and 
time,  preparatory  to  his  reduction  of  all  phenomena  to 
force,  is,  briefly,  as  follows  :  "  Of  those  relations  which 
are  the  form  of  all  thought  here  are  two  orders — rela- 
tions (  r  sequence  and  relations  of  co-existence,  the 
former  being  original  and  the  latter  derivative.  The 
relation  of  sequence  is  given  in  every  change  of  con- 
sciousness. The  relation  of  co-existence,  which  cannot 
be  originally  given  in  a  consciousness  of  which  the 
states  are  serial,  becomes  distinguished  only  when  it  is 
found  that  certain  relations  of  sequence  have  their 
terms  presented  in  consciousness  in  either  order  with 
equal  facility ;  while  the  others  are  presented  only  in 
one  order.  Relations  of  which  the  terms  are  not 
reversible  become  recognized  as  sequences  proper,  while 
relations  of  which  the  terms  occur  indifferently  in  both 
directions  become  recognized  as  co-existences.  By 
endless  experiences  an  abstract  conception  of  each  is 
generated.  The  abstract  of  all  sequences  is  time.  The 
abstract  of  all  co-existences  is  space.  Our  conceptions 
of  time  and  space,  then,  are  generated,  as  other  ab- 
stracts are  generated  from  other  concretes;  the  only 
difference  being  that  the  organization  of  experience 
has,  in  these  cases,  been  going  on  throughout  the 
entire  evolution  of  intelligence.  The  experiences  out 
of  which  the  abstract  of  co-existence  has  been  gener- 
ated are  the  experiences  of  individual  positions  as 
ascertained  by  touch,  and  each  of  such  experiences 
involves  the  resistance  of  an  object  touched,  and  the 
muscular  tension  which  measures  this  resistance.     By 


" 


,X.J 


AfR.   SPENCEH'S   VIE  IV  OF  NATURE. 


207 


countless  unliko  muscular  adjustments  difi'erent  \sm\- 
tions  are  disclosed ;  but  since,  under  other  circumstan- 
ces, the  same  muscular  adjustments  do  not  produce 
contact  with  resisting  positions,  there  result  the  same 
states  of  consciousness,  minus  the  resistance,  and  from 
a  building  up  of  these  results  space.  Similarly  in 
regard  to  time,  the  abstract  of  all  sequences."  ^ 

This  passau*  ontains  an  admirable  illustration  ^'f 
that  mixture  coiimion-senso  realism  and  indiv:i!:.i;;il- 
istic  sensatic*  I,.  <ni  .vhich  runs  through  the  whols  of 
Mr.   Spencer'  ^osophy,   and,   indeed,   through   all 

empirical  psychology.  It  is  really  an  attempt  to  com- 
bine two  discordant  views  that  are  not  capable  of 
union,  and  which,  therefore,  are  simply  applied  to  each 
other  without  being  united,  as  the  surfaces  of  two 
chiselled  stones  may  be  brought  into  close  contact  with- 
out being  joined  together.  In  our  unreflective  expoii- 
ence  of  the  world  we  are  as  far  as  possible  from 
supposing  that  the  objects  we  know  can  be  resolved  into 
our  own  passing  feelings ;  on  the  contrary,  we  tacitly 
assume  that  the  world  vie,  know  is  the  world  as  it 
reaUy  is — the  world  as  known  by  everybody  else.  It 
is  no  doubt  true  that  we  look  upon  ourselves  and  others 
as  independent  individuals,  and  that  this  assumption, 
when  made  explicit,  leads  to  the  view  of  sensationalism 
that  the  only  Avay  in  which  things  are  known  is 
through  our  subjective  feelings.  We  may,  therefore, 
say  that  common  consciousness  assumes,  indifferently, 
that  the  known  world  is  objective  and  intelligible,  and 
that  it  is  subjective  and  sensuous ;  unreflective  con- 
sciousness, in  short,  is,  implicitly,  at  once  idealistic  and 
sensationalistic,  although,  explicitly,  it  is  neither  the 
one  nor  the  other.      Mr.  Spencer's  procedure  is  to 

» F'vett  Principles,  pp.  163-165,  §  47. 


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268 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


accept  both  the  realism — i.e.,  the  tacit  idealism  of 
common  sense — and  its  contradictory  sensationalism. 
Accordingly,  he  does  not  scruple  to  speak  of  relations 
of  sequence  and  relations  of  co-existence  as  if  they  were 
given  in  complete  independence  of  intelligence;  and 
hence  the  only  question,  as  he  puts  it,  is  how  the  indi- 
vidual comes  gradually  to  appropriate  objects  through 
his  own  particular  and  perpetually-changing  feelings. 
From  this  way  of  stating  the  question  the  absurdity  of 
trying  to  build  up  a  stable  universe  out  of  evanescent 
sensations  is  concealed  both  from  Mr.  Spencer  himself 
and  from  the  unwary  reader ;  because,  having  an  intel- 
ligible universe  always  before  their  consciousness,  they 
overlook  the  fact  that  individual  feelings,  as  unrelated, 
are  in  the  most  absolute  sense  unintelligible.  It  is  not 
seen  to  be  a  contradiction  to  identify  successive  feelings 
of  touch  and  of  muscular  sensation  with  "  relations  of 
sequence,"  and  even  with  "  relations  of  co-existence," 
although  it  seems  plain  enough  the  moment  it  is  stated 
that  feelings,  as  such,  cannot  be  "relations"  of  any 
kind  whatever.  Proof  of  this  charge  of  self-contradic- 
tion is  so  important  in  itself,  and  has  so  decisive  a 
bearing  upon  the  doctrine  of  force  as  conceived  by 
empirical  psychologists,  that  a  detailed  examination  of 
Mr.  Spencer's  derivation  of  the  conceptions  of  space 
and  time  may  be  excused. 

The  "relation  of  sequence"  is  primary,  because 
"  given  in  every  change  of  consciousness ; "  the  "  re- 
lation of  co-existence"  is  secondary,  because  it  "cannot 
be  originally  given  in  a  consciousness  of  which  the 
states  are  serial."  How,  then,  does  the  consciousness 
of  co-existence  arise  ?  From  the  fact  that  "  certain 
relations  of  sequence  have  their  terms  presented  in 
consciousness,   in   either   order,   with    equal    facility, 


IX.] 


MR.   SPENCER'S    VIEW  OF  NATURE. 


269 


tuse 
I're- 

IQOt 

the 
less 
lin 
in 


while  the  others  are  presented  only  in  one  order." 
Here  it  is  quite  evident  that  Mr.  Spencer  is  trying 
to  explain  how  we  come  to   experience  a  world  of 
co-existent  and  successive  objects,  conceived  in  the 
first  place  as  independent  of  consciousness.     Now,  a 
world  in  which  events  are  "presented  only  in  one 
order"   is,  in  other  words,  a  world   in   which    the 
events  are  connected  in  an  irreversible  or  uniform 
order,  i.e.,  in  which  they  are  connected  together  as 
cause  and  effect.     Such  a  world,  therefore,  is  already 
constituted  by  universal  forms  of  thought,  involving, 
not  only  intelligence,  but  intelligence  that  has  devel- 
oped itself  by  very  complex  relations.     And  a  neces- 
sary and  uniform  sequence  of  events  is  very  different 
from  the  supposed  sequence  of  feelings,  as  they  occur  in 
"  a  consciousness  of  which  the  states  are  serial."     No 
doubt  there  is  a  point  of  view  from  which  it  can  be 
shown  that  the  serial  states  of  consciousness  imply  a 
uniform  sequence  in  the  way  of  causality,  but  such  a 
point  of  view  can  be  attained  only  by  a  philosophy 
which  sets  forth,  in  systematic  order,  the  different  ele- 
ments that  conspire  to  produce  a  rational  universe — a 
universe  that,  apart  from  reason,  is  nothing ;  not  by  a 
philosophy  which  assumes  the  existence  of  a  ready- 
made    universe   independent   of   reason.     That    Mr. 
Spencer  is  committed  to  the  latter  standpoint  is  evident 
from  his  attempt  to  account  for  relations  of  co-existence 
by  relations  of  sequence ;  and  it  is  still  more  apparent 
from  the  fact  that  he  afterwards  explains  co-existence 
as  a  compound  of  feelings  of  touch  and  muscular  sen- 
sation.    His  method,  then,  is  to  identify  •*  relations  of 
sequence"  with  the  mere  sequence  of  feelings,  in  a 
"consciousness  of  which  the  states  can  only  be  serial;" 
and,  having  thus  assumed  uniform  relations  of  sequence, 


270 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


the  only  thing  requiring  explanation  seems  to  be,  how 
these  give  rise  to  relations  of  co-existence.  But  a 
sequence  of  feelings  conceived  to  occur  in  a  purely 
individual  consciousness  is  as  far  as  possible  from  being 
identical  with  the  objective  sequence  of  real  events  in 
an  intelligible  world.  The  former  is,  ex  hypoihesi,  not 
irreversible,  but  arbitrary;  not  objective,  but  subjec- 
tive. The  latter  is  uniform,  necessary,  and  unchang- 
ing, and  involves  the  actual  relation  of  objects  as 
identical  in  the  midst  of  change,  and  as  necessarily 
connected  with  each  other.  The  one  excludes  all  rela- 
tions, the  other  involves  a  complexity  of  relations.  It 
ia,  therefore,  utterly  impossible  to  extract  from  the 
sequence  of  states,  in  a  purely  individual  consciousness, 
any  objective  order  of  events ;  and  there  is  no  reason 
whatever  for  deriving  co-existence  from  sequence,  ex- 
cept the  unwarrantable  confusion  between  the  causal 
sequence  of  events  and  the  arbitrary  sequence  of  indi- 
vidual feelings.  And  this  brings  us  to  remark,  sec- 
ondly, that  "relations  of  co-existence"  are  not  separable 
from  "relations  of  sequence"  in  the  way  assumed  by 
Mr.  Spencer.  We  may  distinguish  the  causal  connec- 
tion of  events  from  the  reciprocal  influence  of  co-exist- 
ing substances,  but  the  intelligent  experience  of 
reality  involves  both.  It  is  not  possible  to  be  con- 
scious of  events  as  uniformly  sequent,  without  being 
conscious  of  substances  as  dependent  upon  and  in- 
fluencing each  o^  ^ ;  or,  to  take  experience  at  an 
earlier  stage,  it  not  possible  to  think  of  events 
as  following  upon  each  other  in  time,  apart  from  the 
thought  of  things  as  co-existing  in  space.  The  experi- 
ence of  the  one  implies  the  experience  of  the  other ; 
and  hence  any  attempt  to  get  the  one  without  the 
other  is  an  attempt  to  apprehend  one  element  of  the 


IX.] 


MjR.  spencer* s  view  of  nature. 


271 


real  world  apart  from  another  element  that  is  necessary 
to  make  it  real.  We  may  certainly  ideally  distinguish 
the  elements,  but  in  our  analysis  we  must  be  careful  to 
leave  room  for  such  a  synthesis  as  shall  exclude  all 
actual  separation. 

Having  plausibly  derived  relations  of  co-existence 
from  relations  of  sequence,  Mr.  Spencer  tries  to  show 
that  space  and  time  are  "  generated  as  other  abstracts 
are  generated."  The  same  paralogism  of  individual 
feelings  and  relations  of  thought  again  presents  itself. 
We  start  from  the  world  as  given  in  ordinary  con- 
sciousness— the  world  as  implicitly  rational — and  ask 
how,  supposing  we  have  a  knowledge  of  co-existent 
and  successive  objects,  abstract  space  and  time  are 
produced?  There  can  be  no  difficulty  in  giving  an 
apparently  satisfactory  explanation,  because  in  our 
datum  we  already  have  implicitly  that  which  is  to  be 
established.  Things  as  co-existent  and  successive  are 
spatial  and  temporal,  and  by  simply  analysing  what  is 
contained  in  our  ordinary  knowledge,  and  abstracting 
from  all  the  diflferences  of  objects,  we  easily  get  space 
and  time  as  residue.  Mr.  Spencer,  in  other  words, 
when  he  speaks  here  of  space,  has  before  his  mind 
space  as  the  object  of  the  mathematical  sciences. 
Now,  mathematics  does  not  find  it  necessary  to  inquire 
into  the  relation  of  space  to  intelligence ;  as  a  special 
science  it  is  sufficient  for  it  to  assume  its  object  as 
ready-made,  and  to  examine  the  various  ideal  limitations 
of  it  from  the  phenomenal  point  of  view.  Mr.  Spencer, 
therefore,  has,  in  his  conception  of  space  as  the  "  ab- 
stract of  all  co-existences" — an  abstract  that  is  sup- 
posed to  be  obtained  by  mere  analysis  of  a  pre-existent 
material — a  ready  means  of  emptying  intelligence  of  its 
universal  relations.     Just  as,  when  he  has  to  account  for 


272 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


co-existent  objects,  he  first  identifies  the  mere  sequence 
of  feelings  with  the  necessary  or  objective  sequence  of 
events,  and  is  thus  able  apparently  to  extract  from  feel- 
ing the  conception  of  permanent  substances ;  so  here  ho 
assumes  that  objects  as  offering  resistance  are  given  in 
feelings  of  touch,  and  hence  he  easily  derives  empty  space 
from  muscular  tensions  unassociated  with  feelings  of 
resistance.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  repeat  that  indi- 
vidual feelings,  however  numerous,  cannot  possibly 
account  for  the  knowledge  of  extended  things  or  of 
extension,  since  such  feelings  are  assumed  to  be  desti- 
tute of  that  universality  which  is  the  condition  of  any 
knowledge  whatever.  Mr.  Spencer  seems  to  suppose 
that,  by  throwing  the  supposed  experience  back  into 
the  haze  of  the  past,  and  imagining  a  vast  period  of 
time  to  have  elapsed,  during  which  the  race  has  been 
accumulating  knowledge,  the  intellectual  elements  of 
experience  may  be  resolved  into  felt  elements.  But 
this  is  an  utterly  untenable  position.  The  very  be- 
ginning of  intelligent  experience,  whether  in  the  indi- 
vidual or  in  the  race,  must  contain  the  elements 
necessary  to  such  experience,  and  these  elements  can- 
not be  reduced  to  lower  terms  than  a  synthesis  of 
subject  and  object,  of  the  universal  and  the  particular. 
A  purely  feeling  consciousness,  assumed  to  exist  for  an 
infinite  period  of  time,  is  still  a  feeling  consciousness  : 
unless  a  transition  can  be  made  from  this  unintelligent 
state,  by  means  of  a  primary  act  of  abstraction  at  once 
separating  and  uniting  the  object  and  the  subject,  there 
can  be  no  experience  of  the  world  at  all,  and  therefore  no 
experience  of  the  world  as  spatial.  Mr.  Spencer  really 
confuses  the  unreflective  consciousness,  which  does  not 
sharply  separate  subject  and  object,  or  things  and 
space,  with  a  merely  feeling  consciousness  which,  as 


IX.] 


MR.   SPENCER'S   VIEW  OF  NATURE. 


273 


jh,  as 


such,  is  the  negation  of  that  separation.  But  in  the 
former  the  two  terms  are  really  present,  and  although 
their  contrast  is  seldom  explicitly  perceived,  it  is  still 
there,  ready  to  be  brought  out  by  reflective  analysis ; 
in  fact,  were  it  not  implicitly  there,  no  amount  of 
reflection  could  extract  it.  It  is,  therefore,  a  manifest 
hysteron  proteron  to  account  for  space  as  due  to  mere 
feelings  of  muscular  tension.  In  intelligent  experience 
space  and  time  are  not  posterior,  but  prior,  to  co-exist- 
ing and  successive  objects,  as  undiflerentiated  space 
is  prior  to  positions — i.e.,  limitations  of  space.  Mr. 
Spencer  first  identifies  feelings  of  muscular  tension 
with  co-existing  positions — which,  as  involving  rela- 
tions to  each  other,  are  more  than  feelings — and  next 
assumes  that  a  synthesis  of  these  positions  generates 
space.  But  position  already  involves  the  relation  of 
the  parts  of  space  to  each  other,  and  hence  cannot 
account  for  space.  In  short,  just  as  the  co-existence  of 
objects  presupposes  their  relation  to  each  other  in 
space,  and  therefore  different  positions,  so  position  pre- 
supposes a  universal  space,  which  is  ideally  limited. 
Space,  as  Kant  says,  is  not  a  collection  of  particular 
spaces,  but  a  universal  space  differentiating  itself  in  the 
particular. 

Having  found  that  Mr.  Spencer  ostensibly  derives 
space  and  time  from  mere  feelings  of  resistance,  which 
he  unwarrantably  identifies  with  the  conception  of 
force,  we  may  expect  that  in  accounting  for  matter  and 
motion  the  same  fallacious  method  will  be  adopted. 
His  account  of  matter  is,  briefly,  as  follows  :— "  Our 
conception  of  matter,  reduced  to  its  simplest  shape,  is 
that  of  co-existent  positions  that  offer  resistance.  We 
think  of  body  as  bounded  by  surfaces  that  resist,  and 
as  made  up  throughout  of  parts  that  resist.  .  .  .  And 


!  I 


S74 


RANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


since  the  group  of  co-existing  positions  constituting  a 
portion  of  matter  is  uniformly  capable  of  giving  us 
impressions  of  resistance  in  combination  with  various 
muscular  adjustments,  according  as  we  touch  its  near, 
its  remote,  its  right  or  left  side,  it  results  that,  as  dif- 
ferent muscular  adjustments  habitually  indicate  differ- 
ent co-existences,  we  are  obliged  to  conceive  every 
portion  of  matter  as  containing  more  than  one  resistant 
position.  .  .  .  The  resistance-attribute  of  matter  must 
be  regarded  as  primordial,  and  the  space-attribute  as 
derivative.  ...  It  thus  becomes  manifest  that  our 
experience  oi  force  is  that  out  of  which  the  idea  of 
matter  is  built."  ^ 

Here  again  we  have  an  illustration  of  that  method 
of  accounting  for  the  intelligible  world  by  ignoring 
intelligence  which  Mr.  Spencer  carries  on  with  great 
self-complacency,  and  apparently  without  the  least 
perception  of  the  real  nature  of  his  procedure.  "  Our 
conception  of  matter,  reduced  to  its  simplest  shape," 
simply  means  the  real  world  after  we  have  eliminated 
by  abstraction  those  prominent  elements  in  it  which 
presuppose  an  elaborate  process  of  construction  by 
thought.  The  world  as  it  exists  for  the  scientific  man, 
the  world  as  composed  of  objects  bound  together  by 
the  law  of  gravitation,  and  manifesting  physical,  chemi- 
cal, and  vital  forces,  is  stripped  of  all  its  differentiating 
relations,  and  reduced  to  a  congeries  of  extended  and 
solid  atoms,  preparatory  to  the  reverse  process  by  which 
the  relations  abstracted  from  shall  be  surreptitiously 
brought  back  and  attributed  to  independent  feelings. 
But,  even  when  nature  has  been  tlius  attenuated  to  a 
ghost  of  its  former  self,  the  attempted  derivation  of  it 
from  feeling  is  easily  seen  to  be  inadmissible.      The 

'  »fVr8<PWnc»pfe«,  pp.  166,  167,  848. 


IX.] 


MR.   SPENCER'S    VIEW  OF  NATURE. 


278 


passage  from  individual  feelings  to  "  co-existent  posi- 
tions that  oflfer  resistance/'  however  apparently  easy, 
cannot  really  be  made.  We  are  told  of  "impres- 
sions of  resistance,"  and  of  "muscular  adjustments." 
Now,  an  impression  of  resistance  is  not  a  mere 
feeling,  but  the  conception  of  an  object  as  resisting, 
and  such  a  conception  involves  a  construction  of 
reality  by  relations  of  thought.  Similarly,  "muscu- 
lar adjustments"*  presuppose  a  knowledge  of  the  mus- 
cular system,  or,  at  least,  of  the  body  as  it  exists  for 
common  consciousness,  and,  here  again,  relations  of 
thought  are  inconsistently  attributed  to  mere  feeling. 
If  we  exclude  all  that  is  involved  in  the  relations  of 
a  resisting  object  to  the  organism  as  the  medium  of 
muscular  sensibility,  we  are  reduced  to  mere  feelings 
which  can  by  no  possibility  give  a  knowledge  of  anything 
real  and  external  to  themselves.  Hence  the  absurdity 
of  assuming  that  a  mere  feeling  is  in  itself  a  theory  of 
matter  as  the  manifestation  of  force ;  hence,  also,  the 
absurdity  of  regarding  force  as  the  simplest,  instead  of 
the  most  complex,  element  of  the  real  world  as  it  exists 
for  the  scientific  man. 

Prom  what  has  been  said  it  is  eas;,'  i"»  see  why  Mr. 
Spencer  regards  the  "  resistance-attribute  of  matter  as 
primordial,  the  space-attribute  as  derivative."  It  must, 
at  first  sight,  seem  strange  that  "  co-existing  positions 
that  offer  resistance"  should  be  held  to  be  prior  to  "  co- 
existing positions "  themselves.  In  the  apprehension 
of  resisting  positions  there  is,  surely,  already  implied 
space.  Mr.  Spencer,  however,  identifies  his  own  theory, 
that  resistant  positions  are  revealed  by  muscular  sensa- 
tions, with  the  common-sense  apprehension  of  objects, 
which,  like  all  knowledge,  really  involves  the  reduc- 
tion of  particulars  to  the  unity  of  thought.     Hence 


276 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


space,  although  it  is  involved  in  the  ordinary  appre- 
hension of  objects  in  the  same  sense  in  which  resistance 
is  involved  in  it,  is  assumed  by  Mr.  Spencer  not  to 
exist  for  consciousness  at  all,  because  it  has  not  yet 
been  made  an  object  of  the  abstract  understanding. 
Accordingly,  the  resistance  is  abstracted  from,  and 
there  is  left  pure  space,  as  it  exists  for  the  mathema- 
tician. Here  the  purely  analytical  procedure  of  the 
empirical  psychologist  is  apparent.  The  world  of 
objects  in  space  is  supposed  to  be  given  apart  from 
thought,  or  rather  by  means  of  mere  "  impressions  of 
resistance,"  and  by  a  further  extension  of  this  purely 
sensible  process,  the  knowledge  of  space  is  supposed 
to  be  given  by  feeling,  when  in  reality  it  is  got  by  a 
process  of  abstraction  that  presupposes  the  manifold 
relations  of  intelligence  by  which  the  world  has  been 
put  together.  Mr.  Spencer  has  not  asked  himself  the 
proper  question  of  philosophy.  How  is  the  real  world 
related  to  intelligence  ?  but,  instead,  has  put  a  question 
that  presupposes  a  false  abstraction  of  reality  from  in- 
telligence, viz..  How  docs  the  individual  man  apprehend 
by  his  sensations  the  real  world  \  The  true  answer  to 
his  question  is  that,  by  mere  sensation,  no  reality  what- 
ever can  be  apprehended,  and  the  illusion  of  such 
apprehension  simply  arises  from  confounding  sensation 
as  the  first  unreilected  form  of  knowledge  with  sensa- 
tion as  a  mere  abstraction  of  one  element  of  knowledge. 
If  it  be  replied  that  Mr.  Spencer  does  not  base  know- 
ledge upon  mere  feelings,  but  upon  "relations,"  the 
answer  is  that  the  "relations"  do  not  on  his  view  con- 
stitute reality,  but  are  only  the  modes  by  which  the 
individual  consciousness  gradually  fills  itself  up  with 
the  pre-existent  elements  of  a  supposed  real  world ;  and 
hence,  that,  notwithstanding  the  use  of  terms  implying 


IX.] 


MR.  SPENCEJi'S   VIEW  OF  NATURE. 


277 


more  than  feeling,  mere  feelings  are,  after  all,  assumed 
to  account  for  reality. 

Mr.  Spencer's  account  of  motion  is  similar  in  nature 
to  the  account  of  space,  of  time,  and  of  matter.  "  The 
conception  of  motion,  as  presented,  or  represented,  in 
the  developed  consciousness,  involves  the  conceptions 
of  space,  of  time,  and  of  matter.  A  something  that 
moves  ;  a  series  of  positions  united  in  thought  with  the 
successive  ones — these  are  the  constituents  of  the  idea. 
.  .  .  Movements  of  different  parts  of  the  organism  in 
relation  to  each  other  are  first  presented  in  conscious- 
ness. These,  produced  by  the  action  of  the  muscles, 
necessitate  reactions  upon  consciousness  in  the  shape  of 
muscular  tension.  Consequently,  each  stretching-out 
or  dra wing-in  of  a  limb  is  originally  known  as  a  series 
of  muscular  tensions,  varying  in  intensity  as  the  posi- 
tion of  the  limb  changes.  .  .  .  Motion,  as  we  know  it, 
is  thus  traceable  to  experiences  of  force." ^ 

In  treating  of  matter,  Mr.  Spencer  betook  himself 
to  the  conception  of  the  world  as  it  exists  for  the 
scientific  man,  and,  neglecting  the  manifold  relations 
which  form  the  real  wealth  of  the  sciences,  he  fixed  his 
attention  exclusively  upon  body,  conceived  as  extended 
and  resistant.  Now  he  refers  again  to  his  scientific 
conception  of  the  world,  and,  fetching  therefrom  the 
conception  of  motion,  adds  it  to  the  elements  he  has 
thus  far  sought  to  explain.  In  this  way  he  gets  the 
credit  of  explaining  the  origin  of  motion  without  any 
synthetic  activity  of  thought,  while  in  reality  that 
conception  is  assumed,  and  only  seems  to  the  uncritical 
reader  to  be  derived,  because  immediate  feelings  and 
intelligible  objects  are  blended  together  in  the  confused 
medium  of  popular  language. 

^  First  Prineipleg,  pp.  167,  168,  §  49. 


278 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


Motion  is  to  be  explained  by  feeling,  and,  for  tho 
purpose  in  hand,  muscular  tensions  are  most  easily 
manipulated.  "  Movements  of  different  parts  of  tho 
organism/'  we  are  told,  "are  first  presented  in  con- 
sciousness." This  is  an  exceedingly  facile  way  of 
accounting  for  our  knowledge  of  motion.  The  "  organ- 
ism "  is  assumed,  and  that  means  that  we  are  already, 
at  the  beginning  of  knowledge,  supposed  to  have  such  a 
knowledge  of  it  as  is  possessed  by  the  scientific  physio- 
logist. Hence  the  manifold  relations  of  real  objects  to 
each  other,  and  the  differentiation  of  the  human  organ- 
ism from  other  organisms,  and  from  inorganic  bodies, 
are  taken  for  granted  at  the  very  start.  That  being  so, 
there  can  be  no  great  difficulty  in  accounting  for  the 
movements  of  the  organism,  seeing  that  these  are 
already  implied  in  our  knowledge  of  the  organism 
itself.  These  movements,  we  are  next  informed, 
"  necessitate  reactions  upon  consciousness."  No  doubt 
they  do ;  but  the  question  is  whether  such  "  reactions  " 
can  possibly  be  known  by  consciousness  as  reactions, 
supposing  consciousness  to  be  identical  with  feeling. 
The  assumption  that  this  is  really  the  case  derives  its 
apparent  force  from  confusing  the  mere  feeling  of 
muscular  tension,  which  is  incapable  of  giving  tho 
knowledge  of  any  reality  whatever,  with  the  conception 
of  muscular  tension  as  related  to  a  real  intelligible 
world.  Hence  it  seems  as  if  feelings  of  muscular 
tension,  "  known  as  a  series,"  account  for  motion  in  the 
form  of  "  movements  of  different  parts  of  the  organism." 
But  "  muscular  tensions,"  as  feelings,  can  only  be  sup- 
posed to  give  a  knowledge  of  the  movements  of  the 
organism,  because  the  conception  of  such  movements, 
and  of  motion  in  general,  is  taken  up  without  criticism 
from  the  special  sciences.    When  we  make  a  real  effort 


IX.] 


MR.   SPENCER'S   VIEW  OF  NATURE. 


270 


ip- 
bhe 
its, 
Ism 
tort 


to  explain  motion,  we  find  that  it  is  utterly  unin- 
telligible, apart  from  the  other  elements  to  which 
in  an  intellectual  synthesis  it  is  related. 

After  what  has  already  been  said,  it  cannot  be 
necessary  to  show  at  length  that "  experiences  of  force  " 
do  not,  as  Mr.  Spencer  would  have  us  believe,  precede 
experiences  of  motion,  but,  on  the  contrary,  presuppose 
those  experiences.  It  is  only  by  unwarrantably  con- 
fusing mere  feelings  of  muscular  tension  with  the 
muscular  tensions  themselves,  as  they  exist  in  a  real 
world,  which  is,  at  the  same  time,  an  intelligible  world, 
that  any  one  could  fall  into  the  mistake  of  setting  down 
as  primary  and  simple  that  which  involves  a  long  and 
very  complex  process  of  differentiation.  Force  is,  no 
doubt,  presupposed  in  motion,  as  motion  is  presupposed 
in  matter,  and  matter  in  time,  and  time  in  space; 
but  the  implications  of  the  first  and  simplest  form  of 
knowledge  are  not  at  first  discerned,  and,  hence,  force 
is  the  last  element  in  the  scientific  conception  of  the 
world  which  emerges  into  explicit  consciousness.* 

2.  It  will  help  to  emphasize  the  contrast  between 
Criticism  and  Empiricism,  to  compare  Kant's  proofs  of 
the  three  laws  of  Mechanics  with  Mr.  Spencer's  way  of 
establishing  the  indestructibility  of  matter,  the  persist- 
ence of  force,  and  the  continuity  of  motion. 

In  the  first  law  of  Mechanics,  viz.,  that  "  the  quantity 
of  matter  cannot  be  either  increased  or  diminished," 
Kant  refers  back  to  the  proof  of  the  First  Analogy  of 
Experience,  as  given  in  the  Critique,  where  it  is  proved 
that  in  all  changes  of  phenomena  substance  is  per- 
manent, and  its  quantum  neither  increases  nor  dimin- 

^The  above  remarks  on  the  third  chapter  of  First  Principles  originally 
appeared,  with  a  few  verbal  differences,  in  the  Journal  of  Speculative  PhiloS' 
ophjf,  xii.,  123-136.    The  rest  of  the  chapter  is  almost  entirely  new. 


280 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


ishes ;  and  he  only  seeks  to  apply  the  conclusion  there 
reached  to  substance  specialized  as  matter.  Now,  as 
we  have  seen,  the  proof  of  the  First  Analogy  of  Experi- 
ence is  purely  transcendental,  i.e.^  it  shows  that  apart 
from  the  reflection  of  a  manifold  of  sense  on  the  **  I " 
as  the  supreme  condition  of  synthesis,  there  could  be 
no  knowledge  of  objects  as  permanent.  According  to 
Kant,  therefore,  the  indestructibility  of  matter  can  be 
proved  only  by  showing  that  it  is  implied  in  the  very 
possibility  of  knowledge.  The  manifold  of  external 
sense  is  no  doubt  given  to  intelligence,  but  the  fixing 
of  this  manifold  as  permanent  is  due  to  the  very  con- 
stitution of  the  human  intelligence.  Any  attempt  to 
account  for  the  indestructibility  of  matter  by  a  reference 
to  observation,  is,  for  Kant,  an  attempt  to  explain  how 
matter  as  a  thing  in  itself  may  be  apprehended  as  per- 
manent, the  logical  issue  of  which  can  only  be  a  denial 
of  all  knowledge  of  matter.  From  a  mere  observation 
of  external  objects  existing  apart  from  all  relation  to 
intelligence,  the  most  that  can  be  said  is,  tkat  so  far 
as  we  have  observed,  matter  is  indestructible.  But  this 
is  very  different  from  the  unqualified  aflirmation  that 
matter  is  indestructible. 

Mr.  Spencer  endeavours  to  show  that  matter  is  in- 
destructible in  two  ways;  first,  by  "induction,"  and 
secondly,  by  "  deduction."  Both  of  these  proofs  involve 
the  contradictory  assertions,  that  matter  is  imme- 
diately known,  and  that  it  is  known  to  be  permanent 
or  indestructible.  (1)  The  inductive  proof  is  briefly 
this :  Take  any  substance  and  find  out  by  weighing  it, 
the  number  of  its  constituent  atoms ;  then  let  it  undergo 
a  chemical  or  physical  process  of  change,  and  it  will  be 
found  that  the  number  of  constituent  atoms  is  still 
exactly  the  same  as  before.     Here  we  start  from  the 


i 


IX.] 


MR.   SPENCER'S   VIEW  OF  NATURE. 


281 


ordinary  empirical  assumption  that  a  thing,  as  variously 
qualified,  is  given  in  purely  passive  observation.  The 
induction  itself  is  further  supposed  to  be  a  process  of 
passive  observation.  But,  if  that  be  the  case,  how  can 
we  legitimately  pass  from  our  particular  observations 
of  individual  substances  to  the  universal  affirmation 
that  matter  as  a  whole  is  indestructible  ?  As  Hume 
has  shown,  the  mere  observation  of  facts  does  not 
entitle  us  to  make  any  universal  judgment;  we  are 
confined  to  the  judgment,  "  This  substance,  so  long  as 
I  observe  it,  remains  the  same  in  quantity."  But  this 
is  not  all.  For,  if  the  substances  supposed  to  be 
directly  observed,  are  regarded  as  existing  indepen- 
dently of  the  relations  by  which  intelligence  constitutes 
them  as  knowable  objects,  they  cannot  even  be  known 
to  persist  through  a  limited  number  of  moments  of 
time,  unless  thought  combines  the  scattered  impres- 
sions they  are  supposed  to  excite  in  us.  Apart  from 
such  relations  of  thought,  there  could  be  no  object 
at  all  for  us.  Now,  an  object  which  is  known  not  only 
as  something  in  general,  but  as  a  determinate  object, 
having  the  attribute  of  weight,  must  not  only  be  known 
as  enduring  through  successive  moments  of  time,  but 
must  be  determined  by  the  complex  relations  involved 
in  the  conception  of  it  as  a  gravitating  body,  whose 
weight  is  proportional  to  its  mass.  And  this  takes 
us  far  beyond  the  perception  of  the  moment,  to  the 
complex  relations  involved  in  the  connexion  of  material 
bodies  with  each  other.  It  is  only  by  assuming  to 
start  with  the  permanence  of  matter  as  known,  and  the 
permanence  of  its  quantitative  relations,  that  Mr. 
Spencer  apparently  accounts  for  the  indestructibility  of 
matter  from  induction  or  pure  observation.  (2)  The 
"deductive"  proof  simply  repeats  the  fallacy  of  the 


282 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


\ 


inductive  proof.  We  may  conceive  matter  to  be  com- 
pressed, it  is  said,  to  any  finite  extent,  but  we  can 
never  conceive  it  to  be  compressed  into  nothing.  Now, 
as  Kant  points  out,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  conceiving 
— I.e.,  imagining — any  given  unit  of  mass  to  be  reduced 
in  size,  so  long  as  we  contemplate  the  mass  'per  se, 
without  introducing  the  conception  of  weight  or  force 
impressed.  In  like  manner,  it  is  perfectly  easy  to 
imagine  the  decrease  of  the  given  weight  of  any  mass, 
so  long  as  we  abstract  from  the  mass  and  look  only  at 
the  weight.  What,  then,  is  inconceivable  ?  Mani- 
festly, the  conception  of  a  mass  that  is  not  proportional 
to  weight,  or  of  weight  that  is  not  proportional  to 
mass.  We  cannot  conceive  matter  compressed  into 
nothing,  because  we  cannot  conceive  the  compression 
of  nothing.  The  deductive  proof,  therefore,  asserts 
universally  that  mass  and  weight  are  correlative  and 
proportional.  But,  while  there  is  no  difficulty  in 
understanding  how  this  proportionality  of  weight  and 
mass  may  be  known,  when  we  regard  these  as  deter- 
minations of  objects  existing  only  in  relation  to  intelli- 
gence, it  is  utterly  inconceivable  how  objects  which 
are  defined  as  beyond  intelligence,  should  be  known  to 
have  these  or  any  other  properties.  Mr.  Spencer 
therefore,  can  only  assume  that  these  relations  are 
somehow  known,  and  then  proceed  to  "  deduce  "  them. 
The  deduction  cannot  present  any  great  difficulty, 
since  it  is  merely  a  restatement  of  that  which  is  taken 
for  granted,  and  taken  for  granted  in  defiance  of  a 
theory  of  knowledge  that  is  really  a  theory  of  igno- 
rance. 

Kant's  second  law  of  Mechanics  is  that  all  changes 
in  matter  are  due  to  an  external  cause ;  and  in  proving 
this  proposition  he  refers  back  to  the  proof  of  Causality, 


i 


IX.] 


MR.  SPENCER'S   VIEW  OF  NATURE. 


283 


as  given  in  the  Second  Analogy  of  Experience.  Kant, 
therefore,  recognizes  that  the  conception  of  force  is 
simply  a  special  application  of  the  conception  of  causal- 
ity, and  hence  that  the  persistence  of  force  can  only  be 
proved  by  showing  that  it  presupposes  the  relation  of  a 
special  manifold  of  sense  to  intelligence.  He  also 
shows  that  force  and  matter  are  related  as  cause 
and  substance,  and  that  the  conception  which  con- 
nects the  one  with  the  other  is  motion,  which  at 
once  determines  the  changes  of  matter,  and  manifests 
the  forces  without  which  no  changes  in  the  material 
world  could  take  place.  Thus  the  indestructibility  of 
matter  and  the  persistence  of  force  are  correlative  con- 
ceptions, neither  of  which  is  conceivable  apart  from  the 
other. 

Mr.  Spencer,  after  his  usual  method,  endeavours  to 
reduce  the  conception  of  force  to  the  feeling  of  muscu- 
lar resistance,  and,  naturally  failing  to  account  for  the 
persistence  of  force  from  that  which  is  not  persistent, 
but  momentary,  he  strangely  concludes,  not  that  his 
explanation  is  imperfect,  but  that  there  is  an  inherent 
weakness  in  the  human  mind,  which  precludes  it  from 
grasping  the  nature  offeree  as  it  is  "behind  the  veil." 
It  is  especially  unfortunate  that  Mr.  Spencer  should 
be  driven  to  this  conclusion,  because,  as  he  clearly  sees, 
the  indestructibility  of  matter  and  the  continuity  of 
motion  cannot  be  proved  unless  it  can  be  shown  that 
force  is  persistent.  "  The  validity  of  the  proofs  given," 
he  says,  "  tliat  matter  is  indestructible  and  motion  con- 
tinuous, really  depends  upon  the  validity  of  the  proof 
that  force  is  persistent."  ^  And  yet  Mr.  Spencer  holds 
that  "  the  persistence  of  force  is  an  ultimate  truth,  of 
which  no  inductive  proof  is  possible."^     **  Inductively, 


>  First  Priiicipka,  §  68,  p.  185. 


»  Ibid.,  §  59,  p.  183. 


284 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


we  can  allege  no  evidence  except  such  as  is  presented 
to  us  throughout  the  world  of  sensible  phenomena.  No 
force,  however,  save  that  of  which  we  are  conscious 
during  our  own  muscular  efforts,  is  immediately  known 
to  us.  All  other  force  is  mediately  known  through  the 
changes  we  attribute  to  it.  Since,  then,  we  cannot  in- 
fer the  persistence  of  force  from  our  own  sensation  of  it, 
which  does  not  persist;  we  must  infer  it,  if  it  is  inferred 
at  all,  from  the  continuity  of  motion,  and  the  undimin- 
ished ability  of  matter  to  produce  certain  effects.  But 
to  reason  thus  is  manifestly  to  reason  in  a  circle.  It  is 
absurd  to  allege  the  indestructibility  of  matter,  because 
we  find  experimentally  that  under  whatever  changes  of 
form  a  given  mass  of  matter  exhibits  the  same  gravita- 
tion, and  then  afterwards  to  argue  that  gravitation  is 
constant  because  a  given  mass  of  matter  exhibits  always 
the  same  quantity  of  it.  We  cannot  prove  the  contin- 
uity of  motion  by  assuming  that  force  is  persistent,  and 
then  prove  the  persistence  of  force  by  assuming  that 
motion  is  continuous.^^ ^  Now  if  "the  validity  of  the 
proofs  that  matter  is  indestructible  and  motion  con- 
tinuous really  depends  upon  the  validity  of  the 
proof  that  force  is  persistent,"  while  of  the  persist- 
ence of  force  no  proof  is  possible,  one  would  naturally 
conclude  that  all  three  are  pure  assumptions.  Mr. 
Spencer  would,  of  course,  reply  that  here  we  reach 
a  "principle,  which,  as  being  the  basis  of  science, 
cannot  be  established  by  science."  It  is  always  easy 
to  maintain  that  we  have  come  down  to  an  ultimate 
principle;  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  us,  when  we 
find  a  problem  impervious  to  our  method  of  ex- 
planation, from  saying  that  we  cannot  explain  it 
because  it  is  inexplicable.     In  a  similar  way  Mr.  MilP 

*  Firat  Principles,  p.  186.  ^  Examination  qf  Hamilton,  p.  213. 


it 
ilP 


k^ 


IX.] 


M/i.   SPENCER'S   VIEW  OF  NATURE. 


285 


makes  the  consciousness  of  the  identity  of  self  a  "  final 
inexplicability/'  when  he  finds  it  impossible  to  explain 
how  a  self,  defined  as  an  evanescent  series  of  feelings, 
should  yet  know  itself  to  be  evanescent.  It  may  safely 
be  said  that,  to  a  philosophy  which  has  discovered  the 
secret  of  the  explanation  of  knowledge,  there  are  no 
"  ultimate  principles,"  in  the  sense  of  principles  which 
are  absolutely  inexplicable.  The  woi  kmanship  of  the 
mind  in  the  constitution  of  knowledge  cannot  be 
beyond  the  ken  of  knowledge,  if  only  we  do  not  seek 
for  intelligibility  in  that  which  by  definition  is  unintel- 
ligible. It  may  very  well  be  conceded  that  force,  con- 
ceived of  as  "  some  power  which  transcends  our  know- 
ledge and  conception,"  *  cannot  be  understood,  and  it 
may  yet  be  held  that  the  persistence  of  force  is  capable 
of  being  proved.  Mr.  Spencer's  difficulty  in  regard  to 
the  proof  of  the  persistence  of  force  is  really  an  uncon- 
scious admission  of  the  inherent  viciousness  of  his 
philosophical  method.  Separate  the  conception  of 
force  from  intelligence  on  the  one  hand,  and  from  the 
correlative  conception  of  matter  on  the  other  hand,  and 
there  is  little  wonder  that  its  "persistence"  should 
seem  incapable  of  proof.  Force,  abstracted  from  its 
relations  to  intelligence,  is  nothing  at  all ;  it  is  simply 
the  negation  of  every  determinate  or  knowable  attribute 
of  matter.  On  the  other  hand  force,  as  it  is  actually 
manifested  in  the  known  world,  may  be  shown  to  be  per- 
sistent from  the  very  nature  of  that  world .  It  is  of  course 
impossible  to  prove,  simply  from  an  examination  of  the 
nature  of  knowledge,  anything  in  regard  to  the  specific 
objects  of  knowledge,  and  therefore  anything  in  regard 
to  the  specific  forces  which  constitute  the  changes  in 
the  world.      But,  starting  from  the  special  forces  of 

•  Firtt.  Prlnclplfg,  §  60,  p.  189. 


286 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


nature,  it  may  be  shown  that  the  knowledge  of  change 
is  impossible  except  to  an  intelligence  that  connects 
the  particular  element  in  known  objects  as  sequences  in 
time.  And  this  is  the  nature  of  the  proof  which  Kant 
gives  of  the  persistence  of  force.  The  changes  of  matter 
are  changes  of  that  which  is  distinguishable  as  having 
parts  that  are  all  outside  of  each  other,  and  the  changes 
of  such  pai*ts  are  of  courae  motions.  But  a  motion, 
taken  by  itself,  is  only  conceivable  as  mere  velocity,  or 
the  relation  of  space  traversed  to  time  elapsed;  and 
hence  from  mere  motion  no  explanation  can  be  given  of 
any  change  in  motion.  The  actual  fact  that  there  are 
changes  of  matter  cannot  of  course  be  proved,  but  what 
is  involved  in  the  knowledge  of  such  changes  may  be 
set  forth.  Mere  motion,  then,  does  not  imply  change. 
But  neither  does  matter,  which  may  be  defined  simply 
as  that  which  occupies  space,  without  changing  its 
relations  to  space.  To  explain  the  changes  of  matter — 
in  other  words,  the  change  from  one  rate  of  motion  to 
another,  or  from  motion  to  rest — we  require  to  intro- 
duce the  conception  of  something  causing  the  change. 
Now  the  conception  of  cause  is  implied  in  every  real 
sequence ;  and  the  latter  can  be  shown  to  be  knowable 
only  on  presupposition  that  intelligence  combines  the 
separate  determinations  of  change  in  relation  to  time. 
In  the  conception  of  force,  therefore,  there  is  implied  the 
relation  of  all  possible  changes  of  motion  to  a  combin- 
ing intelligence ;  and  as  such  changes  actually  are 
known,  force,  as  presupposing  cause,  is  bound  up  with 
the  very  nature  of  intelligence  as  knowing,  and  hence 
the  knowledge  of  a  single  change  is  virtually  a  demon- 
stration that  no  change  can  possibly  occur  in  nature 
which  is  not  a  manifestation  of  force.  The  persistence 
of  force  is  therefore  simply  a  special  case  of  the  univer- 


IX.] 


MH.   SPENCER'S   VIEW  OF  NATURE. 


287 


ce 
n- 


sality  of  the  law  of  causation ;  or,  what  is  the  same 
thing,  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  as  manifested  in 
special  laws.  Mr.  Spencer's  assertion  that  the  persist- 
ence of  force  is  unprovable  is  only  true  of  a  theory 
which  assumes  nature,  and  therefore  the  changes  of 
nature,  to  be  independent  of  all  intellectual  relations. 
Certainly  the  persistence  of  force  cannot  be  proved 
"inductively;"  for  no  number  of  successive  feelings  of 
"  muscular  eflfort,"  apart  from  the  synthetic  activity  of 
thought,  could  ever  give  us  a  knowledge  even  of  these 
feelings  as  changes,  much  less  of  the  necessity  of  all 
changes  in  the  world  of  nature.  Again,  force  taken  in 
abstraction  from  matter  and  motion  is  of  course  un- 
knowable, because  it  is  only  in  motion  that  force  mani- 
fests itself  at  all,  and  motion  necessarily  implies  the 
moveable,  i.e.,  matter.  It  is  perfectly  true  that,  to 
prove  the  indestructibility  of  matter  and  the  continuity 
of  motion,  we  must  introduce  the  conception  of  force ; 
but  this  does  not  show  either  that  force  is  identical 
with  matter  or  motion,  or  that  it  is  the  mere  negation 
of  matter  and  motion.  It  is  not  identical,  because,  as 
Kant  points  out,  that  which  occupies  space  is  dis- 
tinguishable, although  not  separable,  from  the  relations 
of  that  which  occupies  space,  and  mere  motion  is  dis- 
tinguishable from  change  of  motion.  It  is  not  the  mere 
negation  of  matter  and  motion,  because  substance  is 
essentially  relative  to  its  determinations,  and  these 
determinations  as  changes  are  relative  to  the  force  pro- 
ducing them.  We  have  therefore  only  to  recognise  the 
correlativity  of  the  conceptions  of  matter  and  force,  in 
order  to  understand  why  the  indestructibility  of  matter 
is  bound  up  with  the  persistence  of  force.  The  prin- 
ciple of  both  is  that  no  change  in  nature  can  possibly 
be  known  as  a  destruction  or  creation  of  that  which  is 


988 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS. 


actual,  since  every  change  presupposes  permanence. 
To  say  that  matter  may  be  destroyed,  is  to  say  that 
that  which  is  only  knowable  as  permanent  may  yet  be 
known  as  changing ;  to  say  that  force  is  not  persistent, 
is  to  say  that  that  which  is  only  knowable  as  change 
may  yet  be  known  as  the  negation  of  change.  Matter 
and  force  are,  in  short,  correlative  conceptions,  and 
neither  is  thinkable  apart  from  the  other. 

Mr.  Spencer's  proof  of  the  continuity  of  motion,  as 
corresponding  to  Kant's  third  law  of  Mechanics,  it  will 
not  be  necessary  to  consider,  as  it  consists  in  reducing 
motion  to  force,  and  declaring  the  latter  to  be  an  ulti- 
mate conception — a  point  that  has  already  been  dealt 
with. 


289 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE   DISTINCTION   OP   NOUMENA   AND  PHENOMENA    IN 
KANT   AND   SPENCER. 


TT  is  popularly  supposed  that  the  Critical  distinction 
of  phenomena  and  noumena  is  in  all  essential 
respects  identical  with  the  distinction  of  the  relative 
and  absolute,  the  knowable  and  unknowable,  based 
upon  the  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge, — 
i.  e.,  which  is  maintained  by  Mr.  Spencer  and  which 
was  first  made  known  to  the  English  public  by  Sir 
William  Hamilton.  The  use  of  the  terms  phenomena 
and  noumena  by  Mr.  Spencer,  and  the  superficial  re- 
semblance of  the  two  views,  are  no  doubt  respoD:jible 
for  the  identification  of  doctrines  that,  taken  in  con- 
nexion with  the  system  to  which  each  belongs,  aie  not 
only  different,  but  diametrically  opposite.  To  complete 
that  difierentiation  of  Criticism  and  Empiricism,  which 
it  has  been  my  aim  to  effect  in  what  has  already  been 
said,  it  will  be  necessary  now  to  consider  Kant's  theory 
of  knowledge,  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  theory  of  the  limita- 
tions of  knowledge,  and  an  exposure  of  the  illusions 
into  which  we  inevitably  fall  in  attempting  to  go 
beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  world  of  experience. 
This  negative  side  of  the  Critical  philosophy  I  do  not 
propose  to  enter  into  at  all  minutely.  It  will  be 
enough  to  consider  how  Kant  is  led  to  distinguish 


290 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


!! 


between  phenomena  and  noumena,  and  to  show  wherein 
his  view  differs  from  that  of  Mr.  Spencer. 

In  the  development  of  his  own  theory,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  Kant  draws  a  strong  contrast  between 
the  dogmatic  and  the  critical  point  of  view.  The  great 
vice  of  previous  philosophy  lies  in  the  assumption  that 
determinate  objects  in  their  manifold  relations  exist 
altogether  apart  from  the  forms  of  perception  and  of 
thought.  Kant,  therefore,  holds  that  things  in  them- 
selves, as  ordinarily  understood,  are  not  knowable  at  all. 
The  objects  we  actually  know  are  constituted  for  us 
in  the  reflection  of  the  manifold  of  sense  upon  the 
forms  of  the  mind.  And  the  legitimate  inference  from 
this  would  seem  to  be  that,  as  all  knowable  objects 
exist  only  in  relation  to  our  intelligence,  the  existence 
of  things  in  themselves  apart  from  such  relations  is  a 
contradiction  in  terms.  Kant,  however,  does  not  draw 
this  inference.  Denying  in  the  most  absolute  way  that 
concrete  objects  are  anything  at  all  except  as  informed 
by  the  pure  perceptions  of  space  and  time,  and  by  the 
categories,  he  is  not  prepared  to  say  that  there  are  not 
things  in  themselves,  as  distinguished  from  the  things 
which  constitute  the  actual  world  for  us.  In  the 
^Esthetic  the  distinction  between  phenomena  and  things 
in  themselves  is  made  to  rest  upon  the  subjective 
character  of  space  and  time,  which  as  forms  of  percep- 
tion belong  to  us  merely  as  sensuous  beings.  If  space 
and  time  are  peculiar  to  us  as  men,  or  at  least  belong 
only  to  beings  who  like  us  obtain  knowledge  by  the 
reflection  of  sense  on  thought,  we  are  shut  out,  as  it 
would  seem,  from  the  apprehension  of  things  as  they 
are  in  themselves.  As  the  objects  which  we  know  are 
always  relative  to  the  constitution  of  our  perceptive 
faculty,  the  knowledge  of  things  in  themselves,  suppos- 


X.] 


NOUMENA  AND  PHENOMENA. 


991 


ing  Buch  things  to  oxist  at  all,  must  always  be  im- 
possible for  us.  It  must  be  observed,  however,  that 
Kant  does  not  affirm  dogmatically  that  there  ave  things 
in  themselves ;  all  that  he  says  is  that,  if  there  are 
things  in  themselves,  the  conditions  of  our  perceptive 
intelligence  are  such  that  we  can  never  know  them  as 
they  are.  Whether  other  thinking  beings  are  bound 
down  by  the  same  limitations  as  we  are  in  their  know- 
ledge of  individual  things,  we  have  no  means  of  know- 
ing.* "While  space  and  time  are  the  conditions  without 
which  we  can  have  no  knowledge  of  objects,  there  may 
be  intelligences  to  whom  such  restrictions  are  unknown. 
And  Kant,  in  evident  adaptation  to  the  ordinary  point 
of  view,  even  suggests  that  to  God  real  things  must  be 
known  as  freed  from  the  limitations  of  space  and  time.2 
Taken  literally,  this  is*  a  manifest  affirmation,  not  only 
that  we  cannot  assert  without  qualification  that  the 
objects  we  know  are  identical  with  objects  as  they 
really  exist,  but  even  that  there  are  things  in  them- 
selves, capable  of  being  known  by  an  Intelligence 
higher  than  ours,  and  untrammelled  by  the  sensuous 
limitations  from  which  we  cannot  possibly  free  ourselves 
without  ceasing  to  be  men.  But  as  Kant  has  yet  to 
determine  whether  such  a  Being  as  the  God  of  Natural 
Theology  can  be  shown  to  exist  at  all,  we  cannot  take 
his  remark  as  to  the  freedom  of  such  a  Being  from  the 
forms  of  space  and  time  as  more  than  an  argumentum 
ad  hominem.  If  God  can  be  shown  to  exist,  and  He 
is  such  a  being  as  the  dogmatist  describes.  He  cannot 
have  a  sensuous  nature,  and  hence  He  cannot  be 
limited  by  the  sensuous  forms  of  space  and  time : 
things  as  known  by  Him  must  therefore  be  things  as 
they  are  behind  the  veil  of  sense.      We  cannot  of 


« Kritik,  §  3,  p.  62. 


2  7&W.,§8,  p.  79. 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS        [chap. 


course  say  what  such  extra-sensible  things  may  be  in 
their  real  nature,  but  we  can  at  least  say  that  they  are 
ixot  identical  with  things  as  we  know  them.  Kant, 
however,  is  perfectly  well  aware  that  here  he  is  assum- 
ing an  idea  that  strictly  speaking  he  has  no  right  to 
assume ;  and  he  must  be  held  in  the  Esthetic,  to  say 
no  more  than  this,  that  things  in  themselves,  as  distin- 
guished from  things  as  we  know  them,  must,  if  they 
exist  at  all,  be  altogether  different  from  the  phenomenal 
objects  we  actually  know.  Kant,  in  other  words,  does 
not,  like  Mr.  Spencer,  affirm  dogmatically,  that  there 
are  things  in  themselves,  but  only  that,  granting  the 
existence  of  such  things  in  themselves,  we  cannot 
possibly  know  them  as  they  are,  but  only  as  they  are 
in  relation  to  our  perceptive  faculty. 

It  is  only,  however,  after  the  complete  development 
of  his  positive  theory  of  knowledge  that  Kant  is  able 
to  enter  in  a  satisfactory  way  upon  the  problem  as  to 
the  limitations  of  knowledge.  Accordingly,  at  the 
close  of  the  Analytic,  the  distinction  of  phenomena 
and  noumena,  which  had  been  so  far  kept  in  the  buck- 
ground,  is  expressly  considered  under  the  title — "  On 
the  ground  of  the  distinction  of  phenomena  and  nou- 
mena." ^  The  substance  of  the  discussion  is  as  follows. 
It  has  been  shown  in  the  Analytic  that  the  pure  con- 
ceptions or  categories  are  simply  special  functions  of 
synthesis,  belonging  to  the  constitution  of  the  under- 
standing, but  incapable  of  being  brought  into  play 
except  in  relation  to  the  manifold  of  sense.  It  has 
also  been  shown  that  the  process  by  which  the  mani- 
fold of  sense  is  reflected  on  the  categories  may  be 
formulated  in  certain  ultimate  principles,  which  com- 
bine the  particulars   of   sense  under   the  categories 

^KritU',  pp.  209-224, 


X.] 


NOUMENA  AND  PHENOAfENA. 


MS 


by  tho  intei'ii)odiation  of  the  schemata  of  the  pure 
imagination,  and  in  relation  to  the  supreme  unity  of  self- 
consciousnosM.  But  what  is  thus  explained  is  the 
conditions  under  which  concrete  objects,  or  objects 
capable  of  beii.i;  experienced,  are  known.  Whether  the 
categories  and  principles  of  the  pure  understanding 
have  any  application  apart  from  the  manifold  of  sense, 
schematized  by  the  pure  imagination  as  in  time — 
whether,  in  other  words,  they  are  applicable  not  only 
to  phenomena,  but  to  things  in  themselves — is  a  totally 
different  question. 

Now,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  even  if  there  are  things 
in  themselves,  at  least  the  categories  cannot  be  legiti- 
mately employed  to  determine  them.  For,  apart  from 
the  manifold  of  sense,  which  gives  to  us  the  concrete 
element  of  our  knowledge,  there  is  nothing  for  the 
categories  to  operate  upon.  No  doubt  any  perceptive 
or  concrete  element  would  be  sufficient  to  give  filling 
to  a  pure  conception ;  but,  as  for  us  there  is  no  per- 
ception that  is  not  sensuous,  this  mere  possibility  in  no 
way  enables  us  to  know  any  objects  except  those  which 
are  revealed  to  us  in  actual  experience.  We  cannot 
even  say  that  the  categories,  in  conjunction  with  the 
pure  forms  of  perception,  make  the  knowledge  of  real 
objects  possible ;  for  the  latter  are  in  themselves 
merely  the  potentiality  of  spatial  and  temporal  rela- 
tions, as  the  forms  are  merely  the  potentiality  of  deter- 
minate objects.  It  may  easily  be  shown  that  not  one 
of  the  categories  or  principles  can  be  made  intelligible, 
apart  from  the  sensuous  conditions  in  relation  to  which 
known  objects  are  constituted  and  connected.  Isolate 
a  category,  and  it  is  a  mere  form  of  thought,  requiring 
to  be  determined  to  a  knowable  object  by  being 
brought  in  relation  to  a  special  manifold  of  sense  by 


294 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


the  intermediation  of  the  schema  proper  to  it.  The 
category  of  quantity  has  meaning  and  significance  only 
when  we  take  a  unit  a  certain  number  of  times,  or  suc- 
cessively add  it  to  itself.  The  category  of  reality  im- 
plies the  determination  of  time  as  filled  by  sensation  ; 
the  category  of  negation  the  determination  of  time  as 
empty  of  sensation.  Eliminate  the  idea  of  permanence 
or  relation  to  time  as  a  whole,  and  the  category  of  sub- 
stance is  merely  the  logical  notion  of  a  subject  that  is 
never  a  predicate.  So  the  logical  possibility  of  con- 
ceptions determines  nothing  as  to  the  possibility  of  real 
things.  In  short,  if  we  abstract  .from  the  special  sen- 
suous conditions  under  which  objects  are  knowable  by 
us,  we  have  merely  the  empty  conception  or  thought 
of  a  thing,  telling  us  nothing  as  to  the  actual  nature  of 
the  thing  in  itself.  On  a  mere  conception,  as  has  so 
often  been  said,  only  an  analytic,  and  not  a  synthetic 
judgment,  can  be  based. 

There  is,  however,  a  natural  illusion  which  arises 
here,  from  the  peculiar  character  of  the  categories. 
Space  and  time  are  manifestly  limited  in  their  applica- 
tion to  sensible  objects,  and  hence  we  at  once  recognize 
that  they  are  not  applicable  beyond  the  boundaries  of 
the  world  of  objects  which  we  actually  know  as  deter- 
minate. It  is  otherwise  with  the  categories,  which 
belong  not  to  sense  but  to  thought,  and  therefore 
naturally  seem  to  have  an  application  to  objects  con- 
structed purely  by  thought.  This  supposed  extension 
of  the  categories  beyond  experience  is,  however,  as  it 
need  hardly  be  said,  an  illusion,  for,  apart  from  the 
concrete  filling  which  they  obtain  from  the  imagin- 
ation as  determining  the  manifold  of  sense  in  time, 
the  categories  have  nothing  to  operate  upon.  At 
the   same   time,   the   very   fact   that   we   limit    their 


X.] 


NOUMENA  AND  PHENOMENA. 


296 


application  to  sensuous  existences  or  phenomena, 
inevitably  suggests  that  there  are  non-sensuous  or 
intelligible  existences,  which,  as  the  product  of  intel- 
ligence unaided  by  sense,  may  properly  be  called  nou- 
Tnena.  If  objects  as  known  are  relative  to  our  faculty 
of  perception,  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  imagining  the 
existence  of  an  object  not  relative  to  that  faculty,  and 
equally  impossible  to  avoid  the  supposition  that  it  is 
determinable  by  the  categories.  Thus,  the  self  as 
known  is  always  in  some  determinate  state,  and  there- 
fore is  perceived  as  in  time ;  but  with  this  self  as  in 
time  we  naturally  contrast  the  self  as  existing  in  its 
own  nature  apart  from  its  determinate  relations.  It  is 
easy  to  see,  however,  that  the  noumenal  object  is 
simply  the  conception  of  an  object  in  general — i.e.,  of 
an  object  which  cannot  be  known  to  exist  in  any  deter- 
minate relation;  and  that  it  cannot  be  really  consti- 
tuted as  an  actual  object  by  the  application  of  the 
categories  to  it,  since  these  can  only  act  in  relation 
to  an  object  which  is  capable  of  being  known  as  in 
time. 

We  must  therefore  clearly  distinguish  between  a 
nouraenon  in  the  negative  sense  and  a  noumenon  in  the 
positive  sense.  (1)  In  the  negative  sense  a  noumenon 
is  that  which  is  7iot  an  object  of  perception.  The  con- 
ception of  such  an  object  is  implied  in  the  limitation  of 
real  knowledge  by  the  forms  of  perception.  As  we 
only  know  that  which  is  relative  to  our  faculty  of  per- 
ception, whatever  is  out  of  relation  to  that  faculty  is 
unknown.  The  contrast  of  a  noumenon,  defined  simply 
as  that  which  is  not  within  the  limits  of  our  actual 
knowledge,  and  a  phenomenon  as  that  which  is  within 
those  limits,  is  one  that  arises  from  the  very  nature  of 
our  intelligence.     That  there  may  be  such  a  transcend- 


296 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


ental  object  is  not  a  self-contradictory  proposition.  We 
are  not  entitled  to  affirm  that  the  concrete  element 
required  to  give  determination  to  a  conception  can  only 
be  supplied  by  sensibility  of  some  kind :  it  may  be 
that  there  are  intelligences  which  originate  the  partic- 
ular and  the  universal  element  of  knowledge  by  the 
understanding  alone.  As,  however,  our  understanding 
has  no  concreteness  in  it,  the  conception  of  a  noumenon 
is  merely  a  problematic  conception,  marking  off  the 
limits  of  our  actual  knowledge,  but  in  no  way  enabling 
us  to  go  beyond  objects  capable  of  being  experienced. 
Accordingly,  the  categories  cannot  be  employed  to 
determine  such  a  noumenon.  As  our  understanding  is 
dependent  upon  perception  for  the  particular  element 
implied  in  any  possible  knowledge  of  a  positive  object, 
the  conception  of  a  thing  in  itself  merely  serves  to 
mark  the  limit  of  our  knowledge  in  perceptible  ob- 
jects, without  enabling  us  to  know  a  noumenon  actu- 
ally existing  beyond  that  limit.  (2)  The  conception 
of  a  noumenon,  in  the  positive  sense,  as  an  object 
of  a  non-sensuous  perception,  is  a  mere  thing  of  the 
mind,  arising  from  the  confusion  of  a  bare  conception 
— with  an  actual  object.  From  the  conception  of  a 
thing  in  itself,  an  unwarrantable  transition  is  made  to 
the  affirmation  of  the  reality  for  knowledge  of  that 
which  is  conceived.  But  this  is  the  old  fallacy  of 
basing  real  knowledge  upon  a  purely  analytical  judg- 
ment. There  is  no  logical  contradiction  in  the  concep- 
tion of  a  thing  in  itself,  distinct  from  the  things  we 
know,  for  the  law  of  contradiction  is  satisfied  when 
the  predicate  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  subject. 
But  the  absence  of  logical  contradiction  in  a  judgment 
does  not  establish  the  existence  for  knowledge  of  that 
which  is  judged  about ;  and  hence  we  have  no  right 


i;  w 


[chap. 


X.] 


NOUMENA  AND  PHENOMENA. 


297 


to  say  that  there  is  a  thing  in  itself  corresponding 
to  our  conception.  And  as  a  noumenon  is  for  us 
simply  the  idea  of  a  limit  to  our  actual  knowledge, 
\ve  cannot  determine  it  by  the  categories.  Only  if  we 
had  a  non-sensuous  or  intellectual  perception,  should 
\-Q  be  entitled  to  affirm  positively  that  there  is  a 
noumenal  object ;  and  as  we  have  no  such  perception, 
the  categories  are  not  applicable  in  the  determination 
of  noumena  at  all.  So  far  is  it  from  being  true  that 
our  understanding  is  perceptive,  that  we  cannot  in  the 
least  understand  how  there  can  be  an  understanding 
not  dependent  for  the  concrete  element  of  knowledge 
on  sensible  perception.  The  proper  conception  of  a 
noumenon  is  therefore  merely  that  of  a  noumenon,  in 
the  negative  sense,  as  that  which  is  not  for  us  an  object 
of  possible  perception. 

,  It  will  help  to  illustrate  what  has  just  been  said  if 
we  consider  shortly  Kant's  criticism  of  the  dogmatic 
view,  which  he  contrasts  with  his  own,  the  view  that 
noumena  are  positively  known.  The  fallacy  here 
arises  from  overlooking  the  limits  of  our  knowledge, 
and  applying  the  categories  to  the  determination  of 
mere  limitative  conceptions,  or  from  failing  to  recog- 
nize that  the  objects  we  know  are  not  things  in  them- 
selves, but  phenomena.  Let  us  first  look  at  the  fal- 
lacy which  underlies  rational  psychology,  the  doctrine 
of  the  soul  conceived  of  as  actually  existinpf  beyond  the 
limits  of  experience.^  (1)  The  soul,  it  is  said,  is  a  &uh- 
stance,  because  there  must  be  a  substratum  underlying 
all  the  particular  modes  in  which  we  are  conscious  of  it. 
(2)  As  the  condition  of  any  unity  in  knowledge,  it 
must  also  be  simple,  and  therefore  in  itself  devoid  of 
all  diflference.      (3)  That  it  is  identical,  or  the  same 

•       ::  >A'>v7«/fc,  pp.  273-289. 


I 


298 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


with  itself  in  different  times,  is  implied  in  the  fact  that 
our  various  experiences  are  all  connected  together. 
(4)  Lastly,  it  stands  in  relation  to  all  possible  objects 
in  space,  because  otherwise  it  could  not  be  thought  of 
as  distinct  from  objects  in  space. 

Now  (1)  the  self  is  here  supposed  to  be  known  as  a 
thing  in  itself,  capable  of  being  determined  by  the 
application  to  it  of  the  categories  of  substance,  unity, 
&c. ;  in  other  words,  it  is  supposed  to  be  a  noumenon, 
in  the  positive  sense,  as  an  object  of  a  non-sensuous,  or 
intellectual  perception.  But  this  confuses  a  logical 
element  in  knowledge  with  an  actual  object  existing 
beyond  knowledge.  It  is  perfectly  true  that  the  self 
is  the  subject  of  all  mental  states,  but  so  conceived 
it  is  simply  the  abstraction  of  relation  to  conscious- 
ness, the  "  I  think "  implied  in  every  determinate  act 
of  knowledge.  First  to  hypostatize  this  abstraction, 
and  then  to  determine  it  by  the  category  of  sub- 
stance, is  a  perfectly  unwarrantable  proceeding.  The 
pure  "  I "  does  not  admit  of  determination  by  the 
category  of  substance,  because,  as  abstracted  from  all 
its  relations,  it  has  no  concreteness  in  it.  Nay,  even 
the  "  I "  as  known  cannot  be  determined  as  a  sub- 
stance, because  the  schema  of  "permanence"  applies 
only  to  objects  in  space.  (2)  The  same  paralogism  is 
implied  in  saying  that  the  self  is  simple.  No  doubt 
we  can  only  be  conscious  of  self  as  a  unity,  but  this 
consciousness  is  necessarily  relative  to  the  conscious- 
ness of  knowable  objects  as  involving  multiplicity. 
To  affirm  that  the  self  is  one  in  itself  is  going  beyond 
the  limits  of  knowledge.  (3)  Nor  again  can  we 
argue  from  the  identity  of  the  self  for  consciousness 
to  the  identity  of  the  self  as  existing  out  of  conscious- 
ness.    (4)  And  lastly,  the  fact  that  the  self  as  known 


X.] 


NOUMENA  AND  PHENOMENA. 


299 


stands  in  relation  to  all  objects  that  are  capable  of 
being  known  as  external,  does  not  entitle  us  to  say  that 
there  is  a  noumenal  self,  existing  apart  from  conscious- 
ness, and  determinable  as  an  actual  object.  The  self 
as  known  by  us  is  the  subject  of  feelings  which  exist 
only  in  time,  as  distinguished  from  objects  in  space 
and  time ;  but  although  the  former  is  distinguishable 
from  the  latter,  both  exist  only  in  consciousness,  and 
therefore  only  in  relation  to  each  other.  To  determine 
self  as  a  noumenal  object  is  to  confuse  the  logical  dis- 
tinction of  self  and  not-self  with  their  real  separation. 

The  second  noumenal  object  is  the  world  regarded  as 
a  whole.^  The  illusion  of  rational  cosmology  does  not 
arise,  as  in  the  case  of  rational  psychology,  from  the 
confusion  of  an  abstract  element  of  knowledge  with  a 
thing  in  itself  regarded  as  an  actual  existence,  but  from 
the  assumption  that  the  world  as  known  to  us  is  a 
thing  in  itself,  independent  of  all  relation  to  our  facul- 
ties of  knowledge.  For  when  we  ask  whether  the 
world  is  a  complete  unity,  we  may  gi\'e  one  of  two  con- 
tradictory answers,  according  as  our  general  mode  of 
thought  leads  us  to  emphasize  the  infinite  or  the  finite 
side  of  things.  Hence  we  find  that  reason  here  gives 
rise  to  antinomies  or  conceptions  mutually  exclusive  of 
each  other.  There  are,  as  we  see  from  following  the 
guiding-thread  of  the  categories,  four  and  only  four  of 
these  antinomies,  which  we  may  group  into  two  classes, 
the  mathematical  and  the  dynamical. 

(1)  The  mathematical  antinomies  are  concerned 
respectively  with  the  infinite  extensibility  of  the  world 
in  space  and  time,  and  with  the  infinite  divisibility 
of  matter.  Supposing  known  objects  to  be  things  in 
themselves,  it  can  be  proved  with  equal  cogency,  on  the 

^Kritik,  pp.  301-356. 


800 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


one  hand  that  the  world  is  limited  in  time  and  space, 
and  that  matter  is  finitely  divisible ;  and  on  the  other 
hand,  that  the  world  is  unlimited  in  time  and  space,  and 
tliat  matter  is  infinitely  divisible.  (2)  In  the  dynamical 
antinomies  it  is  shown  that  a  free  causality  and  a. 
necessary  causality  may  be  alike  proved;  and  that  a 
necessary  being  belonging  to  the  world,  either  as  its 
part  or  its  cause,  is  no  more  capable  of  being  established 
than  the  contradictory  proposition,  that  there  is  no 
necessary  being  either  in  the  world  or  out  of  it. 

Now  here  we  seem  to  be  brought  to  the  conclusion 
that  two  contradictory  conceptions  are  equally  capable 
of  being  proved  to  be  true.  But  if  this  were  really  the 
case,  reason  would  be  in  contradiction  with  itself,  and 
we  should  be  incapable  of  justifying  even  the  possibil- 
ity of  real  knowledge.  There  must  therefore  be  some 
radical  flaw  underlying  these  antinomies.  That  flaw 
certainly  does  not  exist  in  the  mere  form  of  the  proof, 
which  is  in  each  case  perfectly  correct.  Wherein,  then, 
does  it  consist  ?  It  consists,  Kant  answers,  in  the  con- 
fusion of  knovable  objects  with  things  in  themselves. 
We  have  seen  that  all  concrete  objects  are  relative  to 
the  forms  of  space  and  time,  and  therefore  that  of  things 
in  themselves  we  can  have  no  possible  knowledge.  But 
if  this  is  so,  it  is  absurd  to  say  either  that  the  world  is 
finite  in  extent  or  infinite  in  extent;  that  matter  is 
finitely  divisible  or  infinitely  divisible.  The  world,  as 
a  thing  in  itself,  is  not  in  space  and  time  at  all,  and 
therefore  does  not  admit  of  being  determined  by 
spatial  or  temporal  relations.  The  world,  as  in  space 
and  time,  again,  exists  only  in  relation  to  our  per- 
ceptive faculty ;  and  hence  it  is  neither  finitely  nor 
infinitely  extended,  but  infinitely  extensible;.  Oo  matter 
is  neither  finitely  nor  infinitely  divided,  but  infinitely 


[chap. 


X.] 


NOUMENA  AND  PHENOMENA. 


301 


some 


divisible.  There  is  no  limit  to  the  determination  of 
space  and  time,  either  as  extensive  or  as  intensive 
quantities,  because  these  are  forms  belonging  to  our 
perceptive  faculty,  and  hence  admit  of  indefinite  de- 
termination. As  to  the  dynamical  antinomies,  both 
alternatives  are  false  when  they  are  supposed  to  refer 
to  the  world  of  experience;  but  both  may  be  true 
when  the  theses  are  taken  as  referring  to  the  nou- 
menal  world,  and  the  antitheses  as  referring  to  the 
phenomenal  world.  There  is  no  contradiction  in  say- 
ing that  there  is  a  free  cause  and  a  necessary  being 
independent  of  the  phenomenal  world,  while  yet,  in  the 
phenomenal  world,  there  is  no  free  cause  and  no  neces- 
sary being.  This,  of  course,  does  not  prove  the  truth 
of  the  theses,  as  interpreted  in  this  way,  but  it  leaves 
the  way  open  for  a  proof  based  on  the  nature  of  man  as 
a  moral  being. 

The  mere  statement  of  Kant's  distinction  of  noumena 
and  phenomena  is  almost  enough  to  show  that,  so  far 
from  being  identical,  his  theory  is  strongly  contrasted 
with  that  of  Mr.  Spencer.  And  the  contrast  extends 
to  the  aim  of  the  theory,  the  general  doctrine  of 
which  it  forms  a  part,  and  the  method  by  which  it  is 
established.  Kant's  object  in  drawing  a  distinction 
between  phenomena  and  noumena  is  not  to  degrade 
the  former  at  the  expense  of  the  latter,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  to  show  that  the  latter  are  mere  ideas  to 
which  no  real  object  can  be  known  to  correspond.  Mr. 
Spencer,  on  the  other  hand,  maintains  that  noumena 
are  the  true  realities,  and  phenomena  merely  the 
appearances  they  present  to  us.  Kant's  theory  of 
knowledge,  again,  goes  on  the  principle  that  no  concrete 
object  can  be  known  to  exist  independently  of  intelli- 
gence ;  and  hence  that  the  objects  we  know  are  necess- 


I 


302 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


arily  constituted  by  relations  of  thought.     On  the  other 
hand,  it  belongs  to  the  very  essence  of  Mr.  Spencer's 
system  to  assume  the  existence  of  objects  constituted 
independently  of  intelligence ;  and  the  doctrine  of  the 
"  unknowable  "  is  therefore  in  his  hands  the  inevitable 
result  of  the  dualistic  conception  of  intelligence  and 
nature  from  which  he  starts.     Lastly,  Kant  maintains 
that  to  noumena  the  conceptions  of  substance,  unity, 
&c.,  and  the  determinations  of  space  and  time,  are  not 
applicable,  and  hence  he  gets  rid  of  the  false  abstraction 
of  a  self  that  is  beyond  consciousness  and  of  a  world 
that  exists  apart  from  the  real  relations  by  which  it  is 
constituted,  by  insisting  upon  the  relation  of  all  know- 
able  objects  to  the  subject  knowing  them.     Mr.  Spencer, 
on  the  contrary,  can  see  in  the  antinomies  of  reason 
only  a  proof  of  the  imbecility  of  the   human   mind, 
and  hence  he  has  no  solution  to  give  of  the  apparent 
contradictions  involved  in  our  fundamental  conceptions 
of  the  universe.     The  opposition  of  the  critical  view  of 
the  relativity  of  knowledge  to  the  dogmatic  view  of 
Mr.  Spencer  is  therefore  radical.     It  is  true  that  the 
two  views  approximate  in  the  denial  of  all  definite 
knowledge  of  supersensible  realities ;  but  this  is  after 
all  only  an  external  resemblance ;  for  Kani  never  for 
a  moment  supposes,  as  Mr.  Spencer  does,  that  a  demon- 
stration of  the  absolute   unknowability  of  things  in 
themselves  is  tantamount  to  an  assertion  that  they  are 
the  only  realities.     Had  Kant  not  believed  that  by  the 
practical  reason  he  could  prove  the  actual  existence  of 
the  soul,  the  world,  and  God,  as  supersensible  realities, 
he  would  have  denied  that  we  are  entitled  to  affirm 
that  there  are  such  realities ;  at  least  one  may  safely 
say  that  he  would  not  have  consented  to  degrade  the 
realities  we  know  in  favour  of  realities  that  are  affirmed 


[chap. 


X.] 


NOUMENA  AND  PHENOMEN 


303 


not  to  be  knowable  at  all.  It  may  also  be  added  that 
a  consistent  development  of  the  principles  established 
by  Kant  in  the  positive  part  of  his  system  leads  to 
the  conclusion  that  there  are  supersensible  realities, 
capable  of  being  known  by  us,  whereas  a  development 
of  the  principles  upon  which  Mr.  Spencer's  doctrine 
rests  must  lead  to  the  denial  of  any  knowledge  whatever. 
Leaving  the  development  of  the  Critical  philosophy  to 
another  chapter,  I  shall  now  endeavour  to  show  more 
particularly  how  marked  is  the  contrast  between  the 
philosophy  of  Kant  and  the  philosophy  of  Mr.  Spencer, 
as  to  aim,  principle,  and  method. 

1.  Kant  does  not  say  that  there  are  noumenal  reali- 
ties, but  that  the  question  of  such  existence  cannot  bo 
established  by  theoretical  reason,  in  consistency  with 
the  conditions  of  knowledge.  All  knowledge  implies  a 
relation  of  subject  and  object ;  or,  more  particularly, 
objects  are  constituted  only  by  the  reflection  of  percep- 
tion on  thought.  Kant,  therefore,  denies  the  knowledge 
of  noumena  hecause  our  knowledge  is  relative,  or  rather 
is  a  knowledge  of  relations.  Mr.  Spencer,  on  the  other 
hand,  maintains  that  there  are  noumenal  realities,  or  a 
noumenal  reality,  existing  out  of  all  relation  to  our 
knowledge ;  and  yet  he  strangely  asserts  that  this 
noumenal  reality  can  be  known.  Like  Kant,  he  holds 
that  known  realities  are  relative  to  knowledge ;  but, 
unlike  Kant,  he  supposes  this  to  be  a  proof  of  the 
existence  of  the  absolute.  Kant's  reason  against  the 
existence  for  knowledge  of  noumena  is  Mr.  Spencer's 
reason  j^r  that  existence. 

There  are  two  distinct  senses  among  others  in  which 
we  may  speak  of  the  "  relative."  Mr.  Spencer  uses 
the  term  in  both  senses,  without  carefully  distinguish- 
ing between  them,  and  by  this  confusion  of  thought 


t 


304 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


and  expression  the  inconclusiveness  of  his  reasoning  is 
partially  concealed.  In  the  first  place,  by  the  relative 
may  be  understood  that  which  as  an  object  of  thought 
involves  a  relation  or  series  of  relations  to  thought. 
The  condition  of  any  consciousness  whatever  being  the 
opposition  of  subject  and  object,  and  the  condition  of 
definite  thinking  being  the  apprehension,  identification 
and  classification  of  differences  in  the  object,  knowledge 
is  always  a  knowledge  of  relations.  The  relative  as 
thus  understood  does  not  necessitate  the  assumption 
of  an  absolute  or  non-relative  beyond  ronsciousness : 
all  that  is  required  to  constitute  the  relation  is  nn 
object  having  more  or  fewer  differences,  and  a  sub- 
ject which  is  more  or  less  determinate ;  and  when 
these  two  correlatives  are  taken  together  the  law  that 
contraries  imply  each  other  is  satisfied.  Secondly, 
the  relative  may  mean  that  which  is  known,  as  distin- 
guished from  the  absolute  which  exists  beyond  know- 
ledge. The  relative  in  this  sense  of  the  term  evi- 
dently presupposes  the  independent  existence  of  the 
absolute;  for  if  there  is  no  absolute  beyond  the 
bounds  of  knowledge,  there  will  be  no  relative  within 
the  bounds  of  knowledge.  The  relative  is  in  fact 
simply  the  non-absolute,  the  absolute  the  non-relative. 
Take  away  the  absolute,  and  the  relative  as  relative 
disappears;  take  away  the  relative  and  there  is  no 
longer  an  absolute. 

Examining  Mr.  Spencer's  arguments  in  the  light  of 
the  distinction  here  pointed  out,  it  will  be  found  that 
all  of  them  receive  their  apparent  force  from  a  con- 
fusion between  the  relative  as  implied  in  the  very 
nature  of  consciousness,  and  the  fictitious  relative  that 
results  from  the  assumption  of  the  independent  existence 
of  a  non-relative  beyond  consciousness.      But  so  far 


[chap. 

oning  is 
relative 
thought 
thought, 
eing  the 
Ution  of 
ification 
ovvledgo 
ative  as 
umption 
ousness : 
>n  is  an 
I  a  sub- 
d  when 
law  that 
econdly, 
s  distin- 
know- 


g 


jrni  evi- 
of  the 
)nd  the 
B  within 

in  fact 
relative. 

relative 
•e  is  no 

light  of 
nd  that 
a  con- 
he  very 
ive  that 
xistence 
t  so  far 


X.] 


NOVMENA  AND  PHENOMENA. 


from  the  one  relative  implying  the  other,  it  is  evident 
that  just  in  proportion  as  the  one  is  established  the 
reality  of  the  other  becomes  precarious.  The  more 
stringently  it  is  proved  that  knowledge  is  in  all  cases  a 
knowledge  of  relations — in  other  words,  that  only  that 
which  is  an  object  of  thought  can  be  known  at  all — the 
more  apparent  it  becomes  that  a  relative  which  has 
no  meaning  except  in  contrast  with  an  unknowable 
non-relative  or  absolute,  is  itself  unknowable  and  in- 
credible. It  is  apparently  from  a  confused  apprehen- 
sion that  he  is  guilty  of  this  ignoratio  eknchi,  that  Mr. 
Spencer,  after  laboriously  removing  the  ground  from 
under  his  own  feet  by  enforcing  in  a  variety  of  ways 
the  proposition  that  the  non-relative  cannot  be  known, 
attempts  to  regain  some  sort  of  footing  by  distinguishing 
between  a  knowledge  of  the  absolute  and  a  "  conscious- 
ness "  of  it — as  if  there  were  a  kind  of  consciousness 
that  excluded  knowledge. 

"  Human  intelligence  is  incapable  of  absolute  know- 
ledge. The  relativity  of  our  knowledge  is  demonstrable 
analytically.  The  induction  drawn  from  general  and 
special  experiences,  may  be  confirmed  by  a  deduction 
from  the  nature  of  our  intelligence.  Two  ways  of 
reaching  such  a  deduction  exist.  Proof  that  our  cogni- 
tions are  not,  and  never  can  be,  absolute,  is  obtainable 
by  analyzing  either  the  product  of  thought,  or  the 
process  of  thought."^ 

This  statement  of  the  general  doctrine,  clear  as  it 
seems,  really  confounds  together  the  two  meanings  of 
the  relative,  discriminated  above.  When  it  is  said 
that  the  human  mind  is  not  capable  of  "  absolute  know- 
ledge," but  only  of  relative  knowledge,  it  is  implied 
that  that  which  is  known  is  connected  with  an  abso- 

« First  Pr'mciple»,  §  22,  pp.  68-69. 
U 


'1 


806 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS 


[chap. 


•?* 


lute  lying  beyond  knowledge,  and  related  to  it  as 
reality  to  appearance.  But  this  evidently  is  true 
only  if  there  exist  such  a  reality :  for  if  there  is  no 
reality  outside  of  consciousness,  knowledge  will  not  be 
of  appearances,  but  of  reality.  If  Mr.  Spencer  had 
said,  as  he  ought  to  have  done  to  be  strictly  accurate, 
not  that  there  can  be  no  "  absolute  knowledge,"  but 
that  there  can  be  no  knowledge  of  the  Absolute  (a  very 
different  thing)  it  would  have  been  at  once  apparent 
that  to  prove  the  "relativity  of  knowledge,"  in  the 
sense  that  knowledge  always  implies  relations  of  an 
object  to  a  subject,  does  not  carry  with  it  the  implica- 
tion of  the  existence  of  an  absolute  beyond  conscious- 
ness, but  on  the  contrary  is  the  negation  of  that 
existence.  If  there  is  no  knowledge  of  the  absolute, 
we  have  no  right  to  predicate  its  existence;  and  if 
all  knowledge  involves  relations,  the  absolute,  as  de- 
void of  all  relations — as,  in  other  words,  not  an  object 
of  thought — cannot  be  known  to  exist.  A  confusion 
between  the  knowledge  of  relations  and  the  relativity  of 
knowledge  being  thus  made  at  the  very  threshold,  it 
is  only  to  be  expected  that  the  same  confusion  will 
vitiate  the  reasonings  that  follow  it.  And  this  is 
actually  the  case. 

"  Reason,"  we  are  told,  "  leads  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  sphere  of  reason  is  limited.  This  conclusion 
expresses  the  result  of  mental  analysis,  which  shows  us 
that  the  product  of  thought  is  in  all  cases  a  relation, 
identified  as  such  and  such;  that  therefore  being  in 
itself,  out  of  relation,  is  unthinkable,  as  not  admitting 
of  being  brought  within  the  form  of  thought."^ 

A  little  reflection  will  suffice  to  bring  out  into  clear- 
ness the  paralogism  implicit  in  this  reasoning.    On  the 

^Eaaaya:  SckrUifie,  Political,  and  Speculative,  voL  iii,  new  ed.,  p.  258. 


[chap. 

to  it  as 
is  true 
3re  is  no 
11  not  be 
ncer  had 
accurate, 
ige,"  but 
le  (a  very 
apparent 
),"  in  the 
3n8  of  an 
e  implica- 
conscious- 
1  of  that 
absolute, 
je ;  and  if 
ite,  as  de- 
an object 
confusion 
ilativity  of 
ireshold,  it 
fusion  will 
id  this  is 

jonclusion 

[conclusion 

shows  us 

relation, 

being  in 

admitting 

linto  clear- 
On  the 

^d.,  p.  258. 


X.] 


NOUMENA  AND  PHENOMENA. 


SOT 


surface,  all  that  seems  to  be  maintained  is  that,  as  the 
product  of  thought  is  always  a  relation,  the  absolute 
being  out  of  relation  is  not  thought  at  all.  Thus  far 
nothing  is  asserted  but  the  identical  proposition  :  That 
which  is  out  of  relation  to  thought  is  not  in  relation  to 
thought.  But  the  natural  inference  from  this  proposi- 
tion surely  is  that  no  such  absolute  exists,  or,  if  it  does, 
that  at  least  it  cannot  be  known  to  exist.  If  every  at- 
tempt to  think  "  being  out  of  relation  "  results  in  failure, 
why  not  give  up  the  attempt,  and  conclude  that  there 
is  no  "  being  out  of  relation  "  to  think  \  Any  effort  to 
make  that  an  object  of  thought  which  is  assumed 
not  to  be  an  object  of  thought  must  result  in  failure, 
since  intelligence  will  not  surrender  the  very  law  of 
its  existence  at  our  bidding.  This  conclusion,  how- 
ever, is  not  the  one  to  which  Mr.  Spencer  comes ;  on 
the  contrary,  he  infers  that  "being  in  itself,  out  of 
relation "  exists  because  it  cannot  be  known.  To  say 
that  "the  sphere  of  reason  is  limited"  is,  he  maintains, 
to  say,  in  other  words,  that  beyond  that  sphere  there 
exists  "  being  in  itself,  out  of  relation."  As  the  only 
reason  given  for  this  assumption  is  that  "  being  in 
itself,  out  of  relation  "  is  not,  and  cannot,  be  known,  it 
follows  that  "  being  in  itself,  out  of  relation  "  is  proved 
to  exist  for  the  sole  reason  that  it  cannot  be  known. 
I  see  no  way  of  escape  from  the  dilemma :  if  •'  being 
in  itself"  is  beyond  thought,  it  cannot  be  known  to 
exist ;  if  it  is  within  thought,  and  so  known  to  exist, 
it  is  no  longer  "  being  in  itself." 

The  contradictioji  here  evolved  is  manifestly  but  a 
special  instance  of  the  general  contradiction  arising 
from  an  interchange  of  the  two  antithetical  meanings  of 
the  relative  already  distinguished.  The  product  of 
thought  is  in  all  cases  a  relation,  and  hence  knowledge 


<i 


r 


308 


KANl  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


may  correctly  enough  be  said  to  be  knowledge  of  the 
relative.  But  with  the  relative  as  thus  understood  is 
identified  the  relative  in  the  sense  of  that  which  is  the 
negation  of  the  absolute,  and  which  as  such  implies  a 
relation  to  the  absolute — the  relation  of  dependence  or 
phenomenal  manifestation.  For  knowledge  of  the 
relative  is  substituted  relative  knowledge,  and  thus  it 
is  secretly  assumed  that  there  is  no  absolute  knowledge 
because  there  is  no  knowledge  of  the  absolute.  But  as 
knowledge  is  in  all  cases  a  relation,  the  true  inference 
is  that  that  which  is  out  of  all  relation  is  unknowable,  for 
the  very  sufficient  reason  that  to  define  it  as  that  which 
is  out  of  relation  is  tacitly  to  assert  its  unknowableness. 
Knowledge  is  relative  or  phenomenal,  in  the  sense  re- 
quired for  Mr.  Spencer's  argument  only,  upon  the  sup- 
position that  the  absolute  exists  beyond  knowledge ; 
and  to  assert  that  the  absolute  is  beyond  knowledge  is 
to  take  away  the  only  ground  upon  which  knowledge 
can  be  shown  to  be  phenomenal,  and  therefore  to 
establish  its  absoluteness.  If  there  is  no  absolute 
beyond  the  sphere  of  consciousness,  knowledge  is  not 
phenomenal  but  real ;  if  there  is  an  absolute  beyond 
the  sphere  of  consciousness,  knowledge  can  never  be 
known  not  to  be  real;  so  that  in  either  case  the 
phenomenal  character  of  knowledge  can  never  be 
proved. 

The  negation  of  the  absolute,  defined  as  Mr.  Spencer 
defines  it,  is  the  only  legitimate  conclusion  to  be  drawn 
from  the  fact  that  thinking  is  in  all  cases  relating.  An ' 
attempt  is  however  made  to  avoid  this  conclusion  by 
distinguishing  between  the  "definite  consciousness  of 
which  logic  formulates  the  laws,"  and  an  "  indejinite 
consciousness  which  cannot  be  formulated."  Although 
it  cannot  be  apprehended  by  definite  thinking,  the  ab- 


[chap. 

re  of  the 
jrstood  is 
ich  is  the 
implies  a 
adence  or 
3  of   the    . 
.d  thus  it 
;nowledgo 
.    But  as 
inference 
wable,  for 
hat  which 
;vableness. 
I  sense  re- 
n  the  sup- 
nowledge ; 
•wledge  is 
:nowledge 
irefore  to 
absolute 
ige  is  not 
te  beyond 
never  be 
case  the 
never  be 

|r.  Spencer 
be  drawn 
bing.  An  * 
[elusion  by 
)usness  of 
indefinite 
I  Although 
Ig,  the  ab- 


X.] 


NOUMENA  AND  PHENOMENA. 


309 


solute,  it  is  held,  is  yet  given  in  a  consciousness  which 
though  undefined  is  not  negative  but  positive.  "  Observe, 
that  every  one  of  the  arguments  by  which  the  relativity 
of  our  knowledge  is  demonstrated,  distinctly  postulates 
the  positive  existence  of  something  beyond  the  relative. 
To  sa;,'  that  we  cannot  know  the  absolute  is,  by  impli- 
cation, to  affirm  that  there  is  an  absolute.  In  the 
very  denial  of  our  power  to  learn  what  the  absolute 
is,  there  lies  hidden  the  assumption  that  it  is ;  and  the 
making  of  this  assumption  proves  that  the  absolute 
has  been  present  to  the  mind,  not  as  a  nothing,  but  as 
a  something.  Clearly,  then,  the  very  demonstration 
that  a  definite  consciousness  of  the  absolute  is  im- 
possible to  us,  unavoidably  presupposes  an  indefinite 
consciousness  of  it." 

We  have  here  evidently  our  old  enemy  under  a 
new  disguise.  The  proof  of  the  "  relativity  of  know- 
ledge," it  is  said,  implies  that  the  absolute  exists. 
But  that  manifestly  depends  upon  what  is  meant  by 
the  phrase  "  the  relativity  of  our  knowledge."  If  it 
means,  as  alone  has  been  proved,  that  thinking  involves 
relations,  the  existence  of  an  absolute  beyond  the  limits 
of  thought,  so  far  from  being  established,  is  incapable 
of  being  established,  unless  thought  can  belie  its 
very  nature,  and  have  an  object  at  once  in  relation  to 
it  and  out  of  relation  to  it.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  by 
the  expression  "relativity  of  our  knowledge,"  we  are  to 
understand  that  knowledge  is  not  of  the  real  but  of  the 
phenomenal,  the  absolute  is  no  doubt  "  postulated," 
but  it  is  postulated  in  defiance  of  "every  one  of  the 
arguments  by  which  the  relativity  of  our  knowledge  is 
demonstrated."  If  the  "  absolute  has  been  present  to 
the  mind,  not  as  a  nothing,  but  as  a  something  "—as  a 

^Firtt  Principles,  §26,  p.  88. 


310 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


real  existence,  that  is,  and  not  as  an  abstraction — it 
follows  either  that  thought  has  violated  its  own  laws, 
according  to  which  it  can  only  think  under  relations, 
or  that  the  absolute  is  not  devoid  of  all  relations.  In 
the  former  case,  the  products  of  thought  are  necessarily 
worthless ;  in  the  latter,  the  absolute  must  be  sought 
within,  and  not  without  consciousness ;  and  thus  the 
Spencerian  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge 
breaks  down,  either  because  it  is  founded  upon  false- 
hood or  because  of  its  inadequacy.  Thus  far  there 
seems  to  be  no  ground  for  the  assertion  of  a  conscious- 
ness of  the  Absolute,  but  very  strong  grounds  for  its 
denial.  We  must,  however,  consider  the  nature  of 
that  "indefinite"  consciousness  which  is  somehow  to 
preserve  the  existence  of  an  Absolute  lying  beyond  the 
confines  of  thought. 

"Thinking  being  relationing,  no  thought  can  ever 
express  more  than  relations.  What  now  must  happen 
if  thought,  having  this  law,  occupies  itself  with  the 
final  mystery  ?  Always  implying  terms  in  relation, 
thought  implies  that  both  terms  shall  be  more  or  less 
defined ;  and  as  fast  as  one  of  them  becomes  indefinite, 
the  relation  also  becomes  indefinite,  and  thought 
becomes  indistinct.  What  must  happen  if  one  term  of 
the  relation  is  not  only  quantitatively  but  also  quali- 
tatively unrepresentable?  Clearly  in  this  case  the 
relation  does  not  cease  to  be  thinkable  except  as  a 
relation  of  a  certain  class,  but  it  lapses  completely. 
That  is  to  say,  the  law  of  thought  that  contradictories 
can  be  known  only  in  relation  to  each  other,  no  longer 
holds  when  thought  attempts  to  transcend  the  relative; 
and  yet,  when  it  attempts  to  transcend  the  relative,  it 
must  make  the  attempt  in  conformity  with  its  law — 
must  in  some  dim  mode  of  consciousness  posit  a  non- 


[chap. 

iction — it 
►wn  laws, 
relations, 
ions.  In 
Bcessarily 
)e  sought 
thus  the 
nowledge 
)on  false- 
far  there 
jonscious- 
ds  for  its 
nature  of 
nehow  to 
3yond  the 

can  ever 

it  happen 

with  the 

relation, 

►re  or  less 

ndefinite, 

thought 

e  term  of 

so  quali- 

case  the 

lept  as  a 

ipletely. 

Victories 

.0  longer 

relative; 

ilative,  it 

s  law — 

lit  a  non- 


X.] 


NOUMENA  AND  PHENOMENA. 


311 


relative,  and,  in  some  similarly  dim  mode  of  conscious- 
ness, a  relation  between  it  and  the  relative."  * 

The  first  part  of  this  argument  is  :  Given  two 
concrete  objects  of  thought  with  definite  relations  of 
quantity  and  quaUty  to  each  other:  take  away  the 
quantity  of  one,  and  the  quantitative  relations  of  the  two 
disappear  ;  take  away  the  quaUties  left,  and  there  is  no 
relation  whatever  between  them.  The  conclusion  here 
reached  is  undoubtedly  correct :  between  two  objects 
from  which  all  inter-relations  have  been  removed,  there 
is  no  relation  whatever,  for  if  there  were,  all  the  inter- 
relations would  not  have  been  removed  :  correlative 
terms  are  no  longer  correlative,  when  the  relation 
between  them  is  eUminated.  True  :  but  when  the 
relation  between  them  is  destroyed,  although  they  are 
no  longer  thought  of  as  correlatives,  each  may  still  be 
an  ohject  of  thought.  The  term  which  has  been  purified 
of  all  relations  to  its  correlative  term,  is  no  longer 
thought  of  as  a  correlative  of  that  term,  but  it  may 
still  be  in  consciousness  as  an  object — indefinite  of 
course,  but  still  an  object.  This  is  clearly  implied  in 
the  application  made  of  the  argument.  What  Mr. 
Spencer  has  to  show  is  that  the  absolute,  while  de- 
void of  all  relations,  is  yet  known  in  a  "  dim  mode  of 
consciousness  " ;  and  however  dim  the  consciousness 
may  be,  there  must  be  an  object  of  it,  or  there  will  be 
no  consciousness.  "There  is,"  says  Mr.  Spencer,  "some- 
thing which  alike  forms  the  raw  material  of  definite 
thought  and  remains  after  the  definiteness  which  think- 
ing gave  to  it  has  been  destroyed."  ^  That  is  to  say, 
the  elimination  of  all  relations  of  one  object  to  another 
still  leaves  each  object  as  an  object  of  consciousness ; 
the  thing  that  has  been  deprived  of  all  its  definiteness, 

» Spencer's  Eaaayg,  vol.  iii.,  p.  293  ff.  "  First  Principles,  §  26,  p.  90. 


■1 


1 

1 

I 

I 


1  m 


"  -"jcr  ■^jfc^T:r--;-a-- 


ai3 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


and  so  taken  out  of  relation  to  the  thing  with  which  it 
was  at  first  correlated,  does  not  vanish  altogether,  but 
remains  as  an  indefinite  "  something,"  we  know  not 
what.  Now  when  it  is  remembered  that  the  Absolute, 
the  existence  of  which  Mr.  Spencer  is  trying  to  prove, 
is  Being  in  itself^  out  of  all  relation,  and  therefore  out 
of  relation  to  consciousness,  the  essential  weakness  of 
the  argument  is  at  once  apparent.  What  has  been 
shown  is  that  a  thing  from  which  all  the  properties  are 
removed  is  not  thought  of  as  in  relation  to  any  other 
thing ;  but  from  the  very  nature  of  the  argument  it  is 
implied  that  this  indefinite  "  something  "  is  an  object 
of  consciousness.  But  as  an  object  of  consciousness,  it 
is  in  relation  to  the  subject  conscious  of  it.  Its  rela- 
tions to  the  object  with  which  it  was  at  first  connected 
have  been  taken  away,  but  not  its  relation  to  the  self 
by  which  it  is  known.  If  then  the  absolute  is  in 
relation  to  a  conscious  self,  it  cannot  be  identified  with 
**  Being  in  itself  out  of  relation,"  and  therefore  is  no 
longer  an  absolute  but  a  relative.  The  same  con- 
clusion of  course  follows  if,  without  taking  advantage 
of  the  admission  that  the  elimination  of  all  definiteness 
may  still  leave,  as  an  object  of  consciousness,  an  in- 
definite something  that  is  not  anything  in  particular, 
we  suppose  that  upon  the  removal  of  all  relations  to 
another  object,  there  remains  no  object  of  consciousness 
whatever,  but  a  pure  blank,  the  negation  of  all  con- 
sciousness. For  upon  this  supposition,  the  absolute 
is  not  brought  within  consciousness  at  all,  but  is  to 
consciousness  pure  nothing,  and  therefore  cannot  be 
shown  to  exist.  Thus  again  we  come  round  to  the 
dilemma  :  if  the  Absolute  is  an  object  of  consciousness, 
it  does  not  exist ;  if  it  does  exist,  it  is  not  an  object  of 
consciousness. 


[chap. 

which  it 
ither,  but 
mow  not 
A-bsolute, 
to  prove, 
refore  out 
5akness  of 
has  been 
)erties  are 
any  other 
ment  it  is 
an  object 
ousness,  it 
Its  rela- 
connected 
bo  the  self 
lute  is  in 
bified  with 
fore  is  no 
lame  con- 
advantage 
lefiniteness 
an  in- 
particular, 
slations  to 
Isciousness 
U  all  con- 
absolute 
but  is  to 
Icannot  be 
Ind  to  the 
^ciousness, 
)bject  of 


X.] 


NOUMENA  AND  PHENOMENA. 


313 


It  may  perhaps  be  thought  that  the  second  part  of 
the  argument  cited  above  affords  a  way  of  escape  from 
this  dilemma.  The  reasoning  seems  to  be  that  it  is 
not  necessary  to  suppose  that  the  absolute  itself  is 
actually  an  object  of  consciousness ;  all  that  is  required 
is  a  "dim  mode  of  consciousness,"  which  repi^esents  or 
is  symbolical  of  the  absolute,  and  which  thus  gives  assur- 
ance of  the  existence  of  the  absolute,  while  keeping  it 
outside  of  consciousness.  That  this  is  the  correct  inter- 
pretation of  the  reasoning  is  confirmed  by  the  remark 
immediately  following  the  passage  quoted :  **  Just  as 
when  we  try  to  pass  beyond  phenomenal  manifestations 
to  the  ultimate  reality  manifested,  we  have  to  symbolize 
it  out  of  such  materials  as  the  phenomenal  manifesta- 
tions give  us ;  so  we  have  simultaneously  to  symbolize 
the  connection  between  this  ultimate  reality  and  its 
manifestations,  as  somehow  allied  to  the  connections 

'  ft 

among  the  phenomenal  manifestations  themselves.'" 
Assuming,  then,  that  the  "dim  mode  of  consciousness  " 
has  as  its  object  an  indefinite  "  something,"  which  is 
not  the  **  ultimate  reality,"  but  is  merely  representative 
of  it ;  it  is  evident  that  this  supposition  creates  more 
difficulties  than  it  resolves.  If  the  "something"  in 
consciousness  is  representative  of  the  unknown  reality, 
we  must  suppose  that  there  is  some  kind  of  pre- 
established  harmony  between  the  something  in  con- 
sciousness and  the  something  beyond  consciousness. 
But  there  must  be  a  consciousness  of  the  representative 
or  symbolical  character  of  the  one,  or  there  can  be  no 
consciousness  of  the  other.  This,  however,  is  but  ano- 
ther way  of  saying  that  there  is  a  relation  between  that 
which  is  and  that  which  is  not  known,  and  hence  the 
unknown  something  is  not  out  of  relation  to  conscious- 

^  Essay »,  vol.  iii.,  p.  296. 


I 


r ! 


i     ' 


8U 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


neas,  but  is  brought  into  relation  with  it,  and  is  no 
longer  an  absolute  but  a  relative.  Otherwise  stated,  a 
mode  of  consciousness  cannot  be  known  to  be  represent- 
ative of  something  else  unless  a  comparison  is  made 
between  that  which  is  represented  and  that  which  is 
representative ;  but  comparison  implies  relation ;  and 
therefore  both  terms  of  the  relation  must  be  in  con- 
sciousness. The  absolute,  then,  to  be  given  in  a  mode 
of  consciousness  representative  of  it,  must  itself  be  in 
consciousness ;  in  which  case  it  ceases  to  be  absolute. 
Or  again,  taking  the  other  side  of  the  dilemma,  a  mode 
of  consciousness  is  representative  of  a  reality  beyond 
consciousness,  only  if  such  a  reality  exists.  But  the 
existence  of  it  is  the  very  point  in  dispute,  and  must 
not  be  assumed.  It  is  a  manifest  see-saw  to  argue  that 
the  unknown  reality'  exists  because  a  certain  mode  of 
consciousness  is  known  to  be  representative  of  it,  when 
this  mode  can  be  known  to  be  representative  only  if  the 
unknown  reality  exints. 

2.  The  principle  underlying  Kant's  conception  of 
uoumena  is  diametrically  opposite  to  that  which  under- 
lies the  philosophy  of  Mr.  Spencer.  Kant  shows  that 
concrete  objects  exist  only  in  relation  to  intelligence, 
and  hence  for  the  ordinary  dualism  of  ideas  in  the  mind 
and  objects  without  the  mind  he  substitutes  the  logical 
distinction  of  feelings  in  time  and  known  objects  in 
space.  Mr.  Spencer,  on  the  other  hand,  starting  from 
the  absolute  opposition  of  object  and  subject,  supposes 
the  former  to  come  into  relation  with  the  latter  by 
means  of  immediate  feelings.  As,  therefore,  we  only 
know  the  objective  world  by  the  intermediation  of 
these  feelings,  the  world  is  gradually  stripped  of  its 
determinate  properties,  and  survives  only  as  a  thing  in 
itself.     Enough  has  already  been  said  in  regard  to  the 


[chap. 


X.] 


NOUMENA  AND  PHENOMENA. 


315 


nd  is  no 
stated,  a 
epresent- 

is  made 

which  is 
ion ;  and 
B  in  con- 
n  a  mode 
self  be  in 

absolute, 
a,  a  mode 
:y  beyond 

But  the 
and  must 
irgue  that 
L  mode  of 
jf  it,  when 
)nly  if  the 

eption   of 
ch  under- 
tows that 
[elligence, 
the  mind 
.e  logical 
►bjects  in 
ling  from 
supposes 
[latter  by 
we  only 
ation   of 
led  of  its 
thing  in 
•d  to  the 


Critical  conception  of  the  relatior  of  subject  and  object, 
but  it  may  not  be  unprofitable  to  follow  with  some  care 
the  logical  process  by  which  Mr.  Spencer  reaches  the 
conception  of  an  unknowable  reality. 

In  his  Fir&t  Principles,  Mr.  Spencer  tells  us  that 
before  stirring  a  step  towards  its  goal,  philosophy  has 
to  assume  the  validity  of  certain  primary  data  of  con- 
ciousness,  and  that  of  these  data  the  most  fundamental 
is  the  conception  of  subject  and  object  as  "  antithetically 
opposed  divisions  of  the  entire  assemblage  "  of  things. 
And  in  his  Psychology  an  attempt  is  made  to  establish 
the  proposition,  that  "when  the  two  modes  of  being 
which  we  distinguish  as  subject  and  object  have  been 
severally  reduced  to  their  lowest  terms,  any  further 
comprehension  ....  is  negatived  by  the  very 
distinction  of  subject  and  object,  which  is  itself  the 
consciousness  of  a  difference  transcending  all  other 
differences."  ^  This  dualistic  conception  of  things  Mr. 
Spencer  supports  by  a  "negative"  and  a  "positive" 
justification.  By  the  former  is  meant  a  proof  that 
Realism  "  rests  on  evidence  having  a  greater  validity 
than  the  evidence  on  which  any  counter-hypothesis 
rests."  2  Tested  by  the  criteria  of  priority,  simplicity, 
and  distinctness,  Baalism  is  found  to  be  superior  to 
Idealism,  the  latter  being  based  upon  the  assumption  that 
"we  are  primarily  conscious  only  of  our  sensations." 
People  are  conscious  of  external  existence  long  before 
they  frame  the  hypothesis  that  the  knowledge  of 
external  existence  is  obtained  mediately  through  sensa- 
tion. "Neither  the  subject  nor  the  predicate  of  the 
proposition — *I  have  a  sensation,'  can  be  separately 
framed  by  a  child,  much  less  put  together."  The 
realistic  belief  is  therefore  not  only  prior  in  time,  but 

^  Spencer's  Principles  qf  Psychology,  vol  i. ,  §  62.  » Ibid. ,  vol.  ii. ,  §  402. 


SI6 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


it  is  the  condition  of  the  construction  of  the  idealistic 
hypothesis.  Bealism  is  also  superior  to  Idealism  in 
simplicity.  For,  in  the  first  place,  Idealism  always 
begins  by  showing  that  Realism  is  inferential,  and  to 
make  good  this  assertion  it  has  to  employ  many  infer- 
ences in  place  of  one;  and,  in  the  second  place,  the 
supposed  proof  of  Idealism  involves  in  addition  a 
number  of  new  inferences.  "  Hence,  if  the  one 
mediate  act  of  Bealism  is  to  be  invalidated  by  the 
multitudinous  acts  of  Idealism,  it  must  be  on  the  sup- 
position .  .  .  that  if  there  is  doubtfulness  in  a 
single  step  of  a  given  kind,  there  is  less  doubtfulness 
in  many  steps  of  the  same  kind."  And  not  only  is 
Idealism  subsequent  in  time  to  Kealism,  and  supported 
by  elaborate  inferential  reasoning,  but  it  is  expressed 
in  "  terms  of  the  extremest  indistinctness,"  while  Real- 
ism is  expressed  in  ''  terms  of  the  highest  possible 
distinctness."^ 

These  arguments  Mr.  Spencer  enforces  with  the 
greatest  earnestness,  and  with  every  appearance  of 
conviction ;  nor  do  I  for  a  moment  suppose  that  he  is 
guilty  of  any  conscious  disingenuousness,  though  the 
tedious  length  at  which  he  sets  them  forth  suggests 
that  he  has  himself  some  suspicion  of  their  cogency. 
To  me  they  seem  mainly  significant  of  their  framer's 
method  of  seeking  for  real  knowledge  by  the  elimination 
of  all  definite  relations  to  thought.  This  is  what  the 
setting  up  of  priority,  simplicity,  and  distinctness  really 
amounts  to.  Moreover,  as  the  tests  by  which  Idealism 
is  shown  to  be  inferior  in  evidence  to  Realism,  would,  if 
valid,  establish  the  superiority  of  the  primary,  simple  and 
distinct  preconceptions  of  the  unscientific  mind  over  the 
infinitely  more  complex  and  more  indistinct  conceptions 

*P«yc/io/ofliy,  vol.  ii.,  §§4W,  412. 


[chap. 

dealistic 
alisni  in 
I  always 
1,  and  to 
ny  infer- 
lace,  the 
idition  a 
the    one 
1  by  the 
the  sup- 
Less  in  a 
ibtfulness 
t  only  is 
mpported 
expressed 
tiile  Real- 
b  possible 

with  the 
trance  of 
;hat  he  is 
ugh  the 
suggests 
cogency, 
framer's 
mination 
hat  the 
iss  really 
lldealisni 
would,  if 
pie  and 
over  the 
Lceptions 


X.] 


NOUMENA  AND  PHENOMENA. 


811 


of  physical  science,  we  may  safely  leave  Mr.  Spencer  to 
fight  out  his  battle  with  other  antagonists  and  upon 
another  arena.  '  jiz  only  other  remark  that  seems 
called  for  here  is  that,  even  granting  the  validity  of  the 
criteria,  the  question  is  not  fairly  argued :  for  on  the 
one  hand  the  philosophical  theory  of  Realism  is  identi- 
fied with  the  common-sense  belief  in  an  external  world, 
and  is  thus  assumed  to  possess  a  priority,  simplicity,  and 
distinctness  not  justly  its  due ;  and  on  the  other  hand 
Idealism  is  confused  with  Sensationalism,  in  which 
alone  the  knowledge  of  the  external  world  is  sought  in 
"  sensations  "  or  "  subjective  states."  For  these  if  for 
no  other  reasons,  the  "  multitudinous  mediate  acts  "  by 
which  Mr.  Spencer  tries  to  show  that  all  mediate  acts 
destroy  knowledge,  are  mere  shooting  in  the  air. 

Idealism  has  been  weighed  successively  in  the 
balances  of  priority,  simplicity  and  distinctness,  and  has 
been  found  wanting.  But  we  must  make  sure  that  we 
have  cut  off  every  possible  way  of  escape.  "  It  is  not 
enough  to  be  clear  that  a  doctrine  is  erroneous  :  it  is 
not  enough  even  to  disentangle  the  error  from  its 
disguises :  it  is  further  requisite  that  we  should  trace 
down  the  error  to  its  simplest  form  and  find  its  root." 
What  we  want  evidently  is  some  universal  criterion  of 
truth,  to  which  even  the  Idealist  must  assent,  and  by 
which  he  may  be  convicted  out  of  his  own  mouth. 
This  absolute  criterion  or  "  universal  postulate "  Mr. 
Spencer  believes  he  has  found  in  the  formula,  that  "the 
inconceivableness  of  its  negation  is  that  which  shows  a 
cognition  to  possess  the  highest  rank."  An  "  inconceiv- 
able "  proposition,  it  must  be  noted,  is  not  simply  a 
proposition  that  is  "  unbelievable,"  but  one  "  of  which 
the  terms  cannot  by  any  effort  be  brought  before  con- 
sciousness in  that  relation  which  the  proposition  asserts 


318 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


between  them."  Thus  the  negation  of  the  proposition, 
"  whatever  resists  has  extension,"  is  not  only  unbeliev- 
able but  unthinkable,  for  the  subject  and  the  predicate 
cannot  be  thought  of  together. ' 

The  "  universal  postulate  "  of  Mr.  Spencer  is  simply 
tlie  well-known  logical  law  of  identity.  An  examina- 
tion of  the  instance  cited  by  Mr.  Spencer  in  illustration 
of  it  places  this  supposition  beyond  dispute.  The  pro- 
position, "whatever  resists  has  extension,"  when  fully  ex- 
pressed becomes,  I  presume,  "  the  material  thing  which 
resists  has  extension."  Now  that  a  "  material  thing," 
i.e.,  an  extended  thing,  "  has  extension  "  is  certainly 
a  proposition  of  which  the  terms  cannot  by  any  possi- 
bility be  separated  in  thought,  for  the  simple  reason 
that  they  are  identical.  We  may  frame  as  many  pro- 
positions of  this  type  as  we  please,  and  all  of  them  will 
conform  to  the  "  universal  postulate."  The  proposition, 
"  a  hippogrift*  is  an  imagined  object,"  is  one  which  bears 
the  test  of  the  postulate  without  flinching,  since  it  is  a 
proposition  the  negation  of  which  is  not  only  "  unbeliev- 
able" but  "unthinkable."  It  is  therefore  difficult  to 
see  how  the  "  Idealist "  is  to  be  brought  to  his  senses 
by  so  innocent  a  device  as  that  of  asking  him  to  admit 
that  what  is  in  consciousness  is  in  consciousness.  The 
mere  analysis  of  a  conception,  as  Kant  has  once  for  all 
pointed  out,  only  results  in  an  explicit  statement  of 
what  the  conception  means;  it  does  not  carry  us  beyond 
itself  to  objective  truth. 

It  is  quite  possible  that  Mr.  Spencer  would  reply  that 
the  proposition,  "whatever  resists  has  extension,"  asserts 
not  only  that  "  an  extended  thing  is  extended,"  but  that 
"  resistance  "  and  "  extension  "  cannot  be  separated  in 
thought  and  therefore  exist  together  in  reality.    And 

^Psychology,  vol.  ii.,  §§414,  426,  427. 


[chap. 

position, 
abeliev- 
redicate 

J  simply 
xamina- 
istration 
rhe  pro- 
fuUy  ex- 
ng  which 
il  thing," 
certainly 
,ny  possi- 
le  reason 
lany  pro- 
them  will 
Dposition, 
lich  bears 
ice  it  is  a 
unbeliev- 
fficult  to 
is  senses 
to  admit 
iss.     The 
ce  for  all 
iment  of 
is  beyond 

[eply  that 

],"  asserts 

1  but  that 

irated  in 

ly.    And 


*1 


NOUMENA  AND  PHENOMENA. 


319 


no  doubt  this  is  so  :  but  it  is  because  "  resistance  "  and 
"extension"  are  correlative  conceptions  that  involve 
manifold  relations  to  thought,  whereas  the  "universal 
postulate"  is  expressly  brought  forward  to  prove  i\if—j^ 
truth  of  a  proposition  immediately.  The  conjunction  of 
these  conceptions  in  our  knowledge  is  the  result  of  a 
long  process  of  mediation,  and  the  justification  of  their 
connection  can  only  be  found  in  the  truth  of  each  step  in 
that  process.  In  the  language  of  Kant,  the  proposition 
"whatever  resists  has  extension,"  in  a  "synthetical" 
judgment,  obtained  by  a  reference  to  experience.  The 
question  therefore  comes  to  this  :  either  the  "  universal 
postulate  "  only  calls  upon  us  to  state  explicitly  what 
is  in  our  consciousness,  and  thus  a£fords  no  criterion  of 
objective  truth,  or  it  admits  that  immediate  knowledge 
has  no  objective  validity.  As  the  latter  alternative  is 
exactly  what  Mr.  Spencer  is  trying  to  disprove,  we  are 
,ompelled  to  adopt  the  former. 

That  the  "  universal  postulate "  is  merely  a  law  of 
formal  thought  is  further  implied  in  the  setting  up  of  a 
new  criterion  to  help  out  the  imperfection  of  the  old. 
It  is  not  to  every  proposition,  Mr.  Spencer  admits,  that 
the  postulate  is  applicable,  but  only  to  those  that  are 
"simple"  or  " undecomposable." i  Now,  in  the  first 
place,  it  is  evident  that  if  we  go  on  analyzing  or  "  de- 
composing" a  proposition  into  its  elements,  we  shall 
only  have  completed  the  process  when  we  have  got 
back  to  the  very  beginning  of  knowledge.  The 
absolutely  primary  judgment  can  alone  be  called 
"  undecomposable  "  in  any  strict  use  of  terms :  and 
when  we  have  got  this  proposition,  the  virtue  of  the 
postulate  has  evaporated.  Into  the  proposition,  "some- 
thing is  in  my  consciousness,"  as  the  simplest,  and 

^Psychology,  vol.  ii.,  §428. 


W\\ 


'    If! 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS        [chap. 


f: 

J 


/ 


therefore  as  the  only  "  undecomposable "  judgment 
that  can  be  framed,  any  proposition  that  we  choose  to 
name  must  ultimately  be  analysed,  and  to  this  pro- 
position alone  the  "universal  postulate"  can  be  applied. 
In  other  words,  the  criterion  of  truth  set  up  by  Mr. 
Spencer  is  but  the  logical  law  of  identity,  which  simply 
formulates  the  condition  of  knowledge,  that  conscious- 
ness postulates  itself,  but  is  utterly  useless  as  a  test  of 
objective  truth.  But,  in  the  second  place,  there  is  no 
absolutely  simple  proposition  embodying  any  real 
knowledge.  Even  the  simplest  judgment  that  can  be 
conceived,  "  something  is  a  real  object  to  me,"  involves 
the  relation  of  subject  and  object,  and  is  therefore  so 
far  complex,  although  in  relation  to  all  other  judgments 
it  may  be  called  simple.  The  only  proposition  which 
is  not  complex  is  one  in  which  subject  and  predicate 
are  identical,  and  such  a  proposition  is  merely  verbal. 
And  in  point  of  fact  this  is  the  only  proposition  to 
which  the  **  universal  postulate  "  properly  applies,  if  as 
is  supposed  it  is  a  test  of  no  knowledge  except  that 
which  excludes  all  relation  to  thought.  The  postulate 
is  therefore  notjonly^  practically  useless,  but  it  falsifies 
even  the  initial  judgment  of  knowledge,  w^ich  is  not 
immediate  but  mediate. 

That  the  supposed  criterion  of  truth  is  really  de- 
structive of  real  knowledge,  becomes  apparent  the 
moment  an  attempt  is  made  to  apply  it  in  support  of 
Realism.  The  application  is  made  at  great  length,  but 
in  the  end  it  amounts  to  this :  the  immediate  deliver- 
ance of  consciousness  is  that  the  object  is  independent 
of  the  subject,  and  this  proposition  alone  conforms  to 
the  "  universal  postulate."  ^  But  this  is  simply  to  say 
that  the  postulate  only  allows  of  the  verbal  or  identical 

'See  especially  Psychology,  vol.  ii.,  §438. 


[chap. 


«.] 


NOUMENA  AND  PHENOMENA. 


321 


propositions:  "the  subject  is  the  subject,"  and  "the 
object  is  the  object."  Bring  the  object  into  relation 
with  the  subject,  and  the  mutual  independence  of  each 
at  once  disappears.  On  the  other  hand,  as  the  very 
existence  of  knowledge  implies  the  relation  of  the 
object  to  a  conscious  self,  the  immediate  deliverance  of 
consciousness,  i.e.  of  the  unreflective  consciousness,  and 
the  postulate  which  endorses  it,  destroy  the  very  possi- 
bility of  knowledge.  The  attempt  to  find  reality  in 
the  absence  of  all  relation  has  once  again,  as  it  must 
ever  do,  resulted  in  the  complete  negation  of  reality; 
and  Mr.  Spencer,  in  his  attempt  to  cover  the  Idealist 
with  confusion,  has  only  succeeded  in  demonstrating  the 
instability  of  his  own  position.  It  is  really  curious  to 
find  any  one  maintaining  that  subject  and  object  are  in 
absolute  independence  of  each  other  because  they  are 
given  in  relation  to  each  other :  that  what  is  in  relation 
to  consciousness  is  out  op  relation  to  consciousness. 
Such  a  self-contradictory  position  must  necessarily  lead 
its  advocate  into  innumerable  incoherencies  of  thought. 
The  main  incoherence  I  shall  now  try  to  point  out. 

The  arguments  hitherto  employed  by  Mr.  Spencer 
derive  whatever  apparent  force  they  have  from  the 
tacit  identification  of  Realism  with  the  common-sense 
belief  that  objects  exist  simply  as  they  are  known. 
But  as  in  the  endeavour  to  preserve  the  assumed  im- 
mediateness  of  knowledge  a  criterion  is  proclaimed 
which  is  applicable  only  to  "  simple  "  propositions,  or 
propositions  that  exclude  all  relation,  I  am  not  surprised 
that  for  the  ordinary  view  which  assumes  that  the 
object  as  completely  qualified  is  directly  apprehended, 
there  should  be  substituted  the  very  different  view  that 
the  object  ast  known  is  absolutely  unqualified ;  but  I 
am  surprised  that  Mr.  Spencer  should  not  have  marked 


323 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


his  divergence  from  common  sense  by  deleting  all  the 
reasoning  which  presupposes  agreement  with  it.  We 
are  now  told  that  the  Realism  which  can  be  established 
is  not  the  "  crude  Realism  "  of  common  sense,  but  a 
more  refined  theory  to  which  the  name  of  "  trans- 
figured Realism  "  is  given.  The  object  is  known  to  us 
through  subjective  affections  or  relations,  and  no  rela- 
tion to  consciousness  can  "  resemble,  or  be  in  any  way 
akin  to,"  its  source  beyond  consciousness.  Nevertheless, 
there  exist  "  beyond  consciousness  conditions  of  ob- 
jective manifestation  which  are  symbolized  by  relations 
as  we  conceive  them."  Our  knowledge  of  the  object 
as  it  really  exists  is  thus  limited  to  a  direct  apprehension 
of  its  bare  existence.^ 

Here  we  see,  going  on  before  our  eyes,  the  dialectic 
by  which  the  common  sense  assumption  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  object  converts  itself  into  a  denial  of 
all  definite  knowledge.  When  Mr.  Spencer  speaks  of 
the  distinction  of  subject  and  object  as  the  "  conscious- 
ness of  a  difference  transcending  all  other  differences," 
he  does  not  see  that  he  is  really  affirming  the  non- 
independence  of  the  object ;  but  he  does  see  that  as  all 
definite  knowledge  is  constituted  by  relation  to  con- 
sciousness, the  unqualified  object  is  not  known  at  all. 
Hence  he  tries  to  combine  Idealism  and  Realism  by 
maintaining  at  once  that  the  object  is  independent  of 
consciousness,  and  that  it  is  in  relation  to  consciousness; 
the  result  being  the  compromise  called  "  transfigured 
Realism,"  which  carries  over  the  concreteress  of  the 
object  into  thought,  and  yet  maintains  the  independ- 
ence of  the  purely  abstract  substratum  that  alone 
remains.  Two  absolutely  incongruous  theories  of 
knowledge  are  thus  combined,  or  rather  set  side  by 

» Payc/totoj/y,  vol.  ii.,  §§  473-4. 


[chap. 


X.] 


NOUMENA  AND  PHENOMENA. 


323 


all  the 
.     We 
blished 
,  but  a 
*  trans- 
n  to  us 
10  rela- 
ay  way 
theless, 
of  ob- 
elations 
I  object 
henaion 

lialectic 
le  inde- 
enial  of 
)eaks  of 
ascious- 
rences," 
le  non- 
it  as  all 
to  con- 
at  all. 
ism  by 
dent  of 
>usness; 
(figured 
of  the 
epend- 
alone 
les    of 
ide  by 


side :  the  one  that  knowledge  is  mediate  or  made  up 
of  relations  to  consciousness,  and  the  other  that  it  is 
absolutely  immediate  or  free  from  relation.  Here 
then  we  have  the  doctrine  of  relativity  as  applied  to 
the  nature  of  the  object.  Its  validity  evidently  de- 
pends upon  the  possibility  of  an  independent  object 
being  known  in  a  purely  immediate  consciousness. 
Now  the  object,  as  assumed  to  be  independent,  is 
altogether  beyond  the  sphere  of  consciousness,  and 
therefore  cannot  be  known  to  exist.  To  say  that  it  is 
independent  of  consciousness  and  to  say  that  it  is  unre- 
lated to  consciousness  is  for  knowledge  exactly  the 
same  thing.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  to  speak  of  a 
consciousness  that  is  absolutely  immediate,  is  equivalent 
to  a  denial  that  consciousness  has  any  object  before  it ; 
for  an  object,  as  Mr.  Spencer  admits,  is  only  given  in 
distinction  from  a  subject.  In  the  attempt  to  preserve 
its  independence,  the  object  has  been  reduced  to  the 
maximum  of  indefiniteness  and  the  subject  to  the 
minimum  of  relation,  and  after  all,  the  definiteness  im- 
plied in  the  bare  relation  of  an  unqualified  thing  to  a 
pure  subject  has  to  be  assumed  under  the  disguise  of 
immediate  knowledge,  or  subject  and  object  alike 
disappear.  The  unknowable  of  Mr.  Spencer,  in  other 
words,  is  simply  the  knowable,  deprived  of  its  concrete 
relations  and  suspended  in  vacuo  by  the  imagination. 
The  dualistic  opposition  of  intelligence  and  nature  has 
accomplished  its  destiny  in  the  negation  of  all  real 
knowledge.^ 

3.  How  strongly  Kant's  conception  of  noumena  is 
contrasted  with  that  of  Mr.  Spencer  becomes  evident 
when  we  look  at  the  view  taken  in  each  of  the  ultimate 

*  The  criticism  of  Mr.  Spencer  contained  in  sections  1  and  2  first  appeared  iu 
the  Jour.  Spec.  Phil,  for  January,  1877. 


I 


324 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


nature  of  the  mind  and  the  world.  The  essence  of 
Kant's  criticism  of  rational  psychology  is,  that  a 
noumenal  self,  existing  beyond  knowledge  as  a  sub- 
stance, is  the  product  of  a  confusion  between  the  mere 
abstraction  of  relation  to  consciousness  and  a  thing 
beyond  consciousness.  Mr.  Spencer,  on  the  other  hand, 
adopts,  without  suspicion  of  the  paralogism  implied  in 
it,  the  dogmatic  view  that  there  must  be  an  unknown 
substance,  of  which  all  mental  states  are  passing  mani- 
festations. Kant,  again,  deals  with  the  apparent  con- 
tradiction involved  in  the  idea  of  the  world  as  a  whole 
and  of  matter  as  divisible,  as  well  as  in  the  ideas  of 
causality  and  of  a  necessary  being ;  but  he  refuses  to 
believe  that  reason  can  be  in  absolute  antagonism 
with  itself,  and  hence  after  stating  the  antinomies  he 
goes  on  to  solve  them.  Mr.  Spencer  dwells  at  great 
length  upon  "  alternative  impossibilities  of  tl'ought "; 
but  believing  the  logical  puzzles  he  has  brought  to- 
gether to  be  absolutely  insoluble,  he  concludes  to  the 
thorough-going  imbecility  of  the  human  mind.  Let  us 
look  at  the  contrast  indicated  more  in  detail. 

(1)  "If  by  the  phrase  'substance  of  mind,'"  says 
Mr.  Spencer,  "is  to  be  understood  mind  as  qualitatively 
differentiated  in  each  portion  that  is  separable  by  in- 
trospection, but  seems  homogeneous  and  undecompos- 
able,  then  we  do  know  something  about  the  substance 
of  mind,  and  may  eventually  kiiow  more.  .  .  .  But 
if  the  phrase  is  taken  to  mean  the  underlying  something 
of  which  these  are  modifications,  then  we  know  nothing 
about  it,  and  never  can  know  anything  about  it.  .  .  . 
Let  us  yield  to  the  necessity  of  regarding  impressions 
and  ideas  as  forms  or  modes  of  a  continually  existing 
something.  .  .  .  Existence  means  nothing  more 
than    persistence ;     and    hence   in  mind   that   which 


[chap. 

ce  of 
lat   a 
,  sub- 
mere 
thing 
hand, 
ied  in 
tnown 
mani- 
t  con- 
whole 
leas  of 
jses  to 
gonism 
nies  he 
t  great 
lught "; 
:ht  to- 
to  the 
Let  us 

says 
[atively 
by  in- 
>mpos- 
)stance 
But 
lething 
lothing 


X.] 


NOUMENA  AND  PHENOMENA. 


325 


lessions 

Listing 

more 

which 


\ 


persists  in  spite  of  all  changes,  and  maintains  the  unity 
of  the  aggregate  in  defiance  of  all  attempts  to  divide  it, 
is  that  of  which  existence  in  the  full  sense  of  the  word 
must  be  predicated — that  which  we  must  postulate  as 
the  substance  of  mind  in  contradistinction  to  the  varv- 
ing  form  which  it  assumes.  But  if  so,  the  impossibility 
of  knowing  the  substance  of  mind  is  manifest.  .  .  . 
If  every  state  of  mind  is  some  modification  of  this 
substance  of  mind,  there  can  be  no  state  of  mind  in 
which  the  unmodified  substance  of  mind  is  present."  * 

Mind,  as  is  evident  from  these  extracts,  is  conceived 
of  as  a  "  substratum "  or  **  underlying  something," 
which,  as  existing  apart  from  its  modifications,  is  un- 
knowable. At  the  same  time  we  are  compelled  to 
"  postulate  "  it ;  in  other  words,  although  unknowable, 
it  nevertheless  exists.  Now,  in  the  first  place,  it  is 
evident  that  Mr.  Spencer  is  here  guilty  of  that  con- 
fusion between  a  noumenon  in  the  positive  sense,  and 
a  noumenon  in  the  negative  sense,  which  Kant  has  so 
clearly  pointed  out.  Apart  from  its  "multitudinous 
modifications,"  mind  is  not  a  real  object  capable  of 
being  known  to  exist,  but  merely  the  negation  of  actual 
knowledge.  The  only  legitimate  inference,  therefore, 
from  Mr.  Spencer's  proof  of  the  unknowability  of  mind 
as  a  thing  in  itself,  is  that  mind  as  so  conceived  is  a 
mere  fiction  of  abstraction.  The  determination  of 
this  pure  negation  by  the  conception  of  "  substance  " 
is,  as  Kant  would  say,  an  illegitimate  application  of  a 
category  to  a  mere  idea.  Mind  in  itself  is  neither  a 
"  substance  "  nor  the  mode  of  a  substance :  it  is  simply 
nothins:  at  all.  That  "  there  can  be  no  state  of  mind 
in  which  the  unmodified  substance  of  mind  is  present," 
is  the  best  proof  that  this  "  unmodified  substance  "  is 

^  Psychology,  voli.,^  58, 59.  , 


326 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


but  an  element  of  reality,  abstracted  from  the  relations 
which  give  it  meaning.  In  the  second  place,  Mr. 
Spencer  is  guilty  of  the  paralogism  which  Kant  shows 
to  be  implied  in  the  dogmatic  conception  of  mind  as  a 
substance.  Although  the  "  substance "  of  mind  is 
affirmed  to  be  unknowable,  it  yet  "  persists  in  spite  of 
all  changes,  and  maintains  the  unity  of  the  aggregate 
in  defiance  of  all  attempts  to  divide  it."  In  other 
words,  mind  implies  the  consciousness  of  self  as  a  unity, 
and  as  identical  with  itself  in  all  its  changes.  Here 
the  transition  is  made  from  mind  as  a  "  substratum  " 
to  mind  as  the  self  to  which  all  mental  changes  are 
relative.  At  the  same  time,  mind  is  still  regarded  as 
unknowable  in  itself,  inasmuch  as  it  cannot  be  pre- 
sented in  consciousness.  That  is  to  say,  the  self  as 
existing  for  consciousness  is  confused  with  the  unknown 
"  substance  "  of  mind,  and  the  unity  and  identity  pre- 
dicable  of  the  former  alone  is  unwarrantably  transferred 
to  the  latter.  In  this  way  the  self  as  a  mere  negation, 
by  borrowing  the  positive  determinations  of  the  self  as 
it  exists  for  knowledge,  seems  to  be  known  as  perman- 
ent and  identical  with  itself.  The  paralogism  is  almost 
too  evident  to  need  pointing  out. 

(2)  Mr.  Spencer  allows  himself  to  be  entangled  not 
only  in  the  paralogisms  of  rational  psychology,  but  in 
the  antinomies  of  rational  cosmology.  He  gathers 
together  with  infinite  pains  all  the  logical  puzzles  in 
regard  to  the  divisibility  of  matter,  the  change  of 
velocity,  &c.,  which  he  can  discover  or  invent,  and 
affirming  them  to  be  incapable  of  solution,  he  concludes 
that  our  "  ultimate  scientific  ideas  "  are  all  self-contra- 
dictory. Were  it  so,  reason,  as  Kant  remarks,  must 
be  in  irremediable  conflict  with  itself,  the  only  legiti- 
mate conclusion  from  which  would  be  absolute  scepti- 


X.]- 


NOUMENA  AND  PHENOMENA. 


327 


3d  not 
)ut  in 

ichers 
Lies  in 
|ge  of 
and 

sludes 
lontra- 
must 
llegiti- 
\cepti- 


cism.     I  shall  not  enter  into  any  detailed  consideration 
of  Mr.  Spencer's  antinomies.     All  of  tbem,  as  it  seems 
to  me,  yield  to  Kant's  mode  of  solution.     Space,  for 
example,    is    neither    finitely    divided    nor  infinitely 
divided,  but  is  infinitely  divisible.     The  infinite  divisi- 
bility of  space,  in  fact,  arises  from  its  very  nature. 
For  any  part  of  space  is  necessarily  continuous,  and 
therefore  admits  of  divisibility  to  infinity.     Only  by 
negating  the  very  idea  of  space,  and  reducing  it  to  a 
mere  point,  whicli,  as  Kant  remarks,  is  not  a  part 
of  space  at  all,  but  simply  the  limit  between  two 
spaces,  can  we  get  rid  of  its  divisibility.     The  question 
of  the  finite  divisibility  or  infinite  divisibility  of  matter, 
as  well  as  the  puzzle  in  regard  to  its  solidity  or  non- 
solidity,  is  also,  as  it  seems  to  me,  virtually  solved  by 
the  method  of  Kant.     As  si:  own  in  the  Metaphysic  of 
Nature,  an  account  of  which  has  been  given  above, 
matter  is  necessarily  divisible  to  infinity,  because  any 
distinguishable  part  of  it,  as  occupying  space,  is  divi- 
sible to  infinity.     So  also  the  infinite  compressibility 
of  matter  is   implied    in    the   intensive   quantity   of 
any   given  force.      The   conception    therefore   of   an 
ultimate  atom,  i.e.  a  part  of  matter  which  is  absolutely 
incompressible,  is  a  contradiction.     This,  however,  is  in 
no  way  inconsistent  with  the  solidity  or  impenetrability 
of  any  given  material  substance,  since  solidity  exists  in 
virtue  of  the  relation  between  two  finite  forces.     While 
therefore  an  indivisible  and  incompressible  atom  is  a 
contradiction  in  terms,  an  undivided  and  impenetrable 
atom  is  not.     To  assert  the  one  is  to  contradict  the 
conception  of  matter  as  occupying  space ;    to  assert 
the  other  is  to  contradict  the  conception  of  force  as 
intensive  quantity.     But  there  is  no  real  incompati- 
bility between  the  conception  of  matter  as  infinitely 


328 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS. 


divisible  and  compressible,  and  the  admission  that  as  a 
matter  of  fact  there  is  a  definite  limit  to  the  separation 
of  the  parts  of  any  given  material  body,  a  limit  which 
is  determined  by  the  equilibrium  of  two  contrary  finite 
forces.  It  need  hardly  be  added  that  a  confusion  be- 
tween the  infinite  divisibility  of  motion  conceived  of  as 
a  pure  or  abstract  quantity,  and  the  finite  quantity  of 
any  given  motion,  underlies  the  puzzle  in  regard  to  the 
possibility  of  increase  or  decrease  of  velocity.  The 
contradictions  which  Mr.  Spencer  finds  in  our  ultimate 
ideas  are  the  product  of  an  illegitimate  abstraction  from 
the  actual  relations  of  the  knowable  world.  When  it  is 
recognised  that  to  a  finite  body  the  conception  of  infinity 
is  necessarily  inapplicable,  the  apparent  contradictions 
in  our  knowledge  of  the  real  world  disappear. 


■    *  1 

"     f             . 

/■     ■ 

■    •  '       .     ":             •             •      ■ .  :. 

329 


,  as  a 
ation 
srhich 
finite 
n  be- 
of  as 
ity  of 
bo  the 
The 
imate 
I  from 
m  it  is 
nfinity 
ictions 


CHAPTEK  XI. 

IMPERFECT  DEVELOPMENT   OF   KANT's   THEORY   OF 
KNOWLEDGE. 

TN  what  has  gone  before  an  attempt  has  been  made 
to  exhibit,  with  as  much  freedom  as  is  com- 
patible with  accuracy  of  statement,  the  nature  of 
the  problem  which  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  was 
intended  to  solve,  and  to  show  how  the  various  parts 
of  the  theory  of  knowledge  contained  in  it  are  joined 
together  in  the  unity  of  a  single  system.  In  what 
remains  to  be  said  I  shall  endeavour  to  point  out 
generally  wherein  that  theory  seems  to  require  further 
development,  in  order  to  make  it  complete  and  self- 
consistent. 

1.  In  defending  the  method  of  Kant  against  the 
animadversions  of  Mr.  Balfour,  I  had  occasion  to 
contend  that  philosophy  cannot  be  asked  to  prove  the 
reliability  of  special  facts  or  laws,  and  must  fall  into 
mere  logomachy  if  it  attempts  to  do  so.  The  universal 
conditions  presupposed  in  the  knowledge  of  those  facts 
and  laws  may  be  arrived  at  by  reflection  upon  know- 
ledge as  it  exists  for  common  consciousness  and  the 
special  sciences,  but  no  amount  of  reflection  upon  the 
contents  of  our  knowledge  can  enable  us  to  discover  a 
single  new  fact  or  law.     Not  only  is  this  recognized  by 


i 


330 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


Kant,  but  as  I  believe  even  by  Hegel,  who  is  popularly 
supposed  to  be  the  very  high-priest  of  the  a  prion 
method.  Now,  if  philosophy  has  nothing  to  say  to  the 
truth  of  our  ordinary  knowledge,  it  is  evident  that  any 
true  theory  of  knowledge  must  in  some  sense  start 
from  the  world  as  already  constituted  for  us,  or,  as 
Kant  would  say,  "  given  to  us."  Unless,  however,  we 
carefully  observe  what  is  "  given,"  and  what  has  to  be 
discovered,  we  shall  fall  into  a  mistake  that  must  be 
fatal  to  the  philosophical  theory  which  we  are  interested 
in  establishing.  As  philosophy  starts  from  ordinary 
and  scientific  knowledge,  it  is  compelled  so  far  to 
proceed  by  a  method  of  abstraction,  or  rather  it  is 
compelled  to  represent  the  concrete  wealth  of  the 
universe  in  an  abstract  symbol.  Such  a  symbol  is  the 
Kantian  "manifold,"  which,  as  I  have  attempted  to 
show,  is  a  term  of  great  comprehensiveness,  and,  there- 
fore, one  which  fluctuates  in  its  meaning  according  to 
our  point  of  view  at  the  time.  And  if  this  term  is 
taken,  as  Kant  undoubtedly  does  take  it  at  times,  as 
standing  for  the  special  facts  or  objects  contained  in 
our  ordinary  and  scientific  knowledge,  the  "  manifold  " 
will  naturally  be  spoken  of  as  "given,"  meaning  by 
this  that  it  is  not  created  by  philosophy,  but  taken  for 
granted  as  a  datura.  To  such  a  contrast  of  the  "  mani- 
fold "  as  "  given  "  in  our  ordinary  knowledge,  with  the 
propositions  of  philosophy  which  are  only  discovered 
by  special  reflection  there  can  be  no  possible  objection. 
But  a  misunderstanding  is  apt  to  grow  up  from  con- 
fusing the  "  manifold "  as  thus  understood  with  the 
"manifold"  as  the  supposed  object  of  sense.  From 
the  fact  that  philosophy  is  an  account  of  the  conditions 
of  knowledge  in  general,  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  this 
identification.     Ordinary  knowledge  is  contrasted  with 


th  the 

pvered 

lection. 

con- 

Ith  the 

From 

litions 

id  this 

with 


XI.] 


IMPERFECTION  OF  KANT S  THEORY. 


331 


philosophical  knowledge,  as  that  which  seems  to  be 
"  given  "  with  that  which  is  the  product  of  reflection ; 
and  hence  the  two  propositions,  that  the  "  manifold  "  is 
"given"  to  philosophy  as  a  datum,  and  that  the 
"manifold"  is  "given"  immediately  in  perception, 
have  the  look  of  being  merely  various  statements  of 
the  same  thing.  And  when  we  have  identified  the  two 
senses  of  the  manifold,  it  is  only  a  step  to  the  contrast 
of  sense  as  a  faculty  receptive  of  the  "  manifold,"  with 
thought  or  reflection  as  a  faculty  wliich  acts  spontane- 
ously or  by  origination ;  and  it  is  but  another  step  to 
the  contrast  of  the  "  manifold  "  as  the  given  "  matter  " 
of  knowledge  belonging  to  the  object,  with  thought  as 
the  principle  originative  of  the  "  form  "  by  which  that 
matter  is  universalized.  It  is  in  this  way,  as  I  think, 
that  Kant  is  led  to  draw  a  distinction  between  the 
"  manifold  of  sense  "  as  "  given,"  and  the  "  forms  "  of 
the  mind  as  spontaneously  originated  in  knowledge. 

Now,  this  contrast  of  the  "  manifold  "  as  given  and 
the  "  forms  "  as  originated — or,  what  is  the  same  thing 
when  we  look  at  knowledge  from  the  side  of  the 
subject,  of  sense  as  receptive,  and  thought  as  spon- 
taneous— has  not  only  no  proper  justification,  but  it  is 
inconsistent  with  the  spirit  of  the  Critical  philosophy 
itself.  We  may,  as  I  have  said,  speak  of  the  mani- 
fold as  "given"  to  philosophy  to  be  explained,  but 
this  is  quite  a  different  thing  from  saying  that  the 
manifold  is  "given"  to  sense.  In  the  one  case,  we  are 
looking  at  two  stages  in  the  temporal  development  of 
our  knowledge,  the  scientific  and  the  philosophical ;  in 
the  other,  as  we  are  speaking  of  two  logical  elements 
in  knowledge,  we  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  ques- 
tion as  to  which  is  first  recognized  by  us  and  which 
second.      It  is  perfectly  true  that  object?  must  be 


332 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


\ 


known  as  objects,  before  our  knowledge  of  them  can  be 
philosophically  accounted  for ;  but  this  does  not  justify 
us  in  speaking  of  one  element  in  knowledge  as  given, 
and  the  other  as  originated.  That  such  a  contrast  is 
inconsistent  with  the  final  result  of  Kant's  own  theory 
may  be  easily  shown.  The  central  idea  of  the  Critique 
is  that  knowable  objects  exist  only  in  relation  to 
intelligence.  Philosophical  reflection,  operating  upon 
the  data  "given  "  to  it  by  ordinary  and  scientific  know- 
ledge, brings  this  truth  to  light,  and  in  so  doing,  it 
compels  us  to  go  back  over  the  data  as  given,  and  to 
interpret  them  in  the  light  of  our  theory.  Accordingly 
the  concrete  objects  which  are  correctly  enough  said  to 
be  given  to  us  as  we  reflect  upon  the  conditions  of 
knowledge,  break  up  into  two  distinguishable  elements, 
the  element  of  the  particular  or  manifold,  and  the 
element  of  the  universal  or  form.  But  as  every  act  of 
real  knowledge  is  now  seen  to  imply  the  reflection  of 
each  element  on  the  other,  we  cannot  contrast  the 
one  as  given  with  the  other  as  originated.  That  which 
is  properly  said  to  be  given  in  ordinary  knowledge  is 
not  a  mere  element  of  knowledge,  but  a  concrete  object, 
comprehending  both  elements  now  distinguished  by 
philosophy.  While,  therefore,  concrete  objects  may  be 
said  to  be  given  to  the  individual  thinker,  we  cannot 
say  that  the  particular  element  is  given,  and  the 
universal  element  produced  by  reflection.  From  the 
phenomenal  point  of  view  both  elements  are  given ; 
from  the  philosophical  both  may  be  said  to  be  produced. 
If,  as  Kant  maintains,  the  objects  which  we  know  are 
relative  to  our  consciousness  of  them,  the  knowledge 
of  objects  and  the  objects  known  are  but  different 
aspects  of  the  same  concrete  reality,  and  there  is  no 
longer  any  valid  reason  for  opposing  one  element  of 


X..] 


IMPERFECTION  OF  KANT'S  THEORY. 


333 


)W  are 

pledge 

ferent 

is  no 

lent  of 


knowledge  to  another.  The  world  as  known  is  the 
world  as  it  exists,  and  the  supposition  that  there  may 
possibly  be  a  world  in  itself,  distinct  from  that  which 
is  knowable,  is  a  mere  product  of  abstraction. 

2.  It  is  but  another  phase  of  the  same  imperfection 
that  Kant  opposes  the  a  posteriori  element  of  know- 
ledge to  the  a  priori  element.     As  the  "  manifold " 
has  two  quite  distinct  senses,  so  a  double  contrast  is 
drawn  between  the  formal  or  a  priori  element  of  know- 
ledge, and  the  material  or  a  posteriori  element.     (1) 
Examining  ordinary  or  scientific  knowledge,  without 
inquiring  into  its   relations  to   intelligence,  we  may 
distinguish  between  particular  facts,  and  the  general 
laws  or  principles  which  govern  them.     The  principles 
of  mathematics  enable  us  to  anticipate  the  spatial  and 
temporal  relations  of  objects;   and  the  principles  of 
pure  physics  enable  us  to  tell  beforehand  the  condi- 
tions   to   which    all   possible   objects   must   conform. 
Special  facts  or  objects  we  may  therefore  distinguish 
from  the  laws  underlying  them  as  the  a  posttnon  from 
the  a  piiori.     (2)  When  we  ask  how  it  is  that  we  can 
anticipate  the  universal  conditions  of  objects,  while  we 
cannot    anticipate    objects    themselves,   we    find   the 
answer   to    be,   that    the   former    depend   upon    the 
essential   constitution   of  our   intelligence,  while   the 
latter  do  not.     By  the  a  priori  is  tlierefore  here  meant 
that  which  belongs  to  the  mind  as  distinguished  from 
that  which  belongs  to  the  object. 

The  distinction  of  a  pnori  from  a  posteriori  know- 
ledge, as  stated  by  Kant,  is  one  that  can  at  best  be 
regarded  as  only  provisional.  A  prion  knowledge  is 
that  knowledge  which,  as  universal  and  necessary,  is 
presupposed  in  all  specific  knowledge,  and  may  there- 
fore be   anticipated.      It  is  universal  and   necessary 


i ;  y 


H'.di 


334 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


because  it  belongs  to  the  constitution  of  our  intelligence, 
and  therefore  is  implied  in  the  activity  of  our  intelli- 
gence, when  it  conies  to  operate  in  specific  ways,  t.e., 
to  be  actually  employed  in  the  definite  knowing  of 
concrete  objects.  A  postenori  knowledge,  on  the 
other  hand,  does  not  belong  to  the  constitution 
of  our  intelligence,  but  is  obtained  by  the  specific 
apprehension  or  recognition  of  the  concrete  element 
in  knowledge.  This  a  posteriori  element  in  know- 
ledge, Kant  therefore  regards  as  in  a  sense  con- 
tingent. Why  so?  Because  our  intelligence  is  in 
reference  to  it  passive,  and  has  to  wait  for  the  presen- 
tation of  the  concrete  element  to  get  something  to 
operate  upon. 

Now,  while  this  account  of  the  relation  of  our 
intelligence  to  nature  has  the  great  merit  of  recogniz- 
ing that  nature  is  not  completely  independent  of 
intelligence,  and  hence  of  pointing  out  that  there  is 
both  a  particular  and  a  universal  element  in  know- 
ledge, and  therefore  in  known  objects,  the  separation 
of  the  universal  from  the  particular  cannot  be 
regarded  as  justifiable.  The  concrete  element  in 
knowledge  is  no  more  contingent  than  the  universal 
element.  If  it  is  true,  e.g.,  that  the  category  of 
cause  is  essential  to  the  explanation  of  the  real  con- 
nexion of  events,  it  is  not  the  less  true  that  the  events 
connected  are  real,  and  therefore  necessary.  All 
knowledge,  as  distinguished  from  mere  opinion,  is 
necessary.  Kant  does  indeed  recognize  this  in  his  own 
way,  but  he  regards  the  necessity  as  communicated  to 
the  a  posteriori  element  by  the  a  priori.  But  as  the 
knowable  world  is,  on  his  own  showing,  nothing  apart 
from  its  relations  to  intelligence,  it  seems  manifest 
that  we  cannot  attribute  the  particular  element  of 


XI.] 


IMPERFECTION  OF  KANT'S  THEORY. 


33S 


novv- 

ation 
be 
in 

rersal 
of 
con- 

v^ents 
All 

n,  18 
own 
dto 
I  the 
part 
lifest 
t  of 


knowledge  to  the  object  any  more  than  to  the  subject, 
or  the  universal  element  to  intelligence  any  more  than 
to  nature.     Only  if  we  suppose  nature  to  be  in  some 
way  constituted  independently  of  thought,  can  we  say 
that  the  mind  is  receptive  in  respect  of  the  particulars 
of  its  knowledge.      Kant,   however,  while  insisting 
in  the  strongest  way  on  the   correlativity   of  object 
and   subject,   particular  and   universal,  yet  conceives 
of  the  subject  with  its  univers  1  forms  as  in  a  sense 
isolated  from  the  object.     Somewhat  after  the  man- 
ner of  Butler,    he   supposes   the   Uiind   to  have   an 
independent  constitution    or    structure    of   it^    own. 
Here  there   clearly   is   some   confusion   betwov  \i   the 
metaphysical   and   the   phenomenal   points  of  view 
As  we  have  already  seen,  it  is  not  inco >  itct.  to  say  that 
the  concrete  world  is  *'  given  "  to  the  individual  thinker 
to  be  philosophically  explained.      But  the  result  of 
Kant's  own  explanation  is  to  show  that  in  that  which 
is  given  there  already  is  implied  the  reflection  of  the 
particular  on  the  universal — or  of  the  a  posteriori  on 
the  a  pnmi,  if  we  still  are  to  use  these  terms.    And  as 
the  distinction  of  the  two  elements  of  knowledge  is 
the  product  of  philosophical   reflection,   although   it 
correctly  represents  what  is  in»r>lied  in  every  act  of  real 
knowledge,  it  must  follow  tl; 't  neither  element  can  be 
said  to  be  "  given  "  in  contrast  to  the  other.     Both  are 
given  to  the  individual  who  reflects  upon  knowledge, 
but  all  knowledge,  as  tho  comprehension  of  particulars 
under  the  unity  of  self-consciousness,  is  a  recognition  of 
that  which  belongs  to  the  essential  nature  of  intelli- 
gence.    Accordingly,  it  must  be  denied  that  there  is 
even  a  possibility  of  the  existence  of  a  thing  in  itself 
incapable  of  ever  being  known  by  us  on  account  of  the 
limitation  of  our  faculties.     We  cannot  rid  ourselves, 


,  :• 


336 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


) 


I 


according  to  Kant,  of  the  peculiar  conditions  under 
which  knowledge  is  possible  for  us,  and  hence  we  can 
say  nothing  about  things  in  themselves.     How  the 
world  would  appear  to  a  being  of  a  different  mental 
constitution,   we  are   unable  to  say.     A  being,   for 
example,  who  was  not  dependent  for  the  particular 
element  of  his  knowledge  upon  the  special  experiences 
coming  to  him  from  time  to  time,  might  perceive  all 
things  at  a  glance ;   but  he  would  have  before  him  a 
totally  different  world  from  ours,  and  what  that  world 
would  be,  we  cannot  possibly  tell.    We  can  say  that  he 
would  not  perceive  things  as  under  the  forms  of  space 
and  time,  that  his  knowledge  would  not  come  to  him 
piecemeal,  that  he   would   not  get   a   knowledge   of 
things  by  means  of  conceptions  and  inferences ;  but  we 
can  form  no  apprehension  of  what  the  world  before 
him  would  be,  or  what  would  be  the  nature  of  his 
intelligence.     Of  such  a  being,  of  course,  we  could  not 
say,  that  part  of  his  knowledge  belonged  to  the  consti- 
tution of  his  intelligence,  and   part  was  due  to  his 
capacity  for  being  passively  affected  from  without ;  for 
all  things  as  revealing  themselves  to  him  by  immediate 
contemplation  or  intuition,  would  be  alike  necessary  and 
universal.     Man,  however,  is  not  a  being  of  that  kind, 
and  must  be  contented  with  a  world  of  objects  such 
as  his  nature  permits  him  to  know.     Now,  it  is  un- 
doubtedly important  to  emphasise  the  fact,  that  know- 
ledge comes  to  us  by  instalments,  and  hence  that  we 
are  limited  by  this  condition  of  our  knowledge.     But 
this  is  quite  a  different  thing  from  saying  that  the 
particular  element  of  knowledge  is  ** given"  to  us,  while 
the  universal  element  belongs  to  our  mental  constitu- 
tion.    For,  while  objects  present  themselves  to  us  in 
part,  each  fart  is  itself  concrete,  involving  as  it  does 


f 


i 


XI.] 


IMPERFECTION  OF  KANVS  THEORY. 


337 


V 


the  reflection  of  the  particular  on  the  universal.  We 
do  not,  e.g.,  first  know  the  particular  properties  of  an 
object,  and  then  bring  them  under  the  unity  of  self- 
consciousness,  but  the  properties  are  known  only  in 
being  referred  to  a  universal  self  This  is  but  one  of 
the  instances  in  which  Kant  has  not  perfectly  freed 
himself  from  the  dogi^atic  or  psychological  point  of 
view,  against  which  he  so  valiantly,  and  on  the  whole, 
successfully  contends.  For,  if  the  world  we  actually 
know  exists  only  in  relation  to  our  human  intelligence, 
we  cannot  be  said  to  have  real  knowledge,  but  only 
knowledge  true  for  us  as  men.  But  relative  knowledge 
is  not  knowledge  at  all,  in  any  proper  sense,  though  it 
may  be  all  the  knowledge  we  are  capable  of  having.  If 
the  observations  peculiar  to  men  as  individuals,  are  un- 
worthy of  the  name  of  knowledge,  the  observations 
common  to  all  men,  which  they  vainly  suppose  to  be 
knowledge,  must  likewise  be  counted  unworthy  of  it. 
If  all  men  were  madmen,  it  would  matter  little  to 
them  that  there  was  a  method  in  their  madness.  If  the 
best  of  our  knowledge  is  orJy  that  which  we  cannot 
help  having,  but  which  with  diflerent  faculties  we 
should  not  have,  why  should  we  pin  our  faith  to  it  ? 

But  while  the  opposition  of  a  'priori  and  a  'posteriori 
knowledge,  when  pressed  home,  undoubtedly  leads,  as 
has  often  been  pointed  out,  to  this  sceptical  conclusion, 
the  substantial  merit  of  what  Kant  has  done  towards 
the  construction  of  a  true  theory  of  knowledge  cannot 
be  denied  without  blindness  or  perversity.  He  was 
the  first  in  modern  times  to  insist  upon  the  correlativity 
of  intelligence  and  nature ;  and  while  the  letter  of  his 
theory  makes  knowledge  after  all  only  a  coherent 
system  of  semblances,  the  spirit  of  it  leads  to  a  much 
more   hopeful    result.      Kant,   however,    never  quite 


338 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


I 


liberated  himself  from  the  dogmatic  separation  of  in- 
telligence and  nature.  Even  to  the  end  the  world 
loomed  up  before  him  as  a  thing  apart,  which  by  some 
means  got  transferred  to  human  intelligence.  Insist 
as  he  will  on  the  correlation  of  the  outer  and  the  inner 
world,  he  still  thinks  of  the  self  and  the  object  as 
somehow  separate,  and  as  requiring  to  be  brought  ex- 
ternally into  connection.  And  the  secret  of  this  is,  that 
he  never  clearly  separates  the  proposition,  that  in  the 
knowledge  of  each  of  us  one  part  of  nature  after 
another  comes  before  our  consciousness,  from  the  pro- 
position that  nature  is  for  us  nothing  a!;  all  apart 
from  its  relations  to  our  intelligence.  In  other 
words,  the  limits  which  hem  us  in  as  individual 
men  are  supposed  to  be  in  some  way  limits  to  our 
intelligence  itself.  But  it  may  be  easily  shown 
that,  while  the  first  proposition  is  undeniable,  the 
second  has  no  proper  foundation.  Unless  there  were 
in  us  a  capacity  for  apprehending  that  which  truly 
is,  we  could  not  know  that  what  we  do  apprehend  is 
only  relative  to  our  intelligence  as  men.  Granting,  as 
we  must  do,  that  the  world  of  nature,  as  the  men  of 
this  generation  know  it,  is  in  some  respects  different 
from  the  world  that  will  present  itself  before  the  men 
of  the  next,  we  still  cannot,  without  committing 
logical  suicide,  distinguish  the  world  as  revealed  to 
human  intelligence  from  the  world  as  revealed  to  any 
other  intelligence.  For  this  other  world,  as  Kant 
himself  was  half  aware,  would  be  for  us  nothing  but  a 
creation  of  the  mind,  formed  by  the  facile  process  of 
abstracting  from  the  fullness  and  concreteness  of  the 
world  we  know,  and  very  absurdly  calling  the  atten- 
uated remainder  a  higher  world.  When  Kant  speaks 
of  the  world  as  it  may  appear  to  a  higher  intelligence. 


XI.J 


IMPERFECTION  OF  KANT S  THEORY. 


339 


,ce, 


he  forgets  that  the  conception  of  such  an  intelligence  is 
for  us  only  what  we  make  it  to  be,  and  that  if  we  were 
really  capable  of  conceiving  a  kind  of  intelligence 
quite  unlike  our  own,  we  should  by  that  very  fact  be 
already  beyond  the  limits  of  our  human  intelligence. 
The  kind  of  intelligence  which  Kant  vaguely  sup- 
poses to  be  higher  than  human,  is  really  below  it. 
Seeing  all  things  as  out  of  space  and  time,  it  makes 
no  logical  distinctions  between  things,  but  only 
looks  into  them.  But  why  should  space  and  time 
be  simply  means  of  hiding  realities  from  us?  They 
are  so,  only  if  we  suppose  that  realities  are  not  in  space 
and  time ;  in  other  words,  if  behind  the  veil  of  the 
phenomenal  world  there  is  a  noumenal  world,  know- 
able  only  as  that  which  is  for  us  unknowable.  The 
genesis  of  this  fiction  is  very  easily  traceable.  Ab- 
stract from  the  world  we  know  all  its  known  re- 
lations, and  call  the  remainder  the  thing  ii  itself, 
and  the  thing  is  done.  We  must  then  discard  the 
assumption  that  the  nature  of  our  intelligence  unfits 
us  for  knowing  reality,  as  a  mere  unresolved  remain- 
der left  behind  in  Kant's  mind  by  that  dogmat- 
ism from  which,  as  we  see,  .he  was  not  thoroughly 
aroused. 

As,  then,  there  is  no  valid  reason  for  separating  the 
real  world  from  the  world  as  known  to  us  as  men,  the 
opposition  of  apnori  and  aposterion  must  take  another 
meaning.  If  the  concrete  element  is  as  essential  to 
the  known  world  as  the  abstract — if  each  is  in  fact  but 
a  logical  distinction  made  by  our  reflection,  although  a 
distinction  necessary  to  explain  what  the  nature  of  the 
world  is — the  one  element  is  necessary  not  less  than 
the  other.  Moreover  there  is  no  longer  any  proper 
reason  for  opposing  the  a  pnori  to  the  a  posteriori  as 


!l'«l 


340 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


! 


that  which  belongs  to  the  constitution  of  intelligence, 
and  in  which  the  mind  is  active,  to  that  which  belongs 
to  the  thing  in  itself  and  is  passively  received.  In  so 
far  as  our  intelligence  reveals  reality,  that  which  is 
revealed  is  that  which  is,  and  the  particular  element  is 
equally  real  and  necessary  with  the  universal  element. 
It  is  in  fact  only  because  Kant  thinks  of  the  mind  as  a 
kind  of  mental  structure  possessed  by  all  men  in 
common,  that  he  opposes  a  priori  and  a  posteriori, 
universal  and  particular.  I  as  an  individual  man,  he 
thinks,  am  dependent  on  sense  for  the  concrete 
element  of  my  knowledge;  while  the  universal  ele- 
ment is  added  by  my  mind.  From  this  point  of 
view,  the  forms  of  sense  and  thought  are  still 
regarded  as  belonging  to  mc  as  an  individual, 
although  they  are  the  same  in  me  as  in  other  men. 
Hence  each  individual  is  apart  from  every  other,  and 
we  have  all  the  same  world  before  us  in  its  essential 
outlines  only  because  we  have  all  the  same  mental 
forms.  Thus  the  dualism  which  Kant  got  rid  of  so  far 
as  the  opposition  of  things  in  space  to  ideas  in  the 
mind  is  concerned,  returns  in  another  form.  Ea.ch 
human  intelligence,  having  like  mental  forms,  has  in- 
deed a  similar  world  before  it,  but  still  for  each  the  world 
is  different,  because  while  the  particulars  and  the 
forms  are  similar,  the  world  as  known  is  yet  not  the 
world  as  it  is,  but  only  as  it  appears  to  be.  Hence 
the  real  world  is  again  thrust  beyond  knowledge, 
and  is  distinguished  from  that  which  we  know  as 
noumenon  from  phenomenon.  The  only  way  out  of 
this  difficulty  is  to  deny  the  subjectivity  of  human 
intelligence.  The  noumenal  world  of  Kant  must 
be  regarded  as  the  product  of  a  mere  abstraction 
from   relation  to  intelligence.      Distinguish  between 


■ 


^ 


'( 


X,.] 


IMPERFECTION  OF  KANT'S  THEOR  V. 


341 


>  ■ 


the  view  of  man  as  a  part  of  the  world  he  knows, 
and  man  as  an  intelligence  comprehending  the  world, 
and  we  cannot  any  longer  speak  of  any  element 
of  knowledge  as  passively  communicated.  Speaking 
from  the  point  of  view  of  individuality,  the  mental 
forms  must  be  regarded  as  received,  not  less  than  the 
particulars  to  which  the  forms  are  applied ;  speaking 
from  the  point  of  view  of  man  as  an  intelligence, 
the  particular  is  not  less  dependent  on  intelligence 
than  the  universal.  Intelligence  raises  man  above  his 
mere  individuality :  the  world  consists  of  relations  to 
intelligence,  and  intelligence  itself  is  simply  the  world 
contemplated_in  itejdeal  aspect jis  spiritual. 

3.  In  developing  his  own  theory,  as  we  have  seen, 
Kant  is  continually  coming  back  to  the  point  that  the 
dualism  of  knowledge  and  reality  is  the  root  of  all  evil 
in  philosophy ;  and  hence  he  is  mainly  interested  in 
showing  that  the  knowable  world  could  not  exist  for  us 
were  it  not  that  our  intelligence  supplies  the  universal 
element  by  which  objects  are  constituted  and  connected. 
But,  bravely  as  Kant  sets  his  face  against  the  separa- 
tion of  subject  and  object,  the  influence  of  the  old 
dogmatic  or  dualistic  point  of  view  makes  itself  felt  in 
the  exposition  of  his  theory.  That  this  was  inevitable 
may  easily  be  understood  from  what  has  just  been  said 
in  regard  to  the  distinction  of  the  a  priori  and  the 
a  postenon  elements  of  knowledge.  Accordingly,  we 
find  that  the  different  parts  of  Kant's  system  are  not 
connected  so  intimately  as  they  ought  to  be.  The 
great  imperfection  in  his  theory,  or  rather  in  his  way 
of  presenting  it,  is  his  want  of  the  idea  of  development ; 
by  which  I  do  not  mean,  that  he  overlooks  the  evolu- 
tion of  one  living  being  from  another,  but  that  he 
isolates  the  various  elements  of  knowledge  from  each 


\\ 


{  \ 


343 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


0 


^ 


^ 
X 


I'd 


Nr 


V.    •  ■         M  . 
?  '•    ^ 


'X; 


;  Ni. 


I.     . 


other  and  is  obliged  to  connect  them  in  an  external 
way.  For  when  the  whole  task  of  philosophy  is 
summed  up  in  a  demonstration  of  the  dependence  of 
the  objective  world  upon  the  forms  of  intelligence,  the 
connection  of  the  various  elements  which  go  to  form 
knowable  objects  cannot  be  represented  otherwise  than 
as  external  or  superficial.  Kant  accordingly  neglects 
what  may,  after  Comte,  be  called  the  dynamical  aspect 
of  the  world.  Starting  from  knowledge  as  already 
given  in  its  completeness,  he  is  contented  to  point  out 
the  various  distinguishable  elements  which  it  implies. 
And  not  only  does  he  not  attempt  to  connect  those 
elements  by  any  inner  law,  but  he  denies  that  any  such 
law  can  be  found.  Thus  he  represents  space  and  time 
as  two  separate  forms  which  as  a  matter  of  fact  belong- 
to  the  constitution  of  our  intelligence  on  its  perceptive 
side,  but  of  which  we  can  give  no  further  account.  So 
the  various  categories  are  functions  of  unity,  armed 
with  which  thought  is  able  to  connect  the  manifold  of 
sense  supplied  to  it ;  but  each  category  is  regarded  as 
complete  and  separate  in  itself.  And  even  the  "I," 
as  the  supreme  unity  implied  in  all  knoM^edge,  is  spoken 
of  as  if  it  were  independent  of  the  other  elements  which 
it  combines  together.  It  must  be  observed,  however, 
that  even  in  spite  of  himself,  Kant  recognizes  a  sort  of 
logical  development  of  knowledge.  In  setting  forth 
one  after  another  the  principles  which  formulate  the 
various  concrete  acts  of  knowledge  by  which  the  world 
is  made  intelligible  for  us,  he  follows,  half-unconsciously, 
the  natural  evolution  of  intelligence,  beginning  with 
the  mathematical  or  quantitative  principles,  and  going 
on  to  the  dynamical  or  regulative  principles.  But  tlie 
want  of  development  in  his  theory  of  knowledge  can- 
not help  imparting  to  it  an  imperfection  in  form  and 


XI.] 


IMPERFECTION  OF  RANTS  THEORY, 


343 


the 


even  in  substance  that  detracts  from  its  conclusive- 
ness. For  the  ultimate  proof  of  the  idealistic  view^ 
of  the  world  lies  in  the  impossibility  of  separating  I 
any  single  element  of  knowledge  from  the  rest  with-  I 
out  destroying  the  unity  of  the  whole. »^  When, 
however,  there  are  numerous  lacunae  in  a  system, 
its  constituent  elements  seem  to  be  detached  and  arbi- 
trary. This  is  the  reason,  for  example,  why  Kant's 
proofs  of  the  principles  of  substance,  causality  and 
reciprocity  have  an  air  of  incompleteness  about  them. 
Contenting  himself  with  showing  that  each  involves 
relations  to  self-consciousness,  he  seems  to  make  up 
knowledge  out  of  detached  fragments.  Only  when 
substance  is  seen  to  involve  causality,  and  both  in 
unity  to  yield  reciprocity,  do  we  feel  that  we  cannot 
deny  one  principle  without  denying  the  others.  And 
the  same  remark  applies  to  the  interconnection  of  the 
categories  of  quantity,  quality  and  modality,  and  to  the 
continuous  development  of  each  of  the  more  concrete 
categories  from  that  wliich  is  next  to  it  in  concreteness. 
In  making  these  remarks  I  have  no  intention  of  sug- 
gesting that  the  mere  contemplation  of  a  category  com- 
pels us  to  see  in  it  one  more  concrete  than  itself  From 
any  given  category  nothing  can  be  evolved  but  itself. 
The  interconnection  of  which  I  speak  is  obtainable  by 
viewing  a  category  in  its  connection  with  the  concrete 
objects  to  which  it  is  applicable.  The  process  by  which 
the  categories  are  isolated  from  the  particular  element 
of  knowledge  which  gives  them,  in  Kant's  language, 
meaning  and  significance,  is  a  process  of  abstraction, 
which  needs  to  be  corrected  by  a  process  of  synthesis. 
Viewing  the  categories  in  their  relation  to  objects, 
it  may  be  shown  that  until  we  bring  the  world  under 
the  highest  category  of  all,  the  category  of  self-con- 


U4 


344 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


sciousness,  we  have  uot  adequately  characterized  it. 
In  this  sense  alone,  as  I  should  say,  is  thought  "dialecti- 
cal." The  characterization,  for  example,  of  existence 
by  the  mere  category  of  "  being  "  is  so  utterly  inade- 
quate as  to  compel  us,  when  we  reflect  upon  its  inade- 
quacy, to  see  that  for  it  must  be  substituted  ever  more 
concrete  categories,  until  at  last  we  havo  reached  the 
highest  category  of  all  in  "self-cop-^ciousness."  Ab- 
stract and  scholastic  as  such  a  logical  evolution  of 
categories  may  seem  to  be,  its  importance  cannot  be 
overrated.  Had  Mr.  Spencer,  for  example,  seen  that 
his  "  Unknowable "  is  simply  existence  characterized 
as  "being,"  the  emptiest  of  all  the  determinations 
recognized  by  intelligence  to  be  implied  in  knowable 
objects,  he  would  have  hesitated  to  elevate  the 
Unknowable  above  the  Knowable.  Nay,  had  Kant 
himself  seen  that  his  thing-in-itself  is  only  determin- 
able by  this  simplest  of  all  categories,  he  might  have 
escaped  the  danger  of  setting  up  the  reality  of  such  an 
empty  abstraction  as  even  possible.  The  systematic 
connexion,  therefore,  of  the  various  categories  or  rela- 
tions to  thought  can  alone  jure  us  that  we  are,  in  any 
given  case,  characterizing  a  special  aspect  of  the  uni- 
verse adequately,  and  it  is  the  absence  of  such  con- 
nexion which  gives  the  appearance  of  inconclusiveness 
to  Kant's  reasoning.  It  may  be  added  that  the  rigid 
front  which  in  the  Critique  the  different  categories 
present  to  each  other,  inevitably  suggests  that  they 
are  mere  things  of  the  mind,  or  abstractions.  For, 
unless  we  see  that  each  lower  category  is  but  a  more 
or  less  inadequate  form  of  reflection,  by  which  we  try 
to  raise  our  knowledge  to  the  height  of  real  existence, 
the  continuity  of  intellectual  development  must  seem 
to  be  arrested  in  exclusive  points.     When,  on  the  other 


t 


XI.] 


IMPERFECTION  OF  KANT'S  THEORY. 


345 


hand,  it  ia  recognized  that  it  is  only  in  the  comprehen- 
sion of  all  the  ideal  elements  conspiring  to  constitute 
the  universe  as  a  whole,  that  we  can  attain  to  complete- 
ness of  philosophical  knowledge,  it  becomes  appar- 
ent that  the  categories,  although  real  determinations 
of  existence  so  far  as  they  go,  are  separated  from  each 
other  only  in  so  far  as  by  reflection  we,  separate  them  : 
in  other  words,  that  the  advance  of  knowledge  is  con- 
tinually showing  the  inadequacy  of  each  given  way  of 
looking  at  things.  Knowledge  is  thus  viewed  as  a 
process  by  which  the  human  mind  recognizes  the  im- 
perfection of  a  conception,  and  feels  compelled  to 
seek  for  one  more  perfect.  The  history  of  human 
thought,  as  embodied  more  or  less  adequately  in  the 
succession  of  philosophical  systems,  is  thus  a  valuable 
aid  in  the  discovery  of  the  order  of  logical  evolu- 
tion of  the  categories  by  which  the  various  wealth 
of  knowledge  is  systematized  and  developed.  But  in 
truth  there  is  no  single  aspect  of  human  knowledge 
from  which  the  determinations  of  reality  may  be  dis- 
covered \  nor  is  there  any  royal  road  to  that  discovery ; 
only  by  the  insight  of  philosophical  genius  operating 
upon  actual  knowledge  in  all  its  aspects  can  anything 
like  a  complete  system  of  philosophy  be  constructed. 

4.  I  shall  not  attempt  to  show  how  all  the  categories 
of  Kant's  table  may  be  connected  with  each  other :  but, 
in  illustration  of  what  has  just  been  said,  a  few  words 
on  the  interconnection  of  the  categories  of  substance, 
cause  and  reciprocity,  may  not  be  out  of  place. 

In  the  determination  of  the  real  world  by  the  con- 
ception of  substance,  the  more  simple  determination  of 
it  as  "  something  real "  is  presupposed ;  for  when  we 
speak  of  a  substance  we  are  thinking  of  something  as 
a   complex  of  various  properties  or  relations  without 


I 


346 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chaf. 


which  it  would  lose  its  reality.  The  accidental  or 
superficial  attributes  of  a  thing  may  be  absent  without 
detriment  to  its  reality,  but  not  the  essential  attributes 
which  constitute  its  nature.  Thus  in  the  notion  of 
substance  there  is  implied  the  permanence  of  certain 
essential  properties,  notwithstanding  the  fugitiveness 
of  accidental  projuerties.  But  in  thinking  of  an  object 
as  a  substance,  we  accentuate  the  permcmence  rather 
than  the  capability  of  change,  although  both  elements 
are  involved  in  the  conception.  This  is  the  point  of 
view  from  which  Kant,  in  the  iirst  analogy  of  experi- 
ence, treats  of  substance,  and  hence  he  remarks  that 
substance  is  one  of  the  categories  of  relation  rather 
because  it  is  the  condition  of  relation  than  because  it 
of  itself  implies  relation.  Hence  he  speaks  of  the  re- 
lations of  an  object  as  if  they  were  superficial  accidents 
of  it,  belonging  rather  to  our  apprehension  than  to  the 
object.  This  separation  of  a  thing  from  its  relations, 
or  of  the  permanent  from  change,  arises  from  the  sup- 
position that  the  particular  element  of  knowledge  is 
somehow  "  given  "  in  sense,  while  the  universal  element 
belongs  to  thought ;  or,  as  we  may  also  say,  from  the 
assumption  that  time  belongs  purely  to  our  perceptive 
faculty.  Ridding  ourselves  of  this  false  contrast,  we 
can  see  that  the  relations  of  an  object  are  as  essential 
as  that  to  which  they  are  related,  and  the  conception 
of  change  as  the  conception  of  permanence.  In  fact, 
if  we  abstract  from  all  the  relations  by  which  an  object 
is  constituted  as  real,  we  drop  back  into  the  mere  con- 
ception of  "  something  we  know  not  what,"  which  is 
the  mere  potentiality  of  an  object.  Substance,  there- 
fore, implies  the  correlation  of  identity  and  difference, 
permanence  and  change.  - 

In  the  conception  of  cause,  again,  we  emphasize  the 


XI.] 


IMPERFECTION  OF  KANT'S  THEOR  Y. 


347 


relations  or  changes  of  things,  rather  than  the  identity 
or  permanence  of  things.  As  Kant  himself  points  out, 
every  real  change  is  an  instance  of  causal  relation,  and  all 
change  implies  permanence.  The  relations  by  which  a 
thing  is  constituted  as  substance,  or  the  changes  which 
a  substance  undergoes,  therefore  imply  the  conception 
of  causality.  To  see  this,  we  must  be  careful  to  note 
that  in  saying  that  substance  is  permanent,  it  is  not 
meant  that  every  individual  object  is  permanent.  An 
individual  or  sensible  object  is  simply  a  certain  sum  of 
properties  connoted  by  a  name,  and  no  object  so  con- 
ceived is  permanent,  as  we  all  know.  In  other  words, 
substance  is  ultimately  a  term  for  nature  itself  as  a 
unity  constituted  by  intelligence.  Hence  there  is  a 
distinction  between  the  conception  of  an  individual 
thing — a  **  substance  "  as  we  usually  call  it — and  the 
conception  of  substance  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term. 
This  distinction  is  responsible  in  large  measure  for 
the  isolation  of  substance  from  causality.  Kant,  for 
example,  gives  as  an  instance  of  causality  the  judg- 
ment :  "  The  sun  warms  the  stone,"  while  he  regards 
the  judgment :  •*  When  the  sun  shines  the  stone  grows 
warm,"  as  not  including  the  conception  of  causality. 
On  the  one  side  we  have  the  sun,  on  the  other  side  the 
stone,  and  each  is  independent  of  the  other.  And,  of 
course,  this  is  true  enough  in  a  sense ;  but  it  must  be 
observed  that  the  sun  and  the  stone,  when  isolated  i!i 
this  way,  are  not  only  not  instances  of  causality,  but 
they  are  not  even  instances  of  substantiality.  Each  is 
assumed  as  immediately  given,  and  hence  the  relations 
implied  in  each  are  overlooked.  The  moment,  however, 
wi  ask  wliat  is  meant  by  the  terms  "  sun  "  and  "  stone" 
the  relations  to  other  objects  implied  in  each  as  real 
come  to  light.     One  of  these  relations  is  expressed 


348 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CA.    ICS.        [chap. 


I 


in  tlie  judgment:  "The  sun  wanna  the  stone;"  for 
part  of  the  connotation  of  "  sun  "  is  its  heat-producing 
power,  and  part  of  the  connotation  of  "stone"  is  its 
heat-receiving  power.  But  only  part  of  the  connota- 
tion of  each  is  expressed  in  that  judgment,  i.e.,  only 
one  of  the  relations  into  which  these  two  objects  may 
ettter.  And  this  is  what  gives  rise  to  the  separation 
of  the  two  conceptions  of  substance  and  causality. 
Every  individual  object  is  a  sum  of  relations,  and  hence 
the  complete  nature  of  any  given  object  is  never  ex- 
hausted in  a  particular  relation.  And  the  matter  is 
made  still  more  complicated  by  the  fact  that  some 
objects  are  capable  of  entering  into  an  infinity  of  par- 
ticular relations,  while  others  are  only  capable  of  en- 
tering into  a  small  number  of  relations.  The  sun, 
e.g.,  warms  not  only  this  object,  the  stone,  but  an 
infinity  of  other  objects;  whereas  the  stone  is  only 
capable  of  being  warmed  in  a  limited  number  of  ways. 
Besides  this  particular  relation  of  heat,  the  term 
*'  sun "  connotes  many  other  relations  of  a  different 
kind.  At  the  same  time,  the  sun  has  no  properties 
except  those  involved  in  its  relations  to  other  objects ; 
and  hence,  not  only  does  the  property  of  producing 
heat  imply  causality,  but  all  the  other  properties 
belonging  to  it.  Only,  then,  in  relation  to  the  stone 
or  some  other  object  is  the  sun  heat-producing  at 
all.  If,  therefore,  we  suppose  the  sun,  for  the  sake 
of  simplicity,  to  have  only  the  property  of  producing 
heat  in  this  particular  stone,  we  must  say  that  it  is 
a  substance  in  virtue  of  its  causality.  Apart  from 
this  property  it  is  only  conceivable  as  "something, 
we  know  not  what."  Similarly,  except  as  capable 
of  being  heated  by  the  sun,  the  stone  is  likewise 
"  something,  we  know  not  what."     Thus  we  have  two 


X..] 


IMPERFECTION  OF  KANT'S  THEOR  Y. 


a40 


ing, 
ible 


"  Romethings "  which  in  themselves  are  indistinguish- 
able ;  the  distinction  falling  between  them  as  a  certain 
relation  or  change.  And  there  is  but  one  relation  or 
change :  the  heat  of  the  sun  is  the  same  as  the  heat  of 
the  stone.  Each  instance  of  causality  is  thus  simply 
one  of  the  relations  or  changes  of  a  substance  considered 
apart  from  the  other  relations  or  changes  which  deter- 
mine it.  Thus  causality  is  reality  contemplated  as 
changing  in  its  relations,  as  substance  is  reality  con- 
templated as  permanent;  and  as  permanence  and  change 
are  correlatives  implying  each  other,  substance  and 
causality  are  correlative  conceptions,  logically  distin- 
guishable but  really  inseparable. 

Finally,  the  category  of  reciprocity  is  just  the  synthe- 
sis of  the  correlative  conceptions  of  substance  and  caus- 
ality. The  sun  warms  the  stone,  but  the  stone  must  have 
the  capacity  of  being  warmed  or  the  sun  could  not  act. 
Each  object  is  considered  in  the  first  place  as  indepen- 
dent, and  then  as  brought  into  relation  with  the  other. 
As  we  have  seen,  however,  the  objects  are  not  independ- 
ent in  so  far  they  are  considered  as  causally  connected : 
change  is  relative  to  substance,  and  there  are  not  two 
changes,  but  only  one.  Substance  is  real  because  of  its 
relations  ;  each  of  these  relations  implies  a  causal  con- 
nection or  change ;  and  each  change  is  the  product  of 
a  relation  between  two  objects  which  only  exist  as 
causal  in  that  relation.  Thus  substance  implies  cause, 
and  reciprocity  comprehends  both. 

5.  When  we  discard  the  opposition  of  a  pnori  and 
a  postenon,  form  and  matter,  intelligence  and  nature, 
the  separation  of  pure  from  mixed  categories  is  at  once 
seen  to  be  untenable.  Assuming  that  there  is  a  fixed 
number  of  categories  belonging  to  the  constitution  of 
the  understanding,  Kant  is  led  to  speak  of  the  primary 


t  < 


350 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


conceptions  involved  in  the  system  of  external  nature  as 
derivative,  and  in  a  sense  empirical.  The  conceptions  of 
matter,  motion,  force,  and  reciprocal  action,  presuppose 
the  categories  of  quantity,  quality,  relation,  and  modal- 
ity, but  they  merely  borrow  from  the  latter  their  a 
priori  character,  while  in  themselves  they  are  empirical. 
When,  however,  it  is  seen  that  there  is  no  ground  for 
such  a  contrast  of  a  priori  and  empirical,  the  concep- 
tions presupposed  in  external  nature  can  no  longer  be 
placed  on  a  different  level  from  those  presupposed  in 
nature  in  general.  Both  classes  of  conceptions  are 
abstract  or  a  priori,  when  viewed  apart  from  the  con- 
crete element  of  knowledge ;  both  are  conditions  of 
real  knowledge,  and  therefore  equally  constitutive  of 
reality.  Nay,  it  may  even  be  said  that  the  conceptions 
of  matter,  motion,  and  the  other  categories  employed 
in  Physics  are  more  real,  because  more  concrete, 
than  the  correspondent  categories  supposed  to  be  in 
a  peculiar  sense  constitutive  of  real  knowledge.  The 
former  can  be  said  to  be  "derived"  from  the  latter, 
only  in  so  far  as  the  more  concrete  conception  logic- 
ally presupposes  the  less  concrete.  In  a  systematic 
presentation  of  the  pure  conceptions  involved  in  know- 
ledge, speaking  generally,  wo  must  put  the  categories 
of  Kant's  table,  as  less  perfect  definitions  of  real  exis- 
tence, earlier  than  those  signalized  in  the  Metaphysic 
of  Nature.  Thus  the  conception  of  substance  will 
precdde  vhat  of  matter,  causality  that  of  force,  recip- 
rocity that  of  reciprocal  action.  In  this  way  we 
get  rid  of  the  illusion,  suggested  by  the  language 
of  the  Critique,  and  partly  shared  in  by  Kant 
himself,  that  the  pure  categories  are  somehow  origi- 
nated by  the  understanding  itself,  while  the  cate- 
gories of  nature  are  obtained   by  going  beyond  the 


XI.] 


IMPERFECTION  OF  KANT S  THEORY. 


351 


understanding  to  the  perceptions  of  sense.  All 
categories,  as  Kant  himself  virtually  admits,  are  dis- 
covered only  by  reflection  upon  actual  or  concrete 
knowledge,  and  hence  there  is  no  proper  reason  for 
distinguishing  one  class  as  pure  and  original  from 
another  class  supposed  to  be  mixed  and  derivative. 
And  this  simplification  allows  us  to  bring  philosophy 
and  the  special  sciences  into  closer  connection  with 
each  other ;  for  while  no  advance  of  science  can  pos- 
sibly bring  to  light  knowledge  which  is  free  of  relation 
to  intelligence,  that  is  no  reason  why  the  development 
of  scientific  knowledge  should  not  teach  us  to  systema- 
tize our  knowledge  by  more  and  more  perfect  concep- 
tions. As  a  matter  of  fact,  philosophy  always  has 
been,  and  always  must  be,  more  or  less  dependent  upon 
the  progress  of  the  physical  sciences,  as  the  latter  have 
been  dependent  upon  philosophy.  The  earlier  philoso- 
phers endeavoured  to  systematize  knowledge  by  cate- 
gories which  were  necessarily  meagre  and  inadequate, 
just  because  the  special  branches  of  knowledge  were  in 
their  infancy.  On  Kant's  view  we  cannot  explain  why 
they  should  have  been  entirely  destitute,  as  they  show 
themselves  to  have  been,  of  such  conceptions  as  cause 
and  force ;  whereas,  in  recognizing  that  philosophy 
formulates  the  relations  to  intelligence  manifested  in 
knowledge  as  it  has  so  far  been  developed  at  the  time, 
we  at  once  retain  the  spirituality  of  the  universe  and 
allow  for  the  process  by  which  new  ways  of  determin- 
ing it  are  gradually  discovered. 


1 


i 


363 


CHAPTER  XII. 

EXAMINATION  OF  KANt's  DISTINCTION  OF  SENSE,  IMAGINATION, 

AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


^"^HE  general  remarks  in  last  chapter  on  the  incom- 
plete development  of  Kant's  theory  of  knowledge 
will  perhaps  become  more  intell'<jible  by  a  considera- 
tion of  each  of  the  elements  of  knowledge  distinguished 
in  the  Critique.  These  elements  may  be  roughly 
characterized  as  those  due  to  sense,  to  imagination, 
and  to  understanding;  or,  looking  at  the  elements 
themselves  instead  of  their  source,  the  manifold  of 
sense,  the  forms  of  perception,  the  schemata  of  im- 
agination, the  categories  of  the  understanding,  and 
pure  self-consciousness.  These  I  shall  take  up  in  their 
order,  endeavouring  to  point  out  wherein  Kant,  in 
departing  from  the  critical  point  of  view,  mars  the 
unity  and  completeness  of  his  system. 

1.  The  manifold  of  sense  is  attributed  by  Kant  to 
the  sensibility,  as  a  purely  receptive  faculty.  This 
naturally  suggests  that  sense  is  an  independent  faculty, 
giving  to  us  one  special  kind  of  knowledge,  as  imagina- 
tion and  understanding  give  other  special  kinds  of 
knowledge.  The  product  of  sense,  however,  is  held  by 
Kant,  notwithstanding  the  apparently  psychological 
distinction  of  different  faculties,  to  be  merely  an  ele- 


XII.] 


SENSE  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


363 


UNATION, 


}  mcora- 

owledge 

msidera- 

iguished 

roughly 

gination, 

ements 

lifold  of 

of  im- 

ng,  and 

in  their 

^ant,  in 

lars  the 


r. 


Kant  to 

This 

faculty, 

magina- 

dnds   of 

held  by 

lological 

an  ele- 


ment in  knowledge,  not  a  particular  kind  of  knowledge. 
At  the  same  time  one  cannot  employ  imperfect  forms 
of  thought  without  being  more  or  less  the  victim  of 
them  ;  and  hence,  Kant  is  led  to  admit  that  a  series  of 
subjective  sensations  constitutes  the  real  element  in  our 
inner  life.  Had  he  clearly  distinguished  the  different 
senses  in  which  we  may  speak  of  sensation,  this  incon- 
sistent admission  might  have  been  avoided.  By  sensa- 
tion may  be  meant  (1)  a  series  of  animal  affections, 
(2)  the  immediate  apprehension  of  a  real  object,  (3)  a 
series  of  individual  feelings  in  consciousness,  (4)  the 
particular  element  in  real  knowledge.  A  few  words 
on  each  of  these  meanings  may  help  to  mvike  clear  the 
confusion  in  Kant's  theory  to  which  I  have  referred. 

(1.)  From  the  point  of  view  of  purely  animal  life, 
sensation  is  simply  a  number  of  affections  of  the  indi- 
vidual animal,  or  changes  in  the  animal  organism  pro- 
duced by  its  reaction  on  external  stimuli.  This  is  the 
point  of  view  from  which  Fechner  and  his  followers 
distinguish  the  two  "  aspects  "  of  the  organism  as  ner- 
vous excitation  and  sensation.  And  of  course  the 
main  question  which  lias  h  .» o  to  be  discussed  is  the 
physical  conditions  under  t  hich  different  sensations 
arise,  and  especially  the  re.ptions  of  the  nervouf;  struc- 
ture to  external  stimul*,  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  the 
function  of  sensation  /)u  the  other ;  to  which  may  be 
added  an  enquiry  into  the  way  in  which  a  given  type 
of  organism  has  in  course  of  time  been  gradually 
developed,  and  has  become  better  adapted  to  be  the 
instrument  of  such  sensations. 

(2.)  From  the  phenomenal  point  of  view  sensation 
is  the  apprehension  of  a  reality  regarded  as  immedi- 
ately presenting  itself  to  us.  It  is  in  fact  but  another 
name  for  ordinary  observation,  as  distinguished  from 


864 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


scientific  generalization.  In  this  sense  of  the  term 
sensation  is  regarded  as  dealing  with  external  things 
assumed  to  be  directly  revealed  to  us  without  inference 
or  mediation  of  any  kind.  The  distinction  of  external 
objects  from  the  individual  who  apprehends  them  by 
his  senses  is  here  taken  for  granted.  Objects  are 
therefore  supposed  to  exist  as  determined  in  them- 
selves, and  sensation  to  consist  in  the  direct  apprehen- 
sion of  them  as  individual. 

(3.)  Sensation  is  regarded  by  ordinary  psychology  as 
the  medium  by  which  we  come  in  contact  with  real 
things  existing  independently  of  our  sensations.  Each 
individual  thing  or  event  is  supposed  to  be  revealed 
through  an  immediate  feeling  in  consciousness.  Thus 
sensation  is  endowed  with  two  opposite  and  mutually 
exclusive  characteristics.  On  the  one  hand  it  is  an 
immediate  apprehension  of  real  individual  objects  and 
events,  and  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  a  number  of  feelings 
coming  and  going  perpetually  in  consciousness. 

(4.)  Sensation  in  the  strict  critical  meaning  is,  from 
the  side  of  the  object,  the  particular  element  known, 
and  from  the  side  of  the  subject,  the  particular  element 
in  knowledge.  The  particular  must  be  carefully  dis- 
tinguished from  the  individual.  The  former  is  merely 
u,n  element  in  knowledge,  the  latter  a  concrete  act  or 
product  of  knowledge.  The  separate  properties  of  a 
thing,  e.g.,  are  particular ;  the  thing  as  a  union  of  these 
properties  is  individual.  ^v 

Of  the  various  meanings  of  sensation  just  dis- 
tinguished it  is  evident  that  only  the  last  can  have  any 
proper  place  in  a  theory  of  knowledge,  the  object  of 
which  is  to  formulate  the  elements  that  combine  to 
produce  actual  knowledge.  (1)  A  series  of  organic  affec- 
tions may  indeed  be  considered  as  taken  into  considera- 


[chap. 


XII.] 


SENSE  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


365 


he  term 
il  things 
nference 
external 
them  by 
jects  are 
in  them- 
.pprehen- 

lology  as 
svith  real 
s.     Each 

revealed 
IS.  Thus 
mutually 

it  is  an 
)jects  and 
>f  feelings 

3. 

pr  is,  from 

known, 

element 

uUy  dis- 

is  merely 

;e  act  or 

;ies  of  a 

of  these 

just  dis- 
have  any 
object  of 
mbine  to 
iiic  affec- 
;onsidera- 


f 


tion  in  a  metaphysic,  but  only  in  so  far  as  metaphysic 
deals  with  the  conception  of  the  organic  as  distinguished 
from  the  conception  of  the  inorgaric  world,  or  as 
it  deals  with  the  organic  beings  comprehended  in  the 
universe  of  objects  which  exist  in  relation  to  intelli- 
gence. But,  in  so  far  as  animal  sensation  is  viewed 
relatively  to  the  possibility  of  knowledge,  an  investiga- 
tion into  its  nature  belongs  to  empirical  psychology, 
not  to  metaphysic :  being  taken  as  a  datum  given  in 
observation,  no  enquiry  is  made  as  to  its  relation  to  con- 
sciousness. Sensation  is  therefore  so  far  regarded  as 
a  series  of  feelings  running  parallel  with  a  series  of 
nervous  excitations,  which  again  are  dependent  upon 
external  stimuli.  There  is  simply  a  given  series  of 
changes  that  are  independent  of  consciousness  in  the 
same  sense  in  which  the  motions  of  matter,  or  tlie 
vibrations  of  the  nervous  system  are  independent  of  it. 
The  distinction  of  subject  and  object  is  here  quite  out 
of  place,  since  that  distinction  involves  the  relation  of 
a  knowing  subject  to  a  known  object.  (2)  Sensation, 
as  the  observation  or  apprehension  of  concrete  objects, 
is  spoken  of  by  Kant  in  various  passages  ;  but  in  these, 
as  I  understand  him,  he  is  referring  to  the  data  on 
which  a  philosophical  explanation  of  knowledge  must  be 
based.  In  the  Prolegomena,  for  example,  he  speaks  of 
the  sun  and  of  a  stone  as  objects  of  sense,  here  employ- 
ing the  term  sensation  in  its  ordinary,  every-day  accepta- 
tion. (3)  When  we  pass  to  the  third  meaning  of  sensation 
we  enter  the  region  of  the  Critique.  Kant  indeed  re- 
fuses to  admit  that  by  sensation  any  knowledge  of  real 
individual  objects  can  be  obtained ;  for  no  mere  series 
of  feelings,  as  he  contends,  can  give  us  a  knowledge  of 
objects,  or  of  their  connections.  The  force  of  his  main 
argument  against  psychological  Idealism  or  dogmatjsift 


k    i« 


;  1    ■■ 

li 


S66 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


rests  upon  the  consideration  that,  from  a  continually 
changing  succession  of  impressions, — which  would  be 
for  us  the  only  representative  of  objects,  if  objects  were 
things  in  themselves, — no  actual  knowledge  can  be 
derived.  But  while  he  denies  that  a  series  of  Sv  i- 
sations  is  capable  of  accounting  ibr  our  knowledge  o^ 
objects,  he  does  not  deny  that  a  series  of  sensations 
exists  in  consciousness,  but  only  that  it  can  be 
known  except  in  contrast  to  permanent  objects  in 
space.  Now  while  Kant's  criticism  of  psychological 
Idealism  seems  to  me  valid,  the  correctness  of  his  view 
that  our  inner  life  may  be  characterized  as  a  series 
of  feelings  in  time  I  am  compelled  to  deny.  Had 
Kant  simply  said  that  there  are  feelings  which  do 
not  belong  to  the  extra-organic  world,  but  exist  only 
in  relaticr  tc  the  organism,  no  objection  could  be  made 
to  the  remark,  except  on  the  ground  of  its  irrelevancy 
to  a  theory  setting  forth  the  conditions  of  knowledge 
in  general.  But  he  does  much  more  than  this.  Even 
when  speaking  of  those  feelings  which  are  supposed  to 
stand  in  direct  relation  to  external  objects,  he  supposes 
that  we  may  legitimately  contrast  the  inner  with  the 
outer  life  as  a  succession  of  feelings  in  time  with  per- 
manent objects  im  space.  But,  when  we  have  denied 
that  external  objects  are  independent  of  consciousness, 
there  can  no  longer  be  any  reason  for  opposing  percep- 
tions to  obiects  perceived.  A  perception  and  a  percept 
are,  ;  a  Kant's  own  showing,  simply  the  same  thing 
view>id,  in  the  one  case  from  the  side  of  the  subject, 
and  in  the  other  case  from  the  side  of  the  object. 
Afart  from  the  relation  of  the  knowing  self  to  the 
object  known,  there  is  neither  perception  nor  percept : 
in  the  relation  of  subject  and  object,  perception  and 
percept  are  two  aspects  of  the  same  concrete  unity.     It 


[chap. 

lually 
ild  be 
3  were 
an  be 
•f  s.  1- 
dge  o' 
sations 
lan   be 
jcts  in 
)logical 
is  view 
t  series 
,     Had 
lich  do 
iat  only 
)e  made 
[levancy 
)wledge 
Even 
30&ed  to 
apposes 
;ith  the 
h  per- 
denied 
ousness, 
3ercep- 
percept 
thing 
subject, 
object, 
to  the 
)ercept : 
ion  and 
ty.     It 


XII.] 


S£J\rS£  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


857 


is  only  from  the  dualistic  point  of  view  that  we  can 
oppose  the  one  to  thi  other:  from  the  critical  point  of 
view,  there  is  merely  a  logical  distinction  between 
them.  Even  if  Kant  in  the  Critique  were  explaining 
the  conditions  of  knowledge  in  the  individual  man,  it 
would  still  be  true  that  a  mere  series  of  sensations  is 
nothing  for  us  as  intelligent  beings.  Subject  and 
object  being  correlative,  perception  and  percept  are 
mere  abstractions  when  taken  in  isolation  from  each 
other.  The  source  of  Kant's  mistake  has  been  alreadv 
indicated  in  the  remarks  on  the  two-fold  meaning  of 
the  "manifold  of  sense."  Distinguishing  between 
observation  as  the  initial  stage  in  knowledge,  and 
sensation  as  an  element  in  the  known  world,  Kant 
yet  allows  himself  to  apply  to  sensation,  in  the  latter 
senae,  attributes  that  are  true  of  it  only  in  the  former 
sense.  As  observation,  sensation  is  taken  to  be  an  appre- 
hension of  real  external  objects.  Hence  the  individual 
man  is  regarded  as  passively  apprehending  individual 
things  as  they  lie  before  him.  Even  when  he  has 
shown  that  the  known  world  is  not  independent  of  con- 
sciousness, Kant  is  still  influenced  by  the  idea  that 
sensation  is  purely  receptive.  On  sensation,  as  he 
thinks,  we  are  dependent  for  the  concrete  filling  or 
"matter"  of  the  categories,  and  accordingly,  while 
thought  is  active  or  spontaneous,  sense  is  passive  or 
receptiv  e.  But  if  the  Critique,  as  I  have  tried  to  show, 
is,  in  spite  of  its  imperfections,  a  systematic  treatment 
of  the  elements  in  real  knowledge,  or,  what  is  the  same 
thing,  in  the  real  world  as  known,  there  is  no  propriety 
in  speaking  of  sense  as  receptive.  Receptive  it  can  be 
only  if  there  is  a  world  lying  beyond  intelligence,  which 
acts  upon  a  separate  mind,  and  so  caDs  up  one  feeling 
after  another.     But  such  an  unknowable  world  has  no 


iss 


JCANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


reason  for  existence,  if  the  world  is  really  relative  to 
intelligence.     It  is  true,  of  course,  that  each  of  us  as 
an  individual  man,  obtains  his  knowledge  in  successive 
parts,  and  from  this  point  of  view  we  may  be  said  to 
be  receptive ;    but  from  no  point  of  view  can  we  be 
said  to  be  receptive  of  mere  feelings.     The  knowledge 
which  comes  to  me  in  fragments  is   not  the  less  con- 
crete :  it  is,  in  Kant's  language,  not  a  mere  "  manifold" 
but  a  manifold  reflected  on  a  unity;  it  is  not  pure  sen- 
sation but  sensation  informed  by  thought.    Sensation  as 
a  logical  element  in  knowledge  is  implied  in  ordinary 
observation,  but  it  cannot  be  identifled  with  it.     When 
we  come  to  explain  what  the  first  stage  of  knowledge 
means  for  us  as  conscious  beings,  we  are  compelled  to  see 
that,  in  real  knowledge,  there  is  not  a  passive  apprehen- 
sion of  a  detached  manifold,  but  a  real  comprehension  of 
a  manifold  in  unity.    If  I  observe  an  object  as  a  concrete 
thing,  I  at  once  know  it  es  one  and  as  many.     If  I 
perceive  a  congeries  of  objects  in  space,  I  comprehend 
them  all  in  the  unity  of  a  single  consciousness.     I  can- 
not apprehend  a  mere  manifold  of  sense,  because  real 
apprehension  is  not  possible  except  as  the  combined 
action  of  intelligence   by  which  the    universal   "  I " 
relates  to  itself  a  real  concrete.     Thus  ordinary  know- 
ledge, and  much  more  scientific  knowledge,  manifests 
the  action  of  intelligence  in  the  formation  for  me  of  a 
real  universe.     While  seeking  to  rid  himself  entirely  of 
dualism  by  carrying  over  nature  into  intelligence,  Kant 
yet  confuses  the  abstract  element  of  the  m<\aifold  or 
particular,  with  the  concrete  object  revealed  in  percep- 
tion.    He  does  not  mean  to  do  so,  and  he  showti  ns 
how  we  are  to  escape  from  doing  so,  but  in  his  view  of 
sense  as  receptive,  he  shows  that  he  has  not  entirely 
freed  himself  from  the  trammels  of  the  false  philosophy 


[chap. 

dative  to 
of  us  as 
uccessive 
»e  said  to 
lan  we  be 
nowledge 
less  con- 
oaanifold" 
pure  sen- 
nsation  as 
I  ordinary 
b.     When 
knowledge 
lied  to  see 
apprehen- 
hension  of 
la  concrete 
tny.     If  I 
imprehend 
I  can- 
cause  real 
combined 
rsal   "I" 
ary  know- 
manifests 
)r  me  of  a 
sntirely  of 
nee,  Kant 
.laifold  or 
in  percep- 
showib  ns 
lis  view  of 
)t  entirely 
hilosophy 


XII.] 


SENSE  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


369 


against  which  he  turns  all  his  strength.  It  is  only  in 
consequence  of  the  mistaken  attribution  of  passivity  to 
sense,  that  Kant  contrasts  the  series  of  internal  feelings 
with  external  things,  even  while  he  is  at  great  pains 
to  show  that  known  objects  are  not  external  to  con- 
sciousness. The  fact  that  our  knowledge  of  objects 
comes  to  us  in  succession  does  not  imply  that  we  have 
a  knowledge  of  mere  feelings  as  contrasted  with  a 
knowledge  of  objects.  It  is  only  from  a  confusion 
between  sensation  as  an  element  in  known  objects,  and 
sensation  as  vaguely  identified  with  ordinary  observa- 
tion, that  we  seem  entitled  to  oppose  the  inner  series 
of  feelings  to  outer  things  in  space.  When,  in  our 
ordinary  knowledge,  we  regard  things  outside  of  us  as 
immediately  apprehended,  it  is  of  course  natural  to  say, 
that  turning  our  thoughts  inward  on  our  apprehen- 
sions we  find  that  there  is  a  series  of  ideas  distinct 
from  the  objects  apprehended.  But  Kant  himself 
points  out  that  this  series  of  states  is  only  known 
in  relation  to  external  things.  His  mistake  is  to 
allow  that,  notwithstanding  the  relation  of  the  sensa- 
tions to  the  objects,  we  must  still  regard  the  two  as 
separate  and  distinct  objects  of  consciousness.  In  what 
are  they  separated  ?  I  have  an  apprehension  of  a  bril- 
liant object,  but  the  apprehension  is  not  separate  from 
the  object ;  it  is  in  fact  simply  the  object  viewed  from 
the  side  of  the  subject.  Hence  apprehensions  are  not 
a  distinct  series  of  feelings  in  time,  as  distinguished 
from  the  objects  apprehended  which  are  at  once  in 
space  and  in  time.  On  the  contrary,  the  apprehension 
is  only  a  losrically  distinguishable  element  in  the  object, 
as  the  object  is  a  logically  distinguishable  element  in 
the  apprehension.  Perception  is  thus,  taken  as  a 
whole,  not  an  element  in  knowledge,  but  the  know- 


i  '•  i 


360 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


ledge  of  a  concrete  object.  Kant  recognizus  this 
relativity  of  internal  and  uxtenml  so  far ;  but  ho  is 
unable  to  liberate  himself  from  the  motion  that  objects 
are  somehow,  in  his  own  language,  "given"  to  us. 
They  may  indeed  be  said  to  be  "  given"  to  us  as  indi- 
viduals, since  knowledge  is  real  only  when  it  is  not 
a  mere  arbitrary  creation,  but  ,i  comprehension  of 
a  concrete  object  in  its  real  relations.  But  they  are 
not  so  "  given  "  that  there  is,  on  the  one  side,  a  series 
of  feelings  in  time,  and  on  the  other  side,  a  number  of 
objects  in  space.  Kant,  therefore,  makes  the  mistake 
of  allowing  the  mere  series  of  feelings  to  survive,  even 
after  he  has  shown  that  all  real  objects  are  relative  to 
our  knowledge  ot  them.  And  this  he  does,  because  he 
confuses  sensation  as  a  terra  for  the  particular  element 
in  known  objects  and  in  knowledge  with  sensation  as  a 
series  of  particular  feelings  coming  and  going  in  the  in- 
dividual mind.  He  denies,  indeed,  that  individual 
objects  are  given,  but  he  fails  to  recognize  that,  with 
tlie  transference  of  objects  as  determinate  to  conscious- 
ness, there  is  no  longer  any  propriety  in  saying  that 
anything  is  "  given."  Or,  at  least,  if  we  are  to  speak 
of  anything  as  given,  it  must  be,  not  from  the  critical 
point  of  view,  in  which  the  elements  of  real  knowledge 
are  contemplated,  but  from  the  psychological  point  of 
view,  in  which  we  look  at  the  process  by  which  know- 
ledge grows  up  for  us  as  individual  men,  limited  by  a 
particular  animal  nature. 

(4)  Ridding  ourselves,  then,  of  this  remnant  of 
dogmatism,  by  which  Kant  has  allowed  himself  to 
be  confused,  we  may  accept  the  view  that  sensa- 
tion, in  the  strict  critical  sense,  supplies  the  particular 
element  in  knowledge.  It  would  perhaps  be  better 
in   this   connection,   although,   to    discard    the    mis- 


RITICS.        [chap. 

recognizos    this 
far ;   but  ho  is 
\on  that  objects 
"given"  to  us. 
i"  to  ud  as  indi- 
'  when  it  is  not 
omprehension  of 
s.     But  they  are 
)ne  side,  a  series 
ide,  a  number  of 
ikes  the  mistake 
,  to  survive,  even 
bs  are  relative  to 
3  does,  because  he 
(articular  element 
ith  sensation  as  a 
id  going  in  the  in- 
,   that  individual 
sognize  that,  with 
nate  to  conscious- 
y  in  saying  that 
we  are  to  speak 
from  the  critical 
of  real  knowledge 
lological  point  of 
s  by  which  know- 
men,  limited  by  a 

this  remnant  of 
owed  himself  to 
view  that  sensa- 
lies  the  particular 
)erhap8  be  better 
liscard    the    mis- 


XII.] 


SENSE  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


m 


leading  term  sensation  altogether.  Nothing  is  more 
important  than  to  recognize  the  concrete  unity  im- 
plied in  every  act  of  knowledge,  and  in  every  known 
object,  and  this  is  all  tho  more  important,  that  it 
brings  out  the  essential  relativity  of  the  elements  of 
real  knowledge.  For,  when  we  clearly  realise  that 
every  real  object  is  concrete,  distinguishable  in  one 
aspect  as  a  multitude  i  particulars  or  abstract  deter- 
minations, the  way  is  j  repared  for  the  comprehension 
of  the  particular  and  tl^  iversal  elements  as  together 
combining  in  the  indiviaual.  Thus  we  get  rid  of  the 
fiction  of  a  universe  existing  apart  irom  intelligence, 
while  at  the  same  time  we  take  due  note  of  the  fact 
that  the  individual  man  no  more  constructs  the  world 
than  he  constructs  himself. 

2.  I  have  already  hinted  that  Kant's  conception  of 
space  and  time,  as  forms  of  perception,  supremely 
important  as  it  is  in  its  ultimate  issues,  cannot  be 
accepted  without  modification.  To  limit  space  and 
time  to  human  intelligence  as  perceptive,  or  at  least 
to  all  possible  intelligences  which  are  dependent  for 
the  particular  element  of  knowledge  on  the  constitu- 
tion of  their  perceptive  faculty,  is  to  make  a  restriction 
which  is  at  once  untenable  and  inconsistent  with  the 
spirit  of  Kant's  own  theory  of  knowledge.  Space  and 
time  are  held  to  belong  to  our  intelligence,  because 
they  are  a  'priori,  or  independent  of  observation,  and 
they  are  held  to  be  perceptions  because  they  are  not 
abstract  universals  but  individuals. 

Now  (1)  the  fact  that  space  and  time  are  independent 
pf  special  observations,  only  shows  that  they  are  very 
abstract  elements  of  the  real  world.  As  space  is,  in 
the  language  of  Mr.  Spencer,  the  "abstract  of  all 
relations  of  co-existence,"  and  time  "the  abstract  of 


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362 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS         [chap. 


all  relations  of  Buccession/'  both  are  necessarily  pre- 
supposed  in  any  knowledge  of  concrete  things.  All 
I  parts  of  space  being  homogeneous,  a  determination 
of  one  part  is  virtually  a  determination  of  every  oth$r./ 
But  what  this  shows  is  not  that  space  and  time  belong 
to  intelligence,  while  individual  objects  do  not,  but 
merely  that  their  parts  as  absolutely  simple  admiii  of 
liO  variation  or  difference.  When  we  contemplate 
knowledge  as  in  process  of  formation,  it  is  no  doubt 
true  that  spatial  and  temporal  relations  may  be  ^- 
ticipated,  while  more  specific  relations  do  not  admit 
of  anticipation.  But  the  reason  of  this  is  not  that 
the  former  belong  to  the  constitution  of  our  percep- 
tive faculty,  while  concrete  things  belong  to  nature. 
No  doubt  it  is  in  virtue  of  our  intelligence  that  we 
can  determine  the  relations  of  space  and  time,  and 
so  form  a  science  of  mathematics,  but  it  is  equally  in 
virtue  of  intelligence  that  we  are  capable  of  knowing 
the  objects  which  fill  them.  The  contrast  of  forms 
of  perception  and  objects  perceived  rests  upon  the 
supposition  that  while  intelligence  is  in  a  sense  mani- 
fested in  nature  as  a  whole,  its  special  work  is  shown 
only  in  the  a  prioii  or  universal  side  of  knowledge,  as 
distinguished  from  the  a  posteinori  or  particular  side  of 
knowledge,  which  belongs  to  nature  itself.  But  in 
this  view  two  conceptions  are  set  side  by  side  which 
cannot  be  made  to  harmonise  with  each  other.  Seeing 
that  a  knowable  world,  virtually  assumed  to  be  un- 
knowable, is  a  contradiction  in  terms,  Kant  rightly 
holds  that  all  real  objects  are  relative  to  our  conscious- 
ness of  them.  As  however  the  particular  element  in 
knowledge  is  still  said  to  be  "given,"  intelligence  in 
perception  is  supposed  to  be  receptive.  But  it  soon 
appears  that  this  explanation  is  not  quite  satisfactory 


[chap. 


XII.] 


SBJ\rSE  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


868 


ly  pre- 

9.     Allj 
lination 
r  oth^r./ 
belong 
ot,  but 
dmit/  of 
implate 
3  doabt 
be  ^- 
;  admit 
ot  that 
percep- 
nature. 
hat  we 
ae,  and 
lally  in 
nowing 
forms 
n  the 
mani- 
shown 
[dge,  as 
side  of 
>ut  in 
which 
ISeeing 
>e  un- 
sightly 
Iscious- 
lent  in 
jnce  in 
It  soon 
Factory 


when  applied  to  space  and  time,  since  their  deter- 
minations, as  independent  of  special  apprehension, 
cannot  properly  be  said  to  be  "given."  Kant, 
however,  misled  by  the  confusion  of  the  receptiv- 
ity^ for  knowledge  of  the  individual  man  with  the 
receptivity  of  ii:^tfiUigffH^!flm^relfl.tion  to  a  particular 
manifold  of  sense,  separates  between  space  and  time 
as  forms  and  particular  spaces  and  times,  supposing 
the  former  to  belong  to  intelligence  and  the  latter 
to  be  in  some  sense  given  to  intelligence.  But  as  even 
the  determinations  of  space  and  time  are  prior  to 
determinate  objects,  both  the  forms  of  perception  and 
the  determination  of  those  forms  are  held  to  belong  to 
intelligence,  but  only  to  intelligence  in  so  far  as  it  is 
receptive.  Such  a  conception  conjoins  incompatible  at- 
tributes. The  assumption  that  space  and  time  are  mere 
forms  of  perception  evidently  rests  on  the  preconception 
that  to  intelligence  in  itself  there  can  belong  only  an 
abstract  universal.  But  there  is  no  proper  reason  for 
such  a  restriction.  Space  and  time  conceived  of  as 
unities  are  mere  abstract  elements  in  knowledge,  and 
therefore  mere  potentialities  of  determinate  spaces 
and  times.  The  distinction  of  potential  and  actual, 
universal  and  particular,  necessary  as  it  is  to  the  dis- 
crimination of  the  elements  of  knowledge,  must  not  be 
taken  to  carry  with  it  any  opposition  of  intelligence  in 
itself  and  nature  in  itself  Hence,  space  and  time,  as" 
IfformSimust  be  brought  into  the  closest  relation  with 
'space  and  time  as  determinate.  A  pure  universal  is 
no  real  object  of  knowledge :  neither  is  a  mere  deter- 
minateness.  This  Kant  clearly  sees,  but  as  he  is  still 
under  the  fascination  of  the  idea  that  only  the  abstract 
universal  belongs  to  intelligence,  he  separates  space  and 
time  as  forms  from  their  determinations.    But  if  the 


364 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


task  of  philosophy  is  to  point  out  the  dements  implied 
in  any  real  act  of  knowledge,  it  seems  evident  that  we 
must  not  suppose  one  element  in  knowledge  to  belong 
exclusively  to  intelligence,  and  another  element  to  be 
externally  revealed  to  intelligence.  Each  space  is  a 
unity  in  difference,  a  universal  reflected  in  a  particular. 
A  point,  as  Kant  himself  remarks,  is  simply  the  ter- 
mination of  a  line,  and  hence  any  number  of  points 
is  a  number  of  nothings ;  a  line  is  th  etermination  of 
a  surface,  but  no  number  of  lines  will  make  a  surface ; 
a  surface  is  the  boundary  of  a  solid,  but  a  solid  cannot 
be  formed  out  of  surfaces.  Each  part  of  space  im- 
plies a  limit  that  is  nothing  apart  from  that  which 
is  limited.  The  particular  units  of  space  are  units, 
in  fact,  only  when  they  are  related  to  the  unity 
in  which  they  coalesce.  Space  and  time  are  only 
forms  when  they  are  regarded  as  pure  unities ;  and 
pure  unities  are  not  real  objects  of  knowledge,  but 
merely  the  universal  aspect  of  a  real  object,  taken  by 

itself 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  space  and  time  are  not  to  be 
regarded  as  mere  forms,  but  as  relatively  abstract 
relations  of  the  real  world.  They  are  just  the  simplest 
point  of  view  from  which  the  real  world  or  real  know- 
ledge can  be  contemplated,  when  we  are  determining 
the  elements  implied  in  actual  knowledge.  But  when 
we  have  got  rid  of  the  arbitrary  opposition  of  that 
which  belongs  t'  telligence,  and  that  which  is  exter- 
nally added  to  i».  Jigence ;  and  when  we  see  that  the 
question  is  not  as  to  the  conditions  of  knowledge  in  the 
individual  man,  but  as  to  the  conditions  of  knowledge 
in  general ;  we  also  see  that  Kant's  view  of  space  and 
time  as  forms  of  human  intelligence  is  inconsistent  with 
his  own  theory  when  developed  to  its  true  issue.    This 


XII.] 


SENSE  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


365 


becomes  still  more  manifest  when  we  consider  space 
and  time  as  perceptions. 

(2)  Space  and  time  are  held  to  be  perceptions, 
because  they  are  not  abstract  conceptions,  but  individual 
concretes.  Attention  has  already  been  called  to  the 
fact  that  they  are  individual  only  when  we  regard  them 
as  determined  to  particular  spaces  and  times.  As 
forms,  they  are  not  perceptions,  but  only  the  potentiality 
of  perceptions.  An  individual  is  a  unity  of  the  universal 
and  the  particular,  and  hence  space  and  time  can  only 
be  said  to  be  individual  when  as  unities  they  are  so 
reflected  in  particular  parts  as  to  form  individuals. 
Kant,  however,  still  holds  that  as  perceptions  they  are 
somehow  "  given."  Although  he  maintains  that  they 
are  constructions  based  upon  pure  or  a  priori  percep- 
tions, he  yet  supposes  them  to  be  receptively  appre- 
hended when  they  are  viewed  in  relation  to  the  concrete 
things  to  which  they  apply.  As  informing  the  manifold 
of  sense,  itself  supposed  to  be  "given"  to  us,  they 
belong  to  the'concrete  side  of  knowledge,  if  not  in  them- 
selves, at  least  in  their  application  to  real  concretes. 
The  forms  of  space  and  time  are  called  out  and  deter- 
mined only  on  occasion  of  the  presentation  of  a  given 
manifold,  and  therefore  they  belong  to  the  receptive 
side  of  intelligence.  If  they  were  not  so  called  out, 
they  would  slumber  for  ever  in  the  mind  as  mere 
potentialities.  Now  this  is  manifestly  only  true 
if  we  look  at  them  as  forms  belonging  to  each 
individual's  intelligence.  The  world  of  objects  as 
informed  by  space  and  time  has  then  to  be  separated 
from  the  real  world  not  so  informed,  and  the  latter  be- 
comes unknowable.  The  assumption  underlying  this 
view  of  space  and  time  as  perceptions  somehow  given 
to  us  virtually  prevents  us  from  explaining  how  we  can 


366         KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


know  that  which  truly  is.  There  is  no  justification  for 
such  an  assumption :  nature,  and  space  and  time  as 
simple  determinations  of  nature,  are  real  because  they 
are  relative  to  intelligence.  If  every  object  is  relative 
to  consciousness,  as  Kant  himself  tells  us,  why  should 
we  imagine  a  world  not  relative  to  consciousness 
at  all  ? 

While  we  cannot  be  too  grateful  to  Kant  for  setting 
us  on  the  right  track,  when  he  points  out  that  space 
and  time,  and  therefore  the  concrete  objects  filling 
them,  do  not  exist  apart  from  our  intelligence,  we  must 
go  on  to  the  end  of  the  path  he  has  entered  upon,  by 
carrying  over  into  intelligence  the  determinations  of 
space  and  time  along  with  space  and  time  as  unities. 
And  this  givec  a  simplicity  to  our  view  of  mathematical 
truth,  which  Kant's  theory  does  not  possess.  If  we 
suppose  that  only  space  and  time  as  abstract  unities  or 
forms  belong  to  intelligence,  how  are  we  to  be  sure 
that  their  determinations  are  universally  and  neces- 
sarily true?  Kant,  of  course,  would  say  that,  as 
belonging  to  our  perceptive  intelligence,  and  con- 
structed by  us,  they  must  be  necessary  and  universal. 
But  the  necessity  and  universality  do  not,  on  his  own 
showing,  belong  to  the  determinations,  but  to  the  forms, 
or  at  least  the  determinations  only  borrow  their  abso- 
luteness from  the  forms.  When,  however,  we  see  that 
the  forms  are  merely  one  aspect  of  the  individual  spaces 
and  times  which  alone  we  actually  know,  we  discover 
that  the  universality  of  the  propositions  of  mathematics 
arises  from  the  fact  that  all  real  relations  of  things,  and 
therefore  mathematical  relations  among  the  rest,  are 
necessary  relations.  Doubt  is  possible  in  regard  to  the 
absoluteness  of  mathematical  propositions  only  so  long 
fus  it  seems  allowable  to  suppose  another  universe  com- 


[chap. 


xil] 


SENSE  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


367 


ion  for 
ime  as 
36  they 
relative 
should 
ousness 

setting 
t  space 
»  filling 
<re  must 
ipon,  by 
tions  of 
unities. 
)matical 

If  we 
aities  or 
be  sure 

neces- 
that;  as 
id   con- 
liversal. 
lis  own 
e  forms, 
}ir  abso- 
see  that 
il  spaces 
discover 
lematics 
ngs,  and 
est,  are 
d  to  the 

so  long 

se  com- 


pletely different  in  its  constitution  from  ours ;  and  when 
it  is  seen  that  such  a  universe  is  a  mere  fiction  of 
abstraction,  since  it  is  only  definable  as  the  unknowable, 
the  doubt  at  once  vanishes. 

The  examination  of  Kant's  theory  of  knowledge  so 
far  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  its  essence  consists  in 
the  proposition  that  the  universal  reflected  on  the 
particular  alone  gives  real  knowledge.  The  manifold 
of  sense,  when  conceived  from  the  purely  critical  point 
of  view,  is  definable  as  the  particular  element  in  know- 
ledge as  contrasted  with  the  universal  element.  The 
opposition  of  space  and  time  as  forms  of  perception  to 
space  and  time  as  perceptions,  which  we  have  seen  to 
be  implicit  in  the  JSathetic  of  Kant,  disappears  with 
the  recognition  of  the  thorough-going  correlation  of 
subject  and  object,  and  leaves  as  residue  the  concrete 
unity  of  intelligence  as  shown  in  the  knowledge  of 
individual  spaces  and  times,  uniting  the  universal  and 
the  particular.  We  have  now  to  consider  the  rela- 
tion of  imagination  with  its  schemata  to  the  elements 
already  considered,  as  well  as  to  those  yet  to  be  con- 
sidered. 

3.  That  imperfect  liberation  from  the  dogmatic  or 
psychological  point  of  view,  which  is  seen  in  the 
doctrine  that  the  manifold  of  sense  is  "given,"  and 
that  space  and  time  arc  merely  forms  of  human  intelli- 
gence, is  also  shown  in  the  doctrine  of  the  schematism 
as  to  the  activity  of  the  pure  imagination.  Kant  cer- 
tainly draws  a  distinction  between  the  reproductive  and 
the  productive  imagination,  making  it  perfectly  plain 
that  the  latter  is  no  mere  repetition  of  given  percep- 
tions ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  he  is  compelled  to  regard 
the  pure  imagination  as  characteristic  only  of  human 
intelligence. 


,1 


ft 


368 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


Pure  imagination,  as  Kant  conceives  of  it,  is  limited 
to  the  general  determination  of  time,  to  the  exclusion 
of  space.  Why  so  ?  Because  it  is  one  of  the  condi- 
tions of  our  intelligence  that  knowledge  comes  to  us 
in  successive  acts.  Now  of  course  it  is  plain  enough 
that  as  individuals,  limited  by  our  animal  organism 
to  a  particular  place  and  a  particular  time,  we  know 
only  in  part,  and  must  pass  from  one  object  of  con- 
templation to  another.  But  while  this  is  true  of  us 
as  individuals,  it  is  not  the  less  true,  on  Kant's  own 
showing,  that  in  our  intelligence  must  be  sought  that 
which  makes  possible  the  knowledge  of  ourselves,  as 
so  limited  by  space  and  time.  Pure  imagination,  as 
described  by  Kant,  is  quite  distinct  from  imagination 
as  limited  by  temporal  conditions,  inasmuch  as  it 
enabl*  s  us  to  determine  concrete  objects  by  universal 
relations  of  time.  Kant  does  not  mean  to  say  that 
we  first  have  the  perception  of  individual  things  and 
events  as  in  a  particular  time,  and  that  we  then  by 
pure  imagination  bring  those  things  under  general 
relations  of  time ;  but  he  means,  that  only  in  the  de- 
termination of  them  in  certain  universal  ways  we  are 
capable  of  knowing  things  as  in  time.  Looking  at 
the  phenomenal  stages  of  our  knowledge,  we  must 
rather  say  that  we  first  have  the  apprehension  or 
perception  of  individual  things  and  events,  which 
we  then  reproduce  by  imagination,  and  finally  bring 
under  conceptions;  and  that  only  when  these 
stages  are  completed,  we  discover  by  reflection  that 
things  come  under  schemata  and  categories.  But, 
from  the  critical  point  of  view,  the  order  of  the  so- 
called  faculties  of  sense,  imagination  and  thought  is 
a  relation  not  of  succession  at  all,  but  of  logical 
dependence.      It  will  be  as  well  to  distinguish  the 


[chap. 


XII.] 


SENSE  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


369 


limited 
Lclusion 
I  condi- 
s  to  us 
enough 
rganiBm 
e  know 
of  con- 
le  of  us 
it's  own 
^ht  that 
elves,  as 
3ition,  as 
gination 
h   as  it 
miversal 
say  that 
ings  and 
then  by 

general 

the  de- 

we  are 
>king  at 
;^e  must 
nsiou  or 
which 

ly  bring 
these  ' 

lion  that 
But, 
the  so- 

ought  is 
logical 

uish  the 


n 


different  meanings  of  imagination,  as  we  have  distin- 
guished the  different  meanings  of  sensation.     ' 

(1.)  By  imagination  may  be  meant  simply  the  oc- 
currence of  feelings  in  the  animal,  when  external 
stimuli  are  not  present.  Taking  imagination  in  this 
sense,  we  may  enquire  into  the  relation  between  the 
condition  of  the  nervous  system,  and  especially  of  the 
brain,  and  the  imagined  feeling  which  accompanies  it. 
Here  we  are  treating  imagination  simply  as  we  treat 
any  other  object  capable  of  being  observed.  The  en- 
quiry belongs  to  that  sphere  of  physiological  psychology 
which  has  recently  received  so  much  attention.  And 
no  doubt  it  can  be  shown  that  the  correspondence  be- 
tween the  molecular  movement  in  the  nervous  system 
and  the  imagined  feeling  is  thorough-going,  so  that  no 
change  in  the  one  can  take  place  without  a  correspond- 
ing change  in  the  other.  But  the  enquiry  lies  beyond 
the  range  of  metaphysic  proper,  because  the  distinction 
of  subject  and  object,  intelligence  and  nature,  is  not 
even  brought  under  consideration.  The  imagined 
feeling  and  the  molecular  movement  are  regarded  as 
known,  but  no  enquiry  is  made  into  the  conditions 
under  which  such  knowledge  is  alone  ^^onsible. 

(2.)  Imagination,  again,  may  be  regard-  id  as  the  second 
phase  in  the  temporal  development  of  knowledge.  The 
observation  of  facts  is  followed  by  the  imaginative  con- 
templation of  them,  as  lifted  above  the  immediate  time 
and  place  in  which  they  are  observed  and  so  idealized. 
In  this  case  also  there  is  no  room  for  an  enquiry  into 
the  dependence  of  reality  upon  intelligence  :  real  things 
are  assumed  to  be  given  to  us,  and  in  exercising  our 
imagination  upon  them  we  abstract  from  the  mere  details 
of  their  existence,  and  contemplate  them  under  vague 
and  general  aspects.     The  poetic  imagination  is  simply 


'Z  A 


i 


870 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.         [chap. 


this  common  faculty  raised  to  its  highest  perfection; 
for  all  intelligent  beings  have  the  capacity  of  repre- 
senting reality  in  images  that  fuse  together  the 
separate  features  of  existence  in  a  new  unity. 

(8.)  In  ordinary  psychology  imagination  is  a  term 
for  the  capacity  of  having  ideas  that  are  not,  like  sen< 
satiolis,  supposed  to  stand  in  direct  relation  to  external 
objects.  The  stream  of  feelings  that  constitutes  the 
inner  life  is  separated  from  the  realities  lying  outside 
of  the  mind.  The  images  in  tlie  mind  are  supposed 
to  refer  to  real  things,  but  only  mediately,  and  in 
so  far  as  they  are  correct  copies  of  sensations 
originally  experienced.  Thus  in  the  stream  of  inner 
feelings,  perpetually  coming  and  going,  there  are 
sensations  directly  confronting,  external  things,  and 
images  referring  directly  to  sensations,  and  so  mediately 
to  external  things.  And  this  mere  succession  of  in- 
dividual images,  like  the  succession  of  individual  sen- 
sations, is  treated  as  purely  subjective. 

(4.)  Lastly,  imagination,  in  the  strict  critical  sense, 
is  the  faculty  of  determining  the  particular  element  of 
knowledge  to  certain  general  relations  of  time,  such 
as  permanence,  order,  and  co-existence.  It  is  at 
once  universal  and  particular — universal  in  itself  and 
particular  in  its  application.  Imagination,  as  thus 
understood,  is  no  mere  reproduction  of  individual  per- 
ceptions, but  the  process  by  which  universal  concep- 
tions or  categories  are  brought  into  relation  with  the 
manifold  of  sense,  which  is  thus  determined  to  universal 
relations  of  time. 

Of  these  various  meanings  of  imagination  only  the 
last  is  properly  in  place  in  metaphysic.  Kant,  how- 
everj  does  not  keep  the  reproductive  imagination  abso- 
lutely distinct  from  the  productive  imagination,  and 


^ 


[chap. 

action ; 

repre- 

er   the 

a  term 
ke  sen- 
ixternal 
ies  the 
outside 
ipposed 
and  in 
nsations 
of  inner 
ere   are 
gs,   and 
lediately 
n  of  in- 
ual  sen- 

il  sense, 
Bment  of 
ne,  such 
t  is  at 
;self  and 
as  thus 
ual  per- 
coucep- 
with  the 
iniversal 

only  the 
,nt,  how- 
lion  abso- 
ion,  and 


XII.] 


SENSE  AND  UNDERSTANDING, 


371 


hence  he  will  be  found  attributing  to  the  latter  attri- 
butes  only  true  of  the  former. 

Imagination  as  a  mere  affection  of  the  animal,  which 
may  go  on  without  any  recognition  of  self  by  the 
animal,  is  of  course  excluded.  Kant,  indeed,  has  a 
summary  way  of  disposing  of  the  "mere  animal,"  which 
reminds  us  that  he  lived  before  the  doctrine  of  evolu- 
tion had  taken  such  hold  upon  the  scientific  imagination 
as  it  has  recently  done.  This  is  no  doubt  an  imperfec- 
tion, for  the  enquiry  into  the  natural  history  of  the 
whole  animal  creation  has  great  importance  within  its 
own  sphere.  But  Kant  was  not  wrong  in  eliminating 
from  his  critical  enquiry  all  considerations  as  to  the 
natural  evolution  of  the  animal,  since,  as  he  shows,  the 
animal,  like  the  other  parts  of  nature,  is  one  of  the 
objects  of  knowledge,  and  therefore  only  falls  to  be 
considered  in  so  far  as  the  general  relation  of  subject 
and  object  comes  under  investigation. 

Kant,  again,  shows  his  appreciation  of  the  distinction 
between  imagination  as  a  phase  in  the  temporal  evolu- 
tion of  knowledge,  and  imagination  in  the  critical  sense, 
although  he  has  not  marked  off  the  one  from  the  other 
so  clearly  as  we  could  wish.  Imagination,  he  remarks 
in  one  place,  is  "  a  faculty  of  representing  an  object 
when  it  is  not  present  in  perception."  *  Now,  as 
Kant  has  pointed  out  that  known  objects  are  not 
independent  existences,  he  cannot  of  course  regard 
imagination  in  the  critical  sense  as  a  reproduction 
of  objects  immediately  known  as  they  exist  apart 
from  our  intelligence.  His  analysis  of  knowledge  has 
led  him  to  regard  sense  as  giving  us  the  "  manifold  "  ; 
but  it  is  a  manifold  of  particulars,  not  of  concrete 
A  reproduction   of   the   "  manifold "   is  an 

>  KritXh,  p.  127. 


I 


things. 


372 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS. 


[chap. 


absurdity ;  for  the  manifold  is  not  of  itself  an  object  of 
knowledge  at  all,  but  simply  an  element  in  knowledge. 
Kant,  therefore,  does  not  regard  imagination  as  repro- 
ductive, but  as  productive.  It  acts  on  the  form  of 
time,  and  by  so  doing  determines  it  in  general  ways. 
Thus  it  does  not  come  after  the  presentation  of  indi- 
vidual things  to  sense,  copying  their  general  features, 
but  is  logicallj/  prior  to  our  knowledge  of  the  things  of 
sense.  But,  just  as  he  accepts  the  ordinary  view  that 
the  "  matter  "  of  sense  is  given,  even  when  so  altering 
the  account  of  the  relation  of  intelligence  and  nature  as  to 
make  the  supposition  meaningless,  so  he  figures  imagin- 
ation to  himself  not  as  simply  the  logical  determination 
of  intelligence  in  relation  to  nature,  but  as  a  process 
taking  place  in  time.  Now  it  seems  plain  enough  that 
imagination  cannot  properly  be  at  once  that  which  de- 
termines time,  and  that  which  is  itself  limited  by  the 
very  determinations  which  it  is  itself  conceived  of  as 
originating.  If  the  actual  knowledge  of  real  things  can 
only  be  explained  by  supposing  a  process  by  which  the 
manifold  of  sense  is  determined  in  time  in  certain  general 
ways,  it  is  absurd  to  say  that  imagination  is  itself  under 
limits  of  time,  and  irrelevant  to  say  that  all  our  know- 
ledge comes  to  us  in  succession.  We  cannot  know  our- 
selves as  individuals  to  be  under  limitations  of  time  in 
knowing,  except  in  so  far  as  the  imagination  determines 
us  to  those  limits.  To  point  out  that  our  mental  life  is 
conditioned  by  the  form  of  time  as  determinate,  is  true 
enough,  but  it  is  a  remark  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  individual,  not  a  remark  in  place  in  a  theory  of 
the  conditions  of  intelligence  as  such.  Here  again 
Kant  is  misled  by  the  influence  of  that  psychological 
Idealism  from  which  he  struggles  so  hard  to  be  free. 
Having  first  conceived  of  time  as  a  mere  form  of  our 


[chap. 

iject  of 
fledge, 
repro- 
orm  of 
ways. 
)f  indi- 
iatures, 
lings  of 
9W  that 
Bkltering 
ire  as  to 
imagin- 
nination 
process 
igh  that 
hich  de- 
i  by  the 
3d  of  as 
ings  can 
hich  the 
I  general 
jlf  under 
ar  know- 
now  our- 
'  time  in 
itermines 
bal  life  is 
e,  is  true 
:  view  of 
heory  of 
re  again 
hological 
be  free, 
m  of  our 


XII.] 


SENSJi  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


373 


sensibility,  and  the  "raanifuld"  as  tiomuhuw  "given" 
to  us,  or  passively  received,  ho  is  uoinpulled  to  brin^ 
the  manifold  and  the  form  into  connection  by  a  device 
that  savours  too  much  of  an  afterthought.  The  form 
lies  ready  in  the  mind,  or  rather  the  mind  exists  apart 
from  nature  with  its  form  of  time,  and  the  manifold  of 
sense  is  then  given  from  without.  The  internal  form 
and  the  external  manifold  must,  however,  be  brought 
into  relation  in  some  way.  But  a  mere  universal  form, 
and  a  mere  manifold  of  sense,  cannot  come  together 
except  through  a  process  of  synthesis  in  time.  The 
form  of  time  must  be  determined,  and  the  manifold  of 
sense  is  no  determination  of  it,  but  only  of  the  external 
reality.  It  is  to  explain  this  determination  that  the 
imagination  is  introduced.  Having  the  form  of  time 
as  potential,  and  receiving  the  manifold  of  sense,  we  go 
through  the  parts  of  the  manifold  one  after  the  other, 
and  so  determine  them.  Without  this  successive 
synthesis,  therefore,  the  form  cannot  be  brought  into 
relation  with  the  manifold. 

There  is  here  manifestly  an  intermixture  of  the 
critical  and  the  psychological  points  of  view.  And  it  is 
not  difficult  to  see  that  two  heterogeneous  elements 
are  mechanically  conjoined  without  being  really  fused 
into  one.  Looking  at  imagination  as  a  phase  in  the 
phenomenal  evolution  of  knowledge,  it  is  of  course 
correct  to  say  that  it  implies  a  synthesis  of  individual 
images,  just  as  perception  implies  a  synthesis  of  indi- 
vidual objects.  But  when  we  attempt  philosophically  to 
explain  what  is  implied  in  this  phase  of  our  knowledge, 
we  must  recognize  that  it  involves  the  concrete  unity 
of  the  universal  and  the  particular,  whether  we  look  at 
the  object  imagined  or  at  the  imagination  uf  the  object. 
There  are  of  course  imaginations  that  are  merely  arbi- 


374 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


trary  combinations  of  incongruous  elements  of  per- 
ception ;  but  an  examination  of  the  distinction  of  real 
from  fictitious  imagination  belongs  to  psychology,  not 
to  metaphysic.  Imagination,  as  an  actual  phase  of 
knowledge,  therefore  implies  the  essential  correlativity 
of  intelligence  and  its  object.  On  the  other  hand, 
imagination,  in  the  critical  sense,  does  not  deal  with 
concrete  objects,  but  merely  with  an  element  in  con- 
crete objects.  Finding  that  every  individual  object 
exists  only  in  relation  to  intelligence,  we  are  compelled 
to  recognize  that  there  is  in  every  real  act  of  knowledge 
a  particular  element  and  a  universal  element.  The 
particular  element,  as  we  have  seen,  Kant  attributes  to 
sense,  the  universal  element  to  thought.  The  mere 
name  is  of  no  consequence,  but  it  is  of  great  importance 
to  recognize  that  the  particular  element  is  not  less 
necessary  to  knowledge  and  to  known  objects  than  the 
universal  element.  But  if  this  is  so,  we  must  not  only 
take  note  of  the  particular  and  of  the  universal,  but  of 
the  relation  between  them.  Now,  all  this  is  implied  in 
imagination  as  a  phase  of  knowledge,  as  it  is  implied  in 
every  act  of  intelligence  whatever.  Hence  Kant  is  not 
entitled  to  say  that  the  pure  imagination  is  conditioned 
by  time.  Separating  in  thought  the  particular  element 
from  the  universal  element,  we  must  yet  take  note  of  their 
relation.  Imagination  is  simply  in  effect  this  relation 
of  the  two  elements  of  knowledge.  Kant,  however, 
conceives  of  it  as  a  faculty  or  process  distinct  from 
thought.  But  if  all  real  knowledge  implies  a  union  of 
particular  and  universal  to  form  the  individual,  there 
is  no  propriety  in  bringing  in  a  special  faculty  to  ex- 
plain what  is  already  explained.  Whether,  therefore, 
we  are  determining  relations  of  space  or  time ;  whether 
we  are  connecting  concrete  properties  in  the  unity  of 


VJ> 


{chap. 


XII.] 


SENSE  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


375 


individual  things ;  or  whether  we  are  considering 
material  bodies  as  moving,  as  manifesting  force,  and  as 
acting  and  re-acting;  in  all  these  cases  we  must 
recognize  the  necessary  relativity  of  the  particular  and 
the  universal  in  the  individual. 

Lastly,  Kant,  so  far  mixing  up  the  phenomenal  with 
the  metaphysical  point  of  view,  is  naturally  under  the 
influence  of  the  psychological  conception  of  imagination 
as  a  separate  faculty  of  knowledge.  Imagination,  as 
Kant  with  great  shrewdness  points  out,  is  at  once  a 
universalizing  and  an  individualizing  faculty.  It  uni- 
versalizes by  drawing  a  sort  of  monogram  of  an  indi- 
vidual thing,  which  as  an  outline  or  sketch  applies  to 
all  objects  of  the  same  species;  it  individualizes  because 
it  enables  us  to  realize  our  conceptions  sufficiently  to 
see  that  they  are  applicable  to  real  things.  Thus  it  is 
a  sort  of  mediator  between  conception  and  perception. 
Imagination,  then,  is  not  merely  the  faculty  by  which 
images  of  individual  things  are  presented  to  us,  but 
the  faculty  by  which  images  are  stripped  of  their 
peculiar  features,  and  reduced  to  schemata.  These 
schemata  of  individual  things  are  however  different 
from  the  transcendental  schemata.  The  points  of 
agreement  are  mainly  these.  In  the  first  place,  the 
empirical  schema  reduces  individual  perceptions  to 
general  outlines  or  pictures ;  the  transcendental  schema 
determines  the  manifold  of  sense  to  universal  modes  of 
time.  In  the  second  place,  the  empirical  schema  as  a 
general  outline  of  an  individual  thing,  gives  definiteness 
to  an  abstract  conception  ;  the  transcendental  schema 
determines  the  category  or  form  of  thought  to  uni- 
versal modes  of  time,  which  combine  with  the  manifold 
of  sense  to  constitute  known  objects.  The  differences 
between  them  are  however  not  less  marked.     In  the 


Itlll< 
I 


jll 


m'l 


376 


/CAJVT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


first  place,  the  empirical  schema  is  aii  outline  of  an 
individual  thing  regarded  as  given  in  apprehension  ; 
the  transcendental  schema  is  a  universal  determination 
of  the  form  of  time,  and  therefore  known  individual 
things  presuppose  it.  In  the  second  place,  the  em- 
pirical schema  is  a  realizing  in  a  general  outline  of  an 
abstract  conception  lying  ready  made  in  the  mind  ;  the 
transcendental  schema  is  a  determining  of  a  primary 
conception  or  category  which  belongs  to  the  constitution 
of  thought,  but  is  in  itself  merely  an  element  in  know- 
ledge or  in  known  objects.  Lastly,  the  empirical 
schema  comes  after  perception  of  individual  things; 
the  transcendental  schema  logically  precedes  the  per- 
ception of  individual  things.  To  sum  up  these  differ- 
ences in  a  word,  the  empirical  schema  has  reference  to 
individual  concretes,  which  it  presupposes ;  the  trans- 
cendental schema  has  reference  to  individual  concretes 
presupposing  it.  Thus  while  the  empirical  schema 
really  supposes  knowledge  of  individuals  to  be  already 
possessed,  the  transcendental  schema  explains  how  such 
knowledge  is  possible. 

Now  as  the  transcendental  schema  ought  to  be 
simply  one  of  the  elements  in  knowledge  or  known 
objects,  we  must  discard  the  resemblances  of  the  two 
kinds  of  schema  as  superficial.  Kant,  however, 
attempts  to  assimilate  them.  And  the  point  of  abso- 
lute agreement  to  his  mind  is,  that  in  both  we  give 
determination  of  a  general  kind  to  conceptions,  and 
to  both  the  sensible  element  is  "given."  But  the 
determinateness  in  each  is  of  quite  a  different  kind,  and 
the  sensible  element  is  also  different.  In  the  one 
case,  it  is  a  determinate  element,  in  the  other,  a 
determinate  representation ;  in  the  one,  the  sensible 
is  the  particular  element  in  knowledge,  in  the  other,  it 


I 


[chap. 

e  of  an 
tension  ; 
nination 
dividual 
the  em- 
ne  of  an 
nd ;  the 
primary 
stitution 
in  know- 
jmpirical 

things ; 
the  per- 
je  differ- 
jrence  to 
tie  trans- 
3oncrete8 

schema 
5  already 
low  such 

it  to  be 
known 
the  two 
lowever, 
of  abso- 
we  give 
ons,  and 
But  the 
ind,  and 
the  one 
other,  a 
sensible 
other,  it 


XII.] 


SENSE  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


377 


is  sensible  or  concrete  individuals.  Now  an  element 
in  knowledge  has  no  reality  apart  from  the  other 
elements  which  go  to  constitute  knowledge,  whereas  a 
determinate  representation  is  already  the  representa- 
tion of  reality.  Moreover,  the  particular  element  in 
knowledge  is  nothing  apart  from  the  other  elements  of 
knowledge,  while  a  concrete  individual  already  implies 
the  combination  of  the  different  elements  of  knowledge. 
In  determining  the  elements  of  knowledge  we  must 
therefore  start  from  ordinary  knowledge  as  completed, 
and  hence  we  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  conditions 
under  which  knowledge  is  possible  for  the  individual 
man.  Accordingly,  imagination  can  only  be  taken  as 
a  term  for  the  process  of  relating  the  elements  of 
knowledge  to  each  other.  Whether  that  knowledge 
comes  to  the  individual  in  instalments  or  all  at  once, 
does  not  alter  the  character  of  the  knowledge  itself ; 
and  hence  we  must  discard  considerations  connected 
with  the  way  in  which  knowledge  is  obtained  by  us  as 
individuals,  and  confine  our  attention  to  the  nature  of 
the  knowledge  so  obtained.  In  short,  imagination,  in 
the  true  critical  sense,  is  simply  a  term  for  the  relation 
between  subject  and  object,  the  universal  and  the 
particular.  The  determination  of  time  is  therefore  but 
one  instance  of  the  activity  by  which  intelligence 
surrounds  itself  with  a  world  of  its  own  construction. 
The  same  elements  are  implied  in  the  determination 
of  space,  in  the  determination  of  matter,  of  motion,  of 
force,  nay,  in  the  simplest  determination  of  an  external 
object  as  a  congeries  of  properties.  Everywhere,  and 
in  all  known  objects,  the  same  process  of  referring  the 
particular  to  the  universal  is  implied.  Kant  is  pre- 
vented from  taking  this  view,  because  lie  cannot  get 
rid  of  the  idea  that  time  is  a  mere  form  of  the  human 


378 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


r-i 


intelligence,  and  that  the  manifold  of  sense  (the 
particular)  is  somehow  "  given "  or  comes  to  intelli- 
gence from  without.  But  time,  like  space,  is,  as  I 
have  tried  to  show,  one  of  the  simplest  determinations 
of  the  real  world ;  and  hence  the  supposition  that 
space  and  time  have  any  more  claim  to  be  referred 
to  intelligence  than  other  objects  of  perception  is 
untenable. 

4.  We  have  seen  that,  when  interpreted  from 
the  point  of  view  which  the  Critique  first  made 
possible,  the  manifold  of  sense  is  properly  a  term  for 
the  particular  element  in  knowledge,  that  the  distinc- 
tion of  space  and  time  as  forms  from  individual  spaces 
and  times  implies  the  reflection  of  the  universal  on  the 
particular,  and  that  imagination  is  virtually  the  process 
by  which  the  particular  in  its  various  modes  is  related 
to  the  universal.  We  have  now  to  consider  Kant's 
account  of  the  understanding  as  a  faculty  of  combining 
conceptions  into  judgments.  It  will  be  advisable  to 
look  first  at  conceptions.  The  following  are  the  senses 
in  which  the  term  "  conception  "  may  be  employed. 

(1)  In  the  development  of  knowledge  in  time  the 
conceptual  view  of  the  world  succeeds  the  imagina- 
tive, as  the  latter  is  preceded  by  the  perceptive  or 
observational.  Conception  in  this  sense  is  distin- 
guished from  imagination,  as  abstract  from  figurate 
representation.  At  the  stage  of  conception  individual 
facts  are  run  up  under  universal  laws.  The  changes 
in  the  material  universe,  for  example,  are  brought 
under  the  conception  of  gravitation,  by  means  of 
which  they  are  all  combined  in  the  unity  of  a  single  law. 
This  law  may  be  called  abstract,  not  because  it  is  a 
mere  general  or  abstract  conception,  obtained  by 
elimination  of  all  the  differences  of  material  bodies. 


[chap. 

se  (the 
intelli- 
18,  a«  I 
inationB 
Lon  that 
referred 
ition    is 

jd    from 
jt    made 
term  for 
}  distinc- 
al  spaces 
=il  on  the 
e  process 
s  related 
r  Kant's 
ambining 
isable  to 
he  senses 
loyed. 
time  the 
imagina- 
)ptive  or^ 
8  distin- 
figurate 
ndividual 
3  changes 
brought 
ineans   of 
ingle  law. 
le  it  is  a 
lined    by 
1  bodies, 


XII.] 


SENSE  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


379 


but  because  it  formulates  only  certain  select  aspects 
of  nature,  to  the  exclusion  of  other  aspects  equally 
real.    The  law  of  gravitation  tells  us  nothing  in  regard 
to  the  chemical,  physiological  or  psychological  relations 
of  existences,  but  picking  out  the  motions  of  bodies 
relatively  to  each  other,  it  combines  them  all  under  a 
single  conception.     Hence  there  is   i   multiplicity  of 
conceptions  or  laws,  corresponding  to  the  varied  aspects 
of  the    real    universe.      (2)   By    conception,    again, 
empirical  psychology  means  a  general  idea,  the  pro- 
duct of  a  process  of  abstraction  by  which  the  points 
of  difference  in  a  given  number  of  individual  objects 
are  gradually  eliminated,  and  their  points  of  agree- 
ment gathered  together  into  a  unity.     It  is  in  this 
sense  that  formal  logic   speaks   of  conception.     By 
immediate    perception,   as    it    is    supposed,   concrete 
objects  existing  independently   of  consciousness  are 
given  to  thought,  and  are  then  worked  up  into  con- 
ceptions, which  include  under  them  all  the  individual 
things  having  common  attributes.     (3)  Pure  concep- 
tions or  categories  are  universal  forms  belonging  to  the 
constitution  of  the  understanding,  by  means  of  which 
the  manifold  of  sense  is  individualized  and  reduced  to 
the  unity  of  known  objects  and  connexions  of  objects. 
These  pure  conceptions  agree  with  abstract  conceptions 
in  the  following  points.     In  the  first  place,  an  abstract 
conception  combines  individual  objects  or  conceptions 
less  abstract  than  itself;  a  pure  conception  combines  a 
manifold  of  sense.     In  the  second  place,  an  abstract 
conception  reduces  individuals  or  species  to  the  unity 
of  a  general  idea ;  a  pure  conception  reduces  a  mani- 
fold of  sense  to  the  unity  of  a  concrete  object.     The 
points   of  difference,   again,   are  these.     In  the  first 
place,  an  abstract  conception  comprehends  the  attri- 


I 


380 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


butes  comuiun  to  a  number  of  individuals  or  species ; 
a  pure  conception  constitutes  an  individual  object  as 
such.  In  the  second  place,  an  abstract  conception  is 
formed  from  individual  objects  given  to  thought;  a 
pure  conception  belongs  to  the  very  constitution  of 
thought.  Thirdly,  an  abstract  conception  follows  the 
perception  of  individual  things;  a  pure  conception 
logically  precedes  and  conditions  the  perception  of 
individual  things. 

It  does  not  require  much  reflection  to  see  that  only 
the  last  of  these  meanings  is  consistent  with  the  critical 
explanation  of  knowledge.  (1)  Conception,  in  the  first 
of  the  senses  just  distinguished,  is  spoken  of  in  many 
parts  of  Kant's  writings,  and  especially  in  the  more 
popular  statements  of  his  theory ;  in  the  Prolegomena, 
for  example,  where  a  distinction  is  drawn  between 
judgments  of  perception  and  judgments  of  experience. 
But  as  the  special  facts  and  laws  of  ordinary  knowledge, 
as  I  have  so  often  insisted,  are  not  by  Kant  sought  to 
be  proved,  but  are  assumed  as  data  requiring  only  to 
be  brought  into  relation  with  intelligence,  an  investiga- 
tion into  the  special  conditions  under  which  such  con- 
ceptions or  laws  are  formed  belongs  to  the  organon  of 
the  special  sciences,  not  to  the  critical  investigation  of 
the  primary  conditions  of  knowledge.  A  few  remarks 
however,  on  the  nature  of  scientific  conceptions  may 
not  be  out  of  place.  v^ 

The  advance  from  simple  apprehension  to  scientific 
conception,  or  from  facts  to  laws,  is  in  one  sense  an 
advance  to  the  more  concrete,  and  in  another  sense  an 
advance  to  the  more  abstract.  Every  science  has  its 
first  beginnings  in  what  may  be  called,  from  the  pheno- 
menal point  of  view,  the  immediate  perception  of  facts. 
And  this  holds  true  of  the  mathematical,  not  less  than 


[CHAI*. 

species ; 
Dbject  as 
eption  is 
)ught ;  a 
tution  of 
Hows  the 
anception 
sption  of 

that  only 
be  critical 
a  the  first 
i"  in  many 
the  more 
degoinena, 
L  between 
xperience. 
nowledge, 
sought  to 
ig  only  to 
investiga- 
such  con- 
>rganon  of 
igation  of 
v^  remarks 
ions  may 

scientific 

sense  an 
•  sense  an 
ce  has  its 

le  pheno- 
H  of  facts. 

less  than 


XII.] 


S£NS£  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


381 


of  the  physical  sciences.  Numbers  seemed  at  first 
sensible  existences;  geometry  arose  from  the  rough 
measurement  of  the  length  and  breadth  of  sensible 
things.  Hence,  the  first  step  towards  the  constitution 
of  a  science  consists  in  abstraction  from  the  immediate 
or  superficial  properties  of  objects,  and  concentration  on 
a  single  aspect  of  reality.  A  certain  relation  has  to  be 
endowed  with  a  sort  of  fictitious  independence,  and  con- 
templated as  if  it  existed  independently  and  purely 
for  itself.  A  clear  conception  of  the  spatial  and  tem- 
poral relations  of  things  is  essential  to  the  progress  of 
the  physical  sciences,  and  upon  the  relations  thus 
artificially  isolated  rests  the  science  of  mathematics. 
Physics,  again,  must  be  blind  to  all  aspects  of  the  real 
world  except  those  connoted  by  the  term  "  matter,"  if 
the  changes  which  take  place  in  external  things  are  to 
be  formulated  clearly  in  a  system.  Each  science,  there- 
fore, ignores  the  sensible  properties  of  things  given  in 
ordinary  apprehension,  as  well  as  the  relations  fixed 
upon  by  the  other  sciences.  It  is  of  course  impossible 
absolutely  to  separate  the  sphere  of  one  science  from 
the  spheres  of  the  others,  for,  as  all  deal  with  the 
relations  of  objects  as  such,  they  may  be  said  together 
to  form  a  single  complex  science  of  nature ;  but  at  least 
the  aim  of  each  science — and  this  becomes  more  and 
more  true  as  time  goes  on — is  to  deal  exclusively  with 
a  single  aspect  of  existence.  Specialization  of  function 
here,  as  in  economical  and  social  life,  is  the  prevailing 
tendency.  Nor  is  this  analytical  tendency  merely 
accidental  and  superficial ;  it  is  the  necessary  condition 
of  progress.  The  vague  and  confused  perceptions  of 
common  observation  cannot  be  developed  into  the 
definite  and  exact  laws  of  science,  until  each  aspect 
of  the  world  has  received  that  peculiar  illumination 


'1 


382 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


which  arises  from  isolation  amidst  surrounding  darkness. 
To  know  an  object  in  the  complexity  of  its  relations, 
it  is  first  necessary  to  concentrate  attention  upon  each 
of  those  relations,  and  this  may  be  called  a  process  of 
abstraction.  The  first  immediate  unity  of  things  has 
to  be  broken  up  by  reflective  analysis,  before  a  concrete 
object  can  properly  be  said  to  exist  for  knowledge. 
The  various  sciences  are  therefore  in  a  sense  based 
upon  abstraction  or  analysis.  On  the  other  hand, 
abstraction  is  at  the  same  time  concretion,  for  it  is 
impossible  to  separate  one  aspect  of  reality  from  others 
without  by  that  very  fact  advancing  to  a  more  definite 
knowledge  of  reality  in  general.  And  if  we  arrange 
the  sciences  in  the  order  of  their  complexity,  we  may 
say  that  all  the  sciences  taken  together  imply  a  gradual 
advance  from  the  relative  abstractness  of  common 
knowledge  to  the  relative  concreteness  of  scientific 
knowledge.  Each  science,  dealing  with  a  given  set  of 
relations,  leave''*  a  residuum  to  be  resolved  by  the  science 
next  to  it  in  complexity.  When  we  have  set  forth  as 
fully  as  possible  the  quantitative  relations  of  things  and 
systematized  our  knowledge  of  them  in  the  science  of 
mathematics,  we  have  next  to  deal  with  the  motions  of 
things  and  with  their  changes,  as  considered  by  dynamics 
and  physics.  A  new  effort  to  comprehend  things  in 
their  completeness  gives  rise  to  chemistry,  as  dealing 
with  the  composition  and  decomposition  of  material 
elements.  Next  we  pass  to  biology  and  lastly  to 
psychology.  The  whole  of  the  special  sciences  taken 
together  may  therefore  be  said  to  constitute  a  syste- 
matic knowledge  of  the  various  aspects  of  the  universe. 
In  formulating  the  process  by  which  scientific  con- 
ceptions are  obtained,  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to 
overlook  neither  the  analytic  nor  the  synthetic  side  of 


[chap. 

larkness. 
•elations, 
pon  each 
►rocess  of 
lings  has 
k  concrete 
lowledge. 
ise  baaed 
ler  hand, 
for  it  is 
om  others 
re  definite 
re  arrange 
^,  we  may 
J  a  gradual 
F   common 
f  scientific 
iven  set  of 
the  science 
jet  forth  as 
things  and 
science  of 
motions  of 
y  dynamics 
things  in 
as  deahng 
►f  material 
lastly  to 
mces  taken 
Ite  a  syste- 
le  universe, 
lentific  con- 
Lportance  to 
letic  side  of 


XI..] 


SENSE  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


383 


knowledge.     There  is  a  sense  in  which  it  may  be  said 
that  all  knowledge  is  based  upon  abstraction  or  analysis. 
The  comprehension  of  one  property  in  pure  isolation  is 
a  feat  that  can  be  performed  by  no  conceivable  in- 
telligence, jince  every  property  exists  only  in  relation 
to  another  property ;  but  in  the  advance  of  knowledge, 
by  successive  differentiation,  it  naturally  comes  about 
that  a  greater  degree  of  interest  attaches  to  one  term 
of  a  relation  than  to  another.     Hence  one  property,  or 
one  set  of  properties^  is  looked  upon  as  positive,  in 
contrast  to  the  other  or  others,  which  are  regarded  as 
negative.     The  distinction  is  itself  a  purely  arbitrary 
one,  for  the  term  from  one  point  of  view  called  positive 
may  from  another  point  of  view  be  termed  negative. 
But  this  predominant  interest  in  one  term  of  a  relation, 
while  it  does  not  convert  the  isolated  term  into  an  in. 
dependent  reality,  yet  prepares  the  way  for  the  illusion 
that  it  does  so.     And  hence,  at  a  later  stage  of  thought, 
the  positive  properties — the  properties  in  which  an  ca«  ess 
of  interest  is  felt — are  classed  together  as  the  essence, 
or  definition  of  a  thing,  while  the  negative  properties 
are  vaguely  passed  over  as  unessential.     But  essential 
and  unessential,  like  positive  and  negative,  are  purely 
relative  distinctions ;  what  from  a  special  interest  is  con  • 
ceived  as  essential,  is  again  rejected  as  unessential.     It 
must,  therefore,  never  be  forgotten  that  when  we  speak 
of  the  essence  of  a  thing,  we  do  not  thereby  limit 
reality  for  all  time  to  the  special  group  of  properties 
we  have  in  view  for  the  time  being.     When  matter  is 
said  to  be  defined  by  the  property  of  solidity,  as  its 
essence,  it  is  a  tremendous  perversion  of  the  truth  to 
suppose  that  by  such  a  limitation  we  have,  as  by  a 
magical  incantation,  caused  all  the  other  relations  of 
the  universe  to  disappear.     Those  properties  classed  as 


IM 


384 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


essential,  fixed  in  a  definition,  and  marked  by  a  common 
name,  are  real ;  but  they  are  not  all  that  is  real.  The 
conception  of  matter  as  a  congeries  of  indivisible  units 
of  mass  is  not  intrinsically  truer  or  more  valuable  than 
the  conception  of  matter  as  defined  in  the  totality  of 
chemical  relations.  Intrinsically,  the  one  is  as  im- 
portant as  the  other ;  relatively,  the  one  or  the  other 
is  more  important,  according  to  the  special  point  of 
view  ;  absolutely,  i.e.,  as  a  formulation  of  existence  in 
its  completeness,  the  more  complex  conception  is  the 
more  important  of  the  two.  The  term  matter,  like  all 
other  common  names,  is  simply  a  short-hand  method 
of  designating  one  aspect  of  real  existence ;  it  is  no 
mystic  spell  to  conjure  all  other  relations  into  nonen- 
tity. To  say  that  knowledge  is  gained  by  an  analy- 
tical process  is  only  a  way  of  drawing  attention  to 
the  fact  that  the  mind's  interest  in  a  special  set  of 
properties  overrides  its  interest  in  another  set,  so  that 
the  negative  term  of  a  relation  is  passed  over  as 
unessential,  and  only  the  positive  term  is  regarded. 
In  reality,  as  has  been  shown,  analysis  is  not  a  single 
process,  but  only  one  aspect  of  a  single  process ;  just 
because  one  property  is  only  an  element  in  reality,  and, 
therefore,  in  itself  an  abstraction,  every  act  of  know- 
ledge is  synthetic  not  less  than  analytic. 

We  may,  therefore,  say  that  knowledge  proceeds  from 
the  less  to  the  more  concrete,  from  the  more  to  the 
less  abstract,  from  the  less  to  the  more  known.  Hence 
common  knowledge  is  more  abstract,  or  less  concrete, 
than  scientific  knowledge.  Here,  again,  it  is  important 
to  notice  that,  from  the  mind's  predominant  interest  in 
some  terms  over  others,  certain  properties  are  classed 
as  essential,  others  as  unessential.  Thus,  existence 
gets  separated  into  groups  of  positive  attributes,  while 


[chap. 


XII.] 


SENSE  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


385 


lommon 
1.  The 
tie  units 
[)le  than 
tality  of 

as  im- 
le  other 
point  of 
itence  in 
►n  is  the 
r,  like  all 
[  method 

it  is  no 
bo  nonen- 
an  analy- 
«ntion  to 
ial  set  of 
jt,  so  that 

over  as 


>t  a  single 

jess ;  just 

|ality,  and, 

of  know- 

1 
l;eeds  from 
Ire  to  the 
Hence 
concrete, 
I  important 
Interest  in 
Ire  classed 
existence 
ites,  while 


the  other  attributes  are  vaguely  merged  in  the  general 
conception  of  negation.  From  this  point  of  view 
common  knowledge  may  be  said  to  be  analytic,  not 
because  analysis  is  possible  apart  from  synthesis,  but 
because  the  mind's  interest  in  the  positive  attributes 
gives  them  a  fictitious  excess  of  reality  for  the  time. 
Thus  the  way  is  made  easy  for  that  formulation  of 
common  sense  which,  overlooking  the  negative  move- 
ment involved  in  the  process  of  knowledge,  conceives  of 
existence  as  made  up  of  a  number  of  individual  things 
or  substances  having  purely  positive  attributes.  Hence 
a  double  illusion :  the  illusion  that  a  substance  has 
reality,  apart  from  its  relations  to  other  substances,  and 
that  it  has  reality  out  of  relation  to  intelligence.  Just 
as  the  negative  factor  implied  in  every  form  of  reality  is 
passed  over  as  if  it  were  not,  because  of  the  almost 
exclusive  interest  taken  for  the  time  being  in  the 
affirmative  factor,  so  the  still  less  manifest  relation  of 
the  properties  to  intelligence  is  overlooked  or  misin- 
terpreted. Accordingly,  we  find  the  empiricist,  who 
formulates  the  common-sense  conception  of  reality, 
speaking  in  language  which  implies  the  threefold 
fiction  of  "something"  apart  from  its  properties,  of 
positive  attributes  in  isolation  from  negative,  and  of  a 
concrete  reality  independent  of  intelligence.  Recog- 
nizing the  analytic  or  affirmative  side  of  knowledge, 
and  passing  over  the  synthetic  or  negative  side,  he  is 
led  to  separate  real  existence  from  that  which  is  the 
necessary  condition  of  its  reality.  The  same  imperfect 
comprehension  of  the  elements  of  knowledge  and  of 
reality  which  leads  him  to  raise  the  positive  or 
relatively  essential  properties  to  the  "  bad  eminence " 
of  independent  sovereignty  also  suggests  to  him  to 
separate  matter,  as  defined  by  one  set  of  properties, 

2b 


111: 


386 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


from  intelligence,  as  defined  by  another  set,  and  to 
claim  for  each  a  reality  of  its  own.  He  passes  from 
the  one  to  the  other  in  turn,  and  fails  to  see  that,  as 
the  negative  aspect  of  reality  has  also  a  positive 
side,  a  real  world  apart  from  a  universalizing  intel- 
ligence to  make  it  real,  is  as  much  a  fiction  as  a 
circumference  without  a  centre. 

The  development  of  common  into  scientific  know- 
ledge involves  a  great  increase  in  that  double  procesn 
of  differentiation  and  integration  which  is  implied  in 
the  simplest  conception  of  reality.  The  universe  in- 
creases immensely  in  complexity,  but  at  the  same  time 
it  coalesces  into  a  more  perfect  unity.  Here,  also, 
countenance  is  given  to  the  false  conception  of  real 
knowledge  as  a  process  of  analysis  or  abstraction.  The 
empiricist  is  not  content  merely  to  separate  thought 
and  matter  as  abstract  opposites  of  each  other.  He 
applies  the  same  process  of  abstraction  to  the  various 
aspects  in  which  nature  itself  is  contemplated  by  the 
scientific  mind  in  its  different  moods.  Common  know- 
ledge really  grows  up  by  means  of  a  dialectical  process, 
in  which  there  is  a  perpetual  equilibrium  of  the  positive 
and  the  negative  aspects  of  reality.  But  as  the  indi- 
vidual mind  interests  itself  temporarily  only  in  the 
attributes  it  conceives  as  positive  or  essential,  the 
negative  or  unessential  attributes  are  passed  over  with 
a  hasty  glance  and  forgotten.  Thus  tiie  equilibrium  is 
destroyed.  The  same  dialectical  process,  and  the  same 
predominance  of  interest  in  certain  select  relations  of 
existence,  is  manifested  in  the  procedure  of  the  special 
sciences,  but  with  this  difference — that  each  tendency  is 
carried  out  to  its  extreme.  The  scientific  man  breaks 
up  the  first  immediate  unity  of  things,  which  is 
sufficient  to  satisfy  the  languid  interest  of  common 


[chap. 

nd  to 
J  froiu 

bat,  as 
lositivo 
r  intel- 
n  as  a 

5  know- 
procesB 

tpUed  w 
jeree  in- 
wne  time 
ere,  also, 
n  of  real 
ton.    The 
9  thought 
bher.    He 
tie  various 
bed  by  the 
lion  know- 
jal  process, 
he  positive 
8  the  indi- 
nly  in  the 
^ential,  the 
I  over  witii 
ailibrium  is 
^d  the  same 
relations  of 
the  special 
.  tendency  is 
man  breaks 
wWch  is 
of  common 


XII.] 


•SEJVSE  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


sense,  and  in  tliis  analysis  he  vastly  extends  tho 
synthesis  esuontial  to  all  experience,  increasing  a 
thousandfold  the  complexity  of  the  known  universe. 
But  as  his  mterest  centres,  not  in  the  easily  accessible 
relations  alone  regarded  by  common  s6nie,  but  in  those 
hidden  away  from  its  superficial  gaze,  he  naturally 
treats  the  sensible  properties  of  things  as  unimportant 
and  unessential. 

"  It  is  important,"  says  Mr.  Lewes,  "  to  bear  in  mind 
that  all  our  scientific  conceptions  are  analytical,  and,  at 
the  best,  only  approximative.  They  are  analytical, 
because  science  is  '  seeing  with  other  eyes,'  and  looks 
away  from  the  synthetic  fact  of  experience  to  see  what 
is  not  visible  there.  They  are  approximations,  because 
they  are  generalities."^  The  contrast  here  drawn 
between  common  knowledge  as  synthetic  and  scientific 
knowledge  as  analytic  is  utterly  fallacious.  There  are 
not  two  discrepant  processes  of  knowledg'^,  but  all 
knowledge  is  developed  in  the  same  way,  by  a  difieren- 
tiation  that  is  at  the  same  time  integration — an  analysis 
that  includes  synthesis.  The  unity  of  the  process  of 
knowledge  is  just  as  perfect  as  the  unity  of  existence 
and  the  unity  of  intelligent  experience.  Common 
knowledge  is  more  remote  from  reality  than  science, 
and  hence  it  is  more  "  general,"  or  abstract.  When 
science,  to  use  one  of  Mr.  Lewes's  illustrations,  resolves 
light  into  undulations  of  ether  acting  upon  the  retina, 
it  does  not  pass  from  fact  to  abstraction,  from  synthesis 
to  analysis.  The  point  of  view  is  changed ;  but  in  the 
change  there  is  an  actual  increase  in  differentiation  and 
integration,  an  advance  from  the  more  to  the  less 
general,  the  less  to  the  more  concrete.  By  breaking 
up  the  phenomenon  of  light  into  its  factors,  the  undula- 

>  Problems  of  Lifr  and  Mind,  vol.  ii.,  p.  285. 


388 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


tions  of  an  elastic  medium  and  the  sensibility  of  the 
retina,  the  phenomenon  is  more  exactly  defined;  the 
analysis  is,  at  the  same  time,  a  new  synthesis.     And 
this  is  but  a  single  instance  of  the  general  procedure  of 
science.     It  is  true  that,  if  we  attend  solely  to  its 
analytic  aspect,  as  Mr.  Lewes  does,  and  attempt  to 
build  an  exhaustive  theory  of  the  process  of  knowledge 
upon  that  alone,  we  may  contrast  the  fulness  of  reality, 
characteristic  of  common  knowledge,  with  the  extreme 
tenuity  of  scientific  knowledge ;  but  to  do  so  is  simply 
to  misinterpret  the  one  kind  of  knowledge  as  well  as 
the  other.    Both  alike  proceed,  and  must  proceed,  by  a 
dialectic  process  that  is  neither  analytic  nor  synthetic, 
but  both  in  one ;  and  both  alike  distinguish  the  essen- 
tial from  the  unessential,  the  positive  from  the  negative. 
Common  sense  attends  only  to  those  relations  that 
rouse  its  interest,  and  all  others  it  dismisses  as  unim- 
portant.    And  as  the  attributes  so  selected  are  simply 
the  most  superficial,  the  knowledge  of  common  sense  is 
necessarily  more  "general"  than  the  knowledge  of 
science.     What  by  the  plain  man  is  regarded  as  essen- 
tial, is  passed  over  as  unessential  by  the  scientific  man ; 
the  interest  of  the  latter  lies  in  the  more  recondite 
properties  of  things,  and  hence  those  commonly  known 
are  taken  for  granted  and  lightly  passed  over.    Science, 
as  such,  however,  does  not  deny  the  reality  of  the 
ordinary  relations ;  that  is  left  for  the  empirical  philo- 
sopher, who  plumes  himself  upon  the  exclusive  accuracy 
with  which  he  formulates  scientific  procedure.     When 
you  know  that  7  +  5  =  12,  you  cannot  be  forever  re- 
peating the  slow  process  of  adding  unit  to  unit.     So, 
when  the  common  properties  of  things  are  once  known, 
they  are  as  a  matter  of  course  taken  for  granted,  and 
henceforth  treated  as  =  x.    Hence  the  seeming  abstract- 


[chap. 

of  the 

id;  the 
And 

dure  of 
to  its 

mpt  to 

)wledge 

reality, 

Bxtreme 

J  simply 

well  as 

sed,  by  a 

^nthetic, 

le  essen- 

legative. 

Dns  that 

\B  unim- 

e  simply 
sense  is 

lledge  of 

las  essen- 

iificman; 
•econdite 
iy  known 
Science, 

Ly  of  the 
!al  philo- 
accuracy 
When 
»rever  re- 
mit.    So, 
:e  known, 
[nted,  and 
abstract- 


XII.] 


S£JVS£  AND  UNDERHTANDING. 


389 


ness  of  scientific  knowledge,  as  compared  with  ordinary 
knowledge.  But  the  abstractness  is  only  seeming ;  we 
cannot  be  always  going  back  to  the  very  beginning  of 
knowledge,  but  must  take  something  for  granted, 
and  start  afresh.  Thus,  science,  without  denying 
established  relations,  widens  the  area  of  existence,  and 
increases  the  complexity  of  knowledge.  It  is  by  a 
reciprocal  analysis  and  synthesis  that  science  comes  to 
classify  one  set  of  relations  as  essential  and  another 
set  as  unessential.  But,  as  no  real  properties  are  un- 
essential in  the  last  resort,  the  distinction  is  an  artifice 
of  science,  not  one  determining  the  nature  of  real  exist- 
ence itself.  Mr.  Lewes's  mistake  is  that  of  all  em- 
piricists ;  he  takes  the  real  world,  in  the  plenitude  of 
its  known  relations,  and  this  he  supposes  to  be  known 
by  a  "synthesis  of  sensibles."  That  is  to  say,  the 
presentations  of  sense  reveal  existence  as  it  truly  is ; 
and  hence  science,  as  contemplating  only  special 
aspects  of  existence,  stands  in  unfavourable  contrast  to 
the  knowledge  of  common  sense.  But,  in  the  first 
place,  sense  does  not  give  real  objects,  for  it  gives  of 
itself  nothing  at  all ;  and,  secondly,  supposing  it  did, 
it  would  be  "synthetic"  only  by  including  scientific 
knowledge  as  a  part  of  universal  knowledge.  On  the 
first  point,  nothing  more  needs  to  be  added.  The 
second  point  brings  out  the  fallacious  procedure  of 
empiricism  into  especial  prominence.  Mr.  Lewes  con- 
templates the  real  world  after  the  completion  of  the 
long  process  by  which  it  has  been  manifested  to  intelli- 
gence, or,  more  correctly,  after  intelligence  has  mani- 
fested itself  in  it;  and  attending  only  to  a  part 
of  that  process  at  a  time,  he  plausibly  tells  us  that 
science  deals  only  with  "  generalities."  Most  assuredly 
it  does,  if  we  contemplate  the  intelligible  world  as  a 


ii 


I 


390 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.  [chap. 


whole ;  most  assuredly  it  does  not,  if  we  are  speaking 
of  it  as  compared  with  ordinary  knowledge.  As  the 
part  is  always  less  than  the  whole,  and  therefore  more 
abstract,  to  say  that  the  world  as  it  interests  science 
is  partial  or  abstract,  compared  with  the  world  in  the 
plenitude  of  its  relations,  is  no  doubt  a  true,  if  not  a 
very  instructive  remark ;  but  to  maintain  that  scientific 
knowledge  is  more  abstract  than  that  common-sense 
knowledge  from  which  it  starts,  and  which  it  is  its  one 
object  to  extend,  is  an  utter  perversion  of  the  truth. 

The  opposition  of  induction  and  deduction  is  but  an- 
other aspect  of  the  false  separation  of  synthesis  and 
analysis.  There  is  a  real  justification,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  scientific  knowledge,  in  separating  the  one 
aspect  from  the  other,  and  there  is  no  practical  harm 
done  in  regarding  each  as  a  separate  process.  For 
science  rests  upon  an  unformulated  abstraction  from 
intelligence,  and  rightly  regards  its  task  as  complete 
when  it  has  set  forth  those  relations  that  in  their 
totality  express  the  realm  of  Nature.  It  is  otherwise 
with  philosophy,  which  proposes  to  itself  the  more 
ambitious  task  of  formulating  existence  as  a  whole,  and 
therefore  essays  to  show  the  ultimate  relations  of 
nature  and  intelligence.  Science,  as  has  been  reiter-- 
ated,  perhaps  to  weariness,  is  interested  only  in  certain 
aspects  of  reality,  and  hence  it  takes  for  granted  the 
relations  of  things  familiar  to  common  sense.  Things, 
as  partially  qualified,  are  its  points  of  departure,  and 
its  own  peculiar  procedure  consists  in  extending  and 
widening  common  knowledge.  Thus  it  may  rightly 
enough  be  said  to  proceed  "  from  the  known  to  the 
unknown,"  or,  as  I  should  prefer  to  say,  from  the  less 
to  the  more  known.  This  is  what  science  knows  as 
induction. 


[chap. 

aking 

lB  the 
more 

cience 

in  the 
not  a 

ientific 

i-sense 

its  one 

uth. 

but  aii- 

Bia  and 

Le  point 

the  one 

il  harm 

,s.     For 

on  from 

ompletc 

in  their 

bherwise 
le  more 
lole,  and 
tions  of 
1  reiter-    1 
1  certain   | 
ited  the 
Things, 
ure,  and 
ling  and 
rightly 
n  to  the 
the  less 
news  as 


XII.] 


SENSE  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


391 


It  is  rightly  held  that  no  advance  in  knowledge  is 
possible  by  what  syllogistic  logic  calls  deduction,  since 
by  a  mere  restatement  of  that  which  is  already 
assumed  to  be  known  no  advance  to  the  "  unknown  " 
can  possibly  be  made.  We  cannot,  therefore,  wonder 
at  the  contempt  of  science  for  "mere  conceptions." 
The  contempt  is  a  healthy  one.  The  man  of  science 
knows  that  to  gain  any  real  knowledge  he  must  begin 
where  common  sense  leaves  off;  that  to  know  more 
about  existence  he  must  go  out  beyond  ordinary  con- 
ceptions of  existence.  Empirical  logic,  here  following 
scientific  thought,  also  asserts  that  knowledge  is  gained 
by  a  discovery  of  new  relations  of  things ;  and,  so  far, 
it  is  correct.  But,  as  it  falsely  asserts  that  our  common 
knowledge  of  things  is  acquired  by  passive  observation, 
it  takes  for  granted  that  individual  things,  or  particular 
**  facts,"  are  discerned  without  any  constructive  activity 
of  intelligence.  Hence,  the  discovery  of  new  relations 
is  supposed  still  to  leave  individual  things  in  their 
isolation.  The  only  change  in  things  is  in  their  greater 
complexity.  The  real  world  is  now  supposed  to  have, 
independently  of  intelligence,  all  the  properties  revealed 
by  science,  as  well  as  those  known  in  ordinary  know- 
ledge. Induction  now  assumes  quite  a  different 
aspect.  It  consists  in  the  separation,  one  by  one,  of 
properties  already  assumed  to  be  known,  and  hence 
it  is  no  longer  a  progress  from  "the  known  to  the 
unknown,"  but  a  regress  from  the  more  to  the  less 
known.  By  abstraction,  it  is  supposed,  a  general  law 
is  discovered ;  and  this  law,  once  discovered,  may  be 
shown  to  apply  to  the  particular  facts  from  which  it 
was  abstracted.  The  process  of  reasoning  down  from 
the  general  law  to  the  particular  facts  is  deduction. 
Now  here  we  have  a  confusion  between  a  universal  as  a 


HJ 


% 


392 


KAMT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS         [chap. 


law  of  nature  and  a  universal  as  an  abstract  conception. 
If  nature  is  already  known  in  the  fulness  of  its  rela- 
tions, what  possible  sense  is  there  in  seeking  for  laws 
of  nature,  which  are  but  special  groups  of  relations  con- 
sidered apart  1  If  everything  is  known  already,  there 
is  no  need  either  of  induction  or  deduction.  By  a  bare 
intuition  we  may  comprehend  all  things,  and  any  pro- 
cess of  knowledge  is  not  only  useless,  but  impossible. 
Thus,  the  measure  of  truth  which  empirical  logic  had 
attained  to  in  the  judgment  that  knowledge  proceeds 
"from  the  known  to  the  unknown"  is  again  lost  in  a 
theory  of  deduction,  that,  assuming  a  perfectly  known 
world  to  begin  with,  can  only  explain  the  process  of 
knowledge  as  a  retreat  from  the  better  known  to  the 
less  known.  If  we  take  the  first,  and  relatively  correct 
notion  of  induction  as  a  progress  from  the  less  to  the 
more  known,  we  may  easily  give  it  a  form  that  will 
correctly  embody  the  true  process  of  knowledge.  Every 
advance  in  knowledge  is  the  discovery  of  a  new  rela- 
tion, and  every  new  relation  is,  from  its  connection 
with  intelligence,  necessary  and  universal.  Thus  scien- 
tific knowledge  does  not  first  reveal  a  number  of 
disconnected  particulars,  and  then  proceed  to  combine 
them  into  a  general  law.  The  law  is  discerned  in  the 
discernment  of  the  particulars.  A  law  is  neither  more 
nor  less  than  a  complex  of  relations,  and  all  relations 
are  i'pso  facto  universal  and  necessary.  The  distinction 
between  **  fact"  and  '*  law"  is  a  purely  relative  one.  A 
fact  is  not  by  itself  regarded  as  a  law,  but  it  contains 
the  universal  element  which  is  characteristic  of  law. 
In  speaking  of  facts,  we  are  looking  rather  at  the 
particular  than  the  universal  aspect  of  relations  ;  in 
speaking  of  a  law,  we  contemplate  the  universal  rather 
than  the  particular  aspect.     But  there  is  no  real  sepa- 


[chap. 

ption. 
fK  rela- 
r  laws 
08  con- 
,  there 
a  bare 
ay  pro- 
ossible. 
gic  had 
proceeds 
lost  in  a 
f  known 
•ocess  of 
a  to  the 
y  correct 
iss  to  the 
that  will 
B.  Every 
new  rela- 

»nnection 
|ius  scien- 

Linher  of 
combine 

Led  in  the 

iher  more 
relations 

listinction 

one.    A 
contains 

lie  of  law. 

Lcr  at  the 

btions  ;  in 

•sal  rather 

real  sepa- 


XII.] 


SENS£  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


393 


ration  in  reality  or  in  knowledge.  That  which  is  real 
is  necessarily  universal,  and  there  is  no  universality 
apart  from  reality.  Induction  emphasizes  the  particu- 
lar aspect  of  reality.  Deduction  emphasizes  the 
universal.  In  the  one,  it  is  said,  we  go  from  the 
particular  to  the  universal ;  in  the  other,  from  the 
universal  to  the  particular.  Correctly  stated,  there  is 
no  "  going"  from  the  one  to  the  other  at  all,  for  each 
exists  only  in  and  through  the  other.  If  the  particular 
did  not  imply  the  universal,  no  combination  of  particu- 
lars would  be  possible,  and  hence  there  could  be  no 
universal  law ;  the  universal  separated  from  the  par- 
ticular is  no  law,  but  a  barren  abstraction.  The  true 
process  of  knowledge  is,  therefore,  one  combining  these 
two  aspects  of  knowledge  in  one  indivisible  act.  There 
is  not  pure  induction  or  pure  deduction,  but  both ;  and 
the  separation  of  the  one  aspect  from  the  other,  how- 
ever convenient  it  may  be  to  the  individual  enquirer, 
is  but  a  logical  artifice,  that  in  no  way  affects  the  real 
indivisibility  of  the  one  dialectic  process. 

(2.)  Conception,  as  it  is  understood  by  formal  logic, 
is  essentially  distinct  from  conception  in  the  sense  of  a 
law  of  nature.  The  latter  is  obtained,  not  by  abstract- 
ing from  the  specific  differences  of  things,  but  by  recog- 
nizing in  things  the  concrete  relations  to  each  other 
which  they  involve.  What  in  the  scientific  compre- 
hension of  the  world  seems  to  be  a  process  of  abstraction 
or  analysis  is  really  a  process  of  concretion,  or  combined 
analysis  and  synthesis.  The  fallacy  upon  which  the 
ordinary  account  of  conception  rests  is,  however,  not 
unnatural.  In  the  development  of  knowledge  from 
simple  apprehension  to  scientific  conception,  individual 
obje<3ts  are  apparently  given  to  us  in  their  completeness 
independently   of  any  activity  of  thought.      To  the 


B94 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


scientific  man,  as  we  may  say,  the  facts  of  observation 
are  **  given,"  to  be  subsumed  under  a  law.  And  this 
law,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  individual  discoverer, 
naturally  appears  to  be  a  mere  conception  in  his  own 
mind,  under  which  he  externally  brings  the  facts  pre- 
sented to  him.  But  as  a  conception  is  a  law  of  nature 
only  when  it  correctly  formulates  the  actual  relations 
of  things,  no  mere  conception  has  any  objective  value. 
Taken  by  itself,  a  conception  is  therefore  simply  an 
abstraction  from  the  concrete  relations  of  which  it  is  a 
symbol.  Formal  logic,  however,  overlooking  altogether 
the  implicit  relation  of  facts  to  intelligence,  assumes 
that  what  may  correctly  enough  be  said  to  be  **  given  " 
to  science  is  "  given  "  to  thought ;  and,  as  all  the  con- 
creteness  of  reality  then  falls  into  apprehension,  the 
activity  of  thought  can  manifest  itself  only  as  a  process 
of  abstraction.  The  confusion  of  an  abstract  concep- 
tion with  p.  concrete  or  scientific  conception  goes  back 
in  the  history  of  thought  to  Socrates,  if  not  further  still ; 
but  it  was  first  developed  in  the  Aristotelian  doctrine  of 
the  syllogism  from  the  Platonic  method  of  division,  a 
doctrine  which  is  itself  implicit  in  the  Socratic  conception 
of  definition  as  an  analysis  of  the  meaning  of  a  common 
name.  The  principle  of  the  syllogism  is  that  in  reason- 
ing we  bring  an  individual  under  an  abstract  conception. 
The  most  perfect  form  of  reasoning  will  therefore  be 
that  in  which  an  individual  is  subsumed  under  the 
most  abstract  conception  of  all.  Syllogism  thus  pre- 
supposes that  the  highest  conception  is  the  most 
abstract.  Thus  we  have  at  the  top  of  the  logical 
ladder  the  conception  of  being,  a*:^d  c  jming  gradually 
downwards  v/e  at  last  reach  the  infinity  of  separate 
individual  things  given  in  simple  apprehension,  and 
included  under  t!)at  conception.     Any  given  syllogism 


CHAP- 

atlon 

L  this 

(rerer, 

a  own 

ispre- 

nature 

lations 

value. 

ply  an 

I  It  is  a 

ogetlier 

issumes 

'  given  " 

the  con- 

jion,  the 

i  process 
concep- 

3es  back 

her  still ; 

(ctrine  of 

ivision,  a 
mception 
coniinou 
n  reason- 
inception. 
srefore  be 
uder  the 
thus  pre- 
the  most 
le  logical 
gradually 
separate 
sion,  and 
syllogism 


XII.] 


S£JVS£  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


390 


expresses  a  particular  stage  in  the  descent  from  the 
abstract  to  the  concrete.  Thinking,  therefore,  consists 
in  all  cases  in  advancing  from  the  concrete  to  the 
abstract,  or  in  going  back  from  the  abstract  to  the 
concrete  by  the  way  we  came.  Suppose,  for  example, 
that  we  begin  with  the  conception  "  gold."  In  accord- 
ance with  the  Socratic  demand  for  definition,  we  ask, 
"What  is  "  gold  ? "  Now  of  course  we  may  easily  give 
an  answer  that  shall  indicate  the  actual  process  of  know, 
ledge.  If  we  know  nothing  about  "  gold "  but  its 
superficial  properties,  by  classifying  it  among  the  metals 
we  distinguish  it  from  things  that  are  not  metals.  But 
the  doctrine  of  syllogism  does  not  contemplate  this 
view  of  the  case.  Assuming  that  "  gold  "  is  already 
known  by  simple  apprehension  to  be  a  "metal,"  it 
formulates  that  knowledge  in  the  proposition,  "  gold  is 
a  metal."  As  the  term  "  metal "  is  more  abstract  than 
the  term  "gold,"  we  have  here  brought  a  relatively 
concrete  conception  under  a  conception  relatively 
abstract.  We  may  now  suppose  a  second  question  to 
be  asked,  viz.,  What  is  a  "metal?"  the  answer  to  which 
may  be  that  "  a  metal  is  a  substance."  Here  again  a 
conception  is  put  under  another  more  abstract  than 
itself.     Thus  we  obtain  the  syllogism  : 

A  metal  is  a  substance  ; 

Gold  is  a  metal ; 

Therefore,  gold  is  a  substance. 

The  syllogism  thus  rests  upon  the  purely  quantitative 
relation  of  whole  and  part.  Now  the  imperfection  of 
this  doctrine  is  not  far  to  seek.  Put  forward  as  an 
account  of  the  process  of  thought,  it  completely  fails  to 
formulate  that  process  as  it  really  is.  To  bring  an 
individual  under  an  abstract  notion  adds  nothing  to 


396 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


knowledge.  To  say  that  "gold"  belongs  to  the  class 
"metal"  tells  us  nothing  but  what  we  are  assumed 
already  to  know,  and  hence  syllogistic  logic  is  no  ex- 
planation of  thought  at  all.  Hence  the  fallacy  of  the 
supposed  process  of  abstraction  by  which  class  notions 
are  formed ;  hence  the  elaborate  trifling  of  the  whole 
doctrine  of  conversion,  opposition,  reduction,  &c.,  with 
its  bewildering  maze  of  subtleties,  interesting  to  no 
living  creature  but  one  who  can  be  contented  to  dwell 
in  the  realm 

"  Where  entity  and  quiddity,  .  ■ 

The  ghosts  of  defunct  bodies  fly." 

The  fallacy  underlying  the  Aristotelian  doctrine  of 
syllogism  has  its  source  in  the  same  mistake  as  caused 
Plato,  in  one  phase  of  his  ideal  theory,  to  identify  the 
universal  with  an  abstract  idea.  It  is  wrongly  assumed 
that  the  "  sensible "  is  given  in  an  immediate  appre- 
hension which  is  absolutely  exclusive  of  any  relation  of 
thought.  Keal  objects,  constituted  of  various  properties, 
are  first,  it  is  supposed,  revealed  as  wholes  in  an  imme- 
diate presentation  of  sense ;  and  then  thought,  of  its 
own  arbitrary  choice,  selects  a  certain  number  of  those 
properties  and  sets  them  apart  for  special  contempla- 
tion. A  general  conception  is  thus  formed,  differing 
from  the  individual  concretes  simply  in  the  absence  of 
certain  properties.  By  successive  generalizations  we 
go  further  and  further  away  from  the  concrete  objects 
with  which  we  started,  until  at  length  we  reach  the 
abstraction  of  "  being."  In  reasoning  we  reverse  the 
process  and  descend  from  the  abstract  to  the  concrete. 
What  proceeding  could  be  more  superfluous  than  this 
monotonous  ascent  and  descent  of  the  same  logical 
tree  !  Syllogistic  logic  is  necessarily  barren  of  all 
results.     We  may  go  on  in  this  way  for  ever,  combin- 


[CHAl'. 

class 
lumed 
ao  ex- 
of  the 
lotions 
whole 
!.,  with 

to  no 
J  dwell 


XII.] 


S£NSIi  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


397 


5trine  of 
s  caused 
itify  the 
assumed 
pe  appre- 
jlation  of 
:operties, 
m  imme- 
it,  of  its 
of  those 
mtempla.- 
differing 
)sence  of 
btions  we 
ce  objects 
•each  the 
[verse  the 
concrete, 
than  this 
je  logical 
[en  of  all 
combin- 


ing, separating,  and  recombining,  without  jver  moving 
a  step  beyond  the  narrow  circle  of  ideas  within  which 
we  have  shut  ourselves.  For,  while  sense  is  said  to 
give  us  a  definite  object  to  reflect  about,  it  can  give 
us  that  object  only  as  it  first  presents  itself  in  simple 
apprehension.  The  attributes  thus  apprehended  and 
fixed  in  a  common  name  are  few  and  superficial.  The 
real  wealth  of  knowledge,  which  is  found  in  the  concrete 
relations  discovered  by  the  special  sciences,  is  not  em- 
bodied in  common  names ;  and  even  the  meagre  know- 
ledge we  are  supposed  to  have  obtained  in  immediate 
perception,  we  are  condemned  by  the  doctrine  of 
syllogism  to  attenuate  still  more.  We  may  indeed, 
when  we  have  attained  to  perfect  purity  for  conception 
in  mere  "  being,"  return  to  the  individuals  from  which 
we  set  out;  but  this  affords  us  no  new  knowledge, 
and  our  toilsome  ascent  and  descent  has  been  to  no 
purpose  whatever. 

The  principle  which  dominates  Kant's  theory  of 
knowledge  is  in  irreconcilable  antagonism  with  that 
upon  which  syllogistic  logic  rests.  It  denies  that  indi- 
vidual objects  can  be  known  to  exist  apart  from  the 
relations  of  thought  by  which  they  are  made  knowable. 
But  Kant,  while  removing  the  basis  on  which  formal 
logic  rests,  is  only  half  aware  of  the  revolution  he  has 
himself  accomplished.  Side  by  side  with  the  cate- 
gories, he  allows  the  abstract  conceptions  to  stand. 
All  that  he  is  prepared  to  say  amounts  in  effect  to  this, 
that  the  latter  belong  to  the  sphere  of  ordinary  know- 
ledge, while  the  former  belong  to  the  ultimate  consti- 
tution of  thought,  and  must  therefore  be  presupposed 
as  the  condition  of  any  real  knowledge  whatever. 
That  the  "  manifold  "  is  somehow  "  given  "  to  thought, 
Kant  is  unable  to  get  out  of  his  head,  and  hence. 


iLlI 


8M 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chap. 


insist  as  he  may  on  the  fact  that  concrete  objects  are 
not  apprehended  by  sense  alone,  he  yet  grants  that 
Homething  is  apprehended  or  received  passively  into 
the  mind.  An  abstract  and  a  pure  conception,  as  he 
thinks,  agree  in  so  far  as  both  reduce  knowledge  to 
unity  by  the  combination  of  differences.  In  reality, 
however,  abstraction  is  not  a  process  of  combination, 
but  a  process  of  separation ;  and  individual  concretes 
are  not  by  such  a  process  raised  to  a  higher  unity,  but 
on  the  contrary  divested  of  the  unity  which  at  first 
they  possessed.  On  the  other  hand,  the  categories 
really  combine  the  particulars  of  sense,  or  rather,  as 
Kant  would  say,  make  that  combination  possible ;  and 
the  unity  so  produced  is  the  real  unity  of  concrete 
objects  and  specific  connections  of  objects. 

(3.)  The  attempted  assimilation  of  mere  fictions  of 
abstraction  with  real  conceptions  leads  to  an  imperfec- 
tion in  Kant's  way  of  looking  at  the  categories  them- 
selves. A  category  is  a  unirersal  or  form  of  thought, 
which  is  potentially  a  synthesis  of  the  manifold  of 
sense.  It  is,  in  fact,  as  treated  by  Kant,  virtually  a 
function  of  synthesis.  But  as  the  forms  of  the  mind 
stand  in  stiff  and  abrupt  contrast  to  the  manifold,  the 
categories  are  held  to  belong  to  the  constitution  of  the 
intellect,  while  the  particulars  of  sense  are  supplied  to 
the  mind  in  an  external  way.  Accordingly,  as  before 
the  forms  of  perception  were  held  to  belong  only  to  us 
as  men,  so  now  the  forma  of  thought  are  regarded  as 
preventing  us  from  getting  beyond  the  limits  of  ex- 
perience. It  is  true  that  the  categories  might  apply 
to  a  manifold  different  from  that  actually  given  to  us ; 
but  this  possibility  of  extending  our  knowledge  beyond 
experience  is  of  no  avail,  since  no  other  than  a  sensuous 
manifold  can  be  apprehended  by  us. 


[chap. 

ts  are 
)  that 
^  into 
as  be 
dge  to 
reality, 
nation, 
(ncretes 
ity,  but 
at  first 
ktegorie>* 
ither,  an 
ale;  and 
concrete 

ictions  of 
imperfec- 

ies  them- 
thougbt, 
mifold  of 
rirtually  a 
the  mind 
lifold,  tbe 
ion  of  tbc 
ipplied  to 
as  before 
only  to  us 
sgarded  as 
its  of  ex- 
Lgbt  apply 
Lven  to  us ; 
[ge  beyond 
a  sensuous 


XII.] 


SENSE  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


I  shall  not  here  repeat  v^hat  has  been  said  above  iii 
regard  to  the  absurdity  of  supposing  the  particular 
element  to  be  given  in  any  other  sense  than  that  in 
which  we  may  say,  with  equal  propriety,  that  the  uni- 
versal element  or  category  is  given  ;  it  will  be  enough 
to  point  out  that,  when  we  have  got  rid  of  this  contrast 
of  activity  and  receptivity,  the  abstract  isolation  of  the 
categories  from  the  other  elements  of  knowledge  is 
completely  done  away  with.     The  category  in  itself  is 
spoken  of  by  Kant  as  if  it  had  a  sort  of  independent 
existence  of  its  own.     It  is  a  potential  form  of  thought 
belonging  to  the  framework  of  the  mind,  and  capable  of 
coming  into  actual  use  only  in  relation  to  the  manifold 
of  sense  as  determined  in  time  by  the  pure  imagination. 
But,  just  as  the  manifold  of  sense  is  simply  the  par- 
ticular element  in  every  real  act  or  product  of  know- 
ledge, taken  in  abstraction  from  its  relation  to  the 
universal  element,  and  as  the  schema  is  simply  the  ab- 
straction of  the  relation  of  those  elements  to  each  other, 
so  the  category  is  but  the  universal  element,  with  its 
relation  to  the  particular  eliminated.  In  other  words,  the 
apparent  independence  of  the  category  is  due  entirely 
to  the  reflection  of  the  individual  thinker.     We  dis- 
tinguish the  universal  from  the  particular,  but  every 
real  act  of  knowledge  is  the  mutual  reflection  of  the 
one  on  the  other.     There  is  therefore  no  propriety  in 
saying  that  the  categories  might  be  extended  beyond 
experience,   provided  that  a  manifold  different  from 
that  given  to  us  were  supplied  to  them.     One  element 
of  knowledge  can  by  no  possibility  exist  except  in  its 
relation  to  the  other ;  if  the  particular  is  nothing  apart 
from  the  universal,  neither  is  the  universal  anything 
apart  from  the  particular.     Kant  virtually  admits  that 
his  distinction  of  the  categories  from  the  schemata  is 


400 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.        [chai*. 


merely  a  temporary  stage  of  thought  when  he  speaks  of 
imagination  as  "  the  effect  of  the  understanding  on  the 
sensibility  " ;  for  here  what  he  elsewhere  regards  as  a 
product  of  pure  imagination  is  affirmed  to  be  a  product 
of  the  relation  between  the  categories  and  the  manifold 
of  sense.  Of  course  the  schemata  imply  the  specific 
manifold  of  space  and  time,  and  therefore  partly  belong 
to  the  metaphysic  of  nature,  as  distinguished  from  the 
metaphysic  of  knowledge  in  general ;  but  in  an  investi. 
Ration  into  the  conditions  of  knowledge  this  specific 
element  does  not  properly  come  under  consideration. 
The  categories  are  therefore  simply  the  universal  aspect 
of  knowledge,  as  logically  distinguished  from  the  par- 
ticular aspect,  and  abstracted  from  the  relations  which 
give  them  meaning  and  significance. 

(5.)  So  much  has  just  been  said  in  regard  to  concep- 
tion, that  a  very  few  words  in  regard  to  judgment  as 
treated  by  Kant  will  be  sufficient.  As  the  categories 
are  potentialities  of  synthesis,  so  judgment  is  the  act 
of  synthesis  itself.  The  manifold  of  sense  has  to  be 
reflected  on  the  universal  forms  of  thought  and  percep- 
tion before  there  can  be  any  real  knowledge,  and  this 
process  of  reflection  is  judgment.  We  must,  therefore, 
free  our  minds  from  the  misleading  associations  which 
arise  from  the  attempted  assimilation  of  the  analytical 
and  the  synthetical  judgment.  "  To  think,"  Kant  tells 
us,  "  is  to  judge,"  and  judging  consists  "  in  referring 
conceptions  to  objects  through  perceptions."  Now,  in 
strict  propriety,  this  formula  is  only  applicable  to  the 
analytical  judgment  of  formal  logic,  which  rests  upon 
the  supposition  that  objects,  with  the  full  complement 
of  their  attributes,  first  exist  full-formed  in  conscious- 
ness, and  are  afterwards  referred  to  an  abstract  uni- 
versal.    Accordingly,  if  we  follow  the  letter  of  Kant's 


[CHAI*. 

ipeaks  of 
tg  on  the 
ards  as  a 
3t  product 
manifold 
le  specific 
ily  belong 
,  from  the 
m  investi- 
lis  specific 
sideration. 
Tsal  aspect 
11  the  par- 
ions  which 

[  to  concep- 
udgment  as 
}  categories 
t  is  the  act 
5  has  to  be 
and  percep- 
ge,  and  this 
;t,  therefore, 
itions  which 
le  analytical 
,"  Kant  tells 
in  referring 
Now,  in 
cable  to  the 
h  rests  upon 
complement 
in  conscious- 
abstract  uni- 
ter  of  Kant's 


XII.] 


SIiWSE  AND  UNDERSTANDING. 


401 


account  of  judgment,  wu  are  naturally  led  to  suppose 
that  objects  as  such  being  given  in  perception,  the 
understanding  proceeds  to  apply  to  them  its  categories. 
It  is  under  this  misapprehension  that  Mr.  Lewes*  and 
others  charge  Kant  with  holding  that  sense  and 
thought  contribute  different  Unds  of  knowledge. 
His  real  thought  is,  that  by  the  application  of  the 
categories  to  the  element  of  knowledge  given  in  sense, 
objects  are  first  constituted  as  objects.  At  the  same 
time  the  admission  of  a  purely  formal  judgment  at  all 
is  inconsistent  with  the  Critical  account  of  knowledge, 
and  Kant  is  himself  partly  to  blame  for  the  misappre- 
hension of  what  his  real  doctrine  is.  Rejecting  the 
analytical  judgment  altogether,  we  must  regard  all 
judgments  as  synthetical,  i.e.,  as  constitutive  of  objects 
as  such,  and  of  their  connexions.  And  this  constitu- 
tion of  reality  is  simply  another  name  for  the  synthesis 
of  pure  imagination,  which,  when  freed  from  its 
psychological  taint,  is  seen  to  be  simply  the  process 
of  relating  a  universal  or  category  to  a  particular  or 
manifold. 

6.  The  last  element  in  real  knowledge  distinguished 
by  Kant  is  the  self,  as  the  supreme  condition  of  all 
unity  in  knowledge.  In  his  usual  fashion,  Kant  speaks 
of  the  self  as  if  it  had  a  sort  of  independent  reality  of 
its  own,  apart  from  all  relation  to  the  other  elements 
of  knowledge.  1  =  1  is,  he  says,  a  purely  analytical 
proposition.  Now,  such  a  proposition  is  not  only 
tautological  but  meaningless.  Only  by  bringing  the 
"  I "  into  relation  with  knowable  objects  can  we  put 
any  meaning  into  it  at  all.  If  we  attempt  to  compre- 
hend the  "I"  p-tively  in  itself,  we  find  that  it  is  a 
mere  abstraction.     And  if  the  "  I,"  taken  in  its  utmost 

'  Problems  of  Life  ami  Mini,  vol.  i.,  p.  442. 
2c 


4.1 


i  t 


402 


KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS. 


purity  is,  as  Kant  himself  asserts,  but  a  logical  ele- 
ment in  real  knowledge,  there  is  no  propriety  in  saying 
that  the  self  may  be  independent  of  the  limitations 
which  apply  to  phenomena.  No  doubt  intelligence,  as 
the  source  of  all  knowledge,  is  in  a  sense  independent 
of  the  objects  which  it  constitutes,  but  it  is  not  for  that 
reason  constituted  of  itself  apart  from  its  relations  to 
objects.  Moreover,  while  each  individual  as  possessed 
of  intelligence  is  capable  of  recognizing  the  real  world, 
which  itself  exists  only  in  its  relations  to  universal  intel- 
ligence, we  are  not  entitled  to  say  that  the  individual 
man,  with  his  complex  rational  and  animal  nature, 
is  free  from  the  conditions  without  which  he  could  not 
exist  at  all.  I,  as  a  particular  person,  with  my  own 
specific  character  and  idiosyncrasy,  am  a  real  being, 
and  in  virtue  of  my  rationality  am  recognized  by 
myself  to  be  real ;  but  this  does  not  cut  me  oflf  from 
the  special  conditions  of  knowledge  or  action  without 
which  I  could  not  be,  or  be  known  to  be,  human. 
The  development  of  this  point,  however,  belongs  to 
psychology.  Here  it  is  enough  to  remark  that  the 
"  I "  cannot  be  separated  from  its  relations  without 
becoming  a  barren  abstraction.  Intelligence  exists 
only  in  and  through  its  specific  modes,  and  it  is  useless 
to  attempt  sublimating  it  by  isolating  it  from  those 
modes:  instead  of  elevating  we  merely  degrade  it. 
The  categories  and  the  particulars  of  knowledge  are 
therefore  simply  the  various  real  relations  in  which 
intelligence  manifests  its  activity,  and  builds  up  for 
each  of  us  the  fair  fabric  of  nature. 


THE   END. 


In  One  Volume,  8vo,  Price  188., 

A  CRITICAL  ACCOUNT  OF 
THE     PHILOSOPHY    OF     KANT; 

WITH  AN  HISTORICAL  INTRODUCTION. 

By  EDWARD  CAIRD,  M.A.,  LL.D., 

Pro/emior  of  Moral  Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Glasgow,  atid  late 
Fellow  and  Tutor  of  Merton  College,  Chford, 


"  This  book  contains  the  most  exhaustive  and  most  valuable  exposition  of  Kant's 
metaphysioal  system  which  has  appeared  in  this  country.  The  critical  analysis  is 
incisive  and  searching,  and  the  exposition  plain  and  unambiguous.  The  running 
commentary  is  the  work  of  a  man  who  both  knows  what  he  has  to  say,  and  knows 
how  to  say  it  forcibly  and  well.  The  Bt;^ le  is  attractive  as  well  as  clear.  Without 
being  ornate  or  rhetorical,  it  has  about  it  a  kind  of  quiet  eloquence  which  comes  of 
conscious  strength  and  of  genuine  conviction. 

"  Whatever  be  the  opinions  with  which  a  reader  may  return  from  the  study  of 
this  book,  he  cannot  fail  to  derive  intellectual  benefit  from  so  luminous  an  exposition 
of,  and  so  valuable  a  commentary  upon  the  most  powerful  work  of  the  greatest 
philosopher  of  his  age." — TAe  Times, 

"Mr.  Gaird's  statement  of  the  Kantian  doctrine  is  singularly  felicitous.  The 
simplification  is  at  once  full,  accurate,  and  unbiased."— Mk.  T.  H.  Green,  in  I'he 
Academy. 

"  No  account  of  Kant's  Philosophy  lias  ever  appeared  in  England  so  full,  so  intel- 
ligible, and  so  interesting  to  read,  as  this  work  by  Professor  Gaird.  It  is  the  English 
Book  on  K&at."— Contemporary  Eevieto. 


In  One  Volume,  Bvo,  Price  10s.  6d., 
AN  INTRODUCTION  TO 

THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

By  JOHN   CAIRD,  D.D., 

Principal  and  Vice-Chancellor  of  tlie  University  of  Glasgow,  and  one  of 
Her  Majesty's  Chaplains  for  Scotland. 


and! 

and  .  .  _       .  .   .  . 

religion.  In  l^ddition  to  the  literary  skill  which  places  his  propositions  in  their 
brightest  light,  and  an  earnestness  of  purpose  which  at  times  rises  into  genuine  elo- 
quence, he  possesses  two  qualifications  which  specially  fit  him  for  his  work — a  spirit 
of  reverence,  which  places  him  in  sympathy  with  mystical  and  intuitional  minds; 
and  an  intellectual  vigour,  which  enables  him  to  stand  side  by  side  with  the  ablest 
thinkers,  to  view  the  utmost  border  of  their  extended  range  of  vision,  and,  while 
he  treats  them  with  chivalrous  fairness,  to  grapple  with  their  arguments." — Edin- 
burgh Review,  January,  1881. 

"It  is  the  business  of  the  reviewer  to  give  some  notion  of  the  book  which  he 
reviews,  either  by  a  condensation  of  its  contents,  or  by  collecting  the  cream  in  the 
shape  of  short  selected  passages ;  but  this  cannot  be  done  with  a  book  like  the  one 
before  us,  of  which  the  argument  does  not  admit  of  condensation,  and  which  is  all 

cream The  most  valuable  book  of  its  kind  that  has  appeared."— Mr.  T.  H. 

Green,  in  The  Academy. 

"  It  is  remarkable,  also,  for  its  marvellous  power  of  exposition  and  gracious  sub* 
tiety  of  thought.  Hegelianism  has  never  appeared  so  attractive  as  it  appears  in  the 
clear  and  fluent  pages  of  Principal  Cuird." — Spectator. 

'*  This  is  in  many  respects  a  remarkable  book,  and  perhaps  the  most  important 
contribution  to  the  subject  with  which  it  deals  that  has  been  made  in  recent  years." 
— Mind, 

JAMES  MACLEHOSE,  Publisher  to  the  University  of  Glasgow. 


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